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Abstract 
This thesis analyses the state's capacity to pursue health reform. It argues that 
the feasibility of health reforms, as well as their final content, are in great part 
determined by their political context, and the political strategies reformers resort 
to when pursuing their policy agenda. The analysis is framed in the political 
context in which a reform initiative evolves, the political dynamics of and around 
the health reform process, and the characteristics and strategies of the teams in 
charge of leading policy change (change teams). The research aims to contribute 
to existing knowledge in the health policy field by furthering the analysis and 
explanation of the political feasibility of health reforms. 
A two case study comparative analysis is used based on primary and secondary 
sources and in-country interviewing. Colombia and Mexico, challenged by the 
need to attain universal coverage, and faced with large inefficiencies, set about to 
transform their health systems in the 1990's. While Colombia was successful in 
passing legislation and initiating implementation, Mexico made a series of similar 
attempts, but its reform was brought to a near halt. The analysis of these 
contrasting outcomes given the similar choice of political strategies in comparable 
political contexts, allows for a greater understanding of the factors at play. 
Key findings demonstrate the relevance of the political context in determining the 
potential of interested actors within and outside the state, to influence health 
reforms. The study also reveals the remarkable resemblance between the political 
strategies used by health reform teams, and those used by economic adjustment 
teams in the 1980's. While these strategies enabled the latter to introduce major 
policy change, they helped health reform teams only partially. As a result, health 
reformers were successful in enabling the creation of new private health financing 
and provider organisations, but the transformation of the old public health service 
institutions remains a challenge. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
During the last two decades, most of the countries in the Latin American region 
have embarked on a period of state reform that has included the social, political 
and economic spheres. The role of the state, as well as that of markets has been 
reassessed and, as a result, there have been significant changes in almost every 
aspect of public policy. While the first areas that called the attention of policy-
makers were located within the economic sphere - monetary policy, fiscal policy, 
trade liberalisation, and the deregulation of domestic markets, among others - the 
social sector was to follow with particular emphasis on the education and health 
sectors'. 
In the health sector, most countries faced the need to transform their large and 
highly inefficient health systems which had been operating along the same policy 
lines for fifty years since the early post-war period. Even though this scenario was 
not born of an imminent crisis, the inefficient service delivery, spiralling costs, 
and increased demand for health services - due to society's epidemiological and 
demographic transitions - were generating deficits in the State's public finances, 
making these policy changes urgent. While in most countries there had been 
important advances in the health status of the popUlation, persistent coverage 
gaps, inefficiencies in service organisation and provision, deteriorating quality, 
and severe financial constraints called for the need to reform the health systems. 
In the face of these policy challenges, there was increasing consensus about the 
need for structural change in the health sector. However, there was no similar 
understanding on the content of a health reform agenda. The definition of the 
problems to be solved, the means to solve them, as well as the speed and scope of 
policy change were all contentious issues, as they each affected the interests of 
different groups and individuals. 
Health reform formulation and implementation means changing "how resources 
are allocated within the health sector, how the financial burden is shared across 
population groups and ultimately, who gets what kind of services" (La Forgia, 
19 
1994:2). It is therefore a highly political process, mobilising many groups within 
the state and in society, whose interests may be affected by the envisioned policy 
changes. As a result, the political dimension of health policy formulation and 
implementation has come to the foreground in recent times as it has proven to be a 
key factor in determining the feasibility of health policy change as well as its 
impact on the health status of the population. 
Reform implies both institutional change and adjustments in the distribution of 
health resources and services, and these reflect new dynamics in state-society 
relations. Interest groups in society compete for health resources and services with 
different views and expectations about the role of the state, as well as their 
entitlements in access to public services and resources. 
However, it would be misleading to consider that the state formulates its policy 
solely by reacting to these social demands. The state plays an active role in 
initiating the reform process and determining its policy content. But the state is 
not a monolithic actor with a single policy preference. Different groups of policy-
makers may have contending views about the goals and means of a health reform, 
and ultimately, about the role the state is to play. 
This complex process draws interest groups from both society and the state into 
the political struggle that permeates health policy redefinition. These groups will 
try to influence the decisions of the group of policy-makers who are in charge of 
formulating and implementing the health reform - the change team2• 
This thesis analyses the converging point where state and society meet in the 
process of health reform by looking into the characteristics and the dynamics of 
these groups of policy-makers in charge of bringing about policy change. It does 
so by looking at the experience of these teams in Mexico and Colombia in 
promoting significant changes in the institutional configuration of their health care 
systems, the role of the state and of the private sector, and the nature of the 
services made available to the popUlation. 
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As it will be described in the following chapters, health reform initiatives in 
Colombia (1990 - 1994) and Mexico (1995 - 1999), were among the 16 countries 
in the region which embarked on a reform of their health systems (Cruz-Saco and 
Mesa-Lago, 1998). These initiatives are representative of the efforts in the region 
to face the challenge of transforming the public provision of health services. Their 
health care systems share similar structural problems that, along with restricted 
public expenditure, have rendered the state - and society as a whole - incapable of 
solving the serious equity, efficiency and quality problems that each country 
faces. In both cases, this process has meant a serious reconsideration of the roles 
the state and society play in ensuring each citizen access to health care. 
Access to health care in these countries is highly stratified along socio-economic 
lines, health care resources are concentrated in large cities, where there is 
duplication of infrastructure and service provision, as well as overlapping 
financial arrangements for users. At the same time, marginal rural areas still have 
little access to basic health care, and users face erratic or non-existent referral to 
other levels of care. The very poor face serious geographic and economic barriers 
to quality care. 
As the case studies will show, Colombia and Mexico had similarities in their 
reform agendas, but their objectives varied, influenced by the context in which 
they were implemented, and the characteristics of the policy-makers who led the 
initiatives. Having said that, both faced similar obstacles, and resorted to very 
similar political strategies to try to overcome them. This thesis analyses the 
strategies that were formulated in response to the political opportunities and 
limitations present in each country for the political feasibility of pursuing health 
reform. 
The research concentrates in the first instance on the creation and use of change 
teams as a strategy to pursue health reforms in the light of the political challenges 
presented by the context in which the policy changes were to take place. For this 
purpose, and in order to enhance the strength of its comparative analysis, an 
aspect of the reforms that was similar in both cases was selected and its process 
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analysed through the same variables. This particular aspect had to do with opening 
the possibility for the private sector to participate in the provision of health care 
and the management of health care funds previously under the exclusive 
responsibility of government agencies - MOH and/or social security institutes. 
The thesis contends that while the importance of the challenging complexities 
behind a policy change of this nature are not to be underestimated, the main factor 
detennining the degree of accomplishment of these refonns is political in nature, 
and thus has to do with the interplay of the different actors involved, their 
strategies and potential to influence the process, and the strategies used by 
refonners to pursue their refonn agenda. 
The objectives of this thesis are twofold in that it aims to contribute to the 
scholarly debate on the politics of health reform (analytical objectives), and, at the 
same time, it intends to support ongoing health policy decision-making (policy 
relevant objectives). Thus the objectives of this thesis can be summarised as 
follows: 
General analytical objectives: 
• To understand the political factors intervening in the state's capacity to 
promote health reform. 
• To analyse the characteristics and strategic decision-making of state 
actors involved in health reform. 
Policy relevant objectives: 
• To elaborate an analytical framework that may help to expedite the 
analysis and understanding of the political context of a country pursuing 
health refonn. 
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• To use this framework to help identify the moments and places in the 
heath reform process where its political feasibility is at stake. 
• To use this framework to help identify and assess the strategy options 
reformers face in view of the political context in which they are pursuing 
health reform. 
In analysing the political dimension of health reforms this thesis alms to 
contribute to ongoing health reform efforts whose leaders, in spite of the 
differences in their policy agendas, are facing similar political challenges and 
having to make similar decisions. 
The thesis is divided in four parts. Part 1 presents a critical literature review of the 
current knowledge and research in the field, the analytical framework that is used, 
and the research methods. Part 2 presents the Colombia case study. Part 3 presents 
the Mexico case study and Part 4 presents the discussion and conclusions resulting 
from the comparative analysis of the two case studies. 
1.1 Review of Current Knowledge and Research 
1.1.1 Health Reforms 
An increasing number of countries have incorporated health sector reforms in 
their policy agendas as they attempt to improve the health status of their 
populations while at the same time maintaining or curtailing their public 
expenditure (OEeD, 1995,1992; World Bank, 1993; Frenk et al., 1994; Berman et 
al., 1995; Walt and Gilson, 1995). In some instances, these reforms have had an 
important component of income redistribution, as they have tried to redress 
imbalances in access to health services and in the distribution of health resources. 
In others, it has been the concern with the financial sustainability of health 
systems that has prevailed in the health reform agenda (World Bank, 1993; Frenk 
et al., 1994; Ugalde, 1995; Zwi and Mills, 1995). 
23 
However, there is no consensus on a definition for health refonn and what it 
entails, and its has been argued that there is a wide variety of policy mixes that are 
being denoted as health reforms referring "in a very loose way to a package of 
policy measures affecting the organisation, funding and management of health 
systems"(Zwi and Mills, 1995 :314). But although they have varied in content and 
scope, health refonns share common general features in that most involve changes 
in the institutional configuration of the health care system, in the role of the public 
and the private sector, and ultimately, in the nature and amount of services 
accessible to different groups of the popUlation (La Forgia, 1994; Bennan et aI., 
1995). 
The DECO notices a shift in the objectives sought through policy change and 
refonn in industrial countries. While previously there was an emphasis on 
expanding coverage and the range of services with a rather stable amount of 
resources, now, with the underlying concern about cost containment, the thrust of 
refonns is how to provide the necessary access at reduced costs (DECO, 1996). 
Following this trend, health sector refonn proposals have tended to emphasise the 
need to "control costs, make systems more responsive to patient interests, to 
assure quality of care, and to provide incentives to raise productivity and 
effectiveness of treatment" (La Forgia, 1993:7) and seek market mechanisms as a 
means to attain these objectives (World Bank, 1993). 
According to Zwi and Mills (1995) all these factors stem from a change in policy 
paradigms that emphasises the epidemiologist and economic perspective and a 
stronger appreciation of market forces. They point to the fact that this new trend 
emerges as a reaction to the failures of the previous state model, and is not based 
on policies with proven effectiveness. Indeed, there is an ongoing debate as to 
whether market mechanisms can attain the goals of improving quality, efficiency 
and equity (Gilson and Mills, 1993; Collins et aI., 1993) and whether middle and 
low-income countries have the state capacity to resort to such mechanisms with 
any possibility of success (La Forgia, 1993). Hisao also remains very critical of 
the "effectiveness of using free market principles to structure the health sector" 
(Hsiao, 1995: 161) and warns about the fact that many countries have defined and 
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undertaken health refonns "often not infonned by facts, but driven by ideology" 
(Hsiao, 1995:162). 
As part of, or reflecting upon structural adjustment programs, health sector 
refonns in less developed countries are seeking to diminish public intervention, 
redistribute the financial responsibilities for health care and introduce market 
mechanisms (Walt and Gilson, 1995). Ugalde and Jackson (1995) have also noted 
that due to international influence on country-level policy definition, there is a 
striking resemblance among health refonn packages across very dissimilar 
contexts. These include the separation of financing and provision of health 
services, the introduction of cost-effectiveness analysis to establish policy 
priorities and resource allocation, the introduction of user fees and expansion of 
compulsory insurance, and the increase in the private sector's role in areas that 
were previously considered the exclusive jurisdiction of the state (Zwi and Mills, 
1995). 
Refonners have based the reconfiguration of their health care systems on two 
major changes. One has been the creation of provider organisations - mainly in 
the private sector - that are to assume roles and responsibilities, such as the 
provision and articulation of health care services under a new scheme of 
collaboration between the private and the public sector. The other is the 
transfonnation of the old providers, or existing public institutions such as security 
and health services, so that they may operate under the new rules of the game 
(Frenk et aI., 1994; Londono, 1996; Frenk and Londono, 1998). 
In the two cases that are analysed in this thesis, reformers considered the creation 
of new providers, and the transfonnation of old ones as concomitant conditions 
for consolidating their health care sector refonns. Policy choice on this matter 
varied in respect to the priority given to either of these two challenges, as well as 
in the choice of timing for their implementation. These choices were made 
according to the vision and the assumptions made by refonners, as well as by the 
political obstacles and opportunities they found during the refonn process. But in 
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both cases, the successful implementation of these two challenges was a key 
element in the long and multi-linear process towards health reform. 
1.1.2 Politics and Health Reforms 
The political aspect of health policy change has been acknowledged in the health 
policy literature describing and analysing health sector reforms but not often fully 
explored (Foltz, 1996; OECD, 1995; La Forgia, 1993; World Bank, 1993)3. For 
instance, comparing the experiences of member countries, the OECD (1995) notes 
that as a result of the different political processes in which health reform 
initiatives are involved, "reform packages have taken different shapes even for 
countries having similar problems" (OECD, 1995:37). 
Indeed, in spite of the fact that the policy contents of health reform initiatives have 
been converging onto a same paradigm (Chernichovsky, 1995) - as described in 
last section - and have striking similarities in the objectives they seek and the 
means used to obtain them, their impact has varied widely4. In some cases reforms 
have encountered effective resistance, as is the case of the United States' 1994 
reform efforts (Skocpol, 1995; Steinmo, 1995). In others, such as Chile's reform 
(Jimenez de la Jara et aI., 1995), the experience has been perceived as so effective 
in bringing about change, that it has encouraged other countries in the region to 
follow along the same lines (World Bank, 1993). 
However, until very recently, with the exception of the literature that was 
generated following the failure of the health reform initiative in the United States5, 
the study of the political factors affecting health reforms had remained very 
limited (Collins, 1989; Freddi, 1989; Bjorkman, 1989; Ferrara, 1989; 
Hollingsworth, 1989; Bossert et al. 1984; Eckstein, 1960). 
There is however, an emerging yet still small body of literature addressing the 
political aspect of health policy as its main focus (Diderichsen, 1995; Skocpol, 
1995, 1992; Wilsford, 1995, 1991; Steinmo and Watts 1995; Schut, 1995; Dholer, 
1995; Walt, 1994; Immergut, 1992)6. Only a few of these recent studies 
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concentrate on the political aspect of health reform efforts in the developing world 
(Cassels, 1995; Chemichovsky, 1995; Walt and Gilson, 1995; Reich, 1994, 1995; 
Jimenez de la Jara et aI., 1995; Gonzalez-Rossetti et aI., 1994). 
Walt and Gilson (1995) see health sector reform definition as a result of the 
political economy surrounding policy-making. They argue that during the decades 
of state-led development, health reforms were largely limited to organisational 
questions dominated by the medical profession and were largely uncontroversial, 
while health reform in the 80's and 90's have challenged previously accepted 
values, that are greatly influenced by the neo-liberal paradigm, and thus became 
highly conflictive (Walt and Gilson, 1995). It may then be inferred that conflict 
and confrontation not only have increased, but have surpassed the health policy 
arena and have trespassed into other political arenas - such as Congress and other 
areas within the Executive - as the current debate on health reform is reflecting 
the tensions stemming from the revision of the role of the state and the 
transformation of state-society relations. 
Thus far, the majority of the emerging literature on the politics of health policy 
has taken a pluralist approach7 by concentrating on the analysis of societal groups 
- called stake-holders or interest groups - who, perceiving that their interests 
may be affected, try to influence the policy process in which health reforms are 
formulated and implemented (Didreechsen, 1995; Blendon and Mollya, 1995; 
Reich, 1995, 1994; Makison, 1992; Blumenthal, 1992;). 
Only a few studies use the new institutionalist approach8 and concentrate on the 
analysis of the political institutions that structure the health refonn process, and 
their effect on the capacity of these interest groups to effectively influence it 
(Dohler, 1995; Skocpol, 1995, 1992; Schut, 1995; Steinmo and Watts, 1995; 
Morone, 1994; Smith, 1993; Immergut, 1992). For instance, Immergut (1992) 
contends that it is a political factor - the different institutional arrangements - that 
explains the striking differences in the final outcomes of similar health refonn 
initiatives promoted in Switzerland, France and Sweden. The following section 
will discuss briefly the political economy models that have informed these studies. 
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1.1.3 The State and the Health Sector 
This thesis uses Skocpol's definition of the state as an entity that possesses an 
administration, laws that guide actions, and organisations and institutions that 
coerce society, structures the relations between society and the public authority, 
and structures the relations within society (Skocpol, 1985). In both developed and 
developing countries the state has been involved in the regulation and financing of 
health care services. Furthermore, in most countries, governments have been 
directly involved in the provision of preventive and curative care, as well as in the 
promotion of health. The range and scope of the tasks and responsibilities of 
health authorities vary widely from country to country and over time, reflecting 
different views on the role the state should play in the promotion of health care. 
Although the boundary between public and private provision of health services 
has been located differently in different countries, subject both to political swings 
and financial expediency over time (Mills, 1990), all countries continue to have 
significant state involvement in the health sector. 
Regardless of the distribution of tasks between the private and the public sector -
the public/private mix (Mills, 2001) - the state will continue to play an important 
role in health policy formulation, and this entails negotiating with groups within 
and outside the state in search of a consensus on the exact nature of health care 
provision and how to finance it. 
From this perspective, health reforms follow the process by which governments9 
formulate and implement public policy, one that takes place as a continuous 
exchange between the state and different societal actors (Evans, 1992). In order to 
remain in office, policy-makers1o need the political backing of key societal groups 
- a significant proportion of the electorate, organised groups such as labour 
unions, business communities, etc. - and are thus willing to provide services, 
distribute resources, subsidies, jobs and issue regulations favouring specific 
interest groups in order to maintain their support. 
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However, this exchange of public goods and services for political support among 
public officials and groups and individuals in society takes various forms 
depending on the political system in which it operates. While in some political 
systems policy formulation seems to be entirely reactive to interest group 
pressure, in others society finds itself reacting to the policy initiatives formulated 
and implemented by policy-makers who are following their own agenda. 
The role of the bureaucracy is a case in point. While in Anglo-Saxon countries it 
is viewed as a subordinate body to political institutions, in continental Europe and 
in Latin America, it is a political arena where groups within the state and in 
society interact, therefore often serving as a converging point for both 11. 
It is within this political context that health policy reform takes place, thus 
reflecting state-society relations, and other policy issues on the public agenda. A 
brief discussion follows on different approaches to the state's role and state-
society relations on the process of policy reform. 
1.1.4 Interest Groups and the Health Reform Process 
The interest group approach - and within it stake-holder analysis - has best 
captured the dynamics of the bargaining process among different interest groups 
trying to influence the policy process, and between these groups and policy-
makers (Kingdon, 1995; Zajac, 1995; Lindblom et aI., 1993; Lindblom, 1988; 
Olson, 1982, 1965; Wilson, 1980; Peltzman, 1976; Lowi, 1972; Dahl, 1961; 
Downs, 1972). This pluralist school sees the state as a neutral actor that mediates 
and reflects the political bargaining among interest groups which are trying to 
influence the policy arena in order to secure and enhance their own interest 
(Olson, 1982). 
A reform initiative is likely to affect the interests of many of these groups and, 
according to the pluralist approach, policy-makers will craft policy changes 
according the level of support they may obtain in exchange for it. These political 
calculations would lead to very little policy change, as entrenched interests would 
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press for the continuation of the status quo. Also, there would be very little chance 
of undergoing policy reform aiming at a more equitable distribution of public 
resources, as these powerful interest groups would effectively oppose it. A 
pluralist approach would thus always expect incremental changes negotiated 
between the state and the strongest coalition in society. 
The interest group approach and stake-holder analysis assist in understanding the 
dynamics of interest group competition or distributional politics, but they offer 
few answers in the cases where policy-makers, actively pursuing their own 
agenda, have decided to introduce a reform in spite of visible opposition 
stemming from powerful societal groups. In Morone's words 'pluralist analysis -
calculating the probabilities of action by counting up the interest groups -
obscures the influence of the administrative apparatus itself' (Morone, 1994: 161). 
Health policy analysis often considers the political factor of health reform along 
the lines of interest group politics in what Morone (1994 ) describes as 'old 
pluralistic calculations: "groups for" versus "groups against"'(Morone, 1994:223). 
For instance, Didrechsen (1995) states that health reforms must strike a balance 
'between equity and efficiency, between equity and broad political loyalty, and 
between broad political support and cost control' (Didrechsen, 1995: 197). And 
looking into coalition management and coalition support, La Forgia notes that 
"although many (social security) and (ministries of health) systems face 
decreasing popular support, reform may involve expanding considerable political 
capital to overcome oppositions by well-organised health worker unions and 
professional associations" (La Forgia, 1993:7). Also following a pluralist view, 
the World Bank Report on Health (1993) suggests a series of policy interventions 
that may gradually reallocate resources - for instance, from tertiary to primary 
health care - in order to maintain the support of middle-income and urban groups 
affected by health reform. 
Reich (1994) has 'mapped' the interest groups in the health arena that may 
mobilise to support or halt a health reform initiative in order to assess the latter's 
political feasibility. He takes a pluralist stand suggesting the empowerment of 
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relatively powerless groups through coalition-making and interest mobilisation as 
a means to ensure a more redistributive outcome of the health reform processes. 
Walt and Gilson (1995) also concentrate on the characteristics and political 
struggle of stake-holders, but go beyond by formally incorporating the political 
context within which the health reform process takes place in their model. 
The pluralist approach has often been used to explain the political aspect of the 
demise of the US health reform. Interest groups, public opinion, and notably the 
media are placed at the centre of analysis in Makison (1992), Blumenthal (1992), 
Blendon and Mollya (1995). 
Jacobs (1994) recognises that the role of public opinion varied according to the 
particular issue - of the health reform plan - that was at stake, but concludes that 
'it can affect agenda setting, interest group leverage over government officials, 
and policy-makers' formulation of detailed administrative arrangements' (Jacobs, 
1994:375). In fact, after interviewing policy-makers in Congress and in the 
Executive branch about the health reform in the US, Hansen and Blendon (1996) 
concluded that public opinion - and not the institutional setting within which they 
operated - seemed to them the key factor determining the feasibility of the health 
reform plan. 
In discussing the impact of conservative governments on the welfare state, 
Marmor and Smeeding (1994) and Pierson (1996), also place significant emphasis 
on the role of interest groups. However, they give as much weight to the 
institutional factor in assessing the capability of the British and American 
governments to diminish the state's role in social policy. A closer look at the 
limitations and opportunities offered by the institutional context within which 
these policy-makers pursue their reform agenda presents a more complete picture 
of the political factors affecting policy change. 
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1.1.5 The Institutional Context and the Health Reform Process 
In order to understand the opportunities and limitations faced by health policy 
reformers, some studies have shifted their focus of attention away from interest 
groups in society and have concentrated on the role of political institutions in the 
interplay among stake-holders, as well as in their mediation between the state and 
society that takes place during the policy process in what has been labelled the 
new institutionalism approach. 
New institutionalism provides an alternative approach, or counterbalance to 
pluralism by addressing the institutional influence on policy-making. It brings the 
state back into the political analysis of policy-making (Evans et aI., 1985), but 
instead of analysing formal institutions as the old statist scholars did 12, it focuses 
on "how a given institutional configuration shapes political interactions" (Thelen 
et aI., 1992:6). Thus the focus is not on institutions per se, but on institutional 
features, or "intermediate-level institutional factors (such as) corporatist 
arrangements, policy networks linking economic groups to the state bureaucracy, 
party structures, and the role they play in defining the constellation of incentives 
and constraints faced by political actors in different national contexts" (Thelen et 
aI., 1992:6). 
Also, along with the literature on bureaucratic politics and rational choice models, 
new institutionalism sees policy-makers as yet another interest group with 
particular preferences!3 - that go beyond income maximisation and endurance in 
power!4 - and have a position about the direction public policy should take 
(Geddes, 1994; Steinmo, 1992; Hall, 1986; Skocpol, 1985; Mann, 1984; 
Nordlinger, 1981). 
According to the new institutionalism, institutions delineate the political arena in 
which societal groups compete to influence policy, while decision-makers try to 
pursue their policy agendas. The institutional configuration of a country acts as a 
filter which allows certain groups and ideas to have access to the policy process, 
leaving others behind. Institutions determine on the one hand the societal actors' 
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capacity to influence policy, and on the other, the policy-makers' capacity to act 
autonomously (Evans, 1995, 1992; Haggard and Kaufman, 1995, 1994,1992; 
Steinmo et al., 1992; Hall, 1986; Evans et al., 1985; Katzenstein, 1978). 
Thus, a country with strong democratic institutions may permeate the policy 
process with the demands and interests of a wider range of interest groups that 
may thus have a voice via congressional representation, lobbying, mobilisation 
and others, while a country with authoritarian institutions may be able to gain 
autonomy by insulating its policy-makers from interest group pressure. It would 
be assumed that by ensuring more room for manoeuvre to its policy-makers, these 
governments enhance their capacity to pursue policy change. 
However, relating the institutional framework to the outcome of policy reform is 
not as self-evident as it may appear. Studying different types of political regime in 
Latin America, Remmer (1990) showed that there did not seem to be any 
empirical relation between these and the state's capacity to promote policy 
change. Also, the content of policy reform cannot be automatically associated 
with a specific institutional configuration. 
The distributional outcome of health reform is a case in point. Pluralist studies 
tend to show that in a democratic regime there is a high possibility of powerful 
interest groups capturing the statel5 , and thus perpetuating an inequitable status 
quo. However, there have been instances in which the same democratic 
institutions have given greater access to politically weak groups who have thus 
been able to influence policy in their favour through mobilisation, or have been 
favoured by policy results in spite of their little capacity for organised political 
action (Immergut, 1992). 
In other words, states with non-democratic institutions have promoted policy 
change aimed at redressing equity imbalances as much as they have used their 
power to maintain an inequitable status quo (Remmer, 1990; Haggard, 1990; 
Haggard and Kaufman, 1989). 
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Thus some studies analysing the political element of health policy refonn have 
turned to institutional analysis in trying to understand the political process behind 
health policy change and assessing the political feasibility of such change. These 
studies shift the focus of attention from interest groups in society willing to 
influence the health refonn process, and concentrate on the role of institutions in 
the bargaining process between the state and society. The interaction between the 
societal groups that have a stake in health policy and the decision-makers 
involved will be mediated by a given institutional framework defining state-
society relations. And this will greatly detennine what services are provided to 
whom and how, and who is to carry the costs of the final policy choice. 
Immergut (1992) puts institutions at the core of health refonn analysis by saying 
that 'the political context is an institutional context' (Immergut, 1992:3). 
Institutions, both fonnal and infonnal are the rules of the game by which interest 
groups compete to influence the health refonn process. They will also determine 
the policy choices decision-makers have, as well as their margin for manoeuvre, 
thus establishing the 'political logic for each nation' (Immergut, 1992:4). 
She compares the health refonn processes in France, Sweden and Switzerland and 
concludes that their different institutional contexts explain why the outcome of 
their health refonn process was so different, despite the fact that these countries 
shared common goals and had similar refonn proposals at the start of their health 
refonn process. As Immergut explains 'the initial aims of policy-makers and 
interest groups were quite similar across the cases, but because they pursued these 
goals within different institutional frameworks, they had different chances of 
success, and different political strategies made sense' (Immergut, 1992:79). 
In stating that the chances of success of interest groups - and policy-makers -
depended on the institutional framework within which they participated in the 
health refonn process, Immergut (1992) makes a radical departure from pluralist 
approaches. According to her approach, the power an interest group has - and thus 
its potential to influence the health refonn process - does not depend solely on its 
characteristics - number of members, level of organisation, geographical 
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concentrationl6 - but on the institutional context within which it operates. In other 
words, institutions will strengthen or make redundant the political resources an 
interest group has to pursue its agenda. 
In studying the politics of social policy in the United States, and later on, reacting 
to the failure of the health reform efforts in the 1990's, Skocpol (1992, 1995) has 
also placed institutions at the centre of the analysis. The importance given to 
institutions in the political analysis of health reform has been echoed by other 
scholars, such as Morone (1994), who contends that the recent US health reform 
attempt did not have a careful institutional framework, or Steinmo and Watts 
(1995), who after making a historical review of health reform efforts in the US, 
conclude that' ... reformers who want real reform rather than a continuation of the 
pattern of buying off interests and avoiding making tough choices should focus 
their efforts on reforming American political institutions rather than designing 
ever more sophisticated reform strategies .. .' (Steinmo et aI., 1995 :368). 
In other industrialised countries, Wilsford (1995) looks at Germany, Japan, 
Canada and Great Britain and contends that to succeed in reforming their health 
care systems, policy-makers have tried to increase state autonomy in order to 
counter the interest group mobilisation of providers. They have done so by 
carefully using the opportunities offered by their particular institutional contexts. 
For instance, in tandem with Smith (1993), he sees the latest British health reform 
experience as an example where institutions influence the policy outcome. 'When 
structures are strong and the high civil servants and functionaries who inhabit 
them can engage in a focused, discretionary decision-making, interest groups are 
reduced to a reactive posture regardless of their organisational strength and 
cohesiveness' (Wilsford, 1995: 603). In this analysis, Wilsford (1995) concludes 
that state autonomy in the process of health reform is as much a result of the 
institutional framework, as it is a result of the policy-makers who are leading the 
process, the change team. 
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1.1.6 The Health Reform Process 
It is in this institutional context that health reforms are evoked through a policy 
process. The policy process is the series of events that a reform initiative follows 
from the definition of the problem and its incorporation to the public agenda, to 
the consolidation of the intended policy change 17. The policy process rarely takes 
a sequential and unilinear form, but for analytical purposes, it may be 'anchored' 
in six crucial stages18 : problem definition, reform formulation, reform legislation, 
reform regulation, reform implementation and reform consolidation. 
As the policy process takes its course within the institutional framework of the 
country, the reform will pass through a number of points in which its substance 
may be altered, and even the very chance of it being implemented at all may be 
put at risk. These crucial stages of the policy process occur at different points in 
the institutional framework, such as the Executive, the Congress, and the agencies 
in charge of its implementation. 
On each of these policy nodes (Immergut, 1992), the reform is affected by those 
actors who are able to access these points and influence the policy process during 
that particular stage. The actors that participate in decision-making at each policy 
node, as well as those who manage to influence them, are not the same at each 
stage. But also, the same actors may have a different role at the different stages of 
the policy process. Their agenda and their power will be different on each policy 
node, and their potential to influence the content of the reform as well as its 
feasibility will vary accordingly (lmmergut, 1992; Thelen et aI., 1992; Skocpol, 
1995; Steinmo, 1995;). 
1.1.7 Change Teams and the Health Reform Process 
Ifpolicy definition does not necessarily reflect the aggregation of societal interests 
- or those of particular powerful interest groups - how and why policy-makers 
define policy change remains an open question. This calls for the need to focus the 
analysis on the group of policy-makers in charge of policy reform, since in 
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defining policy change, this group needs to take into consideration the political 
context in which it operates, and also to react to interest group pressure trying to 
influence its reform agenda. In other words, all the political factors affecting 
health reform are brought to relevance in the reformers' decision-making room, 
where the political context on the one hand, and interest group politics on the 
other, converge. 
A group of political economy studies on policy change in the economic sector has 
concentrated on the reformers themselves (Schneider, 1991; Waterbury, 1992; 
Geddes, 1994; Evans, 1995). They see policy-makers as independent actors 
pursuing their own reform agenda, and not simply reacting to interest group 
pressure. This approach has great potential for the analysis of health reform, since 
it may help explain why despite strong resistance to policy change stemming from 
powerful stake-holders, reform does occur. 
To explain how and why a policy is formulated and what impact it has, this 
analysis focuses on the decisions taken by policy-makers within the state, as well 
as their political competition within the limits of the institutions they operate in. 
The reformers' profiles, their policy agenda, their potential for manoeuvring 
within the state, and their relations with other groups in society playa significant 
role in the state's capacity to bring about policy change. In Geddes' words: 'To 
understand why governments sometimes undertake radical and risky reforms, 
scholars need to think about who the people are who make policies, what their 
interests are, and what shapes their interests' (Geddes, 1995: 198). 
Thus, using the rational choice model19, Geddes (1994) presents the state as a 
collection of self-interested individuals, and policy choice as a result of these 
decision-makers' maximising strategy in furthering their careers. In other words, 
policy-makers as rational individuals, will make policy decisions based on the 
incentives they perceive to secure a successful career. 
If the state is made up of a collection of individuals or groups pursuing their own 
policy agendas, it cannot be assumed to be a single actor with one policy agenda. 
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In fact, Evans (1995) argues that "the state 'wants' because some group of 
individuals within the state apparatus has a project. This does not mean that the 
project is merely a reflection of their personal biographies or individual 
maximising strategies. It does mean that their project may well be opposed by 
others elsewhere in the state and that the definition of what the state 'wants' is the 
result of internal political conflict and flux" (Evans, 1995: 19). 
Stemming from the bureaucratic politics schoot2° Schneider (1991) focuses on the 
political struggle that takes place within the state as different groups of policy-
makers or bureaucratic factioni 1 compete to influence policy definition and 
implementation. This type of analysis tries to see how policy-makers develop 
strategies to pursue their policy agenda within the political constraints determined 
by the institutional framework in which they operate. In Evan's words, "state 
managers do not engage in disembodied maximisation. Their decisions depend on 
an institutional context composed of complex, historically emergent patterns of 
interaction that are embodied in societal structures and taken for granted by the 
individuals who work within them" (Evans, 1995:28)22. 
The particular groups of policy-makers in charge of formulating and promoting 
policy reforms have been referred to as 'change teams' (Waterbury, 1992). A 
change team consists of a small group of technocrats23 isolated from other groups 
in the political arena and whose capacity to operate and pursue policy change 
depends on the support of a high-ranking public official (Waterbury, 1992). 
Change team members belong to the top echelons of the state bureaucracy, train in 
prestigious universities, follow predominantly public careers, and circulate rapidly 
through many different agencies (Schneider, 1993). They share a common view 
on policy priorities, and a similar ideology in what pertains to the role of the state 
in public policy. 
Change teams have been described as technocratic24 (Waterbury, 1989; Collier, 
1979), because their leverage relies on the mix of skills their members bring to 
them - partly technical, partly political - which allows them to operate effectively 
both in policy formulation, as well as in political manoeuvring (Schneider, 1991; 
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Geddes, 1994). Silva (1996), Smith (1993) and Evans (1995) note that part of 
their success in bringing about policy reform is precisely their ability to establish 
links and consolidate policy networks with key interest groups in societl5• 
Scholarly attention on change teams grew as these were formed in different 
countries to formulate and implement policy reform in the context of economic 
reform during the 1980's (Nelson 1990; Schneider, 1991, 1993; Evans, 1992; 
Geddes, 1994)26. These studies depart from the assumption that many features of 
public policy can be traced back to individual and micro-level decisions at the 
state level (Schneider, 1991). They bring back the concept of politics within the 
state by examining these teams' leverage within the state as a means to understand 
their influence on the reform's policy outcome (Downs, 1964; Schneider, 1991; 
Geddes, 1994). 
The act of creating a change team, empowering it and placing it in a position to 
lead a reform process can be considered as a strategy in and of itself. Waterbury 
refers to them as "efficient instruments government leaders may use to promote 
socio-economic reforms" (Waterbury, 1992: 192). A government resorts to this 
strategy as a means to augment its autonomy from interest group pressure -
stemming from both within and outside the state - and thus enhances its chances 
of bringing about policy change. In resorting to the creation and use of a change 
team, governments seek to articulate and pursue a series of political strategies 
geared at enhancing the political feasibility of their reform agenda. 
Change teams have the explicit mandate to circumvent the regular bureaucratic 
channels for inter-sectoral policy formulation and implementation, with the 
double purpose of speeding up the reform process and insulating it from political 
interference (Geddes, 1994). This responds to the technocratic belief that policy 
decisions should not be subject to political bargaining. 
The formation of change teams is appealing to policy-makers because they are 
capable of processing information and making decisions quite efficiently. But, 
however politically autonomous, they remain dependent on the institutional 
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instruments for policy implementation (Haggard, 1990). Also, their very isolation 
may sever their ties with any potential support coalition, thus exposing them to 
any changes in the leader's agenda - in view of his political calculations. Also, 
given the characteristics and particular isolated position of these teams within the 
institutional setting, their survival in view of leadership turnover is at best 
improbable (Waterbury, 1989; Nelson, 1990; Evans, 1992; Walt, 1994). 
Change teams can be located at different points of the policy context, depending 
on the institutional framework of the country (Schneider, 1991; Geddes, 1994; 
Walt, 1994), and may be active at several stages of the policy reform process. For 
instance, in a presidential system, change teams may be active as informal 
committees close to the executive power, while in a parliamentary system it may 
be a commission in charge of drafting legislation. The change team can be a 
formal part of the civil service27 , in the form of a planning commission, an ad hoc 
inter-agency task force, or an advisory group (Walt, 1994). 
The institutional context also plays a significant part in determining whether a 
government can resort to change teams as a policy strategy, and also whether once 
formed, these change teams can operate. In their account of how economic change 
teams were able to implement their policy agenda despite societal opposition -
including resistance from powerful economic interest groups - Conaghan and 
Malloy (1990) pointed out that "the power to implement the programs was not 
simply a function of the mental toughness of the teams. Institutional and political 
factors permitted the insulation of the economic teams from direct societal 
pressures"(Conaghan et at, 1990: 20). 
They contended that this policy style was related to the tradition of centralised 
Executive power in Latin America, where the legal power allocated to the 
Executive allowed reform teams to develop and enact economic policy virtually 
without consulting their Legislatures and political parties. So, in the case of Peru, 
Ecuador and Bolivia, the technocrats' policy prescriptions were mostly applied 
through Executive decrees, and political parties were excluded from the policy 
process. The technocrats viewed party leaders as technically incompetent and 
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feared that their involvement in the policy process would undermine their goals. 
At best, politicians were called upon to help broker a minimum level of consensus 
for the reform agenda (Conaghan and Malloy, 1990). 
In analysing the political economy of reforms in other developing countries, 
Grindle and Thomas also note that "(in) countries in which the process of 
decision-making is highly centralised in the Executive, much policy discussion 
may be relatively closed and even secret, (and that such) characteristics tend to 
increase the importance of technocrats in decision-making" (Grindle and Thomas, 
1991 :97). 
In the case of health reforms, governments have also resorted to the use of change 
teams to pursue and maintain control over their reform agenda. Thus, the analysis 
of these groups' characteristics, their composition, their background and 
networks, as well as their incentives, are key elements in understanding the health 
reform processes. Also, the analysis of the opportunities and limitations they face 
in pursuing their health reform agenda, and the assessment of the political 
strategies they use in response to them, can provide an invaluable body of 
knowledge to inform policy advice in support of health sector reform. 
However, very little formal analysis has been undertaken on these policy-makers 
in charge of formulating and leading health reforms. Wilsford (1995), Pierson 
(1996) and Smith (1993) mention tangentially their role as one of the elements 
determining the degree of the state's autonomy vis-a-vis interest groups seeking 
patronage and resisting policy change, but do not focus on them as the main thrust 
of their analysis. 
Finally, the political economy literature on change teams and first generation 
reforms has noted that while significant progress was made in areas of the 
economic sector where reforms could be brought about with changes in rules and 
incentives, "progress has been far slower with institutional and non-price reforms" 
(Nelson, 1989:11). Graham and Grindle (1999) also point to the fact that reforms 
requiring institutional transformation have proven more complex and need more 
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negotiation (Graham and Grindle, 1999). Nelson suggests that this might be due to 
the orthodox paradox: "the attempt to use the agencies and personnel of the state 
to diminish or dismantle their own power" (Nelson, 1989: 10)28. 
Thus the use of change teams to pursue health reforms requires careful analysis. 
Given that in Latin America the state plays a major role in social services and 
health service provision, second generation reforms will require "reforms in the 
organisation and roles of government bodies (and) in changing attitudes to and the 
working relationship with the private sector" (Batley, 1999: 10). Thus health 
change teams will necessarily face the "orthodox paradox": To successfully 
pursue health reform, they will have to rely on salaried health manpower and 
health sector officials to implement policy change. The question remains open as 
to how the health change teams fare in pursuing health reform given that in 
Bjorkman's words, "(t)ry as they will, the politicians and the bureaucrats cannot 
replace the functions of the health professionals" (Bjorkman, 1989:33). 
1.2 Analytical Framework 
This thesis focuses on the political feasibility of health reforms. To do so, it 
concentrates on the state's capacity to pursue health policy change with two 
working hypothesis. The first hypothesis used was that the state's capacity to 
bring about policy change, and thus the political feasibility of health reform, is 
affected by three elements: 
1. The political context of the country: its political system, its institutions, its 
rules of governance - formal and informal - and key actors and their 
interrelation. 
2. The policy process: The series of stages that are undertaken to bring about 
change, starting at reform formulation and finishing at its consolidation; the 
policy nodes in which these occur and actors within them. 
3. The change teams that are formed and used as a means to increase the state's 
capacity to bring about the reform; their characteristics, political manoeuvring 
and choice of strategies. 
42 
The argument runs as follows: When a health reform initiative reaches the public 
agenda, actors within and outside the state interested in it will take positions in 
favour or against it. The country's political context presents both opportunities 
and obstacles throughout the reform's policy process for these actors to influence 
the reform. Policy-makers promoting the reform will choose political strategies to 
respond to these opportunities and limitations, and thus increase the state's 
capacity to bring about policy change. Among these strategies, they may create a 
change team in order to streamline activities related to the reform's policy 
formulation, political manoeuvring, and the strategies aimed towards enhancing 
the political feasibility of the health reform. 
A complementary second working hypothesis is therefore that the use of change 
teams in health sector reform is a distinctive political strategy aimed at increasing 
the state's capacity to promote health policy change, and that it can be singled out 
as such by both participants and observers of the health reform process. 
The argument here is that health change teams are formed and empowered by 
senior policy-makers with a health reform agenda and put in charge of 
formulating and leading it throughout its policy process. The opportunities and 
limitations present in the political context on the one hand, and the state's 
response to them on the other, converge in these change teams. Therefore, the 
state's capacity to pursue health refonn will depend, in a significant manner, on 
the change team's political manoeuvring and choice of strategies to bring about 
policy change within the political context in which the reform is to take place. 
The change team's capacity for strategic political manoeuvring during the health 
refonn process may be as important for successful implementation as the team's 
technical capacity to formulate sound policy, since change teams resort to a 
combination of technical skills and political manoeuvring to buttress support 
around the reform initiative and enhance the probability of successfully 
challenging resistance to change, 
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Thus, the analytical framework (see table 1.1) is constructed with 3 overarching 
variables affecting the state's capacity to bring about health policy refonn: 1) the 
political context; 2) the policy process; and 3) the change teams. 
Table 1.1 : Political Dimension of Health Sector Reform 
Analytical Framework 
I. Political Context II. Policy Process III. Change Teams 
• Political system • Anchor stages of policy • Formation and use of 
process change teams 
lnstitutional Problem definition Characteristics: 
configuration. Policy formulation Location 
Formal attributions of Legislation Expertise mix 
relevant institutions Regulation Previous experience 
and actors. Implementation Ideology 
Consolidation Perception of state 
society relations 
• Formal/informal • Key policy nodes • Change team political 
institutions structuring manoeuvring 
politics Executive 
Congress Vertical networks 
• Political map of key Implementing agency Horizontal networks 
actors State-society networks 
Political parties • Relevant actors in key • Change team choice of 
Business policy nodes. strategies 
Labour 
Bureaucracy • State-society relations Speed and scope 
Civil society in policy process. Brokerage in Congress 
Choice of legislation 
• Contextual Policy dialogue 
circumstances Transition strategies 
Inducing change 
Economic 
Social 
Political 
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1.2.1 Political Context 
The political context is defined in this thesis as the political system of the country, 
its fonnal institutions and infonnal institutional features, its party system, and 
state-society relations. It lays out the framework within which policy-makers and 
actors operate during the policy process, and maps the position of influence of the 
latter - business, labour, the bureaucracy and groups in civil society. It also 
includes the fonnal and infonnal rules of the game that present opportunities and 
obstacles for policy-makers and societal groups to press for their agendas. Finally, 
it looks into any major economic, social andlor political circumstances that might 
potentially affect the health refonn process. 
The boundaries in this variable are established by focusing only on those aspects 
of the political context relevant to the health refonn process. An emphasis is 
placed on the country's institutional features - both fonnal and infonnal - as they 
establish the rules of the game for state-society relations and thus the 
opportunities and limits for actors involved in the different stages of the health 
refonn process. 
Indicative research questions were: 
• What are the nature and characteristics of the country's political 
system? 
• What are the nature and characteristics of the fonnal institutional 
context? 
• What are the fonnal attributions of the institutions and actors 
relevant to the health refonn process? 
• What were the formal rules (or institutional features) of the 
political system governing the interaction among actors in and 
outside the state as well as state-society relations? 
• What were the informal rules (or infonnal institutional features) 
operating in the interaction among actors in and outside the state as 
well as state-society relations? 
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• Who are and what are the principal characteristics of the key actors 
in the political context - such as politicians, policy makers, elite 
groups, interest groups, social organisations, among others? 
1.2.2 Policy Process 
The policy process is defined in this thesis as the series of events that a reform 
initiative follows from the definition of the policy problem and its incorporation in 
the public agenda, to the consolidation of the intended policy change. This 
variable is operationalised by defining six "anchor" stages in the reform process29 : 
1. problem definition 
2. reform policy formulation 
3. reform legislation 
4. reform regulation 
5. reform implementation 
6. reform consolidation 
The period/place in which these stages of the reform process take place will be 
called policy nodes. Policy nodes are the points in the political system in which a 
reform initiative is exposed to being derailed or have its policy content 
significantly modified. It is not a physical entity, but instead "a point of strategic 
uncertainty" or a "window of opportunity" - for both those in favour and those 
against change - that may occur at any given moment of the reform policy 
process. In other words, each stage of a reform process evolves in a particular 
location within the political system, and thus a policy node is the stage of the 
reform process and the place in which it occurs, where the refonn can be 
significantly altered3o• Examples are the Executive, Congress or the agency in 
charge of implementing the reform. 
The stages of a reform process may not necessarily occur in a unilinear process, 
but instead may happen simultaneously in different policy nodes in the political 
system. Depending on the political system and its rules of the game, a different set 
of actors will have access to these policy nodes. Thus, key actors are 
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operationalised as those who are present in these policy nodes, or who are able to 
influence the health reform process as it passes through them. The other set of 
actors relevant to the analysis are those who, while not having access to the policy 
nodes, may be affected by the health reform, such as health service providers in 
the public and private sectors. 
Indicative research questions were: 
• When and where does problem definition occur? 
• When and where does policy reform formulation occur? 
• When and where does legislation occur? 
• When and where is regulation defined? 
• When and where does policy implementation occur? 
• When and where does reform consolidation occur? 
• Location and characteristics of the policy nodes. 
• What elements of the reform are at stake in these policy nodes? 
• Who are the relevant actors in the policy nodes and their 
interaction? 
• Who has access - and who has not - to the policy nodes? 
1.2.3 Change Teams and their Political Strategies 
The health change team is defined in this thesis as the group of policy-makers 
formed and empowered to lead a health reform. The study works on the 
assumptions that its creation is a political strategy in and of itself used by 
governments as a means to "manage" the technical and political requirements of a 
health reform. Thus it is expected that the change team's characteristics, its ability 
for political manoeuvring and its choice of strategies will have significant 
influence on the state's capacity to pursue health reform. 
Among these characteristics are the educational and professional background of 
change team members, which determine their pool of skills they count on to 
manage the health reform. Its members' previous policy experience will inform 
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the team in its choice of the reform's policy content and the political strategies to 
promote it. 
Once formed and empowered, change teams engage in political manoeuvring in 
order to embed themselves within the state. They will thus try to ensure their 
political leverage, and access to different points of decision-making by securing 
the political support of senior policy-makers and politicians (vertical networks). 
The change team's existence, location and capacity for manoeuvre will be 
dependent upon these vertical networks. 
The change team will also establish channels of co-operation with same-level 
peers in other government agencies (horizontal networks). This will allow it to 
exchange strategic information at the right time and join efforts with fellow 
reformers working in other sectors. It will also allow them to make their case in 
different policy arenas. 
Finally change teams may establish selective contacts with groups in society in 
order to obtain information and knowledge particular to the health sector and to 
buttress political support behind their reform agenda (state-society networks). 
These state-society networks are seldom spaces for policy dialogue. Instead, 
change teams resort to them sporadically and unpredictably, and always 
maintaining firm control over these groups' access to policy formulation and 
decision-making around the health reform. 
Finally, in order to enhance the political feasibility of their agenda, change teams 
make a series of strategy choices affecting different aspects of the reform process 
as well as its policy context, such as: 
• The speed and scope of the reform agenda 
• The type of brokerage in Congress 
• The choice of legislation for the reform 
• The type of policy dialogue 
• The transition strategies 
• The means to induce policy change 
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A few examples ofthe choices change teams face are presented here to clarify this 
variable. However, it must be noted that these choices are presented as extreme, 
oversimplified, dichotomous options for purposes of clarity, but that in reality 
decisions made on these options only vary in degree. 
In the case of speed and scope of the reform agenda, change teams need to choose 
between fonnulating one-time comprehensive change to be implemented in the 
short run, versus incremental change to be implemented in a series of progressive 
stages in the long run. Change teams are also expected to respond to the 
particularities of the political context in which they operate in order to define their 
brokerage strategies in Congress. In their choice of legislation , change teams may 
choose from legislative amendments, Executive decrees, internal administrative 
decrees and changes in regulation as mechanisms to bring about policy change. In 
policy dialogue, change teams confront the option to pursue health refonn 
promoting the participation of interested actors, or, on the opposite side, insulate 
themselves and avoid the influence of these actors. 
Given that change teams are aware that their mandate to lead refonns will only 
last while they count on the support of the senior policy-makers who empowered 
them, they will resort to strategies to ensure the continuity of the refonn process 
once they have left office, and thus augment the refonn's chances of 
consolidation. Among these strategies, they may rely on new regulation and 
budget reallocation to ensure the continuity of their policy changes, or may also 
try to appoint pro-refonn policy-makers in positions key for the continuity of the 
refonn - among others. 
Indicative research questions were: 
• Can a change team be identified among the groups of policy-
makers involved in the health reform? 
• What is the change team's configuration - profile of members, 
expertise mix and previous experience, ideology and others? 
• Where is the change team located in the political context? 
• Where does its political backing stem from? 
• Does it have political leverage? 
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• What are the identifiable networks the change team counts on as 
a means to secure political backing (vertical, horizontal and state-
society)? 
1.3 Methods 
• What are the identifiable strategy choices the change team has 
made to pursue health reform? 
Thus far this thesis has established two main issues to be explored. The first 
working hypothesis argues that the political feasibility of health reform is 
dependent on three elements: the political context; the policy process; and the 
change teams. The second hypothesis claims that the use of change teams in 
health sector reforms is a distinctive political strategy aimed at increasing the 
political feasibility of these reform initiatives. 
This thesis focuses on reform periods in Mexico (1994 - 1999) and Colombia 
(1990 -1994) in which change teams were involved in the process of formulating 
and implementing health policy change. While in both countries the health reform 
process continues and has yet to consolidate, these periods represent the turning 
points in both health reforms when major policy changes were introduced, 
legislated, and implemented - while other components of the health reform 
initiatives lagged behind. The implementation of these health reforms in Mexico 
and Colombia continue to have a highly political element, and their evolution can 
be a source of important lessons on the politics of health reform. 
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Given that the political analysis of health reform is a new field which is yet to 
build a significant core of applied theory, most of the scholarly work informing 
this thesis and its methods stem from the political economy of policy reform in 
other sectors - particularly state reform and economic liberalisation. By applying 
this body of knowledge to the analysis of health reform, this thesis aims at 
contributing to the expansion of the political economy field in health policy 
analysis. This section establishes the "working boundaries for approaching the 
problem" (Altheide and Johnson, 1994:485) and explains the methods that were 
used in conducting this thesis and the judgements that were made to choose them 
based on the literature review on qualitative research. 
1.3.1 The Comparative Case Study Approach and Process Tracing 
This thesis uses a comparative institutional approach (Evans, 1995). It is 
institutional because it focuses on how and why policy-makers interact within the 
institutional constraints and opportunities present in the political context in which 
health reforms take place, and relates these findings to the political feasibility of 
health policy change. It is comparative because it looks for variations in similar 
policy reform processes - in Colombia and Mexico - as the basis to understand 
the relevant elements determining the political feasibility of health sector reform. 
Garson (1976) claims that the use of case studies may be justified on several 
grounds, among which - and relevant for this thesis - is their usefulness in 
explaining a particular phenomenon that may not lead to supporting 
generalisation, but may provide insights useful for further research efforts. Case 
studies can also be a method of obtaining infonnation or concrete illustrations of a 
particular issue under study. The researcher looks into both what is common and 
what is particular about each case, and the result of each case study will be unique 
given its nature, its historical background, its political context, and, significantly 
those infonnants through which we come to know about it (Stake, 1994). 
Thus, in order to undertake relevant comparative analysis, the researcher needs to 
choose how much and how long of the complexities in each case to study when 
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gathering data on these aspects. To do so, the researcher may use comparative 
analysis as "a powerful conceptual mechanism fixing attention upon the few 
attributes being compared and obscuring other knowledge about the case" (Stake, 
1994). 
Van Evera (1995) argues that case studies can serve five main purposes: testing 
hypotheses, creating theories, identifying previous conditions, testing the 
importance of these conditions, and explaining cases of intrinsic importance. This 
thesis employed the case study method, and its qualitative selection of cases (non-
probabilistic sampling), to test the working hypotheses and identify whether the 
relationship between the independent variables (political context, policy process, 
change team) and the dependent variable (political feasibility of health reform) 
were significant to elaborating new general associations that were not previously 
apparent in the field of public health. 
The use of only two cases (small sample) made inquiring about the details of the 
variables and their interaction feasible, providing the conditions to gain insight 
into the casual processes presented in the hypotheses that were being tested. In 
contrast, a large number of cases (large sample) would have risked providing little 
or no new insight into the detailed causal process proposed in this thesis's 
working hypotheses. In general, the simultaneous analysis of a large number of 
cases (large sample) tell more about whether hypotheses hold, rather than why and 
how they hold (Weiner, 1975). In this case, the how and why were prioritised, and 
therefore only two cases were selected. If the findings support the working 
hypothesis, then further cases can be explored in order to test the hypotheses 
further and see if generalisations about these hypotheses can be made. 
Another advantage of case study methods is that they allow the researcher to 
"process trace" the variables that are being studied by following their interaction 
in their specific context (George and McKeown 1994, King et aI., 1994). In 
process tracing, the researcher explores the chain of events or the decision-
making process by which initial case conditions are translated into case outcomes 
(King et aI., 1994). In this manner, the cause-effect links that connect the 
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independent variables (context, policy process and change team) are unwrapped 
and divided into smaller steps; so that observable evidence may be analysed at 
each stage. 
This was particularly useful in this thesis, since the state's capacity to pursue 
health reform and its use of change teams were analysed against the backdrop of 
the reform's policy process. And to do so, the latter was divided in smaller units 
of analysis (policy nodes) through which the interaction between state and society, 
and policy-makers and interest groups could be observed. Thus, process tracing 
helped define the boundaries of the research and limit the complexities observed 
in the cases under study, allowing for the particular phenomenon being explored 
to surface. 
1.3.2 Selecting Mexico and Colombia 
There is no consensus on a method or a single set of criteria for selecting case 
studies. Stake (1994) contends that cases are not necessarily selected based on 
their representativeness, but instead, based on their potential to offer an 
opportunity to learn about the phenomenon of interest. The literature on 
methodology for social science and comparative politics points at six criteria 
useful for selecting the case studies (Eckstein, 1975, King et aI., 1994, Van Evera, 
1995). 
Table (1.2) does not exhaust the logical possibilities, but includes all possibilities 
that were consistently mentioned in the literature that was reviewed, making a 
case for their selection of Colombia and Mexico for comparative analysis. 
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Table 1.2: Selection of Case Studies 
Case selection criteria Colombia Mexico 
(1990 - 1994) (1994 -1999) 
l. Data richness . Vast amount of scholarly work, primary and secondary 
sources and a good climate to conduct interviews. 
2. Identifiable values on independent Variables were not difficult to identify and research. 
variables and dependent variables. 
3. 
3. Resemblance to current policy- Health reforms were an issue on the political agenda, 
problem cases . and resembled the dynamics of other current policy 
problems. 
4. Ease of controlled comparison Comparison was feasible due to the long list of 
between cases. similarities and differences found in both cases. 
5. Appropriateness for replication of Conclusions about these particular reforms are not 
previous tests . statistically representative (small sample) . However, 
they may show features that are common to other 
countries in the region and could be the basis for further 
comparative analysis. 
6. Feasibility to conduct fieldwork. Funding was sufficient to conduct the appropriate 
fieldwork. Language and access were not problems. 
The selection of Colombia and Mexico as case studies had various advantages. 
They are both middle-income countries in the Latin American Region with a long 
history of state intervention in the health field. They have also undergone 
important structural reforms affecting their economic, political and social spheres. 
Both countries have resorted to change teams in these reform efforts, and did so as 
well when promoting health reform. The fact that Colombia succeeded in moving 
on to the implementation stage of its health reform, while Mexico only achieved 
mixed results thus far, made the case study comparison relevant, as the use of 
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change teams can be analysed against a backdrop of positive and mixed-result 
scenanos. 
At different times during the last decade, Colombia and Mexico - as many others 
in the region - have attempted important policy reforms aimed at redressing 
imbalances in access to health service delivery and correct pervading 
inefficiencies. However, health reform initiatives met with great resistance from 
vested interests strongly defending the status quo. The degree of these groups' 
success in halting or significantly altering health reform efforts has been largely 
determined by the three factors that this thesis explores: the political context, the 
policy process, and the strategy choice of the health change teams. 
The two case studies of Colombia and Mexico were also selected on the grounds 
that they shared in their reform agenda a reconsideration of the role of the state 
and of the market in the provision of health services. As a result, both countries 
envisioned the creation of a plurality of new providers that, under market 
mechanisms and state regulation, would share the responsibility for health 
provision with the old state agencies, thus radically transforming the health 
systems that had been operating as state services since the post-war era. 
While the change teams in charge of health reform in Mexico and Colombia were 
similar in composition, ideology, and policy experience, their political 
manoeuvring and choice of strategies varied and so did their results. Colombia has 
successfully started the implementation of its health reform, while Mexico has 
thus far attained mixed results. Given the similarities on the political strategies 
used to pursue health sector reform in these two countries, and the difference in 
the results attained thus far, the comparative analysis of these two cases tries to 
shed some light on the factors affecting the political feasibility of health sector 
reform. 
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1.3.3 The Research Process 
Between mid-1996 and mid-l 997 I undertook a through review of the literature on 
both health reform in general, and theoretical approaches to the political economy 
of policy refonns, and designed the study around the analytic framework as 
depicted in section (1.2). During this period I was also able to explore the 
immense primary data base of Colombian documents housed In Harvard 
University, and undertake some preliminary interviews with experts on both 
Colombia and Mexico who were in Boston at the time (see appendices I and II for 
technical details on the health refonns in Colombia and Mexico). 
The document review, synthesis, interpretation of pnmary and secondary 
sources, published and unpublished, was enriched by generous colleagues in both 
countries, who shared valuable information, including official and unofficial 
government documents, policy drafts and proposals among others. I also had 
access to secondary sources produced by think-tanks such as Funsalud in Mexico 
and Fedesarrollo in Colombia. Local newspapers and magazines were another 
source of infonnation and were useful in complementing such documents. 
The main source of data for this thesis remained the official and unofficial 
government documents that contained the health reform proposals and/or elements 
referring to them. These included government programs, memos, internal reports, 
public dissemination documents, notes, transcripts, drafts of proposals and law 
bills among others. These documents needed careful interpretation. Hodder 
points out that "texts have to be understood in the context of their conditions of 
production and reading" (Hodder, 1994). Given that the use of information was in 
itself a strategy for political manoeuvring, document contents could not be taken 
at face value, but instead had to be analysed in the light of the circumstance in 
which they were prepared, as well as that of the audience they were directed t031 • 
In many instances, documents - or at least their contents - were discussed in 
interviews in an effort to gain insight into their meaning and their use beyond 
what they communicated in their writing. 
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Interviews and informal meetings with infonnants were an extremely important 
part of the methods used, with some interviewees being seen more than once. The 
two main objectives for undertaking interviews were: 
To reconstruct the inside political history of the health refonns 
during their initial periods, and 
To identify and analyse the perceptions of the actors who were 
directly involved in the health refonns 
In the case of policy makers - the majority of those approached -, the interviews 
explored their participation in, and interpretation of, specific decisions affecting 
the health refonn processes, as well as their perceptions of the institutional 
opportunities and limitations for promoting health policy change (see appendix V 
for an example of interview schedule). The career path of these policy-makers was 
examined by getting biographical data obtained through official sources or 
through interviews. 
Stake (1994) points to the fact that once the case studies have been selected "there 
are subsequent choices to make about persons, places and events to observe" 
(Stake, 1994:244). In choosing who to interview in case studies, the criteria of 
access should have a significant role. Thus, just as was the case in the case 
selection, "the primary criterion is the opportunity to learn" (Stake, 1994: 244). 
Thus, convenience sampling was used to approach the first interviewees during 
preliminary fieldwork. Convenience sampling32 is obtained "when the researcher 
selects whoever is most conveniently available for the interview" (Goel, 
1988:104). However, once I gained more depth and knowledge in my research 
topic, I resorted to judgmental sampling in choosing - to the best of my capacity 
and the access I had - the next group of infonnants. Judgmental sampling is done 
when the topic of interest involves top leaders in a community and thus a random 
sampling would be inefficient (Goel, 1988)33. This sampling process was further 
aided by snowballing (Garson, 1976) also known as chain sample (Garson, 1976). 
This consists in starting with a few respondents - based on the access one has to 
them, and then asking these respondents to name other individuals for 
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interviewing, who in tum are asked to recommend others - thus multi-stage 
sampling (Garson, 1976). 
Garson (1976) warns that ifnon random sampling such as this is used, it cannot be 
assumed that the resulting group of informants forms a representative sample. 
However, Stake points that the important factor here is "assuring variety but not 
necessarily representativeness" (Stake, 1994: 244). Thus, following this criterion, 
a total of 43 persons were interviewed in both countries stemming from the 
players, the relevant stake-holders, the interested observers and some of the 
country-specific experts. Key informants were policy-makers who participated in 
all or a fraction of the health reform process, as well as other relevant actors in 
and outside the state, who where involved in supporting or confronting the reform 
initiative. 
Among the actors interviewed were the policy-makers at the head of the Health 
Ministry in Colombia during the reform process and the Mexican Social Security 
Institute in the case of Mexico, the Minister's advisory staff in Colombia and 
policy-makers in planning units within the Ministry of Health in Colombia. Their 
peers and counterparts in other ministries, such as the National Planning 
Department (DNP) in the case of Colombia, and the Finance Ministry in the case 
of Mexico were also interviewed along with heads of the institutions participating 
or being affected by health policy change or other members of the Cabinet. 
A second group of interviewees were actors active in politics, such as members of 
the parties in power and in the opposition, lobbyists and consultants involved with 
the reform process for the case of Colombia, as well as business and labour 
leaders in Mexico. These actors proved crucial in assessing the political weight 
and the nature and the role of the actors in the first group. Other key actors with a 
stake in the reform process who were interviewed were members of multilateral 
organisations and donors participating in the support of health sector reform for 
both cases. Union leaders of the health work force and health service bureaucracy 
and leaders of the peak associations, such as medical associations were also 
interviewed for both cases. 
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Finally, a third group of interviewees included academics, policy and political 
analysts whose articulated account of the political economy of Colombia and 
Mexico, as well as the policy process enriched the background work done in these 
areas with primary and secondary sources. Members of specialised think tanks in 
the health sector were particularly relevant, not only because of their familiarity 
with the process, but because on many occasions they had been direct actors as 
policy-makers in previous reform attempts. This is due to the fine line between 
academic life and government activity that has characterised state reforms in the 
last two decades in Latin America. 
A total of 157 persons were contacted in both countries - 65 in Colombia and 92 
in Mexico. The fact that only 43 encounters were recorded as interviews may give 
the misleading impression that very few of these actors were open to share their 
infonnation and experience for this thesis (see appendices III and IV for details). 
Instead, a number of these individuals kindly volunteered their perceptions, 
information and material during informal encounters that could not be recorded as 
formal interviews. 
Fontana and Frey note that "unstructured conversation, mere chichat, listening to 
others without taking notes or trying to direct the conversation is also important to 
establish rapport and immerse oneself in the situation, while gathering a store of 
'tacit knowledge' about the ... (subject) ... studied" (Fontana and Frey, 1994:371) 
Indeed, in many occasions both in Mexico and Colombia, these informal meetings 
were richer in information, and gained in depth and scope over formal interviews. 
Altheide and Johnson point that "bureaucratic settings have numerous occasions 
for what could be termed 'bureaucratic tacit knowledge'. This includes 
understandings about written and verbal communications, ... ( ... ) ... and language." 
(Altheide and Johnson, 1994:493). Along those lines, these informal meetings 
gave me the opportunity to access information and further my understanding in 
areas that were not addressed during formal interviews. 
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This note withstanding, I made a serious effort to conduct as many formal 
interviews as it was possible from the different groups of actors described above 
in order to ensure objectivity and have the means to probe the information I 
obtained, as it will be discussed below. Interviews can be structured, semi-
structured or unstructured (Fontana and Frey, 1994). Given the characteristics of 
the research required for this thesis, it was not relevant to conduct structured 
interviews, in which informants are asked to respond to a nearly identical set of 
questions, since this method does not allow sufficient leeway to adapt the 
interview to the informant's knowledge base and experience. It has been noted 
that unstructured interviews "vary widely, given their informal nature and the 
nature of the setting, and some eschew any preestablished set of techniques" 
(Douglas, 1985 in Fontanta and Frey, 1994:371). 
On the other hand, in many occasions the profile of the senior level interviewees 
and their tight schedules did not allow for informal interviewing, without structure 
or control. A compromise was therefore used between these two extremes, by 
devising semi-structured interviews, using an outline checklist of questions 
(Bernard, 1988) or interview schedule (Garson, 1996). The list of issues covered 
varied according to the informant and for this reason, each interview required 
major background information prior to the meeting. I put particular emphasis in 
trying to reduce ambiguity (Garson, 1976) given the complex and some times 
abstract subjects I was studying34, and in some cases I volunteered background 
information to assure that the respondent understood the context of the question 
(Garson, 1976). During interviews, I took notes, which I put onto computer as 
soon after the interview as possible (see appendix V for an example of an 
interview guide). 
Colombia and Mexico are countries with little experience in open democratic 
processes and debate. Therefore, policy-making tends to be secretive and even 
information easily available in consolidated democracies can be considered 
sensitive. For this reason, as it has been stressed in this section, it was useful to 
have had previous work experience in these countries related to the health sector 
and to maintain close professional links with the actors in the field in both 
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countries. This was helpful in two ways. On the one hand, it allowed me to pursue 
participant observation and better understand the dynamics among the actors 
relevant to my study. On the other, it helped me establish links of trust with some 
of the actors I needed to interview, by trying to get to them through persons they 
trusted and respected. 
A large number of issues that were dealt with during interviews were about 
power. Also, as will become evident throughout the study, infonnation was one of 
the tools policy-makers and societal actors used to pursue their agendas. 
Furthennore, while in the case of Colombia many of the interviewees were not 
holding positions in public office any more; this was not the case in Mexico, 
where the health refonn was still at its outset. Thus, the issue of confidentiality 
was a decisive one in opening the doors of high-ranking officials, and reassuring 
them that off-the-record comments would be respected, to put infonnant at ease. 
Even though a majority of the people interviewed decided to remain anonymous, 
their arguments were only used if I received confinnation of their account from 
another source. In the case of fonnal interviews, I sent back my notes to the 
interviewee for comments in order to affinn the accuracy of the story and 
perceptions. I classified the interviews by keeping a record of their date, and these 
dates were used throughout the case studies to trace back the infonnation to the 
interviewee in case there was a need for further clarification. 
To further verify the objectivity of the infonnation gathered, and reduce the 
likelihood of misinterpretation, I resorted to systematic triangulation "a process of 
using multiple perceptions to clarify meaning, verifying the repeatability of an 
observation or interpretation" (Stake, 1994: 241). However, this approach also 
served to identify and analyse the different ways by which the same phenomenon 
was perceived (Flick, 1992 in Stake, 1994) (see chapter 9 for a discussion on this 
matter). I was able to further probe the different accounts I recorded through the 
interaction with interviewees and other informants during the seminars I organised 
in each country as well as in academic fora in Mexico, the US and the UK. There, 
through group discussion, participants were invited to react to preliminary 
61 
versions of the case study, and I was given the opportunity to receive feedback 
(Garson, 1976) and refine my argument. 
Given that a rather small group of actors was formally interviewed as explained 
above, it was not possible to provide the list of the 43 interviewees, since it would 
be very difficult to maintain the confidentiality of their accounts. Instead, a 
generic classification of interviewees - as well as other individuals with whom I 
held informal meetings - has been presented in this section. A more detailed list of 
the positions held by the persons contacted in each country is presented in 
appendices III and IV. Names of public figures only appear in the text and figures 
when referring to a fact that was official or known to the public. 
1.3.4 Field Work Organisation 
I completed the literature review and designed the study in London, from early 
1996 to mid-1997. This was followed by preliminary fieldwork and primary 
document search in London, Mexico, Boston and Bogota, leading to the 
completion of the research proposal (upgrading document). Part of this thesis was 
conducted at the Centre for Population and Development Studies at the Harvard 
School of Public Health, where I reviewed primary and secondary data on 
Colombia's health reform. To conduct fieldwork I established residence in 
Mexico City and made field trips to conduct interviews in Bogota, starting in mid-
1997 and ending in December 1999. Interviews also took place in London, Boston 
and Washington. 
Soon after beginning fieldwork, I joined the Harvard School of Public Health as 
research associate and participated in a USAID-funded project entitled Health 
Policy Process Project as research director. I was responsible for co-ordinating 
this thesis in Chile, Mexico and Colombia, working with researchers in each of 
these countries. While I could not work on my own research during this project, 
there were many overlapping areas of interest, and through the project, I was able 
to interview many high-level officials in these countries, and gain access to the 
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health refonn documents and policy evaluations at national and international 
levels. 
While research of this collaborative nature inevitably involves input from a wide 
range of people, the research conception, design and analysis was my own and 
drew closely to my doctoral work. The fieldwork design, selection of infonnants 
and interview guidelines were my original work. I wrote the final report for this 
thesis synthesising my own findings and those of researchers in the different 
countries, and presenting a series of policy guidelines stemming from the 
findings. The data collected in fieldwork for the Harvard project fed into this 
thesis' case studies. Further fieldwork and analysis for the doctoral research was 
undertaken during the months after its completion, up until mid-2000. 
At the final stage of my research, I was able to triangulate and get feedback on 
findings through a series of seminars sponsored by Harvard, USAID and the ODC 
in Mexico City, Boston and Washington, where I had the opportunity to discuss 
my analysis and receive useful comments from participants, as well as experts in 
the political economy of reforms. This helped me fine-tune my analysis and 
clarify my arguments in preparation for write-up. 
1.4 Caveats 
The main scope of the thesis was influenced and bounded by politics and the 
strategies that politicians, policy-makers and technocrats used in order to design 
and implement a health reform in Colombia and Mexico. This approach did not 
leave space to evaluate the policy content of the health reforms. The reforms were 
not assessed by the principles of equity, efficiency, access and quality or 
measured their impact on the population. However, these principles sometimes 
motivated the different players involved in the case studies. For example, business 
leaders in Mexico based their political stance on the reform along efficiency 
issues, and Colombian doctors argued that access and quality were being 
compromised by the reform. In both cases the thesis studied how these actors used 
their political leverage in order to influence the reform process, but at no time did 
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the research question their incentives or the extent to which their perceptions were 
reflected in outcomes. 
The analytical framework used in the thesis was based on the following 
assumptions, which might limit its relevance in other countries. First, it assumes 
that the countries under study have a sufficiently developed state capacity based 
on the essential institutions present in a middle-income country in order to 
identify the independent variables (institutional context, policy process, change 
team) and enact a health reform with a political impact on the national public 
agenda. In that sense this framework might require adjustments for use in a low-
income country with weak institutions. 
Second, it assumes that international organisations played a limited role in 
influencing the political feasibility of the health care reform in Colombia and 
Mexico, and therefore the research did not look in detail to the micropolitics 
inside these organisations. The rationale behind this assumption is that 
international conditionality did not play a significant role in the country-level 
politics of health care reforms. Reforms were not a response to conditionality, 
they were influenced in their design by the ongoing debate in the international 
health policy community - reflected in the World Development Report of 1993. 
Every attempt was made to be objective, by checking perceptions, and positions 
of interviewees against each other through probing, double-checking, and holding 
seminars to check the validity of the interpretations presented here. However it is 
inevitable that research of this kind is open to some level of interpretation and 
potential bias. 
Among the possible sources of bias that may be reflected in the study, the 
following stand out: while testing the hypothesis of the strategies that change 
teams employed, the research had to rely heavily on accounts of the change teams 
in Colombia and Mexico, due to the fact that written accounts are seldom kept in 
Latin American countries, specially when reforms are being designed. 
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Another source of bias is related to the time frame of study. In the case of 
Colombia (1990 - 1994) the fieldwork was done after the health reform process 
had completed the formulation, legislation and the initial implementation stages; 
this enabled the research to have a clear view of the "big picture" when 
conducting the study. Also, the change team that led the reform had left office, 
due to the change of administration, when interviews were conducted. This 
situation probably allowed the interviewees to be more candid and volunteer 
richer information. 
This ran in stark contrast to the case of Mexico (1995 - 1999), where the health 
reform was an ongoing process. This situation could have biased the study in 
different ways. In the first place, given that many of the events that were analysed 
were happening at the time the fieldwork was conducted, there was a real 
possibility of taking slow policy changes for no policy change at all. In second 
place there could be an inclusion of new actors who could try to affect the 
outcome of the reform by launching new political proposals. Also, as the change 
team was conducting and operating the political strategies to manoeuvre the 
reform through the public agenda, interviewees were considerably more cautious 
about their answers and comments than their Colombian counterparts. 
Finally, the number and diversity of actors involved in a health reform process is 
large. However, not all have equal access to health reform formulation and 
implementation and only a few manage to effectively influence the reform 
process. Given that the rationale of this thesis is to look into the strategies and 
actors who have a tangible impact on the political feasibility of health reform - as 
well as the time and resource limitations of doctoral work - this thesis 
concentrated on those actors who had most potential to influence the health policy 
process. For the same reasons, the study concentrated on the national level, 
leaving the impact of sub-national and local level actors On the political feasibility 
of health reform - particularly at the implementation stage - as open agendas for 
further research. 
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1.5 Summary and Main Points 
This chapter reviewed current knowledge and research on health reforms 
generally, and noted the neglect of political analysis in the literature, which 
provided the rationale for looking at the political dimension of health policy 
reforms. Different approaches to the political economy of policy reform were 
analysed and critiqued in the light of their relevance for the analysis of the 
political dimension of health reforms. The resulting analytical framework that was 
designed for this thesis was presented, and its variables were described in the 
manner they were operationalised to undertake this thesis. The framework also 
presented the argument for the thesis in the form of two working hypotheses. The 
last sections of the chapter described in detail the methods used to conduct this 
research, with particular emphasis on case study analysis, the research process, 
and its organisation. 
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Footnotes for Chapter 1 
I The first set of refonns aimed at the structural change of the economic sphere came to be referred 
to as first generation reforms; whereas the second set of refonns that followed, aimed at 
transfonning the social sphere are called second generation reforms. See Graham and Grindle, 
1999. 
2 Change team as a tenn, was used by Waterbury (1992) to describe the group of policy-makers 
who were in charge of structural refonn. With a technocratic approach to policy-making, these 
groups' power stemmed from the direct support of the Executive. They were insulated from 
pressures stemming from interest groups and bureaucratic factions which had a stake in policy 
change as a strategy to maintain state autonomy in directing the policy change. 
3 See also Reich, 1994 and Foltz, 1995 for a critique on different approaches to the politics of the 
health policy process. 
4For more on how globalization has induced policy decision-makers in different countries to 
embrace what Bjorkman and Altenstetter call the 'common middle ground', see Bjorkman and 
Altenstetter, 1997. Also see Mannor, 1997 for a critique on the oversimplification of health policy 
debate leading to a common international policy agenda. 
5 For recent literature on the subject, see among others Haynes and Broder, 1996; Pierson, 1996; 
Steinmo and Watts, 1995; Skocpol, 1995; Mannor, 1994; Moron,1994. See also Mannor, 1983 
for a collection of his seminal work on the politics of health, as well as an overview of the 
literature on the subject of the 1960's and 1970's. 
6See Altenstetter and Bjorkman (eds), 1997 for recent works on the politics of health policy refonn 
in Western and Eastern Europe, the Americas, and Israel. 
7 See Parsons, 1995 for the different theoretical approaches that have been used to analyse the 
r.0litics of health. 
See Parsons, 1995 as above. 
9Governments are defined in this thesis as the political entities that administer and regulate a 
nation or society. See Parsons, 1995 for a discussion on the role of governments. 
IOPolicy-makers are defined by Nakamura and Smallwood as "the principal actors in policy 
fonnu1ation ( ... ) people who occupy positions in the governmental arena that entitle them to 
authoritatively assign priorities and commit resources" Nakamura and Smallwodd in Rist, 1994. 
:548). They will be referred to as government officials. 
IIPor a discussion on the different roles attributed to the bureaucracy and the state see Suleiman, 
1974. 
12Por a compilation of the relevant literature on the old approach to institutional analysis, see 
Eckstein and Apter, 1963. 
13This particular aspect about the preferences of policy-makers stems fonn the literature on 
bureaucratic politics. See Downs, 1964; Schneider, 1991; and Geddes, 1994 among others. 
14Por instance, there is an ongoing debate about how to interpret the motivations of policy-makers 
when they implemented structural change. Many of the measures ran counter to the interests of 
important stake-holders who resisted the measures and in many cases withdrew their support for 
the government in office. When policies were accompanied by poverty alleviation programs, 
resources were allocated to the poor, who had serious difficulties in showing their political 
support, since they were not powerful or organised to do so (Nelson, 1990). 
t5The concept of 'capture' refers to the possibility of having powerful interest groups consolidate 
their influence on the state and thus bending public policy permanently in their favour. See Olson, 
1982; Sandler, 1992. 
16Por a complete list of the variables used to assess the power of influence of an interest group, see 
Wilsford, 1995: 576. 
17See Wildavsky, 1972; Lindblom, 1983; Rondinelli, 1984; and Korten, 1976 among others for 
definitions and characterisations of the policy process. 
ISSee Parsons, 1995 for other definitions of the stages of a policy process. 
t9Por an explanation of the rational choice model and its use in political science, see Riker, 1990. 
20See Downs, 1967. 
21The labelling of distinctive groups of policy makers or bureaucratic factions within the state has 
always been problematic. Schneider (1991) acknowledges that all policy makers are in essence 
part of the bureaucracy, but points to the fact that 'the bureaucracy' is not homogeneous, since 
different groups of bureaucrats have different preferences and degrees of power. Studying Mexico, 
Grindle (1977) makes a distinction between high ranking and mid-level officials within the 
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bureaucracy. In studying the role of the bureaucracy as a distinctive but integral part of the 
political system, Suleiman (1974) also distinguishes politicians from high ranking officials, but 
this distinction may prove deceptive when studying high ranking technical officials who engage in 
rolitics: the technocrats. 
2Strong criticism has been raised about the deterministic emphasis on institutions. Other authors 
of the new institutionalist approach have argued that the constraints put by institutions are more 
flexible; and that in fact, transforming the institutional framework may be part of the policy-
makers' political strategy (Rothstein, 1992). 
23 Technocrats were first defined as "individuals with a high level of specialised academic training 
which serves as a principal criterion on the basis of which they are selected to occupy key 
decision-making or advisory roles in large, complex organisations" (Collier, 1979: 403). Grindle 
defines them as public officials with extensive technical training, particularly in economics, who 
accumulate considerable political influence (Grindle, 1996). Dominguez refers to them as 
technopo!s to emphasise their combined use of highly technical skills and political manoeuvring 
(Dominguez, 1997). Centeno refers to them as tecnocratas and stresses that they combine the 
educational credentials of technical officials with the political access and acumen of politicians 
(Centeno, 1994). 
24Technocracy as a social movement has its origins in the US during the depression in the early 
1930's, when there was a growing belief that the application of the scientists' and engineers' 
scientific and technological principles to the social, political and economic spheres "could solve 
the problems that had so confounded politicians" (Parsons, 1995:266). 
25 Also see the concept of embedded autonomy in Evans (1992), whereby the state manages to 
maintain its autonomy in policy decision-making while at the same time establishing selective 
links with societal groups thus forming policy networks. 
26For a compilation on the literature on the politics of economic adjustment, and a discussion of 
the use of change teams, see Haggard and Kaufman, 1992. However, governments have resorted to 
policy groups similar to change teams for a long time. Geddes (1994) sees similar characteristics 
in the 'executive teams' and 'pockets of efficiency' that the Brazilian government used in order to 
modernise the administration between the 1930's and the 1960's. Shneider (1991) also recognises 
the same features in the teams of policy makers in charge of the Brazilian industrial policy 
between the mid 1960's and the mid 1970's. Silva (1996) argues that even during the Frei and 
Allende administrations, technocrats played a role in Chilean politics, long before Pinochet's 
military regime. And Cepeda (1994) tracks the origins of Colombia's change team operating from 
the mid 1980's onwards, to the efforts to modernize the state in the 1960's. 
27See Smith, 1993 for a discussion on elitist technocratic decision-making in Britain, and 
Suleiman, 1974 for the same topic in France's policy-making. 
28 She explains: "Governments rely on their officials to carry out reforms. Officials with a genuine 
commitment to their agencies and programs often deeply resent what they view as external attacks. 
More broadly, measures to streamline or privatise public enterprise, to tighten central economic 
agencies' control over budgets and expenditures, and to eliminate a wide variety of state controls 
and regulations over economic activity and convert others ( ... ) from criteria within the discretion 
of state officers to quasi-automatic criteria or mechanisms all constitute a direct assault on the 
interests of many public employees" (Nelson, 1989: 1 0). 
29 See Parsons, 1995 for other definitions of policy cycles and reform stages. Also see Rist, 1994. 
30 Part of this definition is borrowed from Immergut's definition of "veto points" Immergut (1992: 
9)However, policy node was preferred to emphasise the fact that a reform may face equal chances 
of being vetoed - thus halted - or only having its policy content altered. 
31For Hodder the written text is "an artefact, capable of transmission, manipulation, and alteration, 
( ... ) 'doing' different things contextually through time"(Hodder, 1994:393). 
32Convenience sampling is also referred to as haphazard or volunteer sampling. See Goel, 1988. 
HGoel (1988) notes that "effective use of Uudgmental sampling) requires that the researcher have a 
wealth of political knowledge about the region being studied" (Goel, 1988: 103). 
34Garson points to the fact that "the most important variables in political science are abstractions: 
power, influence, trust, efficacy. loyalty, ( ... )" (Garson, 1976: 150). Most of these variables were 
of relevance to the thesis, putting an additional challenge on the interviews I undertook. 
PART II 
Colombia Case Study 
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Colombia - Chronology of Events 
Year(s) 
1940's 
1953 - 1958 
1958 
1975 
1986 -1990 
1986 
1987 
1990 
1990-1994 
Aug 1990 
Jan/Jul 
1991 
Sep/Dec 
1991 
Sep 1992 
Milestone 
The ISS is created to provide services and pension to private formal sector workers. 
It is funded by employers and employees. 
Local health authorities are established. 
Rojas Pinilla military regime. Peak to the ten year political warfare. 
The Liberal and Conservative parties sign the National Front Agreement. 
New health system organised around the MOH as head of sector, formally 
controlling social security institutions, private health providers and its own 
facilitates; but it only controls its own. 
Barco Administration 
First steps towards the decentralisation of health services. Efforts were to last until 
1990's. 
The local health authorities begin to receive direct resources for health services as 
part of the decentralisation process. 
In addition to receiving funding, local authorities are put in charge of the provision 
of health services. The national level is to concentrate on policy guidelines and 
assistance. 
Gaviria Administration 
First stage of economic and state reforms including exchange rate regime, foreign 
trade, financial sector, taxation reform, housing policy reform and labour reform. 
National Consitutent Assembly (ANC) is called to enact a new Constitution. The 
ANC mandates reform in social security, public services, education, planning, 
central bank and decentralisation. 
The new social security system was to be based on the principles of universality, 
solidarity and efficiency and was to cover the pensions and health jointly, as well as 
public and private sector entities. 
The Social Security Commission is created by the ANC with the objective of 
formulating the social security reform proposal. After several months, the 
Commission did not agree on a reform proposal. 
The Executive, through the Labour Minister, presents a social security reform 
project to Congress that does not include health. 
Congress rejects it and conditions the approval of the social security reform to the 
inclusion of the health reform. 
Dec 1992 
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The former DNP deputy director, Juan Luis Londono is appointed Minister of 
Health. 
Londono presents to Congress a partial health reform project (Empresas Solidarias 
de Salud) as a complement to the Executive's social security reform proposal. 
Congress rejects it once more and demands a comprehensive health reform. 
Apr 1993 The Executive presents to Congress a social security project including a 
comprehensive health reform. From this moment onwards, the health change team 
takes pre-eminence in the health reform process. 
Dec 23 1993 The social security reform is approved in Congress and ratified by the president. It 
included both health and pensions reforms. 
Jan/Aug 1994 Expedition of Executive decrees ratifying the health reform's regulation package 
prepared by the health change team at the MOH 
1994 - 1998 Sam per Administration 
Aug 1994 The change of administration puts in power a rival liberal faction that had opposed 
the health reform in the previous administration. 
This government is responsible for the implementation of the majority of reforms 
legislated during the Gaviria administration, including the health reform. 
1994 -1995 Alonso Gomez is appointed Minister of Health. 
He attempts a counter reform by putting a halt to the reform's implementation and 
issuing Executive degrees to redress the resource allocation established by the health 
change team. 
1995-1996 Augusto Galan is appointed Minister of Health. He puts the health reform back on 
track by forcing President Samper to issue a degree overriding those issued by 
Gomez, and re-activating implementation. 
71 
Chapter 2. Political Context 
2.1 Introduction 
During the 1990's, Colombia initiated a swift and in-depth health reform 
characterised by its technocratic approach. But the political context in which the 
reform took place empowered other actors, notably the legislators, who were able 
first to promote radical change, and then to influence its final form. The first 
stages of this reform process - incorporating the issue into the public agenda, 
legislating it and preparing implementation - was done in a surprisingly short 
period of time. But during this time, the reform's initially limited agenda for 
change was transformed into a more comprehensive project that reflected not only 
the technocratic position of the change team in charge of it, but also the positions 
of other actors involved in it. As a result, the reform contains mUltiple objectives 
expected to be accomplished simultaneously, such as equity and universal 
coverage, along with efficiency and cost containment. 
This chapter presents a brief description of Colombia's institutional context from 
the perspective of the policy process. It focuses on the main arenas for policy-
making and the actors in them, as they have been operating in recent years. A brief 
account of contemporary events in Colombian politics follows with a description 
of the formal and informal rules for political competition, interest representation 
and participation that structure the policy-making process. It then presents the 
arrival of the technocracy to power and its characteristics in chronological order, 
with particular emphasis on the Gaviria administration, when the health reform 
was initiated. The chapter concludes with a brief description of the Samper 
administration that was to follow Gaviria's, and in which the first stages of the 
health reform implementation evolved. 
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2.2 The Colombian Political System 
2.2.1 Division of Powers and Policy-Making 
Colombia is a Republic with a presidential government and division of powers -
the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary. Formally, the Executive is in 
charge of implementing and enforcing the laws approved in Congress, the 
Legislature is in charge of formulating and issuing laws, and the Judiciary is 
responsible for solving non-armed conflicts between individuals, and between an 
individual and the state. 
2.2.2 The Executive 
The Executive is headed by the president, elected with a four-year mandate, with 
no right to re-election. It is the most dynamic policy arena in Colombia's 
institutional context. It is the source of nearly all substantive policy formulation. 
Until the early 1990's, the majority of policy initiatives circumvented Congress, 
but the extraordinary prerogatives that allowed the Executive to do so were 
curtailed in the new 1991 Constitution. Nonetheless, the Executive still has 
extensive control over the legislative process, having the power to veto legislation 
passed by Congress, and to govern by decree, and it is the source of the majority 
of bills. In addition, the Executive has the authority to formulate and enforce the 
regulatory body of laws approved in Congress. This gives the Executive a second 
opportunity to shape the final outcome of a policy initiative. The Executive's 
leverage over Congress is further reinforced by the lack of technical capacity and 
political will of most congressmen to assume their formal role in policy-making 
(Acher, 1997). 
Within the Executive, the president uses formal and informal mechanisms to 
reinforce the power vested in him and his control over the workings of the 
Executive branch. One of the key formal mechanisms is his prerogative to appoint 
the ministers, top and medium level government employees, and directors of 
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national decentralised agencies l • Among the infonnal mechanisms is the 
possibility of fonning small teams of policy makers who remain very close to the 
president and whose combined technical and political abilities facilitate 
fonnulation and control over the implementation of the president's policy agenda. 
In spite of the power imbalance between the Executive and the Legislative, the 
Legislative power remains an important veto power. The fragmentation of the 
political parties and the influence of the regions' rent-seeking behaviour in 
Congress has slowed down policy initiatives stemming from the Executive, since 
it is forced to lobby and secure the votes needed to pass legislation almost on an 
individual basis CAcher, 1997). The administration of President Gaviria was an 
exception to the rule. The social mandate for a thorough political and social 
refonn, along with the political manoeuvring of the economic team that he 
empowered, were able to successfully pass through legislation a series of 
economic and social refonns. One of these refonns was the social security refonn, 
along with its health component. 
Within the Executive the highest fonnal decision-making bodies are the Council 
of Ministries - decisions of political content - and the National Council for Social 
and Economic Policy (CONPES) - decisions on social and economic matters. 
Both are chaired by the president. As a result of the state refonn initiated in the 
early 1990's, the responsibilities and functions of the CONPES in the social 
policy area were modified, and these now include aspects such as decentralisation, 
joint financing of social services, social security and health care, among others 
(Decree 2132, 1992, Art. 26). 
The National Planning Department (DNP) has the role of technical secretariat for 
this body, and in that role, it helps prepare all the white papers that are presented 
by the sector-specific ministries for analysis and discussion. While the existence 
and activities of this body are not enforced by law, it is here that all policy 
initiatives in the social sector are presented and discussed within the Executive, 
and law initiatives to be presented in Congress stem from it. Its power and 
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importance in the policy process depends entirely on the president's support of 
this decision-making body. Once the CONPES has defined the policy guidelines 
and the budget has been approved, ministries enjoy a high degree of autonomy in 
policy decision making. 
A central factor undermining the Executive's capacity to implement its policy 
initiatives once they have been approved in Congress, is the high degree of 
circulation in top positions at the ministerial level. This is particularly 
conspicuous in the social sector ministries, since they are not seen as strategic as 
the economic sector ones, and therefore have their heads appointed on the basis of 
political criteria looking to maintain the government's coalition of support among 
party factions (Hartlyn, 1994). The weaker the government in power, the higher 
the degree of circulation and, as a consequence, the higher level of state paralysis 
in policy-making. 
2.2.3 The Legislature 
The Congress has two chambers: the Senate and the House of Representatives. It 
operates on the basis of specialised committees and plenary sessions. Although the 
latter is the final and highest decision-making level, most of the discussions, 
debates, and bargaining are carried out within the committees. With few 
exceptions, a committee's approval is simply sanctioned in plenary sessions. 
Issuing a new law or reforming one is a long process taking up to a year to be 
discussed, negotiated, and eventually approved. When a bill is submitted to 
Congress it is turned over to a Commission or specialised committee in one of the 
congressional chambers. There, it is given priority among other bills according to 
the legislators' and the government's interests. It is during this period that the bill 
undergoes major changes. Political bargaining takes place between the Executive 
and the Congress, between congressional factions and between the latter and 
interest groups in society trying to influence the policy process at this stage. Once 
approved, the bill is turned to plenary sessions for further discussion and 
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negotiation, and eventual approval. Once approved in one chamber, the bill is sent 
to the other chamber to undergo a similar process. 
Even though the Executive has considerable power in policy-making, the 
Congress maintains a strong veto power. However, its power resides largely in its 
reaction to the Executive's initiatives, since its fragmentation precludes it from 
being proactive in policy formulation and legislation - even along party lines. This 
is due to the difficulty of creating coalitions in support of policy issues, given that 
there is no party unity and members of Congress are not accountable for policy 
results at the national level, but for the particular benefits their local constituencies 
may obtain. The Executive is thus forced to build a congressional coalition for 
each policy initiative it submits for legislation, and the willingness and capability 
of the traditional parties to conform is each time uncertain (Archer, 1995 and 
1997; Hoskin, 1997). 
Finally, the persistent tension between the federal government and the regions is 
reflected in the competition for control over policy-making and public resource 
allocation between the Executive and Congress. While the Executive tries to 
impose policy guidelines on the regions on behalf of the national interest, 
Colombia's regions use Congress to influence policy-making in particular benefit 
and often resort to rent-seeking behaviour. This has created such political 
incentives that legislators tend to condition their vote in favour of federal level 
policy to perks and benefits for their regional and local constituencies (Hartlyn, 
1988; 1994, Archer, 1995; 1997). 
2.2.4 The Judiciary 
The Judicial branch of power is formed by four bodies: The Supreme Court, the 
Constitutional Court, the State Council and the General Prosecutor's Office. 
Following the political reforms brought about by the new Constitution in 1991, 
the Judiciary has tried to recover ground in the balance of powers with the other 
two branches of power. Although still facing the challenges of modernising and 
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speeding the process of administration of justice and de-politicising its 
configuration and dynamics, it has made progress in its role as a check and 
balance by pursuing cases protecting citizen's rights vis-a-vis the Executive and in 
constitutional legislation. Issues stemming from the health reform's new law have 
been at the centre of such an institutional power struggle (Palacios, 1995). 
2.2.5 Structuring Politics: The National Front (1958 -1986) 
During the 1940's and 1950's Colombia suffered a period of violence between 
adherents of the two traditional parties, the Liberal and the Conservative, which left 
more than 200,000 deaths and the imposition, in 1953, of a military regime. In order 
to restore civilian rule and stop the violence, both parties established a partisan 
accord in 1958 called the National Front. This accord introduced the power-sharing 
rules by which the parties agreed to rotate the presidency by having only one party 
nominate a presidential candidate in four-year turns. As a result, in spite the fact that 
regular elections were held, party alternance in power was not a reflection of voters' 
preference - since there was only one presidential candidate to vote for -, but the 
result of this agreement. Thus, as it can be seen in figure (2.1), a "pendulum" 
pattern2 emerged and was to last until the Barco administration in 1986. 
Figure 2.1: Party Rotation After the National Front Accord 
Liberal Pa rly 
Liens Camargo 
(1958- 1962) 
Lleras Rest repo 
( 1966- 1970) 
Lopez Michelsen 
Va rllllS Barco 
o Technocratic governments 
COnllervatlve Party 
Lebn Valencia 
(1962- 1966) 
Pastrana Borrero 
( 1970- 1974) 
Betancur Cllar tas 
( 1982- 1986) 
PAllnnl Annao 
(1998-1002) 
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The agreement provided for positions at all levels of government - with the 
exception of the Presidency -, as well as the Congress, to be shared among the 
parties on an equal basis, regardless of electoral results. This power-sharing 
commitment was furthered by establishing a requirement of a two-thirds majority 
vote in Congress for the approval of a law initiative. 
The National Front achieved its short-term goals by restoring civilian rule in 1958, 
and ending inter-party violence in the following decade. However, it generated a 
series of side effects for politics and policy-making in Colombia. For instance it 
created barriers for the participation of other parties and political groups, limiting 
not only the incentives for competition, but also political participation and interest 
representation3. The instances for institutional competition among societal groups 
with different ideological and political positions were rendered ineffective, and this 
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created the conditions for the re-emergence of violence, although this time not 
among the traditional parties, but from societal groups excluded from political 
competition against the state. Both the F ARC and the ELN, the two strongest 
guerrilla groups, emerged in the mid 1960's and gained strength in the following 
decades. 
The need for a two-thirds majority in a bipartisan Congress generated the incentives 
for coalition-building and voting on an individual basis, instead of voting and 
negotiation along party lines. Power-sharing brought the role of the opposition to an 
end, and policy debate among political parties was merely rhetoric. Legislators tried 
to secure re-election not by studying and debating policy initiatives, but by 
conditioning their vote to the allocation of public resources and benefits to their 
regional constituencies and control over a certain number of government posts with 
the same purpose. This, in tum, promoted the emergence of regional and local 
leaders whose careers were not based on their ideological or programmatic 
coincidence with the traditional parties but on their ability to control a constituency 
by obtaining public resources and benefits for it. The political elite at the national 
level reacted by centralising decision-making at the party conventions, where 
national party leaders took the important decisions and elected the presidential 
candidate. 
A constitutional reform in 1986 formally sought to limit the life-span of the National 
Front accord to 1974, at which time political competition was to be reintroduced in 
the Executive and Legislative branches, as well as in regional and local elections. It 
also reduced the number of issues requiring a two-thirds majority in Congress for 
legislation. But the two-party rotation for the Presidency, even if fonnally 
terminated, was maintained until 1978, and the distribution of government posts 
among the two parties on an equal basis was to continue, with one short-lived 
exception\ until 1986 (Hartlyn, 1988; Leal, 1989; Dix, 1987; Kline, 1995). 
The Barco administration (1986-1990), was the first single-party government since 
the 1940's, as a result of the Conservative party's refusal to participate in a coalition 
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government that reflected electoral results - which gave the Conservatives only 35% 
of government positions, instead of automatically assigning it half of the 
government's posts. This was seen as the end of the coalition governments 
established by the National Front accord - which had formally ended in 1974 -, and 
thus as an opportunity for the return of more disciplined parties with clear 
ideological profiles and separate policy platforms resulting from the newly 
invigorated need for party competition (Hartlyn, 1988; Bushnell, 1993; Kline, 1995; 
Dix, 1989; Cepeda, 1994; Hoskin, 1990). 
2.3 The Actors 
2.3.1 Political Parties 
The party system in Colombia is characterised by the predominance of two 
traditional parties that emerged in the mid-19th century - Liberal and Conservative. 
They have shared 90% of votes in presidential and congressional elections 
throughout the 20th Century. The power-sharing agreement they arrived at in the late 
1950's, and the influence of Colombia's regions in legislative politics led to their 
fragmentation and de-based them of ideological cohesiveness. 
During the last 40 years, a few short-lived movements have been able to control a 
little over 10% of the votes; in most cases they have been either a coalition of small 
parties or a strayed fraction ofthe two traditional parties. 
Only two political movements formed outside the realm of the traditional parties 
were able to accumulate a significant number of votes to have seats in Congress, 
albeit temporarily. These were the Patriotic Union (UP), the political arm of a 
guerrilla group (F ARC), and the Democratic Alliance, created by a demobilised 
guerrilla group (M-19) and led by one of its former leaders, Navarro. The 
Democratic Alliance obtained a third of the total votes during the 1990 elections -
establishing itself even above the Conservative party - and winning a dozen seats in 
Congress. This electoral mandate forced the government to include the movement in 
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the Executive's cabinet, and Navarro was appointed Minister of Health during the 
Gaviria administration - at the time when the health refonn started to be discussed. 
In the 1994 elections, the UP lost all its congressional seats and presented no 
presidential candidate. The M -19' s Democratic Alliance obtained only one seat in 
Congress and less than 5% of voters' preferences for president. 
2.3.2 Business 
In the absence of party representation, powerful societal groups have resorted to 
other types of organisations seeking to influence policy decision-making by 
directly interacting with the Executive. Their access to decision makers has been 
favoured by the political parties' lack of control as state-society intennediaries. 
The level of influence of these groups has increased during weak governments 
that have had to bring them close to policy decision-making in order to maintain 
their coalitions of political support. Instead, strong governments have been able to 
substitute the lack of party ideology by resisting interest-group pressure and 
appointing like-minded individuals to their cabinet positions (Hartlyn, 1989)5. 
Public officials seeking to control policy-making are not the only obstacle to these 
societal groups' access to policy-making. They stem more from the nature of the 
groups themselves, which are heterogeneous, fragmented and have unequal access 
to the arenas of policy-making. In the case of producer associations, which count 
among the most powerful groups, they lack member representation and in some 
cases are unable to have their membership abide by agreements reached with 
government. Yet they remain influential groups, in clear distinction with 
consumer associations, which have found access to policy decision-making more 
arduous. 
2.3.3 Labour 
Only 7% of the work force in Colombia is unionised, since half the economy is 
made up of small enterprises mostly in the infonnal economy. While it can be 
argued that the union movement is fragmented and weak in the private sector, the 
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same cannot be said of public sector unions, and particularly those related to the 
provision of social services. The latter have a higher degree of influence on the 
Executive, members of Congress and the media through their participation in 
Congressional Commissions - to which they may be formally invited; as well as 
in public debates and other negotiation arenas. But their main means of exerting 
influence over policy decision-making is their political mobilisation capacity, 
notably through strikes, to press for interests, such as wages, employment benefits 
and job security. 
The most powerful labour organisation is the public school teachers' umon 
(FECODE), which currently has approximately 250,000 members, strong 
leadership with high representation, and is very disciplined. The health-sector 
workers' union is much less important in terms of its influence in the policy-
making process. As opposed to the teachers' union, the health labour movement is 
fragmented with separate unions for hospital workers, medical doctors, nurses, 
and others; and their political mobilisation tends to be isolated. 
Outside the social sector, unions with particular strength are those in strategic 
sectors, notably the oil workers' union of Ecopetrol. Other examples are those of 
truckers and public inter-urban transport, among others. Finally, there are a few 
umbrella organisations, which group together important unions and have strong 
influence, such as the Central Unitary Union (CUT), which represents most labour 
unions; or the Public-Sector Workers' Union. These unions - particularly the CUT 
- play an important role in the annual definition of the minimum wage, which 
takes place in a government-business-Iabour committee. 
2.3.4 Bureaucracy 
The state bureaucracy in Colombia was divided into three levels: high, middle and 
low level. High-level bureaucrats or policy-makers do not promote their interests 
through unions or any other type of formal organisation, they pursue their careers 
and protected their interests through the informal networks with other policy-
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makers. Mid-level officials sought to promote their interests by demonstrating the 
loyalty to their boss. Only low-level public employees joined state workers' 
unions in order to pursue and protect their interests by means of collective action 
(Cepeda, 1990). 
The president appoints all cabinet ministers and vice-ministers, however, 
ministers have a say in the nomination of some of their close collaborators. Each 
of these, would in tum name hislher work team, and loyalty and trust are 
prioritised over expertise and performance (Grindle, 1977). The lack of an 
institutionalised civil service in Colombia, and the change of administration every 
four years has brought a massive renovation of personnel within the public sector. 
The incentives to build a career in the public sector on a specific field is not very 
feasible due to the shifts within government and to policy think tanks. The higher 
the rank of the bureaucratic level, the higher the degree of circulation. 
Given the lack of institutional mechanisms for a meritocratic career, policy-
makers are dependent on their personal network and the factions within their 
political parties to ensure the continuity of their careers. When high level 
bureaucrats leave office, they are sometimes offered a position in one of 
Colombia's think tanks, like Fedesarrollo, in order to wait for the next 
administration to take office or obtain a post through one of their parties faction. 
This revolving door phenomenon between government and think tanks has created 
a certain level of job security for senior officials. It has also created a type of 
overlooking body, with the technical skills, able to monitor policy decisions by 
the current government, similar to that of a shadow cabinet. 
2.3.5 Civil Society 
Aside from business and labour organisations, other societal groups outside the 
state have been able to influence policy-making. Among these, think tanks 
(Fedesarrollo); the academia; foundations (FES, Corona Foundation); the mass 
media and individual opinion leaders, such as former presidents and individual 
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journalists. These groups have increased their mobilisation and influence since the 
1970s and, to a certain extent, have filled the political space left by political 
parties. They have been the most consistent interlocutors of the government, 
analysing, doing follow-up and criticising public policy decisions. Their power 
has depended on their level of organisation, their resources, the importance of the 
sector they represent and their analytical capacity (Sanchez, 1989). 
They have sought - and in most cases obtained - access to policy-making through 
informal and semi-institutionalised channels. Their most visible and direct access 
to policy-making was through congressional commissions, and by having some of 
their members win congressional seats. But in most cases, they resorted to their 
analytical authority and knowledge and information on particular policy issues in 
order to exert their power of influence in different policy arenas within the 
political system. While Congress was the most visible of these arenas, they 
prioritised influencing the Executive, given its importance in the policy-making 
process. 
There were clear informal channels among these societal groups and high-level 
decision-makers in the Executive - including the president and the ministers - due 
to the revolving door between government posts and positions in organisations 
such as producer associations, the academia, think tanks and other private 
foundations. Formally, there were frequent institutional forums in which 
government and pressure groups interacted, but their direct influence over policy-
making happened through informal personal contacts with policy-makers away 
from public scrutiny. However, these groups resorted to the mass media and to the 
courts to present their cases when these channels of access failed (Bushnel, 1993; 
Hoskin, 1997). 
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2.4 Technocracy in Power 
2.4.1 Origins 
As a response to the policy immobility generated by the political arrangement 
described above, in 1968, the government of President Lleras Restrepo promoted a 
constitutional amendment to strengthen the Executive's power, with particular 
emphasis on the president's control over economic policy (Hartlyn, 1994; Archer, 
1997). In order to increase the Executive's command over the economic sector, 
monetary and fiscal policies were centralised and taken away from congressional 
intervention. Also, control over the budget and foreign trade was re-taken by the 
Executive, requiring the approval of the Finance Ministry and the DNP, instead of 
that of Congress. 
Heavily influenced by international trends - promoted by multilateral 
development agencies - the Lleras Restrepo administration (1966 - 1970) 
strengthened state intervention and the centralisation of policy decision-making 
and planning (Cepeda Ulloa, 1980). It also aimed to professionalise the 
bureaucracy in key areas of government, as well as of the policy-making process, 
by basing it on technical assessments of policy and public investment projects. 
This prompted the training and recruitment of a technical work force in decision-
making positions within the state that was to be the precursor of the technocratic 
teams of the 1980's and 1990's. 
Two central policy-making bodies were strengthened along these lines within the 
Executive. The Economic and Social National Council (CONPES), chaired by the 
president, which was to become the highest level of policy decision-making and 
the National Planning Department (DNP), which was put in charge of the national 
development plan and, along with the Finance Ministry, of the public annual 
budget. All decisions related to the national budget - including budget allocations 
to the different ministries and national agencies - were put under the joint 
responsibility of the Finance Ministry and the National Planning Department. 
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For the sake of improving and rationalising policy-making, a particular effort was 
made to isolate these two government agencies from party politics and the patronage 
network that had taken control of all realms of the political system. The positions of 
both Finance Minister and Director of the National Planning Department were no 
longer subject to political bargaining and they were assigned to technical 
professionals who were close to the president. The assignment of these two policy-
makers tended to be stable and the high level of circulation that permeated the other 
ministries was avoided. 
The recruitment of policy-makers for both agencies was made from highly trained 
technical professionals, mostly economists, who did not have previous political 
experience. This effort started a trend in which the government became the principal 
recruiter of economists with graduate studies in important universities in the United 
States and in Europe for the following thirty years (Cepeda, 1994). This strategy 
played an important part in Colombia's economic perfonnance during that same 
period of time 6, since it successfully limited the political use of economic policy 
and provided the state with the capacity to manage the growing complexity of 
economic policy. As a result, the Ministry of Finance, the National Planning 
Department, along with the Central Bank and the Office of the President, became 
the source and support of state refonn and policy change initiatives in the following 
decades. 
The expanSIon of the central level's control over national policy-making was 
another feature of this effort to regain control of policy-making. More than 60 
central agencies were created during the 1960's and 1970's (Bird, 1984) putting 
under central control policy responsibilities previously in the hands of regional and 
local governments, such as water supply and sewage, health and education. 
Simultaneously, the government created regional and field offices for these agencies 
under central control and with no fonnal link to regional and local authorities, 
whose functions and responsibilities were overtaken. 
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As a consequence of this centralisation process, in the early 1970's health and 
education became the exclusive responsibility of the federal government - in what 
was called the "nationalisation" of health and education. From then on, teachers and 
health workers became civil servants under the jurisdiction of the national lever. 
Tax revenue resources for primary education and health services were allocated to 
the different departments, but it was the regional offices of the ministries of health 
and education that received and managed such resources, with no participation by 
regional authorities. 
2.4.2 The Arrival of Technocracy to Power: 
The Barco Administration (1986 -1990) 
The arrival of President Barco to power in 1986 marked a turning point in politics 
and policy-making in Colombia. His profile was different from that of his 
predecessors in that he had a highly technical background as well as experience in 
politics. He also brought with him the experience obtained by his exposure to the 
international arena. He had occupied technical ministries such as the public works 
and agriculture ministries and had broad international experience in Washington 
as director for Colombia in the World Bank and in London as ambassador. He 
also had an active participation in politics: he was a member of Congress for more 
than twenty years and had his political base outside the capital. He was also 
Mayor of Bogota. He had studied engineering in Colombia and post-graduate 
studies at MIT. 
His administration attempted to change the political rules of the game and 
introduced major state and economic reforms. Although these reform efforts were 
not to be consolidated during his administration, they set the basis for the period 
of major reforms that were to follow in the 1990's in the economic and social 
sectors. He considered technical expertise as a condition for state performance, 
and thus was the first to empower public officials with high technical skills and 
entrust them with the formulation and implementation of the public agenda in 
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several fields. He also systematically attempted to bridge the gap between this 
new breed of policy-makers and politicians. 
President Barco tried to depart from the traditional coalition government 
arrangement by presenting in his candidacy a liberal platform with little space for 
the conservative agenda - a stark difference from the previous conservative 
government that incorporated the agenda and the members of the Liberal party in a 
traditional coalition government. The resulting party unity, along with the weakness 
and the lack of support for the departing conservative government8, gave the Liberal 
party a clear majority (58%, vis-a-vis the Conservative party, which obtained 34% 
of the votes). 
But party unity for electoral purposes was not sustained once the Liberal party was 
in power. The government received serious criticism from its own ranks, particularly 
congressmen eager to pursue their political careers by differentiating themselves 
and/or their factions, instead of by abiding by party discipline. But in spite of 
politicians' resistance from within and outside the party, President Barco pursued 
his efforts to modernise the state. For that purpose he empowered a group of 
technocrats9 whose power depended exclusively on his political support. They 
occupied the core positions in government - Finance, Planning, Central Bank and 
the Office of the President - and became the government's spokesmen, particularly 
in Congress. Their technical apolitical discourse and their lack of experience in 
political manoeuvring created serious tension between the Executive and Congress, 
and President Barco had to reshuffle his cabinet in order to protect his technocratic 
team. 
In spite of the regions' control over Congress and the prevailing effects of the 
National Front accord, the Barco administration managed to introduce key state 
reforms. It legislated and implemented the first major decentralisation effort, 
which devolved the management responsibility of a series of public goods and 
services to local governments. Such was the case of water and sewerage, local 
infrastructure, urban and rural electricity, rural extension services, infrastructure for 
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primary education and health, urban public services and urban planning, among 
others. This was accompanied by the reallocation of resources in the fonn of 
intergovernmental transfers and an increase of the share of the value-added tax to be 
transferred directly to municipal governments with 45 % earmarked for social 
services and infrastructure. 
In the political arena, it passed a constitutional amendment by which mayors were to 
be elected by popular vote in local elections, and were to assume executive 
responsibilities as heads of local governments. This endowed local governments 
with greater autonomy and limited the centre's influence over local policy-making lO • 
Other measures aimed at enhancing community participation were the establishment 
of the practice of referendums for decision-making on key issues, the direct election 
of local administrative boards - community bodies with delegated executive 
functions - as well as other measures. 
In the economic arena, the Barco administration introduced what was called the 
Strategy for Modernisation and Internationalisation of the Economy. Since its 
approval was achieved during the last year of the administration, only a few 
measures were implemented - such as lowering import tariffs - but this effort set 
in motion Colombia's economic refonn during the following administration. Of 
particular relevance was the fact that for the first time, this reform was conducted 
by the small group of technocratic policy-makers close to Barco, thus forming an 
economic change team 11. The economic reform's policy formulation - the white 
paper - as well as the first steps towards implementation, were put in the hands of 
this team made up of a few ministers and presidential advisors with highly 
technical skills, and who had been part of the Barco government since his arrival 
in power. Figure (2.2) shows the location of the economic team in the Gaviria 
administration. 
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Figure 2.2: Government's Economic Team* 
(1990 - 1994) 
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2.4.3 The Consolidation of Technocracy in Power: 
The Gaviria Administration (1990 - 1994) 
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In 1990, Cesar Gaviria became the youngest president of Colombia at the age of 43. 
He had been the campaign co-ordinator for the Liberal party's presidential 
candidate, Luis Carlos Galan, who was assassinated by the drug cartels when he was 
the most likely winner of the presidential elections. Gaviria counted on the support 
of fonner President Barco, in whose administration he was Chief of Staff for several 
years until joining Galan's campaign. Gaviria and his close teanl were economists 
with post-graduate degrees mostly obtained abroad. Nonetheless, he had enough 
political manoeuvring skills to manage to secure the support of fonner Galan 
followers who were also in favour of major reform, as well as that of the traditional 
leaders of the Liberal party. 
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Gaviria formed the first echelons of his governments with the youngest generation 
of highly technical professionals with little previous experience in politics: their 
average age was in the early thirties. Only a few members of his cabinet stemmed 
from the ranks of the traditional party elite. He appointed the ex-guerrilla leader of 
the former M-19 group - now Democratic Alliance movement - Navarro, as Health 
MinisterJ2. Gaviria also appointed civilians to posts historically assigned to the 
military, such as Minister of Defence, and the DAS director. 
The Gaviria administration set out to implement a radical reform in Colombia's 
institutional context, the state and the economy. The economic reform was based on 
market liberalisation, privatisation, and the modernisation and internationalisation of 
the economy. This was not set in motion as a response to a perceived acute 
economic crisis. Instead, it sought to increase economic growth through economic 
liberalisation with particular emphasis on trade and labour reforms. 
In spite of the emphasis on the technical aspects of their policy initiatives, President 
Gaviria and his economic team were aware of the political implications of their 
reform agenda. According to Montenegro, the DNP director, their reform agenda 
was aimed at trying to dismantle the model of elitist pluralism that had led to the 
state's capture by important business groups. One that had resulted in public policies 
responding to particular interests, high protectionism, state inefficiency, and its 
inability to procure policy change (Montenegro, 1997). Hommes, the Finance 
Minister, who had an open confrontation with one of the most powerful economic 
groups in the country - Grupo Santodomingo - backed this position. 
The economic change team's liberalisation initiative counted on the backing of 
multilateral agencies, such as the World Bank, which had been promoting it for the 
last decade. Within Colombia, a coalition of strong actors supported trade 
liberalisation. These included the export sector, politicians, technocrats and some 
producer groups; as well as some universities and think tanks with high credibility 
in public opinion which counted among its members a significant number of former 
policy-makers who still had political influence. 
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The government presented an initial package of in-depth economic reforms -
designed by its economic team - and had them approved in Congress13. This set of 
laws was completed with a series of policy initiatives that were approved by 
presidential decree. A particularly controversial one was the labour reform - to 
which President Gaviria had given priority - and which was prepared by his team 
before taking office in order to have it ready to submit to Congress (Urrutia, 1996). 
Congress had a tradition of impeding any initiative that could diminish labour rights 
or go against organised labour's interests, but the academia played an important role 
in showing levels of unemployment and job instability as a direct result of the 
existing labour legislation. Thus, the labour reform was approved in spite of 
organised labour's opposition. 
The rather swift approval of the labour law can also be attributed to the fact that the 
debate around the organisation of the National Constituent Assembly (ANC) was 
taking place simultaneously, taking public attention away from these controversial 
reforms. Issues such as the drug cartel crisis and the guerrilla movement further 
diverted public attention. Opinion polls at the time showed that the electorate backed 
the Executive's policy and the Executive moved on with its economic liberalisation 
agenda (Urrutia, 1996). 
As had been the case during the Barco administration, the group working on these 
reforms was small and relatively isolated from bureaucratic pressure. The economic 
change team started formulating these policy initiatives before President Gaviria 
took office, thus securing the possibility of presenting them for legislation in due 
time. Figure (2.3) shows the sectors that were reformed during the Gaviria 
administration. The small dots show the presence of economic team members who 
were appointed to positions within these sectors to lead their reform process. 
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During the process of policy formulation that continued once Gaviria had taken 
office, the strongest opposition to Gaviria's reform agenda stemmed from within the 
Executive. Particularly from the Minister of Economic Development, Emesto 
Samper - a Liberal Party member, but from an opposing faction , who had joined 
Gaviria' s campaign and was to succeed him as president. He led another group of 
economists l4 who although not being against economic liberalisation in principle, 
criticised the pace and depth at which Gaviria' s economic change team was 
planning it. This prompted a long and serious struggle between the two government 
factions, which eventually needed the direct arbitrage of the president. 
The economic change team saw the relevance of the social sector as a key 
investment in the country's human capital, but saw its institutional organisation as a 
welfare-style apparatus which was extremely politicised. They therefore thought that 
new mechanisms and institutional changes should be introduced in order to promote 
efficiency through targeting, decentralisation, demand subsidies and the 
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involvement of the private sector in the provision of services. Budgetary allocations 
for the social sector during this period were not diminished, but actual expenditure 
and implementation were delayed in part by the requirements of the new 
Constitution for institutional change (Consejeria Presidencial para la Politica Social, 
1994). 
2.4.4 The 1991 National Constituent Assembly (ANC) 
In 1991, in the midst of the Gaviria administration, the National Constituent 
Assembly (ANC) was elected and started to operate. Its mandate was to draft a 
new Constitution that was to respond to the political needs and aspirations of 
Colombian society in the 1990'sI5. After a year of work, the ANC issued a 
comprehensive new Constitution that involved a radical institutional reform as well 
as reforms in the political, economic and social spheres. The institutional reform 
included the reform of the Judicial and Legislative branches. 
The ANC aimed to establish a real balance of powers between the Congress and the 
Executive. It focused on reducing patronage and improving the transparency of the 
political process, as well as diminishing vote buying. For this purpose, it 
mandated the dismissal of Congress in August 1991 and new congressional 
elections later on that same year. Other measures included the democratic election 
of departmental governors, new measures geared at increasing political 
participation, and community participation in local affairs, as well as an electoral 
reform. 
In the social and economic spheres, the package of policy reforms that were 
presented by the Gaviria government to Congress was ratified by the ANC, and a 
new series of policy reforms were added to them by the ANC 6 • For the majority of 
these policy reforms, the ANC only presented a general framework and, in some 
cases, a series of guiding principles. This left policy formulation in the hands of the 
Executive and Congress, granting both branches of power a wide margin for 
manoeuvre to define the final content and direction of these reform initiatives. The 
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new Constitution gave the Executive one year to prepare the reform initiatives and 
the Legislature one congressional period to debate them. This contributed to 
speeding up the reform process in several policy areas, including health. 
2.4.5 Policy-Making after the ANC: The Remaining Structural Reforms 
Responding to the ANC's schedule requirements, and following its own style of 
policy-making, the Gaviria administration set out to prepare the series of policy 
initiatives to be presented in Congress in areas such as social security, education, 
transportation, sub-national governments regime, decentralisation, the budgetary 
process, and others. For this purpose, the government formed a series of change 
teams integrated by officials from the relevant ministries according to the policy 
initiative. For all policy proposals being prepared, the Finance Ministry and the 
National Planning Department headed the policy formulation process. Officials from 
the Ministries of Health and Labour formed the change team for the social security 
reform. 
This strategy was successful in streamlining the decision-making process within the 
Executive, and made it more expeditious. However, in spite of the ANC's mandate, 
the legislation process to approve this package of policy proposals proved to be 
much slower than the approval of the first package of reforms presented to Congress 
before the ANC. Given that Congress had gained leverage, the Executive's leeway 
to formulate and legislate policy initiatives without consensus building 
diminished. This forced the Executive's change teams to use more open political 
strategies, "market" their policy proposals to legislators and assist members of 
Congress in charge of presenting the reform bills. 
Factionalism and fragmentation remained virtually the same after the ANC. The 
fragile unity of the newly emerged political forces - stemming from the 
demobilised guerrilla groups - was broken. The influence of unions, interest 
groups, and sub-national governments increased. As a result, when the Executive 
sought the approval of a policy initiative in Congress, it had to bargain in most cases 
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on an individual basis with each legislator (Shugart, 1992). However, the prevailing 
intra-party factional politics of the traditional parties helped the Gaviria 
government secure the needed number of votes for the approval of its policy 
initiatives, since it could compensate the loss of votes of its own party with a 
number of votes from the Conservative party - particularly from a new 
technocratic and pro-modernisation faction, led by future President Pastrana. 
Also as a result of the new Constitution, society turned its attention to the policies 
being discussed in Congress, thus submitting the process to a higher degree of 
public scrutiny. The politicisation of the policy debate was further increased by 
the weakening of the Gaviria government, who had lost society'S original support 
in bringing about radical reform, and was facing the lowest levels of popularity 
due to a perceived mismanagement of the drug traffic issue and an energy crisis. 
This empowered societal actors such as the unions, which found effective means 
to influence decision-making and to veto policies counter to their interests l7 , in 
stark contrast to their low profile during the expeditious approval of the labour 
reform. 
The first generation reforms - related to the economIC adjustment - were 
formulated and legislated during Gaviria's first years in office, when he counted 
on a strong popular mandate for reforming the state and had enough time to 
implement and consolidate policy changes. The social reforms - or second 
generation reforms - were legislated during the second period of Gaviria's 
government, with no time left for their implementation, and during a particular 
time in which Congress enjoyed recently acquired leverage due to the new 
Constitution. This not only reflected the complex preparation for implementation 
this set of policies required, but the fact that their processes of fonnulation and 
legislation were more lengthy and controversial than those of the first set of 
refonns. Since it cannot be argued that the first generation refonns were less 
controversial, it may be concluded that the determinant factor was the political 
context in which both groups of reforms were legislated. 
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2.4.6 Technocracy Delimited: The Samper Administration (1994 - 1998) 
In August 1994, the Liberal Party's candidate, Emesto Samper, was elected 
president after winning slightly more than 1% over his rival in second-round 
elections - having lost the first round. This weak mandate, and the drug money 
political scandal that soon besieged his governmene s, forced Samper back to old 
power-sharing politics. Also following his more political profile, he focused 
policy-making on the construction and maintenance of a large and heterogeneous 
coalition of political support - with the marked presence of the traditional 
political leadership. As a result, his government's composition reflected the 50%-
50% arrangement similar to the coalition governments of the National Front 
accord, and budget allocations and public project implementation followed clear 
criteria of political survival19 • He did, however, maintain the technocratic profile 
of the economic ministries, where he appointed two respected economists - Perry 
and Ocampo - Finance Minister and DNP director respectively. 
Although stemming from the Liberal party too, the Samper administration 
represented a departure in ideological stand from the preceding Barco and Gaviria 
administrations. During his term as Economic Minister under the Gaviria 
administration, Samper headed - along with Finance Minister Ocampo, who was 
then Agriculture Minister - the most visible resistance to President Gaviria's 
policy agenda stemming from within the Executive. At the time, his faction 
opposed the radicalliberalisation measures promoted by Gaviria's economic team 
on the grounds that the country could not undergo policy and institutional change 
at such a speed, and that the reforms' content did not reflect society's 
participation. Therefore, during his administration, he sought to slow down the 
reform process and, in a great departure from their top-down technocratic process, 
to search for consensus building around policy initiatives. As a result, interest 
groups such as unions, professional associations and the bureaucracy, recuperated 
the leverage they had lost in previous administrations, and regained access to 
policy decision-making. 
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President Samper's economIC team did not resemble the small, isolated and 
powerful group of technocrats who worked close to President Gaviria. Instead, 
although the Minister of Finance and the Planning Director still held the most 
influential positions, their leeway for manoeuvre was severely limited by the 
participation of other cabinet ministers - as well as many presidential advisors -
who were given voice and veto power in cabinet meetings. This made policy-
making slow and even erratic, as was the case of the health reform's initial 
implementation process. 
It was in this political context that the reforms formulated and legislated during 
the second period of the Gaviria administration were implemented. These 
included, among others, decentralisation, education, social security and health. 
Furthermore, President Samper's visible opposition to some of these reform 
initiatives during the previous administration was not only a clear precedent of his 
intention to modify them during their implementation, but also sent confusing 
signals about his administration's support for them. This had serious repercussions 
in both the speed and scope of these reforms, with health being no exception. 
However, while reforms such as decentralisation and trade liberalisation were 
drastically modified and in some cases halted - with some attempts at reverting 
laws that had already been approved in Congress - the Samper government moved 
ahead with the social sector reforms - including health - with the expectation of 
gaining political dividends by showing an emphasis on the social sector over 
economlcs. 
2.5 Summary and Main Points 
This chapter has described the main characteristics of the political context in 
which the Colombian health reform was initiated in the early nineties. In 
Colombia, the Executive has important policy-making powers. While some policy 
initiatives need to be approved by Congress, many others remain the domains of 
the Executive. This situation, even when modified by the ANC, played a key role 
in the state's ability to bring about policy change. This ability was reinforced by 
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the creation, started in the late 1980' s, of pockets of efficiency within government 
agencies - particularly in the economic institutions such as the Central Bank, the 
Ministry of Finance and the National Planning Department. Groups of technocrats 
stemming from these institutions, with the political backing of top decision-
makers, worked in the fonn of change teams, and as such, played key roles in the 
state's capacity to fonnulate and pursue policy refonns - particularly in the 
economic sphere. During the early nineties, and as part of a major state refonn 
that touched the economic and social spheres, change teams were also fonned in 
social sectors such as health and pensions, and were empowered to develop and 
pursue policy refonn. 
Nevertheless, these refonn proposals faced resistance at various stages of their 
policy process. The first and most important one was the Executive itself, where 
opposing views and ideologies on economic refonns confronted each other in the 
1980' s and early 1990' s, and did so again on social refonns throughout the 
1990's. Another policy node was Congress. The interaction between the Executive 
and Congress was a complex one, due to the characteristics of interest 
representation in Colombia and the configuration of the legislative chambers. For 
many congressmen, incentives to participate in policy process fonnulation were 
more related to the patronage resources they could tap into, than to having 
influence over the end result of policy decision-making. The high levels of party 
fragmentation and factionalism reduced the veto power of the opposition, but also 
severely hampered the Executive's efforts at consensus building. 
Other groups that intervened in the process of policy-making such as producer 
associations, unions, think tanks, the media and interest groups had varying levels 
of influence, depending on their own political resources and the political 
circumstances. However, with very few exceptions, they all shared serious 
impediments in influencing policy-making due to lack of representation of their 
own membership, fragmentation and poor institutional mechanisms for interest 
participation. 
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The political context played a key role in the process of health refonn. A social 
mandate called for the drafting of a new Constitution and a profound refonn of the 
state, political institutions, and the economic and social spheres. The Gaviria 
administration saw in this a window of opportunity to pursue, with the backing of 
Congress, at first a series of economic refonns and later on, a set of social-sector 
refonns, which included education, housing, social security, and health. 
However, while the Gaviria government had enough time in power to implement 
its first set of refonns, it only managed to fonnulate and legislate its social-sector 
refonns. The implementation of the latter occurred in a very different political 
context and under an administration with a different ideological stand. The policy-
making strategies of the Samper administration were a radical departure from 
those of the Gaviria administration. Sam per emphasised consensus building and a 
slower pace for policy change. The political management of these strategies was 
complicated by a political crisis that severely weakened the government, reducing 
its capacity for action and changing its policy priorities. 
These circumstances gave enonnous power to Congress and different interest 
groups, such as unions and business groups, who were thus able to obtain 
important concessions - such as salary increases, privileges, and modifications to 
policy content. While these political circumstances hampered the state's capacity 
to pursue policy change, major policy changes were nevertheless implemented in 
the case of the health sector refonn - if at a much slower pace than first 
envisioned. The health refonn was to become one of the most visible results of the 
Samper administration. 
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Footnotes for Chapter 2 
I Among the mechanisms trying to reverse the power imbalance between the Executive and 
Congress included in the 1991 constitution, is a new prerogative by which Congress may veto 
these appointments. 
2 The idea of the pendulum pattern is borrowed from the analysis of Mexican politics of Cornelius 
and Craig (1998), and is presented here to stress the similarities between the two countries: In 
spite of both being formal democracies, the political elites in both countries established power-
sharing rules with similar results in the "sway" between conservative and liberal governments in 
power. The only difference being that, as it will be discussed in Part Ill, while Mexico's power-
sharing rules and elite rotation were established within the framework of a single party, in 
Colombia they were established within two. 
3 This was the case of the Revolutionary Liberal Movement, which in spite of obtaining a significant 
number of votes for Congress, was excluded from power-sharing in the 1960's. 
4 The Turbay government (1978 - 1982). 
5 In the business sector, some of the most influential groups have been ANDI, FASECOLDA, 
ASOBANCARIA, FENALCO, ANIF, SAC, Santo domingo Group, Ardila Lule Grupo and 
Sarmiento Carvajal Group. 
6 Colombia had an economic growth averaging four points during the 70's and 80's and avoided 
the cycles of depression and hyperinflation that were common in other Latin American countries 
during that period. 
7 A policy reform that was supported by the education and health unions since it facilitated their 
unification in one central and national body, thus strengthening their negotiation power vis-a-vis 
the state. 
8 Due to the effects of the Latin American economic crisis, which were being felt at the time, and 
the Betancourt government's mismanagement of the political crisis generated by the M -19 
guerrilla group's invasion of the Palace of Justice, which ended in a massacre. 
9 This group of public officials can be described as technocrats because they were assigned senior 
positions due to their technical skills, but in those positions they were expected to pursue political 
manoeuvring in favour of their policy agenda. See Dominguez, 1997. 
10 In the health sector, it passed Law lOin 1990, which reorganised government functions within 
the sector by granting municipalities the responsibility for primary health care as well as first-level 
hospitals and health centres. The same law assigned responsibility for second-level hospitals to 
departmental governments, as well as the co-ordination of health campaigns. The central 
government was left the responsibility of policy formulation, the establishment of national 
minimum health standards, and the management of third-level hospitals. Central-level institutions 
were either reformed, as was the case of the Ministry of Health, or dismantled, as was the case of 
the National Hospital Fund, and the National Health Institute - which was converted into a 
research institute. 
11 The team was formed by Maria Mercedes Cuellar, Minister of Economic Development -
previously director of the DNP also during Barco's government; Luis Fernando Alarcon, Minister 
of Finance; Luis Bernardo Florez, Director of the National Planning Department - previously 
Finance Vice Minister and Deputy Director of DNP also under the Barco administration; as well 
as the directors of the Central Bank and the Administrative Department of the Presidency. 
12 Who, in tum, appointed many of his rank and file to positions in the Ministry of Health. 
13 This first set of reform initiatives included the exchange-rate regime (Law 9, 1991 (January)); 
foreign trade (Law 7, 1991 (January»; fmancial matters (Law 45, 1990 (December»; taxation reform 
(Law 49, 1990 (December)); harbour privatisation (Law 1, 1990 (January)); labour regime (Law 50, 
1990 (December)); housing subsidies and fmance (Law 3, 1990 (January»; and government 
indebtedness (Law 51, 1990 (December)). 
14 As in the case of Gaviria's team, Samper was backed by a technocratic team, led by Ocampo (a 
PhD in Economics from Yale University and previous Director of Fedesarrollo, the most 
important economic centre of studies in Colombia), and including the previous Barco Director of 
the National Planning Department (Flores), as well as Guillermo Perry (a former Minister of 
Energy and PhD in Economics). 
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15 The 1886 Constitution and its subsequent amendments up to 1968, were based on the 
assumption that the political horizon in Colombia was exclusively composed of two catch-aU 
political parties. The peace process that was started in the mid-1980's aiming at ending the 
guerrilla war, recognised the need to open institutional political representation to other forces and 
groups that had been excluded. During the 1990 congressional elections, a student-led movement 
forced the insertion of an additional ballot asking voters whether they wanted a constitutional 
reform. The "yes" vote won 90% and led to the National Constituent Assembly during the Gaviria 
administration. 
16 Among others: social security, public services, education system, higher education, the 
provision of electricity services regime, economic and social planning, the budgetary process, 
financial regulation, central bank, intergovernmental transfers and decentralisation, 
telecommunications, civil service, transport sector and public works, and territorial organisation. 
17 This was particularly the case during the approval of legislation regarding the social sector. A 
case in point is the attempt at decentralising education, which ran counter to the interests of the 
teacher's union (FECODE), which called a two-month strike and forced the government to change 
its position. 
18 Once Samper was elected though not yet in office, aUegations that the Liberal campaign had 
been financed with money from the Cali drug-cartel were made public. By the end of his first year 
in government, the Defence Minister - Samper's closest aUy during the campaign - was 
imprisoned along with another dozen Liberal congressmen as a result of the investigations carried 
out by the General Prosecutor. In such a situation, President Samper decided to form a coalition 
government, in order to achieve a clear majority in Congress, since this was the only branch of 
government that could conduct an eventual political trial against him. This resulted in the most 
serious political crisis in Colombia since the early twentieth century, but President Samper 
managed to complete his term and the Congress declared him not guilty. 
19 A large number of appointments in the bureaucracy, as weU as in the higher levels of 
government, were made according to political interests and commitments. In a similar manner, 
public projects were developed in regions where loyal congressmen had their political base. 
Government agencies were once more captured by local interests and political leaders. Pork barrel 
resumed in Congress, but pressing for larger quotas in budget aUocations and with a more visible 
political use of social programs (Salazar, 1997). 
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Chapter 3. The Policy Process 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a brief background of the health system and the problems 
that were considered for its reform, followed by an overview of the reform 
agenda. The rest of the chapter is organised following the sequential order of a 
reform process, starting with problem definition and reform formulation, and 
ending with the initial strategies of policy implementation. Throughout this 
sequence, the actors involved in the process, their strategies and their influence 
over the reform's content are analysed. 
3.2 Background 
In 1991, when the debate around the reform was initiated, in spite of the fact that 
compulsory affiliation to social security was established by law, only 20% of the 
popUlation was enrolled. The Institute of Social Security (ISS) was the largest 
agency offering social security, but there were another 1,040 social security 
organisations in the country. Among them, those created by governmental 
agencies to provide health services to their employees (4% of the population); Co-
operative Health Organisations or "Cajas"l, which offered some health services 
for formal sector workers organised by economic activity and their families; and 
the private insurance companies that catered for the highest income groups (4.5% 
of the population). There were also some experiments with co-operatives and 
mutual organisations. This spontaneous institutional development generated an 
overlapping of expenditure and affiliation, as well as segregation (Londono, 
1996). 
The rest of the population was formally covered by servIces financed and 
provided by the Ministry of Health through its own facilities. However, it was 
estimated that only half of this group had real access to health care, and those who 
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could afford it, turned to private providers in search for better quality of care 
(Jaramillo, 1997). 
The health reform initiated in 1991 in Colombia reflected an international trend in 
social security reform. It introduced a more dynamic role for both the public and 
the private sector and reconsidered the management and allocation of funds 
destined to the health sector and to pensions. But the context, the formal and 
informal political institutions and the main actors involved, made it peculiar to 
Colombia and its political circumstances in the early nineties. 
The leading objective behind the reform can be summarised as the need to 
rationalise health expenditure by creating in the long term a single system that 
would cater to all citizens and, in doing so, introduce equity and universality by 
eliminating the relation between purchasing power and access to a minimum level 
of health care. The new system envisioned in the reform intended to provide 
universal health coverage through a compulsory social security system organised 
around two health plans: a contributory health plan and a subsidised health plan. 
The first was to cover the employees and the independent workers who could 
afford to pay, and the second the poor, estimated at approximately 30% of the 
population. It was expected that both health plans would offer the same package 
of basic health care services (POS) by the year 2001 (8 years after the reform was 
legislated). 
In order to introduce diversity and a certain degree of competition, an array of new 
providers were created. Some to manage health care and others to provide it. The 
Law distinguished the function of provision of services from that of articulating 
them: the IPS (Health Service Providers) supply services and the EPS 
(Organisations to Articulate Health Services) purchase them. Every person had to 
enrol in an EPS, or in the case of the subsidised health plan, to a Solidary Health 
Enterprise (ESS) -organisations to articulate the health services under the 
subsidised health plan. Competition was created in the provision of services, but 
not in their financing, in order to minimise dispersion of services and 
segmentation of markets. Free choice was established2• 
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The new system introduced solidarity mechanisms such as the establishment of a 
UPC (Risk Adjusted per Capita Payment), which potentially allowed equal 
resources for each beneficiary with no relation to his/her payment capacity or 
health risk. In the case of the contributory health plan, the premium to enrol was 
calculated according to the enrolee's payment capacity and not according to 
hislher risk probability. Families enrolled in the contributory health plan allow 1 % 
of their payment to go to the subsidised health plan, and this contribution was 
expected to be matched by at least the same amount of resources from public 
sources. The rest of the resources for the subsidised health plan came from the 
national budget and resources from the health territorial authorities. 
All funds were expected to concentrate in a single national account (FOSYGA) 
from which health management organisations were paid according to their number 
of affiliates adjusted by risk, age, sex, and other factors (see figure (3.1 )). Under 
this new scheme, the ISS was formally converted into an EPS joining many others 
in the contributory health plan. The reformers expected that with the creation of 
new health providers, competition, and the opt-out option, many ISS affiliates 
would resort to new services and thus the ISS would diminish considerably in size 
- to a point where it would cease to be the central actor in the health system. 
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Law 100 created a National Council for Social Security in Health (CNSS) with 
regulatory powers, thus formally limiting the role of the MOH to the 
administration of some facilities and technical assistance. Provision of services 
was shifted from the Ministry to local agencies and independent providers; and a 
Superintendence was created to monitor and survey the system. 
The process that culminated in the approval and initial implementation of Law 
100 passed through a series of "policy nodes" where the reform's probability of 
being approved and implemented were at stake, and its content was greatly 
modified. These were the National Constituent Assembly (ANC) (January-June 
1991); the Social Security Commission established by the new Constitution to 
define the basic points of a social security project (July-December 1991); the 
reform formulation within the Executive (1992); the debate in Congress with its 
different stages: commissions, plenary sessions, conciliatory process (1993); the 
drafting of the reform's regulatory body at the MOH (January-August 1994); the 
formulation of the Executive decrees (1995) and the initial stages of the 
implementation process under a new administration. 
Most of the issues under discussion gravitated around the tension between the 
ideas of solidarity and efficiency that different groups would like to see 
predominate in the new social security system. The final result was a compromise 
with the inclusion of both of them as the main principles behind the reform. This 
tension was present since the early stages of the debate around health reform 
during the drafting of the new Constitution, and prevailed until the reform's initial 
implementation stage. The other tension present during the whole reform process 
was around the new roles assigned to the public and the private sectors. The 
reform of the health services redefined the relations between the state, the market, 
and society. This was reflected in the public/private mix that was finally 
formulated and is currently being implemented. 
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3.3 Problem Definition and Policy Formulation 
The debate around a social security reform, and with it, that of a health reform was 
initiated in an unprecedented environment of plural participation of the National 
Constituent Assembly along with issues such as in-depth state and political 
reform. The analysis of a social security reform was assigned to Commission V, in 
charge of economic, social and environmental issues. Within it, there were two 
dominant positions vis-a-vis the issue. One in favour of introducing competition 
and a pUblic-private mIX to increase efficiency, and the other in favour of 
promoting solidarity and universal access in a non-segmented system that 
preserved a strong role for the state. The former position was backed by the 
economic team of the Gaviria administration and the president himself, some 
members of the ANC and the business community; while the latter was backed by 
the cabinet members with a pro-state ideology, the Institute of Social Security 
(ISS) and organised societal groups such as the unions3• 
Since no agreement was reached, the new Constitution established a consensual 
combination of both positions as social security principles: on the one hand, 
solidarity and universal care, and, at the same time, efficiency and a public/private 
mix in the provision of health care. Thus, the new Constitution, through articles 
48 and 49, defined social security as a compulsory public service under state 
control, guided by the principles of efficiency, universality and solidarity. The 
service should be decentralised and could be provided by either public or private 
agencies. Finally, the new Constitution established the conformation of a 
Commission in charge of establishing the basis for the social security reform 
within six months after its formal issuance4• 
This Social Security Commission worked during the last four months of 1991 at 
the Ministry of Labour. According to the decree that created it, this Commission 
was made up of members of government, unions, business associations, political 
and societal movements, peasant organisations, and informal workers. Issues such 
as health services, pensions and labour risks were discussed by the different sub-
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commissions. The discussion around the health reform was co-ordinated by a 
former member of the ANC5, and had seven members: two representing 
government, two representing unions, one representative of the small businesses, 
one member of the Liberal party and one of the agriculture association. Those 
meetings focused mainly on the definition of social security; they were dominated 
by the unions and the government was not able to generate support around its 
proposals (Interview 05/12/98). 
While the debate was taking place at the ANC and the Social Security 
Commission, the government continued to work on the development of social 
security reform initiatives to be included in the National Development Plan, at the 
Planning Department (DNP). The Plan was ready in August 1991, scarcely a 
month after the new Constitution was approved, which points to the fact that 
policy formulation was taking place simultaneously and independently from the 
ANC and its Commissions. Within the Executive, policy formulation was 
assigned to the DNP's technical policy-makers and a few experts from academia. 
No other group from society participated, since the goal of these discussions was 
not consensus building, but the formulation of policy reform initiatives with a 
high level of technical content. 
The debate around the social security reform was therefore occumng 
simultaneously in two parallel arenas. While there was an inclusive debate at the 
ANC, with the participation of several interested actors in society, open to public 
scrutiny and looking for consensus, there was a simultaneous process of policy 
negotiation within the Executive open only to policy-makers and their 
bureaucratic factions, and away from public scrutiny. Therefore the health policy 
defined in the Gaviria administration's Development Plan presented the 
government's initial position towards the reform, even though it tried to introduce 
the principles defined by the ANC and incorporated in the new Constitution. 
The National Development Plan of President Gaviria - called "La Revolucion 
Pacifica" - did not consider a health reform as such. The chapter on health policy 
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had as main guidelines the improvement of efficiency within the system and the 
strengthening of local health services. Nor did it contain the social security reform 
project, and instead assigned the responsibility of formulating it to the Social 
Security Commission, following the ANC's mandate. However, the Development 
Plan did contain most of the elements that were later to be part of the social 
security and health reform initiatives. These were the need to expand coverage to 
family members of social security affiliates, eliminate duplication in the provision 
of health services, and separate the health component of social security from 
pensions. It also addressed the need to continue the decentralisation process, allow 
the social security system to contract out services from a public/private mix of 
providers, and introduce provider eligibility. There was also a suggestion to start a 
pilot experience in pre-paid health care for the poor funded with public resources 
in a voucher scheme - thus establishing demand-based resource allocation and 
target subsidies6• 
But beyond these general guidelines presented as the government's monolithic 
position, disagreement around the social security and health reforms between two 
main factions within the Gaviria administration prevailed. The Social Security 
Institute and its allies in the cabinet - such as Minister Samper - had a pro-state 
position, while the DNP and the rest of the economic team - including the 
Ministry of Finance - had a pro-market approach. Four different reform proposals 
were at stake. The one presented by the DNP was closer to President Gaviria's 
own ideas, and coincided with the state reform being promoted by his government 
in elements such as the introduction of competition and the definition of a new 
role for the private sector in the promotion of efficiency. According to some 
officials who opposed this proposal, it considered introducing the Chilean model 
of social security in Colombia, privati sing the health system and giving the 
principle of solidarity a secondary status (Interview 05/17/98). 
At the other extreme, the ISS wanted to maintain the monopoly of the state in 
social security, introducing competition only at the level of provision of services. 
The Ministry of Health7 presented a compromise between these two extreme 
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positions that would maintain the solidarity mechanism, while introducing some 
degree of competitions. Finally, ASMEDAS, the unions' association, wanted to 
maintain the monopoly for the ISS in every aspect - affiliation and provision of 
services - and expand its coverage under the same conditions9 • 
A very politicised debate continued in society after the ANC's Social Security 
Commission's mandate had ended. It involved many actors and forums in Bogota 
and in the regions, such as university seminars, experts' discussions, and 
international seminars, among others. Among the groups that were involved were 
unions; think tanks, such as Fedesarrollo, Fescol and Consenso (the team that left 
the ISS with Cecilia Lopez's resignation); NGO's such as Fundacion Corona, 
Instituto Fes de Liderazgo and Metrosalud; and universities lo . The two factions in 
government not only were present in different roles in most of these debates, but 
also promoted some in alliance with the groups that favoured each of the two 
positions. Figure (3.2) shows these two coalitions across state-society lines that 
could be recognised along the main two policy positions: those who advocated 
solidarity and a predominant role for the state (ISS, Fescol, state unions), and 
those who advocated competition, efficiency, and a stronger role for the private 
sector (DNP, Ministry of Finance and business with interests on insurance 
companies). 
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As the Social Security Commission approached the end of its mandate without 
reaching an agreement, and with public debate around the issue still going on, the 
government moved on in order to jump-start the social security reform. First, in 
December 1992, it promulgated a series of executive decrees related to state 
reform, which included the transformation of the ISS, the Ministry of Health, the 
Health Superintendence and the public-sector employees' social security 
institutionsll . Through these executive decrees, the government streamlined key 
elements that would facilitate the health reform's implementation, while 
circumventing Congress and the need for consultation and consensus building that 
a bill would have required. 
Second, President Gaviria sought to end the fierce competition between factions 
within the Executive around the social security agenda, and to consolidate a single 
position within his government in support of the pro-market initiative. He 
dismantled the pro-state faction in a cabinet reshuffle during May 1992, in which 
he removed Cecilia Lopez, the Director of ISS who had been leading the 
opposition to the DNP proposal, and replaced her by Fanny Santamaria. 
Santamaria, who was at the time a senior official of the Ministry of Finance, was 
in favour of the economic team's technocratic proposal. Simultaneously, Luis 
Fernando Ramirez, a young conservative with many years of working experience 
in the private sector, and Deputy Finance Minister at the time, was appointed 
Labour Minister. Thus, President Gaviria put members of the economic team 
directly in charge of the social security reform by assigning them to the key 
government agencies involved in the reform, and buttressed the private sector's 
political support in its favour. Figure (3.3) shows the key members involved in the 
social security reform, their positions in the economic agencies, and the 
appointments they were given. 
Figure 3.3: Economic Team Members Assigned to 
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As part of this same effort to ensure the political feasibility of the penslOns 
refonn, President Gaviria decided at this stage to abandon the health reform. In his 
view, the government did not count on enough financial, institutional and political 
capital to reform both health and pensions simultaneously. His priority was clearly 
set in the pensions reform, as an element of the economic adjustment still to be 
completed12, and in his view, the complexity and visibility of a health reform 
initiative could jeopardise the political feasibility of passing a pensions initiative 
in Congress. His perception was further reinforced by his advisors, who felt that 
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there was not enough support behind the measures the government was 
envisioning for the health reform (Interview, 05117/98b). 
Thus, in September 1992, the government submitted a bill to Congress to reform 
social security, which addressed only the pensions component (Proyecto de Ley 
155, September 1992). The bill was called the Law for the Creation of Pension 
Savings (Ley para la Creaci6n de Ahorro Pensional). The Congress debated the 
proposal in December 1992. The bill found opposition from two fronts. From the 
unions, which feared that the reform would cut their benefits - the proposal 
included more requirements to join the system and offered less benefits - and 
from those groups that did not disagree with the proposal, but wanted to have the 
health component includedl3 • The resulting coalition responded simultaneously to 
two agendas: one responding to a genuine interest in ameliorating the health 
system; and the other using its inclusion as a strategy of delay against social 
security reform, counting on the health reform's formulation being a complex and 
long process. 
In a meeting with President Gaviria, the legislators effectively conditioned the 
pensions reform to the simultaneous inclusion of a comprehensive health reform 
in the same bill to be re-submitted to Congress. This interaction between the 
Executive and Congress makes health reform in Colombia a unique case. One in 
which it is Congress, and not the Executive, which stands behind the inclusion of 
a comprehensive health reform initiative on the public agenda. Thus it was in 
Congress that the reform found the political support to force the Executive to 
reconsider its inclusion in the social security reform. 
President Gaviria thus formed a high-level technical team within his government 
to develop the proposal in detail. The team was co-ordinated by the DNP, and 
involved officials from the DNP, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Labour, 
and the ISS. This team's proposal- called the Hatogrande Proposal- was strongly 
influenced by the neo-liberal model used by the Gaviria administration in the 
economic reforms that had also permeated the pensions reform. However, it 
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departed from the radical health reform proposal of the DNP, and took a more 
moderate position by responding to some of the concerns raised during the 
bureaucratic in-fight that had resulted in the ousting of the pro-state faction. It 
proposed a health system based on provider competition, compulsory affiliation 
and universal access to health care, with risk distribution and cross subsidies 
among income groups, and defined two health insurance plans, one contributory 
and one subsidisedl4 • 
The team presented the project to the DNP's director, Montenegro, a key member 
of the economic team, and to the deputy director, Londono, who was soon to 
become health minister. They approved it. It was also shared with the then 
Minister of Health, Gustavo de Roux, who did not oppose it, but was not 
committed to it either; since he found it too complex for the institutional capacity 
of the country, and at the same time too partial, in that it sought to transform the 
Ministry of Health, but not the ISS (Interview, OS/27/98). 
The Hatogrande proposal was presented to President Gaviria on November 16, 
1992. He found it too complex and was again concerned about the possibility of it 
jeopardising congressional approval of the pensions reform. He had in mind a 
health policy proposal that would respond to the legislators' concerns just enough 
to have them pass the pensions reform. In other words, he saw the need for a 
health reform initiative only as part of his negotiation strategy, but was yet to be 
convinced to include a comprehensive health reform in his policy agenda. Thus, 
he rejected the proposal and instead demanded the formulation of a small health 
initiative to create community health-care organisations - called Health Solidarity 
Enterprises (ESS)15 - and to channel through this new health service scheme, a 
large amount of fresh resources into the health sector. 
Two weeks after this meeting took place, and after the resignation of De Rouxl6, 
Gaviria named Juan Luis Londono Minister of Health on November 30, 1992. A 
liberal economist, Londono stemmed from the core of the government's economic 
team. As DNP deputy director, he had been directly involved in the government's 
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technocratic proposals related to social policy - social security, health and 
education - and had been supervising the Hatogrande proposal. Londono's 
appointment marks the consolidation of the economic team's control over the 
social security reform, since it followed the cabinet reshuffle, some months 
earlier, in which some of its members had been appointed to the ISS and the 
Ministry of Labour. From this time on, Londono played a crucial role in the health 
reform process, and became its clear leader. 
The initial health reform bill presented to Congress by Londono in December 
1992 was very limited in scope following President Gaviria's demand to constrain 
its content to the minimum necessary to respond to the Senate's demands. But the 
Congress considered it a half-hearted effort and rejected it once more, keeping its 
stand to condition the pensions reform to a more comprehensive health reform 
initiative. President Gaviria realised at this point that the Executive was losing 
political leadership and control over the social security reform, since now, it was 
being credited to the Legislative power. He thus moved swiftly to regain ground 
by concentrating efforts in putting together a sweeping health reform with more 
ambitious goals than those first intended by Congress. Therefore, with President 
Gaviria's support, Londono began to work on a comprehensive health reform 
taking as a departure point the Hatogrande project, which by then had been 
discussed with the ISS, Co-operative Health Organisations (Cajas), pre-paid 
medicine agencies, local health authorities and experts, and had reached some 
degree of consensus. 
For this purpose, Londono appointed a small group of policy-makers with no 
previous experience at the Ministry of Health - which will be called the health 
change team - under his direct control and isolated from the rest of the ministryl7. 
He then immediately proceeded to construct a closely-knit network of support 
around the reform and the change team itself. First, he concentrated on building 
strong alliances and ensuring the support of members of the government's 
economic team in senior positions at the key ministries - notably Finance and the 
DNP - which will be called vertical networks. 
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Second, he and other health team members reinforced informal links with mid-
level officials in government agencies such as the Labour Ministry and the 
Banking Commission - which will be called horizontal networks. The latter were 
to provide the health team with strategic information and knowledge, and were 
also to offer the team informal opportunities to make their case in these 
government agencies even when their senior official's support seemed to falter. 
Also as part of these horizontal networks, the team established selective links with 
other actors within the MOH, such as the finance staff within the ministry, which 
was more receptive to a health reform with an economic perspective. 
And finally, Londono and his team started to establish informal links - with no 
commitments on either side - and tapping the expertise and knowledge of groups 
in society such as think tanks, academia, business organisations, insurance and 
pharmaceutical companies, doctors' associations, private hospitals and others -
which will be called state-society networks 18• 
The change team worked on the new health reform proposal during early 1993, 
and had it ready in April, when congressional sessions were resumed. Following 
the institutional procedure, the Executive submitted an amendment to the initial 
social security bill. The amendment finally incorporated an integral and 
comprehensive proposal for social security reform in both pensions and health. 
The content of this health reform reflected a compromise between the two extreme 
positions that had permeated the policy debate around it from its outset in the 
different arenas where it had been discussed so far. Thus, along with efficiency, it 
included universal coverage and solidarity as its main principles. These principles 
were reflected in the reform's policy components, such as two health plans - a 
contributory one for those families with either a formal employment or with 
sufficient purchasing power, and a subsidised one for those families with informal 
employment and no purchasing capacity-, market competition mechanisms; and 
the establishment of a single health insurance fund (FOSYGA) in order to 
maintain the principle of solidarity among affiliated members of both health plans. 
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Figure (3.4) shows a political map of the principal actors who participated in this 
stage of the reform process, and their position vis a vis the reform (veto, support, 
or non-defined). The health reform has been placed at the centre. The relative 
distance of each actor with respect to the centre is an indication of its relative 
power to influence the reform's content. 
Figure 3.4: Reform Formulation Stage (1992 - 1993): 
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When the final health reform bill was submitted to Congress, it was turned to the 
respective commissions in the Upper and Lower Houses. Commission VII, in 
charge of Social Affairs, received it for discussion. As was the case in the ANC, 
the members of this commission represented a plurality of political forces that 
went beyond those present within the Executive and the two traditional political 
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parties. The Liberal and Conservative parties were not dominant and there were 
representatives from left-wing parties such as the UP and M-19, and civic groups. 
The proposal was perceived as an attempt at dismantling and even privati sing the 
ISS (Interview 05/12/98). This caused a severe reaction among those members of 
the commission who wanted to preserve the ISS monopoly and the social security 
benefits of public sector employees. The Law was debated with intensity at this 
stage, and several modifications were introduced. 
The Congressional Commissions generated a new long public debate around the 
social security refonn, in which many groups in society were consulted. The main 
actors intervening in the discussions were the Minister of Health, government 
officials, local health authorities, private health institutions such as pre-paid 
medicine organisations, health providers, the phannaceutical industry, the 
Colombian Medical Federation (ASCOFAME), the Colombian Hospital 
Association, the National Medicine Academy, the insurance companies, producer, 
industrial and financial associations (Consejo Gremial, Andi, Asobancaria), labour 
organisations and unions (Asmedas, Anea, Sintra, ISS), Co-operative Health 
Organisations (Cajas de Compensaci6n), NGO's and foundations (Corona, 
Fundaci6n FES de Liderazo), think tanks (Fescol, Consenso, Fedesarrollo and 
Metrosalud), and independent opinion leaders. 
During this process, Londono and members of the health change team held 
meetings with each of these actors in order to lobby the proposal. Interviewees 
pointed to the high level of technical content of these meetings (Interviews 
05/17/98, 08/20/98, 08/22/98, 10/28/98). This perception helped the change team 
show that policy decision-making was taking place from a neutral political stand, 
and that it was responding exclusively to rational objective considerations. But 
also, the team's counterparts were often overwhelmed with information and a 
technical discourse that was difficult to grasp and thus to reject. 
Two dominant coalitions coalesced in Congress. One in favour of the 
government's proposal, composed of the business associations, some factions of 
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the traditional parties (Liberal and Conservative), private health providers, co-
operative health organisations (Cajas) and international organisations; the other 
opposing the project, including the unions and left wing political movements l 9 • 
Other groups did not have the same level of influence over the reform. That was 
the case of users and other civil society groups. The doctors were represented by 
their professional organisations, whose leaders supported the reform on the 
grounds of the principles it was based on, such as solidarity, equity and 
universality. However, when the reform entered its implementation stage, these 
doctors claimed that they were not represented by their professional organisations' 
leadership and disavowed the reform (Interviews 05117/98b, 10/25/98, 1111 0/98). 
Figure (3.5) presents a political map of the principal actors involved at this stage 
of reform legislation and their positions vis a vis the reform's law initiative. The 
health reform has been put at the centre, and each actor's relative distance from it 
represents their relative power to influence the reform's policy content. 
Figure 3.5: Reform Legislation Stage (1993): 
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Some interviewees perceived the policy debate around the reform at this stage as a 
democratic and participatory exercise; but others felt it was a dilatory strategy 
used by Congress as a negotiating chip with the Executive. Yet in retrospect, most 
saw it as a formality to comply with the political demand for open participation 
and legitimise the government's proposal, while the real process of decision-
making was taking place elsewhere within the Executive (Interviews, 08/24/98, 
11105/98, 11106/98). While it is difficult to assess the degree of influence of this 
exercise on the Executive's policy choices for the reform, it is clear that it did 
work as a sounding board that the government tapped on in order to assess the 
political feasibility of particular reform components, as well as to learn about the 
interest group's positions about them. 
The debate in Congress was prolonged for more than a month and by May 1993 
not a single article had been approved. The Executive's officials who had been in 
charge of lobbying the social security refonn - mainly the Minister of Labour and 
the Minister of Health - perceived that they had gone as far as they could in the 
negotiation, without obtaining approval, and thus turned to President Gaviria to 
solve the gridlock. President Gaviria called a meeting with the leadership of the 
Liberal and Conservative parties and obtained an agreement by which both parties 
would secure enough votes to have Law 100 approved (Interview, 05/17/98b). 
The Legislative Commissions concluded their work and the bill was passed to 
plenary sessions for its discussion. The most significant modifications to the 
initial bill were done at this stage, and all its articles were revised again. This 
reflected the persisting disagreement around the Law and the need for negotiation. 
The full Senate discussed the Law between August and November 1993. After the 
refonn was modified and approved in the Senate, it was sent to the Lower House, 
where a Commission studied the project - with the active lobbying of the Minister 
of Health. 
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After the project was approved at the Lower House, a Conciliatory Commission 
with members from both chambers and with the participation of the Ministry of 
Health, had to be created and assigned the responsibility of unifying the approved 
proposals stemming from the Upper and the Lower Houses, since the controversy 
around the reform initiative had generated incoherence among them. 
The debate coincided with a period of intense political mobilisation with union 
strikes and several protests. The teacher's union (FECODE) and the oil workers' 
union (USO) were particularly active against the decentralisation law (Law 60) 
also being discussed in Congress, but they were also against being incorporated 
into the new social security system under Law 100. The Executive agreed to 
exempt both labour groups and the armed forces as a strategy to diminish 
organised resistance to the reform. 
In December 1993, the Law was finally approved by Congress, and ratified by 
President Gaviria. The new Law for social security reflected, in different degrees, 
the array of positions held by the groups involved in the debate. In order to 
accommodate the vast array of interests and to jeopardise a minimum number of 
interested groups, the Law was purposely written in very general terms, thus 
leaving a vast space for interpretation and to policy definition that had to be 
detailed in the following stages. This opportunity was seized by the health change 
team during the preparation of the regulation package under its jurisdiction, to 
bring the reform's content closer to the proposal they had originally presented. By 
the same token, the lax wording of Law 100 also opened an opportunity for the 
groups against it to alter it during its implementation stages, seriously 
undermining the reform's possibilities of consolidation. 
3.5 Regulation 
After the approval of Law 100, the MOH was assigned the responsibility of 
preparing the 25 regulatory decrees that composed the secondary law package, in 
consultation with the CNSS, and to be endorsed by the president. Thus the reform 
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moved back to the control of the Executive, and away from the Legislative arena 
and the process ceased once more to be a participatory and plural one. Only the 
change team along with a few experts who were sporadically invited, participated 
in the regulation package's formulation. The information that was shared with 
groups outside the state was carefully selected and access to decision-making and 
to the policy options being studied was very controlled. 
The health change team was aware that it had eight months before the end of their 
term in office due to the change of administration. It wasted no time in trying to 
ensure the reform's consolidation, or at least to limit the possibility of its reversal 
in the short term. To this end, it concentrated on three key activities: preparing the 
regulation package, creating the mechanisms through which fresh financial 
resources would be allocated to the new health system, and training the new 
providers that were to playa key role in the new system - such as health care 
providers and especially, health management organisations (EPS)20. 
It was their belief that setting the new rules of the game would bring about in the 
mid to long-run the needed institutional change for the new health system to 
emerge once they had left office. For this reason, the team classified the reform's 
components according to their priority, since there was not enough time to 
develop the regulation for the reform in full, putting particular emphasis on 
creating and setting up the rules for the new providers, even if at the expense of 
establishing the details of the transformation of the old existing ones -like the ISS 
and the MOR services. Thus key points of the transition were not defined, such as 
the gradual incorporation of the very poor to the subsidised health plan and the 
transition from supply to demand subsidies, among others. These components left 
in a state of incompletion proved to be a serious obstacle during the reform's 
implementation process (Londono, 1996). 
This probably explains the fact that, contrary to what was asserted by change team 
members and DNP officials at the time, other actors who were also interviewed 
pointed out that the change team tried to define more precisely some aspects that 
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were left too open in the Law, and that they did so according to their own criteria. 
They favoured efficiency over solidarity and universal access, by concentrating on 
the strengthening of the private sector's role, the introduction of competition, 
provider choice and financial sustainability. For instance, they defined reductions 
in the POS content that was approved, having as the main criterion cost-
effectiveness analysis: high cost treatments without proven efficiency were not 
included in the package. 
Some critics21 asserted that this stage of the reform process could be considered a 
return to a segmented system, since in spite of the agreement in Congress around a 
single POS, the team in fact defined two different ones. They also pointed to the 
fact that the priorities defining the regulation favoured the activation of the role of 
the private sector and established no incentives for the transformation of the 
public-sector actors (Interview, 08/19/98). 
The change team tried to address policy options with criteria as objective and 
technical as possible, and for this, it resorted to the specialised support of national 
and international experts who played a key role in this part of the reform process. 
However, the most technical members of the team felt that in the end, several 
political concessions were made in order to ensure its feasibility (Interview 
OS/27/98). For some members, this helped ground the reform on more feasible 
scenarios, while for others, the concessions made were of such a nature that they 
seriously jeopardised the reform as it had been envisioned from the start. The 
centre of this controversy was the definition of the content and scope of the pos. 
The composition of the change team working on the reform at this stage was 
modified: Londono brought to the group highly qualified persons such as Maria 
Luisa Escobar, Teresa Tono and Beatriz Londono, some of whom had been 
working on the technical studies backing the reform since the time it had first been 
discussed in Congress. Most of the team members working during this period 
recall it as a frantic atmosphere with excruciating journeys in a race against the 
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clock. Between August 1 and August 5, 1994, President Gaviria's last week in 
office, 22 key Executive decrees regarding health reform were approved. 
The team pointed to the scarcity of time as the reason for the few consensus 
building activities they conducted with other groups in the sector during this 
period, and particularly with the incoming administration members who were 
going to be left in charge of the health sector. Change team members do assert that 
they did have meetings with the incoming team, but it seems that the focus of 
these meetings was placed on informing the newcomers about the reform and 
educating them about its benefits, rather than on exchange of information about 
the state of affairs of the reform process. In fact, the new team specifically asked 
to see the work that was being done on preparing the regulatory package, but this 
was denied. As a result, the new team felt alienated and the possibilities of 
conducting a co-operative transition were severely undermined. 
Also, although the Ministry consulted the general issues of the secondary law 
development with the new National Health Board - but not the details - the fact 
was that the board had neither the time, nor the training to debate them in depth, 
and thus another opportunity for ensuring a more predictable transition was lost. 
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3.6 Initial Implementation 
The reform's implementation began in 1995 under a new administration and with 
newly elected local authorities. In August 1994, a different faction of the Liberal 
Party had come to power led by President Samper. Given the party system in 
Colombia, the fact that the new administration stemmed from the same party as 
the Gaviria administration did not mean that it shared the same policy platform, or 
even the same ideology. Both groups represented rather opposite ideological 
positions on the role of the state, as well as on state-society relations. President 
Samper and his group had been part of the government faction that had been 
openly critical of the Gaviria administration's economic and social reforms. 
In the health sector, this meant that the group of policy-makers that had 
vehemently opposed the reform's pro-market approach, and had been ousted from 
the previous government, was back in power, and in senior positions from where 
it could now defend the status quo and particularly the integrity of the ISS, as a 
means to preserve the leading role of the state in health provision. Only two 
members of the health change team who had been leading the reform during the 
Gaviria administration stayed at the MOH, and for a short period of time22 • 
The political map around the health reform coalesced around two coalitions. One 
seeking to halt the reform process, and the other supporting the continuation of the 
process. The former counted on actors that until then had been precluded from 
participating in the reform's formulation and legislation stages, and that now took 
a central role because their co-operation was indispensable for the reform's 
implementation. This was the case of health workers, doctors, senior officials of 
government agencies - particularly the ISS - and local governments, among 
others. 
The pro-reform coalition counted on the new providers created by the reform, 
such as the EPS and the ARS, some local governments23 , and those societal 
groups who were having access to health services for the first time - notably the 
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poor. The reform was also backed by international support in the form of loans 
(IDB and World Bank) - which had been secured by the change team under the 
Gaviria administration - to support the health reform's initial implementation, and 
by the involvement of international organisations and foreign universities in 
advisory roles. 
During the first 20 months of the Samper administration, three different Health 
Ministers were appointed24 • The constant changes of health ministers was 
accompanied by a high circulation of senior officials at the MOH, and even the 
technical teams did not remain constant, further undermining any effort at 
institution- building around the reform. This slowed the reform's momentum due 
to the constant changes in policy direction and contradictory signals, and seriously 
affected the initiation of the reform's implementation stage. The passive resistance 
stemming from the bureaucracy within the health sector public institutions did not 
only respond to the lack of information and technical assistance during the 
reform's initial implementation, but to a 'wait-and-see' strategy expecting that 
each new minister would express opposition to the reform and effectively bring it 
to a halt. 
President Samper appointed Alonso Gomez2S as his first Minister of Health. 
During the Gaviria administration, Gomez opposed the health reform on the 
grounds that it had a pro-market approach and the fact that it intended to divert 
resources away from the tertiary level of the health system. He had been further 
alienated by the former health change team's lack of political will to share the 
preparation of the new Law's regulatory package with the Samper health team, of 
which he was part. 
While he was in charge of the MOH, his decisions generated confusion among the 
health sector actors, since he was openly against a significant number of measures 
that were expected to start implementation during his term in office. His position 
against the reform was at first supported by doctors, health-sector unions, and 
government agency officials who were interested in stopping and reverting 
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different aspects of the reform. It also ran along the lines of the political strategy 
of the Samper administration, who resorted to the political support of organised 
state groups - notably unions - to retain power, and therefore was reluctant to 
affect their interests. Gomez sought to redress some of the core elements of the 
health reform. For instance, he promoted an Executive decree overriding the new 
mechanisms of resource allocation within the health system, and reallocated the 
resources that had been secured for the cost of the reform's transition into health 
manpower salary increases. 
But he soon lost the support of the doctors and the provider unions - due to his 
autocratic style - and was criticised for wanting to revert policy changes that had 
been legitimised during the legislation process. When political pressure started 
mounting, and following the advice of several of his cabinet ministers, President 
Samper asked Gomez to resign and appointed him presidential advisor for health 
policy - a position of influence from which he continued to undermine the reform 
process26 • 
In July 1995, Augusto Galan Sannient027 was appointed new Minister of Health. 
He belonged to the "Galanista" faction of the Liberal party28, whose support 
President Samper was seeking. While not having had previous experience in the 
public health system, he had followed the reform process closely, and believed in 
it as a social project. His time in office was very short -less than seven months29 -
but the perception about his role during those months varies greatly. In spite of his 
short time in office, he played a key role in putting the reform back on track, after 
former minister Gomez's attempts to bring it to a halt. 
In a tour de force with President Sampero, he succeeded in having an executive 
decree (Decree 2357) signed that reverted the one in force presented by Gomez 
(Decree 2491). This decree had a significant role in re-starting the reform process 
by re-activating Co-operative Health Organisations, the EPS and the ESS. With 
this new decree he thus re-established the basis for public-private mix and 
competition in health services provision, as well as the mechanisms that would 
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allow the health subsidies to follow demand instead of supply. This new change in 
policy direction was welcomed by national health experts who had been reaching 
a greater consensus around the principles on which Law 100 is based31 • 
The results of this seemingly subtle change in decrees were not visible until the 
second half of 1996, when Maria Teresa Forero de Sade was appointed Minister 
of Health32. She brought to the ministry her experience in the public sector as well 
as in the private sector - where she had been Director of ACEMI. She was to 
remain in office for the rest of the Samper administration. It was during this 
period that, after two years of delay, the health reform implementation was started 
in a systematic manner. Forero de Sade did not promote major changes in policy 
direction. Instead, she focused on putting into practice what was stated in Law 
100. 
Opposition to the reform did not cease. Several initiatives were presented to 
Congress to amend Law 100, although none of them progressed. For instance, the 
Finance Minister proposed, in 1996, a return to the state's monopoly in the 
provision of health services for the poor under the subsidised health plan, and the 
exclusive provision of services - through public hospitals and health authorities. 
Other proposals aimed at reducing the central government's transfers by half -
which would have a negative effect on the subsidised health plan as well. This 
was due in part to the financial difficulties the government was facing, but also to 
the prevailing view in the Samper administration that the public sector should be 
the central provider of health services for the very poor. 
Aside from the effective resistance to change, the transfonnation along the lines of 
the reform of the old providers in the health-care system - such as the ISS, the 
local health authorities, and public hospitals - faced fonnidable difficulties. The 
lack of information about the day-to-day operation of several components of the 
reform, and the slow allocation of the fresh funds that had been secured for their 
implementation - notably the resources to be allocated to the subsidised health 
plan - were serious hurdles33 • But also, the uneven capacity of old and new 
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providers to meet the reform's requirements on information, organisational and 
managerial resources, and thus absorb and/or implement policy change. 
This was particularly the case in what pertained to the scarcity of trained 
personnel able to assume the new complex functions that were to be put in 
operation under the new system - such as those entailed in the separation of the 
financing, articulation and provision of health care. Above all, the financially 
fragile ISS's failure to transform itself, reduce its size, and abide by the regulation 
of the new health system put the financial viability of the new health system at 
risk in the medium to long term. 
Six years after the approval of Law 1 ~O, the evolution of the health reform's 
process as well as its first outcomes continued to be a cause of much controversy 
among actors directly involved, and among interested observers. In retrospect, the 
economic team that backed it during the Gaviria administration sees it as a 
successful attempt at bringing about significant change in the health sector, and 
thus one of the most important reform initiatives that took place during this 
decade. 
What makes the Colombian expenence umque is the fact that due to the 
incorporation of a mix of principles in the reform - efficiency, universality and 
solidarity - which resulted from its political process, those groups who at first 
opposed the technocratic proposal, adopted the reform in its final form (Law 100), 
and thus pursued it and protected it when it was put in serious jeopardy by the 
different actors that favoured the status quo. One official of the Samper 
administration and member of the group that first objected the Gaviria initiative 
stated: "we felt represented with the final outcome of the reform, which 
introduced principles of universality and solidarity. This is the reason why we 
have defended the reform against the resistance during the implementation 
process" (Interview, 08/26/98). 
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According to the MOH34 , since the formal start of the reform's implementation in 
January 1995, the coverage of social security in health has increased from 23% to 
54% in 1998. Of those enrolled, 66% (21.5 million people) are in the contributory 
health plan and 33% in the subsidised health plan. The resources allocated to the 
health sector have doubled and there have been significant institutional changes, 
such as the creation of 30 EPS35 and the Agencies for the Management of the 
subsidised health plan. The change of public hospital funding from supply-based 
to demand-based is on its way, if with difficulties. Therefore, while not yet 
consolidated, the reform seems to have had a significant impact on the expansion 
of coverage and institutional change. 
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3.7 Summary and Main Points 
Throughout the process of health reform definition, formulation and legislation, 
and in the different policy nodes where it took place, actors coalesced around two 
main positions about the principles that Colombia's new health system should 
prioritise. One gave priority to efficiency and market competition, and the other to 
equity and state intervention. Law 100 reflected a compromise between them, and 
mandated a health system which introduced competition and involved the private 
sector; but at the same time maintained the role of the state not only as regulator, 
but also as service provider. In spite of the consensus-building process that this 
mixture of principles in the reform's Law reflects, Colombia's institutional 
context gave the health change team many opportunities to determine its final 
policy content. 
At first, most of the reform formulation took place within the Executive where the 
change team was shielded from political pressure. When the team's initiative was 
presented to Congress for legislation, it counted on the direct political support of 
the president. Furthermore, once the new Law was passed, the draft of its 
regulation package was assigned exclusively to the change team, which once more 
was able to determine the reform's policy content away from public scrutiny. 
Law 100 reflects an international trend in social security refonn, but the political 
context, the fonnal and informal institutions and the main actors involved in its 
process, made it peculiar to the Colombian situation of the early nineties. The Law 
was the result of an intense debate where many "policy nodes" were important: 
the National Constituent Assembly (January - June 1991); the Social Security 
Commission mandated in the new Constitution (July-December 1991); the 
Executive during reform formulation (1992); Congress (1993); and the Executive 
again during the definition of regulation (January-August 1994), the transitional 
executive decrees (1995) and initial implementation (1996 - 1999). 
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The actors involved in the policy debate around the reform changed according to 
the stage of the reform process and the policy node it was in. During the very first 
stages of reform fonnulation, the main actors were the members of the National 
Constituent Assembly, particularly the members of the Social Security 
Commission it created. But as soon as the Executive incorporated the health 
reform into its policy agenda, the central actors of the policy debate were the two 
bureaucratic factions led by the National Planning Department and the ISS, 
respectively. These two factions were to establish close links with like-minded 
groups to enforce their positions in the battle to influence the reform's content. 
Among these actors were unions, think tanks and academic groups. 
By the time the proposal was presented to Congress, the Ministry of Health, 
already under the control of the economic team, became the central actor leading 
the refonn, and remained so until the end of the Gaviria administration. The 
central actors changed once more as the reform entered its initial implementation 
stage coinciding with the change of administrations. Provider groups such as 
health manpower unions, the bureaucracy of the health system's old providers, 
and local health authorities took centre stage as their co-operation was needed to 
bring about policy change. 
A variety of actors within the state and in society tried to influence its policy 
content using different formal and informal means to access decision-makers and 
the central actors described above. Their success at this endeavour varied greatly 
and constantly depending on their means to make their voice heard, but also on 
the degree of permeability of the institutional context in which the reform was 
taking place. Local health authorities, unions, congressmen, medical associations, 
health experts; private research institutes; health workers; co-operative Health 
Organisations, pre-paid medicine groups, productive and industrial associations, 
phannaceutical organisations and politicians at different levels, tried to influence 
the reform's formulation, legislation and initial implementation. The users of the 
system, the consumers, remained at the periphery of the reform process and were 
not represented, formally or informally. 
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At the centre of the refonn process, and with great power to detennine all these 
actors' access to policy decision-making, was the health change team, led by Juan 
Luis Londono, the Health Minister. This small group of highly technical policy-
makers worked in isolation and shielded from the rest of the actors thanks to the 
direct support of the president and the economic team. The group only interacted 
selectively with some of these actors when it was forced by the institutional 
context - for instance, when having to lobby the refonn' s approval in Congress -
or when it needed infonnation and/or knowledge related to the refonn. To a lesser 
degree, the team tried to institutionalise change in view of the short period of time 
they expected to be in power, and thus in control of the refonn. 
The final policy content of the refonn continued to be a matter of great 
controversy even as it entered its implementation stage. However, many of the 
actors that had been the visible heads of the rival coalitions in the competition to 
influence the refonn's content during its fonnulation and legislation stages, 
perceived that the end-result did represent their policy views, and thus defended 
the refonn's implementation when resistance mounted. 
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Footnotes for Chapter 3 
I Among these, the coffee labourers' and bank employees', among others. 
2 Families can join any EPS for a minimum period of one year, after which they can terminate 
their contract and join another EPS. On the other hand, an EPS can not reject potential enrolees. 
3 During this time the debate around the Chilean model was very important. The experience of the 
ISAPRES was evaluated, and it was seen as a highly inequitable model where competition had 
broken the solidarity mechanisms. Nevertheless other principles of the Chilean model were seen as 
desirable, such as to end the monopoly and to incorporate the private sector into the system. 
4 Constituci6n Politic a de Colombia, 1991 (Article 57, transitory). 
S Antonio Yepes, who in 1994 became director of the ISS under President Samper. During the 
debate that took place at the ANC, the pro-state ISS group found in him a good ally. 
b Departamento Nacional de Planeaci6n La Revolucion Pacifica, 1991. 
7 Headed at the time by Navarro, a member of the former guerrilla group M-19. 
8 It is important to note that, despite the fact that the MOH is formally the head of the health 
sector, this agency was unable to exercise leadership in the debate that was taking place within 
government. 
9 There were also complete proposals the University of Antioquia (1991), the Olof Palme 
Corporation (1991) and Fedesarrollo (1991). 
10 See press coverage 1991 - 1992 with particular emphasis on the newspaper El Tiempo. 
\I Decree 2148, 1998 mandated the reform of the ISS; decree 2164 mandated the reform of the 
Ministry of Health; decree 3174 mandated the reform of the Health Superintendence and the other 
public social security institutions. 
12 Pensions reform was seen as a mechanism that could boost internal savings and thus give more 
stability to the country's economy in the long run. 
13 This last position was defended by senators like Jaime Arias, a Conservative member of 
Congress who was a doctor with a political base in the sector and with a particular interest in 
public health issues. 
14 Influenced by the Ecuadorian system, the team suggested that both insurance plans should offer 
the same services within a certain number of years after the reform's implementation (Interview, 
07/27/98) 
IS This health service scheme was based on an experience President Gaviria had seen in Southeast 
Asia and was favoured by De Roux, the Minister of Health and the rest of the M-19 party. 
16 Gustavo De Roux resigned accompanying the M-19's decision to break from the political 
coalition that supported the Gaviria administration. See El Tiempo, November - December, 1992 
issues. 
17 This team was soon joined by Nelcy Paredes, who had been working on the Hatogrande 
proposal. 
18 At this stage, these state-society networks also proved valuable to help the team find and recruit 
the very scarce technically trained personnel the team needed to develop the health reform 
proposal in detail. 
19 Discussions mainly centred around the content of the basic health care package (POS), and the 
funding for the subsidised health plan. The government, some members of Congress and actors 
from the private sector advocated a flexible POS whose content should be adjusted and if 
necessary reduced, according to the available resources. However, the final decision moved 
towards the inclusion of every level of attention and every risk, as was provided for - if only on 
paper - by the ISS according to Decree-Law 1650, 1977. At the end, a single POS for all was 
approved, along with the progressive expansion of coverage of the subsidised health plan's basic 
health care package, until both health plans would offer the same POS. 
The ISS' role and its functions were also discussed during those sessions, particularly whether it 
should be decentralized or even dismantled. The Minister of Finance (Rudolph Hommes) as well 
as the Chairman of the Legislative Commission (Fernando Botero) thought that should be the 
case. Countering this position were some members of Congress, including some liberals, leftist 
parties and civil movements; unions and the group from the ISS-Consenso. At the end, the ISS 
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was not dismantled and was even left in a stronger political position after the congressional 
debates. 
20 According to people working in the Ministry at the time, the law development process focused 
mainly on technical issues such as the creation of the CNSSS; definition of the new providers who 
were to operate in the health system such as EPS, IPS, public hospitals - in their new role - ESS 
and FOSYGA; the definition of the system's benefits through the POS, complementary plans and 
the subsidised health plan; reforming public institutions such as the Ministry of Health and the 
Health Superintendence. 
21 Gonzalez Posso was the second Minister of Health during the Gaviria administration in early 
1992, and was a member of the M-19, but not a former guerrilla member. 
22 Nelcy Paredes and Beatriz Londono. 
23Local governments of the affluent regions and some cities had the capacity to absorb and profit 
from the policy changes brought about by the reform. But other regional and local level 
governments which did not count on the human capital necessary to assume the responsibility of 
health policy and which were uncertain about the new resource allocation system, were less 
willing to assume autonomy in health policy-making. See La Forgia, 1994. 
24 Alonso Gomez (who stayed for one year); Augusto Galan Sarmiento (six months) and Maria 
Teresa Forero de Sade (two and a half years). 
25 He was Samper's personal doctor, and former director of Hospital San Jose, a public hospital in 
Bogota. A psychoanalyst by training, he met Samper when working in the intensive care section 
where Samper was treated after he had suffered an assassination attempt in the 1980s. 
26 For instance, in his new position, he promoted the creation of the presidential Program for 
Hospital Development, based on principles contrary to the reform such as state responsibility, and 
in clear contradiction to ministerial and local authority and autonomy. 
27 A cardiologist, he was involved in private practice and worked in a prestigious private clinic in 
Bogota (Clinica Maio). 
28 He is the brother of Luis Carlos Galan Sarmiento, the founder of this faction and a Liberal 
leader and presidential candidate assassinated in August 1989. 
29 He resigned when allegations surfaced that President Samper had accepted drug money to fund 
part of his presidential campaign. 
30 In which Galan Sarmiento wanted to leave his imprint in the health sector, instead of just 
playing an instrumental role in Samper's coalition building. 
31 Fedesarrollo, 1995. 
32 A doctor specialised in paediatrics, she had previous experience in the public sector, and had 
held a cabinet post before. 
33 Public funds to FOSYGA (the new health system's national fund) which had been secured in the 
new Law, were instead conditioned by the government's fiscal policy at the macro level, and thus 
became unreliable. The fund was further crippled by evasion and under-reporting on the 
contributory health plan 
34 Ministerio de Salud. Informe de Actividades 1997-1998 al Honorable Congreso de la Republica, 
Julio 1998, Bogota. 
35 20 private, 10 public and 1 public/private 
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Chapter 4. The Change Team and its Strategy Choice 
4.1 Introduction 
As in other sectors where the Gaviria administration had a reform agenda, a group 
of policy-makers foreign to the Ministry of Health and with expertise in 
economics was assigned the responsibility of formulating a health reform and was 
empowered to lead it. The health change team was created upon the appointment 
of Juan Luis Londofio as Health Minister in November 1992, and was to last until 
the end of the Gaviria administration in August 1994. During those eighteen 
months, the health change team formulated the reform proposal, negotiated its 
legislation, formulated the new Law's regulation package and prepared its 
implementation. 
This chapter analyses the health change team. It describes its characteristics and 
looks into the profile of its members in order to bring to light the shared skills and 
policy experience which it counted on to pursue the health reform. It then looks 
into the team's ideological profile and how this reflected their policy choices as 
well as the political strategies it resorted to. Next, the series of policy networks the 
team built and resorted to as a means to embed itself within the state are described 
and analysed. Finally, the team's choice of political strategies are analysed in the 
light of the political context in which they were made and the policy process they 
were to buttress. 
4.2 Change Team Characteristics 
The health change team was created in November 1992 by Juan Luis Londono, 
when President Gaviria appointed him Minister of Health. Londofio appointed 
highly trained young professionals from within and outside the public sector, but 
who, with very few exceptions, were new to the Ministry of Health. The team's 
overall composition changed as the refonn process evolved, but it sustained 
throughout the reform process a combination of skills that emphasised an 
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economic perspective and the use of changes in regulation in guiding its policy 
choice. 
The health change team became clearly identifiable during the reform's 
formulation and its presentation for approval in Congress. At this time, Londono 
and other members of the team built an important network of support around the 
reform and the team itself with key members of Congress, the Executive, and 
other groups in and outside the state. The fact that some of the team members' 
previous positions had been as DNP officials, gave the team credibility vis-a-vis 
other policy-makers working on similar state reforms, and crucially vis-a-vis the 
economic team in government. 
Juan Luis Londono studied Business Administration and obtained a Masters in 
economics in Colombia before earning his PhD in Economics from Harvard 
University'. Soon after returning to Colombia, he joined the government's 
economic team when President Gaviria appointed him to the DNP, where he 
became deputy director in August 1990. He was later appointed minister of the 
MOH, where he stayed until the end of the Gaviria administration2• He was the 
team's undisputed leader, taking final decisions when there was disagreement 
among team members, and the reform's principal broker within the Executive, in 
Congress, and in society. 
He also played a crucial role in absorbing the ideas on health reform that were 
being discussed in the international health policy community, and "tropicalising" 
them to the Colombian contexP. During his graduate studies at Harvard, and later 
on in his position as DNP deputy director, he became acquainted with 
international social policy trends, and particularly with the background work for 
the World Bank's World Development Report (1993) that focused on health 
reform. Once appointed Minister of Health, he approached international experts 
like Julio Frenk and Philip Musgrove, national health specialists such as Francisco 
Jose Yepes and Ivan Jaramillo and groups with experience in health issues 
working in the private sector to learn and discuss the health sector's policy issues. 
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When he was assigned the formulation of the health reform, Londono put together 
a change team at the MOH, whose members, instead of holding formal positions 
the MOH's structure, worked directly with him in the form of a task force. The 
core members of this health change team were Nelcy Paredes, Maria Luisa 
Escobar, Beatriz Londono, Oscar Emilio Guerra, Teresa Tono and Edgar 
Gonzalez. Other members included Wolfgang Munar, Eduardo Alvarado, Ivan 
Jaramillo and Diego Palacios. This group was recognised as the health change 
team by its members and by outsiders, both at the Ministry and elsewhere in the 
government. More than half of them did not have any previous public policy 
experience and were not considering a career within the government prior to 
joining this effort. 
Notwithstanding, the sum of each member's particular skills and professional 
experience endowed the team with the technical and political tools to formulate 
the health reform and to negotiate its legislation and eventual implementation. 
While core team members did not vary significantly following different demands 
at each stage of the reform process, their level of influence in the team's decision-
making did. This reflected the constant tension between the need for highly 
technical detail in the reform's policy content, and the simultaneous need for 
policy negotiation and consensus-building with other actors in the sector. For 
instance, during the formulation of the reform's regulation package, technical 
decision-making was prioritised, but this same emphasis on technical aspects was 
given a secondary role and even perceived as a hurdle during the team's efforts to 
ensure the political survival of the reform just before they were going to leave 
office. 
A salient example of the combination of these skills put to work are the 
contrasting roles of Nelcy Paredes and Maria Luisa Escobar, both members of the 
health change team. Nelcy Paredes, an economist, was Londono's second in 
command throughout the reform process4 • Having been head of the Health 
Division at DNP for almost a decade from the 1980's to the early 1990's, she 
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brought with her key knowledge of the health sector as well as its actors. Her 
command of knowledge and information about the health sector in Colombia 
combined with her ability to communicate on a one-to-one basis with actors 
involved in both high and low-level positions of responsibility, made her playa 
strategic role as broker for the team's technocrats (Interview, 07110/98). She won 
the trust of and was involved in direct negotiations with mid-level and senior 
officials in the Executive, legislators in Congress, and leaders of societal groups 
involved in the reform process, and working on many occasions as a ground-
breaker for Londono (Interview 07/10/98). 
Being aware that the health reform's feasibility was based as much on its technical 
viability as on the political dynamics of its process, she was willing to 
compromise policy content as a strategy to ensure the overall survival of the 
reform. This sometimes put her at odds with the technical members of the team. 
She was the only member of the change team who was to remain at the MOH for 
most of the Samper administration, from where she continued her efforts to ensure 
the consolidation of the health reformS. 
In a mirror image of Paredes, Maria Luisa Escobar, also an economist, was an 
orthodox technician. She was working at the Inter-American Development Bank 
in Washington when she was recruited by Wolgfang Munar - then Deputy Health 
Minister. Even before the reform initiative was approved in Congress and political 
negotiations were taking place, she started to conduct highly specialised studies 
based on the team's reform agenda anticipating the requirements to define the 
reform's regulation package. Upon her arrival at the MOH, she put together a 
large team of very young economists who concentrated on the most complex and 
technical aspects of the reform. 
She and her aids worked in complete isolation from other change team members, 
the MOH bureaucracy and interest groups in society. She defined elements central 
to the reform's implementation, such as the content of the Benefits Package (POS) 
- for which she conducted the costing and DALY's analysis. During the process 
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of reform formulation and legislation, her authoritative knowledge of health 
microeconomics and her technical penchant made her instrumental in supporting 
the team's image as an apolitical group working exclusively on rational objective 
premises. 
Also during this period, her expertise was also used to overload policy dialogue 
with a technical discourse that worked as a smoke screen for the team and the 
reform (Interview, 08/05/98). She firmly believed that no concessions should be 
made on these elements if the reform was to preserve its original nature - and 
objectives. So when the political dimension of the reform process pressed for 
concessions, her participation in decision-making was marginalised (Interview, 
08/05/98)6. 
Oscar Emilio Guerra and Edgar Gonzalez played a key role in converting the 
reform's policy content into law. Guerra, a lawyer, joined the team on the 
recommendation of the Deputy Finance Minister - who later became Minister of 
Labour. His expertise in regulation and knowledge of the law was central, given 
that the team's strategy to bring about policy change was based on changes in 
rules and regulation. He enjoyed great credibility among the members of the 
economic team and had experience in policy regulation of the financial sector -
where he had occupied senior positions in the banking and stock market 
regulatory agencies. 
Guerra, along with the team of lawyers he brought to work at the MOH, ensured 
the legal base of the team's proposals (Interview, 11/12/98)1. Gonzalez 
complemented this role using his expertise in public administration, with 
particular emphasis on the health sector. He was instrumental first, during 
congressional discussions around the reform, and later, on the formulation of the 
regulatory package once the reform had been legislated. He was the only member 
of the change team that had an appointed position at the MOH before the team's 
arrival, and while not entirely in disagreement, he did not share the team's 
ideology (Interview, 10/11/98)8. 
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Following in importance, were Teresa Tono and Beatriz Londono, both doctors 
with graduate studies in the US. They both had had research-based careers in 
academia abroad and Colombian think-tanks. While Teresa Tono participated in 
the institutional development aspect of the regulation package, Beatriz Londono 
played an increasingly important role as the articulator of the team's agenda 
towards public opinion. The fact that she was a doctor helped the team to soften 
its image as outsiders in the sector and to bridge links with the medical profession, 
which acknowledged her "hands-on" experience. 
She was one of the most visible members of the team, smce aside from 
participating in policy formulation, she was in charge of public relations and 
appearances in the mass media (Interview, 07/l 0/98). Close to the outset of the 
Samper administration, Beatriz Londono became Health Secretary of Bogota, 
becoming the only member of the health team to have the opportunity to pursue 
the reform process into its implementation stage. Using a change team strategy as 
well, she was able to bring about significant policy change9 • 
Finally, although not part of the core group forming the change team, Diego 
Palacios was instrumental in developing the media campaign geared to buttressing 
public opinion's support for the refonn - and by the same token, for the change 
team. He was a doctor who had studied public health and communications. He 
developed a media strategy by which a series of public health topics - such as 
AIDS - were presented on T.V. and radio and in the press as a means to introduce 
the health refonn issue to public opinion and thus build support around it. 
The policy-makers and technical professionals described above endowed the 
change team with an array of policy and political skills that went beyond its 
members' technical expertise. Thanks to this, the team was able to tap the 
knowledge about the health sector in Colombia and its actors, and the intricacies 
of public administration. It also counted on the expertise needed in the area of 
lawmaking, as well as media management. Team members adjusted to the 
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requirements of the health reform process by emphasising at times some of its 
members' skills in political manoeuvring and brokerage, while at others, other 
members' highly technical command of the reform's policy content. 
Figure (4.1) presents a diagram representation of the mix of skills with which the 
change team was endowed as a result of the professional profiles of its members. 
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Figure 4.1: Change Team's Mix of skills 
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4.3 Cbange Team Ideology and Perception of State-Society Relations 
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The health change team had a cohesive view about the importance of introducing 
market mechanisms to make the health sector more efficient and de-politicise 
resource allocation within it (Interview, 11/12/98). This ideological position was 
in tune with that of the economic team and President Gaviria himself. However, 
within the change team, some division persisted between those in favour of a 
stronger public heath sector versus those in favour of the market as the main 
mechanism for regulating the sector and an enhanced role for the private sector in 
health service provision. Under Londono's arbitrage, the latter position prevailed. 
However, this should not be mistaken for an orthodox neo-liberal stand. Londono 
believed in the benefits of market competition as much as in the need for its 
effective regulation. Also, more than anyone of his peers in the economic team, 
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he strongly believed in the need for investing in Colombia's human capital as part 
of the policy to promote economic development - and as an end in itself'°. Still, in 
line with the Gaviria administration's ideology, he saw demand subsidies, a 
greater role for the private sector, competition mechanisms and targeting of social 
programs as the means to pursue these policy objectives. 
The team perceived state-centred servIce delivery and regulation not only as 
inefficient, but as serving vested interests. Therefore, the team viewed with 
suspicion arguments pointing at the country's limited institutional capacity to 
absorb policy change as a justification to avoid comprehensive and in-depth 
change. Along that line, the sector's old providers - such as the ISS, the MOH and 
local authorities, among others - should be forced into action by the imminence -
and inevitability - of the policy change brought about by the reform, and by the 
effects of market competition it intended to put in motion. From this standpoint, 
the team systematically thought about the policy results it wanted to attain with 
the reform, and systematically avoided considering the limitations its 
implementation would face (Interview, 11/12/98). 
However, within the restricted space of technical discussions, team members did 
ponder the applicability of international experiences in the Colombian context, 
and the feasibility of implementing certain elements of the reform given the 
country's institutional capacity. Notably, discussions did address the viability of 
inducing policy change solely through changes in legislation and regulation 
(Interview, 05/ll/98b). But technical arguments were seen as superior and more 
legitimate than political considerations, and the team stood firmly behind the 
belief that it was possible to "modernise" the country through the technocratic 
strategy the economic team in power had chosen (Interview, OS/11198b). 
This emphasis on technical criteria to the detriment of political considerations, and 
the team's self-perception as apolitical- thus with no personal agenda behind the 
reform - made it consider that it had the moral ground to decide what was best for 
the country. Team members saw consensus-building efforts and participation with 
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suspicion and therefore to be conducted only when institutional rules required it -
as when submitting the reform initiative to legislation, but not when formulating 
its regulation package. The team believed that organised vested interests took 
these "openings" in an otherwise insulated process as opportunities to resist 
change or to influence policy-making in their favour, and that the reform risked 
putting its central elements - notably equity and efficiency - in jeopardy 
(Interview, 08/05/98). Also, in their view consensus-building was difficult to put 
into practice, since the members of very few societal groups felt represented by its 
leadership, rendering consulting the latter a useless process (Interview, 11112/98). 
4.4 Change Team Political Manoeuvring 
Team members did not have any personal political support or power base outside 
the Executive, therefore the political feasibility of their reform agenda and of their 
leading position in the reform process depended exclusively on the support of the 
president and the government's economic team (vertical networks). This fact 
shielded them from political pressure from outside the Executive - and from other 
government factions within it. But not having a social mandate or a particular 
coalition of support made them entirely dependent on changes in the economic 
team's - or the president's - policy priorities. Once given the political backing to 
lead the reform (vertical networks), the team's brokers - notably Londono and 
Paredes - made a systematic effort to embed the team within the state (horizontal 
networks) and provide it with information, knowledge and specific help from 
other actors in Congress and society (state-society networks). 
4.4.1 Vertical Networks 
The president's and the economic team's support for the health change team was 
based on two grounds. First, the fact that once taken on board, the health reform 
initiative became part of the government's agenda on a par with the pensions 
reform. Second, the fact that Londono was a member of the economic team, which 
effectively converted the health team into an extension of the former. The change 
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team's main vertical networks were thus President Gaviria, Finance Minister 
Hommes, and DNP Director Montenegro, whose direct support empowered the 
team and shielded it from inter-agency and bureaucratic competition and external 
political pressure. The backing of these senior officials and the president also gave 
the team enough political weight to confront resistance to change in the different 
policy nodes where the reform process took place. 
Both Hommes and Montenegro viewed the health change team's reform initiative 
as an opportunity to transform the health sector and make it more efficient. Given 
that Londono had participated in the economic reforms as a member of their team, 
they saw in him an equal not only in training, but also in ideological stand. This 
relationship and their sharing of the same technical language gave the health 
change team the capacity to make its case in favour of the reform and prove its 
financial soundness based on direct and authoritative knowledge of public 
finances and the potential economic impact of the proposal. 
But ultimately, in spite the fact that the health reform had not been part of his 
original reform agenda, it was President Gaviria's direct support that proved to be 
the most crucial vertical network. He intervened directly to back the change team 
at least on three occasions that proved to be critical for the reform's survival - and 
showed the importance of his role and that of the other two vertical networks. 
First, when all other instances of negotiation were exhausted during the reform's 
legislation process, President Gaviria resorted to Colombia's inter-party elite 
negotiation and summoned the leaders of both traditional parties to reach an 
agreement that secured enough votes to approve the bill (Interview, 08/23/98). 
Second, once the Law had been approved and the details for its implementation 
were being prepared, he ensured that the economic team's faltering support was 
held firmly behind the health team. When the health team moved on to secure 
public resources to cover the reform's transition costs, and focused on ensuring 
the rapid expansion of the newly mandatory access to health care - while failing 
to limit the basic health care package (POS) - the economic team became 
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concerned about the fiscal impact of the health reform. Both Hommes and 
Montenegro balked at their support - with the latter taking action to limit the 
change team's efforts. 
The curtailing of these two vertical networks meant the sudden halt of the reform 
on the grounds that sound fiscal policy was a higher priority on the government's 
agenda. However, President Gaviria stepped in to secure the support of both 
officials in favour of the health change team, in view of the reform's visibility and 
positive political impact. 
Thirdly, President Gaviria resorted to his prerogatives as head of the Executive 
and during his last days in office, he signed a series of executive decrees -
prepared at frantic speed by the change team. By using this institutional 
mechanism, and resorting to this strategy, President Gaviria maintained the 
definition of the reform's details insulated from public scrutiny - thus averting 
resistance to policy change - and sped up the reform process in an effort to ensure 
its implementation and consolidation in the following administrations 1 I. 
Figure (4.2) shows the principal points within government from where the sources 
of support for the health reform initiative stemmed. Members of the economic 
team - located in government agencies marked in grey - formed the change 
team's vertical networks. Support stemming from within the MOH, from the team 
appointed by President Gavitia at the ISS, and from the Ministry of Labour, 
represent the health change team's principal horizontal networks - which will be 
analysed next. 
148 
Figure 4.2: Health Reform Initiative: Sources of Support * 
... PRESIDENT 
... 
... 
- \ L __ IS_S_---' 
t 
o Economic team 
_ Support for health refonn initative 
·lndicauvc, non comprehensive di agram 
4.4.2 Horizontal Networks 
Once counting on the support of its vertical networks, the health change team 
actively sought to embed itself within the state by strengthening its horizontal 
networks and building new ones with like-minded public officials with a similar 
hierarchical level. These horizontal networks helped the team negotiate the reform 
at the different stages of its process - notably during legislation - facilitated 
communication and information exchange at the right time among peers, and were 
also used in an attempt to institutionalise the reform within the MOR proper. 
In the case of the Labour Ministry and the pensions change team, the fact that the 
health reform initiative was presented in Congress as an addendum to the pensions 
reform gave the health team the opportunity to join efforts - and political leverage 
- with these policy-makers. The change team thus strengthened ties with the 
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pensions change team - which was also working in close co-ordination with the 
economic team - and jointly prepared strategies in aspects relevant to the health 
refonn. Therefore, the health change team mounted its political strategy in 
Congress profiting as far as possible from the advances made by the pensions 
team, and reducing its political manoeuvring to those instances that were 
particular to the health reform12 (Interview, 08/23/98). 
In the case of the DNP, although its relevance in the health reform's policy 
formulation greatly diminished when its senior officials working on the issue were 
assigned to the MOH, the junior officers who stayed behind continued to maintain 
informal ties with their fonner project leaders. Through this horizontal network, 
the health change team had access to the DNP's policy studies, background 
material and relevant information that helped it both in policy fonnulation, and in 
enhancing its leverage during negotiations within the Executive and in Congress. 
Although these horizontal networks were intermittent and were enhanced or 
suppressed at different stages of the reform, it could be argued that the Social 
Policy Division within the DNP acted as a "back office" to the health change team 
effectively expanding its policy-making capacity (Interview, 11103/98). 
Two examples point to this fact. First, while at the DNP, Londono had promoted 
the formation of a policy group called Misi6n Social formed by highly trained 
officials who were relieved from everyday operations at the DNP and focused 
exclusively on policy research to support decision-making13 • After Londono left 
the DNP, this group continued to support the health change team, along with 
officers heading the Health Division. Second, the health change team made 
extensive use of a targeting mechanism for social programs that was being 
developed in the DNP - called SISBEN - as a tool to develop the implementation 
ofthe reform's subsidised health plan directed at the poor. 
As regards the ISS, it cannot be argued that there was extensive co-ordination in 
policy-making between the health change team and ISS officials. In fact, both 
agencies pursued their transformation in separate parallel processes. However, the 
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change team did establish horizontal policy networks with like-minded officials at 
the ISS directorate who supported both the pensions and the health reform, and 
shared the same ideology and technical language. 
This was made possible once President Gaviria had replaced the ISS directorate 
that resisted change with officials stemming from the core economic ministries 
more in line with the government's policy agenda. Thus these ISS officials and the 
health change team co-ordinated those aspects of the ISS transformation that were 
relevant to the health reform, and joined efforts in lobbying for the pensions-
health bill in Congress. These horizontal networks played an important role in 
maintaining unity within the Executive and presenting a common front vis-a-vis 
other groups resisting change. 
The change team created a series of horizontal networks within the MOH with a 
mix of new and old MOH officials, thus creating a "pocket of efficiency" 
(Geddes, 1994) within the MOH that streamlined key activities in support of the 
change team's endeavours. This allowed the change team to embed itself within 
the MOH and tap into the inputs it needed to operate - such as information, 
knowledge and support activities, among others - sidelining major segments of 
the MOH's bureaucracy. To do this, Londono seized the opportunity of a major 
transformation of the MOH taking place in late 1992 as part of the government's 
broad institutional reform agenda and replaced most of the MOH directors with 
like-minded officials 14. 
Simultaneously, after carefully studying their professional profiles, the change 
team selectively approached officials who were already working at the MOH and 
who were willing to co-operate with the reform initiative. In contrast to the 
officials who were removed - or whose assignments were changed - the officials 
who thus made up these horizontal networks supporting the change team were 
young, highly trained and believed that policy change was possible. A few 
examples were the MOH General Secretary in charge of overseeing the MOH's 
reform and its decentralisation, the directors in charge of the Public Health 
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Division and the Promotion and Prevention Division, and notably, the liaison 
personnel for international co-operation, since the latter proved key for the change 
team efforts. 
The change team also intended to use these horizontal networks as a long-tenn 
strategy aimed at institutional ising the health refonn within the MOH and ensure 
its continuity beyond its tenure in office's. However, while the creation of this 
pocket of efficiency was effective in its short-tenn purpose of giving support to 
the change team, and most of its members did stay in office during the Samper 
administration, its modus operandi - particularly the fact that it operated 
independently from the MOH bureaucracy - precluded it from institutional ising 
the refonn more broadly within the MOH bureaucracy, which did not assume 
ownership of the refonn initiative (Interview, 11/12/98). 
4.4.3 State-Society Networks 
Along with its efforts to secure political support (vertical networks) and to embed 
itself within the state (horizontal networks), the health change team established 
selective state-society networks with groups and actors outside the state in order to 
obtain relevant infonnation and knowledge, and ultimately to fine-tune the refonn 
using the experience these organisations had - particularly in the private health 
sector. These state-society networks varied according to each stage of the refonn 
process. During the refonn fonnulation stage the main networks were with 
academia and international organisations; during the reform's legislation the main 
networks were with legislators; and during the fonnulation of the regulation 
package the main networks were with private health organisations. Finally, the 
change team attempted to establish networks with policy-makers who were going 
to be put in charge of the refonn in the incoming administration. 
As soon as the health change team was fonned, it strengthened the networks that 
some of its members - notably Londono and Paredes - had established with 
academia, think tanks and NOD's that had been studying the health issue and had 
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been involved in the national policy dialogue around health reform that started in 
the early 1990'sI6. The team thus obtained first-hand information and knowledge 
through what it saw as an informal training process. Some examples of these 
networks at the time of reform formulation were Metrosalud and the FES 
Foundation of Leadership. However, while these experts were consulted for 
advice and information, they were not invited to join the change team or to 
participate in policy formulation and decision-making. Their level of influence 
over the reform's content was limited to the change team's criteria. 
During the reform's legislation process in Congress, the change team built 
networks with key legislators and their advisors who brokered the reform among 
their peers, and were key in teaching the change team the insiders' knowledge of 
political manoeuvring within Congress. Two legislators stand out as examples. 
The first and most important one was Alvaro Uribe Velez. A Liberal identified 
with a rival faction to that of President Gaviria's - Samper's faction - he was 
nonetheless sympathetic to the technocratic reforms pursued by the Gaviria 
administration and had a particular interest in the health reform. He was in charge 
of presenting the social security bill in Congress17 • Uribe Velez had also been in 
charge of presenting the labour reform initiative in 1990, and therefore was 
acquainted with the economic team and its "extensions" now working on the 
health and pensions reforms. A traditional politician, he had studied at Harvard 
and was a strategic ally for the change team since he had a long successful record 
of political negotiation, but at the same time was able to rely to the highly 
technical discourse of the change team. Another important network in Congress 
was Victor Renan Barco, who was also a traditional politician, but who had 
played a key role in economic legislation, and was also able to bridge the gap 
between the change team and the legislators l8 • 
From a different standpoint, the health change team was also able to approach 
members of the Alianza Democratica movement - related to former guerrilla 
movement MI9 - who were part of the Congressional Commission debating the 
health reform. It did so through the network it had maintained with former MOH 
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advisor Ivan Jaramillo, who helped "bridge" the interaction between these 
legislators and the change team, in spite of the fact that the M-19 had left the 
government's coalition. Jaramillo did not share the change team's ideological 
position, but had been involved in the discussions on health refonn since the start. 
After the departure of Health Minister Navarro - a fonner leader of the M-19 -
Jaramillo continued to work on several aspects of the health refonn - particularly 
related to the health system's decentralisation and Law 60, 1993 - and thus 
remained in contact with the change team. 
Once the refonn had been approved in Congress and gravitated back to the 
Executive's control, the change team modified its state-society networks once 
more and significantly reduced them, opting back for the insulation strategy. 
According to an interviewee, only those actors who shared the change team's 
ideas remained in touch with it (Interview, 07/27/98). Thus the change team 
selectively - and intermittently - reached out for actors in society who had 
infonnation or knowledge relevant to the health refonn, or who were to have an 
important role in the new health systeml9 • These state-society networks seldom 
evolved into a policy dialogue where the health change team and these groups 
would discuss policy content on equal tenns. Instead, the change team tightly 
controlled these groups' access to policy fonnulation opening and closing the door 
to the decision-making room according to its own agenda. 
This did not preclude the societal actors who were contacted from trying to use 
these state-society networks as a means to make their case and influence policy 
fonnulation in their favour, and there does not seem to be consensus as to how 
successful they were and the degree of influence they had. Such was the case of 
the private health insurance companies that approached change team members to 
make their case for a lax regulation package (Interview, 11/03/98). 
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4.5 Change Team Choice of Strategies 
The change team chose a series of strategies aimed at both securing its position of 
influence throughout the policy process and also, as a result, enabling it to 
promote its reform agenda. Those strategies changed according to the stage of the 
reform process and were not made in a vacuum but instead responded to the 
opportunities and limitations of the political context in which the reform process 
was taking place. Some of them defined the interaction between the change team 
and other actors involved in the reform process, while others altered the reform's 
policy content as a means to ensure its political feasibility. Finally, while some 
strategies focused on solving short-term bottlenecks or resistance to change, 
others were aimed at enhancing the reform's chances of consolidation in the long 
term. 
Some of the team members pointed to the speed at which it was constrained to 
operate to justify the choices of strategy it made - such as the choice of 
comprehensive change, as opposed to incremental change; and the minimum level 
of policy dialogue - or insulation (Interview, 11/12/98). While it is undeniable 
that the team had a very short time frame in which to act - only eighteen months -
it can also be stated that their strategy choice was coherent with their ideology, as 
well as their view of the role of the state and of state-society relations. In other 
words, their choice of strategies can be related back to their perceived need to 
bring about major policy change in the short run, and their view of the relation 
between arguments against the reform and entrenched interests resisting change. 
4.5.1 Speed and Scope of Policy Change 
Thus, when formulating the reform, and in view of the scarcity of time, but also as 
a means to avoid organised resistance to policy change, the change team chose to 
avoid an incremental, trial-and-error approach and pilot projects to verify the 
applicability of the reform before its implementation on a major scale. Instead, it 
opted for assuming the risks - and absorbing the costs - related to in-depth fast 
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change that bore little consideration for the complexities of its implementation and 
the involved actors' uneven capacity to absorb it. Thus the team's strategy can be 
described as one that transferred the learning process to the implementation stage 
in order to avoid marring the reform at its formulation stage. Also, foreseeing the 
possibility that resistance would mount once the team left office - and the reform 
entered its implementation stage during the Samper administration - it focused on 
advancing the reform as far as possible to increase the costs of redressing it once it 
lost control over it (Interview, 07/10/98). 
4.5.2 Brokerage in Congress 
During legislation, the change team's overall strategy choice was to broker the 
health reform under the umbrella of the major social security reform project in a 
sort of "division of labour" by which it left as many aspects of the political 
manoeuvring as possible in the hands of the pensions team. In doing so, it was 
able to preserve its image as a technical apolitical group20 and to negotiate the 
health reform away from the limelight. But in spite of the fact that most of public 
opinion's attention and political negotiation centred on the pensions reform, the 
health change team still needed to lobby the aspects that were particular to the 
health reform. 
Thus, relying on the Executive's active participation in promoting the social 
security reform, and based on its perception of congressional politics, the team 
chose a strategy of targeted brokerage, instead of broad coalition-building. The 
health team's assessment of Congress was one in which the majority of legislators 
were disengaged with respect to the health reform issue, and thus ready to 
"follow" the vote of the minority groups that were directly involved with it and 
thus could potentially veto the reform (Interview, 08/08/98). These minority 
groups, which were thus crucial for the reform's approval, were perceived by the 
change team as having to two extreme positions. 
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The first group was made up of the legislators in charge of analysing the reform at 
the Social Affairs Congressional Commission and a few congressmen who had a 
particular interest in the health reform. The legislators in this group departed from 
positions for and against the reform based on their ideological stand and/or their 
alliances with societal groups for or against the reform - as was the case of pro-
labour legislators who were against the reform because it affected the provider 
union's interests. For this group, the change team's strategy was to single them 
out and lobby them individually, engaging them in a policy dialogue on a one-to-
one basis over the entire legislative period. The team made a point of listening to -
if not of incorporating - all the queries and suggestions these legislators made, and 
focused on explaining the complex issues that lay behind the different elements of 
the reform. 
At the other extreme, the change team perceived a group of legislators who did not 
have a position vis-a-vis the health reform, but instead engaged in patronage and 
Congress' parochial politics, thus conditioning their vote to favourable conditions 
for their constituencies. The health team's strategy towards this group was 
twofold: on the one hand, the team relinquished direct political bargaining as 
much as possible, and instead relied on the Executive's direct negotiation on 
behalf of the social security reform - mostly through the pensions team, but also 
through the direct intervention of the president. On the other, the team phased the 
reform's implementation in a way that it would produce visible results in the 
regions these legislators represented, thus creating the political incentives for them 
to support the reform21 (Interview, 05/18/98). 
Figure (4.3) presents a diagram of the composition of Congress in the light of the 
health reform initiative as perceived by the change team, and its choice of strategy 
to broker the reform with each group. 
Figure 4.3: Change Team Assessment of Congress 
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Another key strategy choice made by the change team was to draft a reform bill 
based on broad general terms and the common ground principles that had been 
agreed on during the National Constituent Assembly - equity, efficiency and 
solidarity. This eluded interest confrontation and greatly reduced the need for 
policy negotiation, since all parties saw their positions reflected in these general 
principles, and the potential overlap in the requirement to apply them was not 
made evident, given the lack of detail on how they would be implemented. 
This strategy of having a law based on general principles approved, also gave the 
change team more space for manoeuvre in defining the reform's final policy 
content, since the definition of policy details forsaken during legislation was 
postponed to happen during the formulation of the reform's regulation package _ 
which was a prerogative of the Executive. 
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However, while in the short term this strategy proved useful in legislating the 
reform - and ultimately in enhancing the team's control over its content - it 
proved to hamper its potential for consolidation in the long run, since the very lax 
terms of the new Law left room for further modifications made by other 
governments in charge of the reform's implementation. 
4.5.4 Policy Dialogue 
Particular emphasis needs to be placed on the change team's choices when 
determining other actors' access to the reform process and therefore their 
influence on policy content: The strategy of insulation. Based on its views about 
state-society relations, the change team's first choice was to insulate itself and the 
reform from the influence of other actors in order to avoid vested-interest 
pressure. While some interviewees pointed at the lack of time as one of the 
reasons for the team's restricted engagement in policy dialogue (Interview, 
11/12/98), the fact that the team chose to "open" the process to other actors at 
certain stages of the reform and "close" it at others, in spite of facing sustained 
time constraints, points to a strategy choice. 
The team's capacity to insulate itself and the reform from other actors trying to 
influence its content depended on two elements. First, the political backing of its 
vertical networks, which gave it the leverage to determine when and with whom to 
engage in policy dialogue. Second, the institutional context in which the team had 
to operate following the reform process. In other words, the formal and informal 
rules of the game of political competition and policy negotiation of Colombia's 
political context. Thus, having been empowered to lead the health reform process 
by the president and the economic team, the health team "opened up" only when 
forced by institutional requirements, or when it needed knowledge and 
information to pursue the health reform. 
Three stages of the reform process - formulation, legislation and preparation of 
the regulatory package - exemplify the team's strategy choice in determining the 
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degree of insulation around the reform. When recently appointed, the team chose 
to "open" the process to a wide variety of actors with whom it established state-
society networks and participated in policy debate as part of its learning process. 
But at the moment of reform formulation - i.e. the preparation of the bill to be 
presented in Congress - the team chose to insulate itself and policy decision-
making was conducted exclusively among the team's members, in spite of the 
efforts of these actors to participate (Interview, 11103/98). 
During reform legislation, the team was forced to "open up" again by institutional 
requirements and to engage in pro forma consultation exercises with every visible 
head of the groups interested on the health reform, such as unions, doctors, 
business associations, pre-paid medicine organisations, and academic forums, 
among others. However, the change team approached this requirement more as an 
exercise of information dissemination, than one of policy dialogue, and did not 
alter the reform's content as a result of the debates. Furthermore, the change 
team's ideological position to constrain policy debate to technical argumentation 
precluded many actors participating in the consultation exercises from 
understanding what was at stake22 • 
Once the reform was legislated and given that the institutional rules made the 
formulation of its regulation package a prerogative of the Executive, the team's 
need to resort to consultation and policy dialogue ceased, and it chose to insulate 
itself once more. Thus, with the leverage to resist interest-group pressure, it 
carefully selected the actors with whom it established state-society networks based 
on its needs for knowledge and information in the preparation of the reform's 
regulation (Interview, 11/03/98). 
Figure (4.4) presents a diagram with the change team's choice of strategy over 
policy dialogue. The horizontal axis presents the different stages of the reform 
process. The vertical axis represent the choice of policy dialogue from closed or 
non existent (insulation), to open or inviting participation (consensus building). 
The line presents the team's choice at each stage. The closer the line is to the 
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horizontal axis, the less policy dialogue and thus the more insulated the change 
team. The diagram shows that the change team chose a strategy other than 
insulation only during two stages: First, during the definition of the health sector's 
problems and second, during the reform legislation. In both stages, the 
institutional context forced the team to abandon the insulation strategy and engage 
in policy dialogue to broker the reform. 
Figure 4.4: Change Team's Strategy Choice on Policy Dialogue 
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With the end of its tenure in office in sight, and aware that under the incoming 
administration the health reform would be under the control of the government 
faction that had opposed it during its formulation, the health change team sought 
to enhance the chances of the reform's implementation and consolidation. The 
strategies it chose for this purpose were permeated by its ideology, as well as its 
members' previous policy experience in economic reform. Three of its choices 
exemplify this. First, as has been discussed, the team focused on formulating 
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detailed regulation as a means to produce - and ensure - change through 
modifications in the rules and incentives that actors in the health sector would 
have to abide by. 
Second, the team attempted to ensure the incoming government's commitment to 
policy change through the signing of loans directed at funding the reform 
transition23 • Along with ensuring the financial viability of the reform's 
implementation, it expected that the terms of agreement of these loans would limit 
the possibility of diverting reform efforts to other directions. Simultaneously, the 
team sought the co-operation of international actors with no domestic vested 
interests and technical command over the reform content as another attempt at 
enhancing the reform's probabilities of being implemented as it had been 
envisioned24• However, both efforts to bring international actors closer to the 
reform process yielded mixed results, since they lacked the leverage to have 
influence over decisions on the reform's direction. 
But the largest stakes rested on the team's relation to the incoming group of 
policy- makers that was to substitute it in the control of the health reform. The 
change team chose to approach its rival faction as a means to promote the 
continuation of the health reform process along the lines it had defined. The 
change team thus invited the new group of policy-makers to a series of meetings 
to discuss the technical content of the reform2$. However, it simultaneously 
refused to allow it to participate in the team's ongoing last minute efforts to define 
the reform's regulation package. In other words, the change team resorted back to 
informing and educating about the content and benefits of its reform agenda, 
instead of engaging in policy dialogue on equal terms with the new group. The 
team's firm control over access to decision-making - i.e. its insulation strategy, 
which at this point reached its highest level isolating the team even from the core 
ministries - hampered its strategy geared to ensuring the reform's continuity and 
its probabilities of consolidation26 • 
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4.5.6 Inducing Change 
The change team's reform agenda was based on the implementation of two 
elements that were complementary conditions for the consolidation of the new 
health system. One was the creation of new providers in the health care system -
particularly in the private sector - that would participate in health services 
provision, management and financing. The other was the transformation of the old 
providers - notably the Social Security Institute, the MOH and the local health 
authorities. The new health care system would be consolidated once both newly 
created actors and the transformed old providers were able to abide by the rules 
and incentives established by the new Law and its regulation. While both elements 
presented complex policy challenges and depended on the new and old providers' 
capacity to absorb and implement change, the transformation of the old providers 
presented, above all, a political challenge. This was particularly the case of the 
ISS, who resisted change protected by its strong coalition of support - such as 
some politicians, the ISS bureaucracy, its unions and doctors. 
The change team's choice of strategy in this case was to phase out the 
transformation of the old providers - notably that of the ISS and to concentrate on 
the creation of the new providers and the rules and incentives by which they 
would operate. This policy choice avoided the need to impose change by directly 
confronting the organised provider groups opposing it. Furthermore, the change 
team resorted to two indirect mechanisms to bring about change in the old 
providers in the mid to long run. These mechanisms were based on the 
assumptions and the ideological stand ofthe change team. One was the reliance on 
changes in rules and regulation: the new Law mandated the transformation of the 
ISS and its operation under the new regulation. This was expected to be enforced 
during the Samper administration. The other was the market forces that were to be 
triggered once the new providers were created and were put in operation under the 
new rules and regulation: the change team expected that with the creation of new 
choices, consumers would opt for the best services, thus generating competition 
163 
and forcing the ISS to transform itself in order to be able to compete - and 
survive. 
Neither of these two mechanisms proved to be effective as means to trigger the 
transformation during the reform implementation phase. In the case of enforcing 
changes envisioned in the health reform and mandated by the new law, the 
Samper administration lacked the leverage - and the political will - to enforce it. 
In the case of market forces, ISS affiliates did not opt for the services of new 
providers in sufficient numbers to trigger competition and thus incentives for the 
ISS to reform. The result has been the superposition - and not the substitution - of 
old providers operating under old rules, and new providers operating under new 
rules and regulation. 
Figure (4.5) shows the two scenarios for the reform's policy implementation in 
terms of the presence of new and old providers. The horizontal axis is an 
indicative time line, and the vertical axis presents the share of the health sector 
that each group of actors occupies - i.e their distribution. The first scenario, 
(presented in solid lines) describes the reform's evolution as it has occurred. New 
providers have emerged, but the old ones, far from losing part of their affiliates to 
them, have increased in size. The second scenario is the one envisioned by the 
change team according to the assumption that market competition would operate: 
new providers would emerge in the health sector and would compete to attract 
users previously affiliated to the old providers. A substitution effect would occur 
in which the old providers would diminish in size and thus their relative share of 
the sector would diminish as well. As a result, a more plural more competitive 
market would thus substitute the old health system. 
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The fonning and empowerment of a change team in charge of the reform was one 
of the government's strategies to pursue health reform in Colombia. This change 
team was able to achieve results because of the particular strategies it used, but 
also because its work was part of a larger state reform agenda. Another 
determinant factor was the team's close relation to the economic change team. The 
team's legitimacy came from its academic training and its track record in 
government. It was a small group of policy-makers, most of them technical , 
highly trained and with some international experience. They saw themselves as 
apolitical. With few exceptions, none had in mind pursuing a career within 
government, but rather were attracted by the possibility of inducing tangible 
policy change. The team's joint expertise was not only in health or economics, but 
also in communications, law and public administration. It worked in isolation 
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from other groups within and outside the sector, and it was not part of the formal 
structure of the MOH. 
Its ideological stand was in favour of economic and state reform. This meant 
changing the role of the state in the social sector, promoting the role of the private 
sector, increasing efficiency and using mechanisms other than those historically 
used in the delivery of social services, such as targeting and demand subsidies. In 
the team's view, the social sector was relevant as an investment in the country's 
human capital, and in that sense, as a necessary condition for economic 
development. 
The team did not have a base of political support, nor did it have particular links 
with any specific groups within or outside the state. Instead, its power stemmed 
from the support of senior policy-makers in core areas of government such as the 
Presidency, the Finance Ministry and the Planning Department (vertical 
networks). It also counted on a network that team members had been building 
within government during their professional careers with peers in other 
government agencies (horizontal networks). 
This fact gave change team members independence from interest groups, but also 
vulnerability, since its permanence in power and its capacity to act depended 
exclusively on the support of its vertical networks. In addition to those vertical 
and horizontal networks, the team worked in establishing state-society networks 
with particular groups that could support its reform agenda politically, but also by 
providing valuable information and knowledge. 
The team's composition, networks and strategies changed according to the stage 
the reform was at. During the stage of formulation and legislation, it had contact 
with many different groups involved in the reform. However, during the 
development of regulation it insulated itself from interest-group influence. This 
isolation was partly the result of time constraints, but also it was a deliberate 
strategy aimed at retaining control over the reform's content. While this strategy 
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allowed the team to develop an important number of decrees and prepare the 
reform's implementation - by establishing the basis for the development of the 
new providers under the new system - in a very short period of time, it became an 
important source of conflict during the transition period to a new administration. 
The team tried to institutionalise policy change through different strategies: the 
legal one, which was very important and was materialised in the approval of Law 
100 and its regulatory package; changing key personnel, but also the structure of 
the MOH, and establishing networks with co-operative personnel already working 
at the Ministry; trying to convince the group that was going to replace them in 
power of the benefits of the reform and placing some of the team's members 
within the new group. These strategies were complemented by securing the 
approval of significant loans from the World Bank and the IDB to support the 
transition to the new health system; and with the establishment of an international 
network of leading international experts who favoured the reform. The 
sustainability and long- term benefits of these strategies will have to be assessed 
in the light of the reform's implementation, which is still in process. 
The health change team took two crucial decisions during the reform that have had 
mixed results during the implementation process. First, it decided to formulate a 
law with general principles that could then be further developed more precisely 
once the reform was back in control of the Executive, during the formulation of 
the body of regulations. This strategy facilitated the Law's approval and, at the 
same time, gave enormous room for manoeuvre to the health change team during 
the issuing of decrees. Nevertheless, this very same space propitiated by the broad 
terms of the Law was used against its underlying principles once the new 
administration took power and the change team was no longer in control. 
Secondly, it decided to give priority to the development of the new providers that 
were to operate under the new system, instead of concentrating on the direct 
transformation of the old existing ones - which presented great political obstacles. 
In doing so, the change team thought that the new providers - as well as the new 
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allocation of resources - would stimulate the transformation of the old ones. 
However, these expected results have taken longer to materialise, and, at present, 
the health system is made up of an array of new providers operating under the 
reform's rules, alongside old providers who are still operating under the rules in 
place prior to the reform. 
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Footnotes for Chapter 4 
1 Where he concentrated on income distribution in Colombia under the supervision of Jeffrey 
Sachs. 
2He became Minister of Health in November 1992. After leaving government with the arrival of 
the new administration, he went to work for three years in multilateral organisations as senior 
health expert (World Bank, IDB). Upon his return to Colombia in 1997 he assumed the direction 
of a business and economics publication -"Dinero" - and continues to play an important role in 
public debates particularly related to economic and development topics. 
3 See for instance Londono, 1996. 
4 Interestingly, Paredes was not immediately brought into the core of the team due to her lack of 
academic credentials from foreign universities. She won her place as second in importance due to 
the team's - and Londono's - dependence on her hands-on knowledge of the field and institutional 
memory. 
5 Currently she is working for ACEMI, the pre-paid medical organisations' association. 
6 After August 1994 she went back to Washington and joined the World Bank. 
7 Through Londono's influence, he later became Director of the Health Superintedence from 1993 
to 1994. 
8 He developed, along with Ivan Jaramillo, Law 60/1993, with which the allocation of fresh 
resources to the new health care system was secured. 
9 During her tenure as Bogota's Health Secretary significant progress was made in the process of 
decentralisation and greater hospital autonomy. A more efficient division of responsibilities with 
other government agencies was established, freeing up resources in public hospitals. As a result, 
public hospitals increased their revenue 8.8 times the amount assigned by budgetary allocation. 
Hospital boards were organised with the participation of consumers, and a system of civil service 
(or administrative career) was also put into practice. However, the formal conversion of these 
public hospitals into state Social Enterprises was blocked in the local Congress at the request of 
unions. A successful primary health care program was implemented - and later on replicated in 
other regions in the country by the MOH - and a visible and very fast incorporation of the poorest 
sectors into social security was pursued. Also during her tenure, the territorial council for the 
health component of social security was created along with 19 ESS. 
10 Following this stand, he had concentrated his academic and research activities, as well as policy 
formulation in government in areas such as education, income distribution and health. For this 
reason he was perceived by his peers more like a man of the centre, instead of an orthodox neo-
liberal (Interview, 11103/98). 
II Between August 1 and August 5, 1994, his last week in office, President Gaviria approved 22 
decrees related to the health reform's implementation. 
12 For instance, the Labour Ministry - leading the pensions reform - actively participated in 
obtaining Congress' agreement in principle to vote for the pensions and health reforms prior to 
Gaviria's direct involvement in this effort. Also, the fact that the pensions team was directly 
involved in lobbying legislators on behalf of the joint initiative, spared the health team the need to 
bargain with the most reticent factions in Congress. 
13 The rationale behind the formation of this group is a clear precedent of the formation of the 
health change team as a strategy to streamline policy formulation. But the Mision Social was not a 
change team since its responsibilities were strictly technical and not related to policy-making or 
political manoeuvring. 
14 This strategy was also feasible given the leeway incoming ministers had to remove and appoint 
mid and high- level non-unionised personnel due to the lack of a civil service. 
15 With this aim in mind, Londono also tried to give a sense of mission to the MOH bureaucracy 
and effectively managed to "upgrade" it from the "second-rate status" it had when he arrived -
compared with other government agencies (Interview, 07/10/98). 
16 While it may not be classified as a state-society network, during this period another group 
played a key role in supporting the change team's reform formulation. It was formed by an 
extended group of international experts who were systematically consulted by the change team 
(lntervi~w, 05/11/98). Such was the case of Philip Musgrove, who had participated in the 
productlon of the World Bank Report (1993), which focused on health reform; William Hsiao, 
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who was heading what was called the Harvard Colombia project from the Harvard School of 
Public Health; Jose Luis Bobadilla, who had participated in the production of the World 
Development Report (1993); Julia Walsh, who was at the Harvard School of Public Health; 
Robert Evans, who was a leading health economist and an expert in the Canadian health care 
system, and had participated in the international debate on health policy formulation in different 
organisations; and Julio Frenk, who had been working in collaboration with the Harvard and the 
World Bank teams on different topics, and was heading the formulation of a health reform 
proposal for the Mexican health care system (Interview, 11/03/98). 
17The formal presentation of a bill to Congress has to be done by a legislator even when it stems 
from the Executive. 
18He was in charge of Law 60, 1993, which was crucial in many respects for the health reform. 
Particularly as concerned the health system's decentralisation and the fresh resource allocation into 
the health system. 
19Such was the case of already existing semi-private organisations which managed health 
insurance plans, such as the Cajas de Compensacion Familiar. or the pre-paid medicine 
companies. All of them had experience and information that was key to enable the change team to 
finalise the reform's regulation package (Interview, 11112/98). 
20 The health change team reinforced this image by purposely relying heavily on data and 
diagrams to present its arguments to legislators (Interview, 05/19/99). 
21 For example, in some instances, the selection of regions where the first ESS were going to be 
created and put into practice in order to expand access to health services, included this political 
criterion. 
22 Of all the societal actors involved at this stage, the change team only considered one think tank 
(Fedesarrollo) as an equal with which to engage in policy dialogue on technical terms (Interview, 
05/11/98) 
23For instance, WB Loan No. P006854/1993 
24 Such was the case of a Harvard-based consulting group to prepare the master implementation 
plan, monitor the reform's implementation process and eventually evaluate its impact (Interview, 
05/19/98). 
25 These meetings were preceded by a series of meetings the change team had organised during the 
presidential campaign in which members of the contending presidential candidates' teams were 
invited, along with international health experts, in order to promote the health reform and explain 
it. 
26 As part of the effort to ensure the reform's continuity, and persuaded that he would be appointed 
as the new Health Minister, the change team made special efforts to lobby Augusto Galan, a 
member of the Samper presidential campaign, about the need to continue with the health reform. 
He was not appointed and instead Alonso Gomez, one of the policy-makers who had been 
alienated, was - and he was largely responsible for the derailing of the reform's initial 
implementation. However, when Gomez resigned, Galan was appointed Health Minister, and it 
was thanks to his efforts that the reform was to be put back on track. 
PART III 
Mexico Case Study 
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Mexico - Chronology of Events 
Year(s) Milestones 
1935 Institutionalization of a strong presidential regime. 
1938 Foundation of the PRM (later PRJ) and incorporation of social sectors to the 
official party. 
1943 Merger of the Department of Public Health and the Ministry of Social 
Assistance to create the Ministry of Health and Assistance (SSA). 
Enactment of Social Security Law. Foundation of the Mexican Institute for 
Social Security. 
1959 Reform of the Social Security Law in order to expand coverage to new 
occupational groups. 
1961 Inauguration of the National Medical Centre, the largest concentration of third 
level hospitals in the country. Its control is transferred from SSA to IMSS. 
1965 Medical profession movement starts and is repressed. 
1979 Implementation of IMSS-COPLAMAR in an effort to expand the coverage of 
basic health services to rural areas. 
1982 - 1988 De la Madrid Administration 
Debt crisis. 
1983 Integration of the Health Cabinet presided by the president to coordinate 
health policy. 
1984 The right to health protection is legislated in the Constitution. 
1985 Earthquake in Mexico City. Considerable damage to tertiary care facilities. 
Deepening of the economic structural adjustment strategy. 
Beginning of the pro-democracy civil movement. 
1986 Decentralisation of health services is completed in 15 states. 
Establishment of the National Health Council 
1987 Creation of the National Institute for Public Health (INSP). 
Decentralisation of health services is completed in two more states, and then 
brought to a sudden halt. 
1988 -1994 Salinas Administration 
Mid 1993 Genaro Borrego is designated IMSS Director. 
Creation of CEDESS. 
Change in the leadership of the economic team's pensions reform project. 
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Dec 1993 Gabriel Martinez joins IMSS' Finance and Systems Division. 
1994 - 2000 Zedillo Administration 
Dec 1994 Economic crisis. 
Minister of Finance Serra Puche resigns. 
Jan 1995 LXXVI General IMSS Assembly: 
Beginning of formal social security reform process. 
Early 1995 Publication of the Health Sector Reform Program (1995-2000). 
Mid 1995 Presentation of IMSS document Hacia el Fortalecimiento y Modernizacion de 
la Seguridad Social. 
Mid 1995 Approval in Congress ofa 50% increase to the Value Added Tax. 
Oct 1995 Labour, business and government join an IMSS' sponsored Consulting Forum 
Comision Tripartita para el Fortalecimiento del Istituto Mexicano del Seguro 
Social to discuss IMSS reform. 
Nov 1995 Presentation to President Zedillo of the document Propuesta Obrero Patronal 
de Alianza para el Fortalecimiento de la Seguridad Social resulting from the 
forum. 
Nov 1995 President Zedillo presents before Congress the initiative for the New Social 
Security Law. 
Dec 7,1995 The New Social Security Law is approved by the Lower House of Congress. 
Dec 12, 1995 The New Social Security Law is ratified in the Senate House of Congress. 
1996 
Mid 1997 
Jul1997 
Apr 1999 
Dec 1999 
Conformation of an inter-agency group to develop IMSS quota reimbursement 
and the regulation of the emerging HMO market (lSES). 
In mid term elections, the government's PRJ party loses its majority in the 
Lower House of Congress. 
Enactment of the New Social Security Law. 
The Insurance Law amendment creating and regulating ISES is approved in 
the Lower House of Congress. 
The Insurance Law amendment creating and regulating ISES is ratified in the 
Senate House of Congress. 
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Chapter 5. Political Context 
5.1 Introduction 
During the Zedillo administration (1994 - 2000), a health reform initiative was 
formulated and presented as part of the government program. Although the reform 
initiative considered the health sector as a whole, policy change was planned in 
the form of two separate but parallel processes: One, undertaken by the Ministry 
of Health (SSA), concentrating on the decentralisation of its health-care services; 
and the other, implemented by the Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS), 
concentrating on its financial reorganisation and the introduction of a 
public/private mix in health service provision. 
President Zedillo's economic team perceived the IMSS reform as an element of 
their economic reform, but also as a reform initiative bridging economic and 
social-sector reforms. The reform of the IMSS' health services is relevant because 
they officially catered for 57% of the total popUlation. But also because the IMSS' 
health service provision operated along the lines that reflected the country's 
political context that prevailed until the early 1980's. This reform initiative brings 
to light most of the aspects of the politics of health reform - and indeed social 
sector reforms - in Mexico, since behind this initiative converge the changing 
political context, the politics involved in the health reform process proper, and the 
strategies used by reformers to bring about change. 
This chapter analyses the political context in which the initiatives to reform the 
IMSS' health component were formulated and attempted. It first presents the 
characteristics of the Mexican political system, such as the formal and informal 
rules that structure the division of powers between the Executive, Legislative and 
Judicial branches of government, and the corporatist arrangement in state-society 
relations. A profile of the relevant actors involved in public decision-making is 
presented with partiCUlar emphasis on the societal actors most relevant to the 
specific arena of health reform. The chapter then presents the emergence and 
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consolidation in power of the technocratic group of policy makers who were to 
lead the health reform initiative. 
5.2 The Mexican Political System 
5.2.1 Division of Powers and Policy-Making 
Mexico is a Republic formally constituted as a federal state and structured 
according to the principle of division of powersl. The concentration of formal and 
informal powers in the Executive, however, has led to an over-centralisation of 
power and an uneven balance among the branches of power, in such a way that the 
Executive controlled the Legislative and the Judiciary until the late 1990's2. The 
1917 Constitution3 determines that the Executive power should be concentrated in 
the president and endows him with ample prerogatives. It contains limited checks 
and balances that the Legislative and the Judicial branches can use to control the 
Executive, and even fewer are put into practice (Weldon, 1997). 
5.2.2 The Executive 
The president, who is elected every six years with no right to re-election, has the 
formal prerogative to name the heads of the 16 ministries4 and their vice-
ministers. The core ministries, those with outstanding weight in policy decision-
making, form the economic cabinet: the Finance Ministry (SHCP), the Commerce 
Ministry (SECOFI), the Labour Ministry (Secretaria del Trabajo), the Social 
Development Ministry (SEDESOL), and the Office of the Presidency (Oficina de 
la Presidencia). The Central Bank (Banco de Mexico) also plays a major role in 
macroeconomic policy and the design of programs with a high financial content 
such as the pensions reform. 
Policy decision-making occurs in the Executive cabinets, which are chaired by the 
president himself. These cabinets are organised by policy areas and are the 
economic cabinet, the national security cabinet, the social policy cabinet, the 
foreign affairs cabinet, and the agriculture cabinet. When a policy issue acquires 
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special relevance, the minister responsible for that sector is summoned to present 
the issue in the economic cabinet. Such was the case of the pensions and health 
refonns - as well as the poverty alleviation program - which were normally 
assigned to the social policy cabinet. 
The Office of the Presidency was created in an effort to rationalise and supervise 
policy decision- making and bring it even closer to the president's control by 
means of a small group of advisors responding exclusively to him. Although its 
creation was at first an informal institutional arrangement, it grew in size and 
acquired central importance in the 1980' s, and its power and influence peaked 
during the consolidation in power of the technocracy in the early 1990's. It was 
made up of a series of technical groups each corresponding to a policy area 
specific to each cabinet. The Office of the Presidency was formally restructured 
into two presidential advisory groups in 1997. 
The Finance Ministry is the other government agency with a similar level of 
influence in policy decision-making. Its power was further increased as a result of 
the merging of the Planning and Finance ministries in the late 1980's. It is from 
the rank and file of these core government agencies that the technocratic group 
emerged and seized power in the early 1980's. 
5.2.3 The Legislature 
Legislative power in Mexico is exercised by Congress, which is composed of the 
Lower House and the Senate. Both bodies need to approve a law for it to be 
legislateds• When a bill is received by one of the legislative chambers, one or 
several commissions are appointed to study it. Once the commissions have 
discussed the bill, their recommendation is forwarded to the general assembly for 
its final discussion and vote. If approved, the bill is then remitted to the other 
congressional chamber where it follows a similar procedure. At the end of the 
process, the bill is sanctioned by both chambers and sent to the Executive, who 
has the obligation to issue it and order its compliance6 • 
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Throughout Mexico's modem political history starting in the 1930's, Congress 
has played a weak role in the institutional balance of powers. By law, the 
Executive can submit bills to Congress and can veto Congress' resolutions7• These 
formal attributions along with the president's extra-constitutional powers derived 
from his relation to the ruling partl, converted the Executive into virtually the 
sole source of bills in the public agenda (Weldon, 1997). Until the PRI lost its 
absolute majority in the Lower House in 1997, Congress rubber-stamped the 
Executive's bills without presenting effective opposition. But Congress' new 
party composition has forced the Executive to lobby its bills for the first time with 
opposition parties - as well as with its own party membership9. This has 
represented a slow movement towards equal balance of powers between both 
branches. 
5.2.4 The Judiciary 
The Judicial branch is made up of the Supreme Court, the tribunals, the district 
courts of justice and the Federal Judicial Council. It has been the weakest of the 
three powers and has faced serious institutional problems in the administration of 
justice due to the lag in the modernisation of its procedural capacity. 
The Zedillo administration presented to Congress a reform initiative to restore the 
Judiciary's independence from the other two branches of power and to make its 
procedural capacity more efficieneo. This institutional reform allowed the 
Judiciary to de-politicise its role and acquire a certain degree of autonomy. Efforts 
included the creation of the Federal Judicial Council, the reconfiguration of the 
Supreme Court, and the modification of the prerequisites for the nomination of 
judges and the President of the Supreme Court - none of whom can now be 
appointed or removed by the Executive alone. However, the strengthening of the 
Judiciary's institutional capacity has proven complex and slow to have a 
significant impact in the balance of powers (Aguinaco Aleman, 1997). 
5.2.5 Structuring Politics: The Corporatist System of 
Interest Representation (1929 - 1982) 
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The political system that emerged in the late 1920's, and that lasted until the early 
1980's was organised around a corporatist model 1 1.12. State-society relations were 
structured around the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRJ), the official 
party, in which organised groups - originally created or supported by the state -
representing key interests in the state, the economy, and society, were 
incorporated (Stevens, 1977). Through this political arrangement, the state secured 
the political support of these groups, and in exchange, gave them privileged access 
to public goods and services. 
The stability of the Mexican political system was thus built around a coalition 
fonned by state-society alliances that were constantly renewed through the 
political use of public policy. As a result, the logic behind policy decision-making 
was penneated by the need to maintain the equilibrium of this coalition of 
support. Policy-makers resorted to a combination of concessions and impositions 
when considering who got what, how and when in the distribution of public goods 
and services (Purcell and Kaufman, 1980). The state bureaucracy in charge of 
managing and providing these public goods and services became a vested interest 
in its own right and a central political player as intennediary in these state-society 
relations. 
This was the case of social security and its health-care services. Organised groups 
- predominantly official unions representing state workers and fonnal economy 
employees - were granted exclusive access to pensions and health services 
through a social security system that excluded all those who did not have fonnal 
employment, or who were not politically organised. And state workers in charge 
of managing and providing such services - including health manpower - became 
key political interrnediaries13 (Hernandez Llamas, 1982). 
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The inclusion of organised societal groups in the corporatist arrangement also 
converted the PRI into a state mechanism of mass control, and the central arena 
for political negotiation. Since the official party acted as an extension of the 
Executive, interest group representation and participation in policy decision-
making happened within the party and the Executive. This made political 
participation gravitate away from democratic political party competition, and from 
Congress - which was reduced to rubber-stamping the Executive's bills (Bizberg, 
1989). The groups that were incorporated within the limited and very structured 
instances of the official party and the Executive did not share the same ideology, 
and competed to have their respective ideological stand and policy agendas 
prevail. This explains why in spite of the fact that the PRI remained in power for 
71 consecutive years, Mexico's policy agenda followed a "pendulum pattern" 
swaying between liberal and conservative ideology, similar to that in democracies 
with party alternation (Cornelius and Craig, 1980). Figure 5.1 borrows the 
diagram from Cornelius and Craig (1980) depicting this idea. 
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The structuring of state-society relations around the single-party corporatist 
arrangement also implied that all those groups who did not have formal 
employment or who did not belong to a state-sponsored organisation, faced 
significant barriers in accessing political participation, and were excluded from 
policy decision-making. Furthermore, societal groups that were not organised and 
therefore were not relevant in the maintenance of political support, did not share 
equal access to public goods and services, in spite of having equal needs (Ward, 
1994). Therefore, while in official discourse social benefits were distributed 
according to the state's commitment to improving the living conditions of the 
population, access to them reflected each group's bargaining capacity in state-
society relations. 
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This mechanism of selective political incorporation went hand-in-hand with the 
development model that prevailed until the late 1970's, which assigned the state a 
central role in allocating public goods and services. Until that time, public 
resources were sufficient to sustain this strategy, but the economic crisis of the 
early 1980's curtailed the state's capacity to maintain political stability through 
these means (Meyer, 1992). Added to the lack of public resources, the diminished 
role assigned to state by the technocracy in the 1980's not only precluded the 
incorporation of new groups under the rules of the old corporatist arrangement, 
but rendered it incapable of maintaining its traditional base. Thus, lacking public 
funds and debased of its pro-state ideology, the corporatist structure of state-
society relations started to be dismantled from within the state. 
The country's economic, social and political profiles had also changed rapidly. 
From the 1970' s onwards, the population's growth and rapid urbanisation 
surpassed the rate at which formal employment was created in the cities, forcing 
urban groups to join the informal economy. These groups grew in size as a result 
of the drop in formal employment caused by the economic crisis of the 1980's. 
While excluded from the corporatist pact - since they did not hold fonnal 
employment, nor did they belong to PRJ organisations - these groups acquired 
relevance in the political context. More educated and urbanised, they soon joined 
social movements that started to outnumber the corporatist organisations, and 
pressed to have a share in the distribution of goods and services, as well as 
participation in policy decision-making (Woldenberg, 1992). 
Thus in the 1980's, as a result of the economic crises and the neo-liberal economic 
refonn, the state was forced to redefine the rules for state-society relations. And in 
doing so, the administrations that pursued structural adjustment in the 1980's and 
1990's faced a dilemma. On the one hand, the imposition of painful economic 
measures needed a strong state apparatus like the ailing corporatist arrangement. 
On the other hand, the downsizing of the state - which was a central part of the 
structural adjustment agenda - would dismantle it. Furthennore, policy-makers 
needed to reach out for new societal groups by improving their access to public 
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goods and services in order to form a new political coalition that would work 
against the corporatist groups' resistance to change (Cavarozzi, 1994). 
In the light of this new political context, policy-makers perceived state 
bureaucracies in charge of social service provision - including health services -
more as an obstacle than an asset. They were perceived as self-serving interest 
groups that were hampering the renovation of state-society relations by diverting 
the bulk of public resources into wages, providing inefficient services, and 
maintaining the old corporatist criteria (Ward, 1994). A new social policy agenda 
was designed that by-passed this bureaucracy in an effort to target new 
disenfranchised societal groups and the poor, and thus form a new political 
coalition strong enough to challenge the corporatist arrangement. 
But the societal groups that were gIven access to public goods and servIces 
through these new criteria lacked a level of political organisation comparable to 
that of the resilient corporatist groups. Furthermore, state-society relations could 
not coalesce around them since the benefits of economic reform were not made 
tangible to them in a systematic manner (Cornelius, 1994). The technocracy thus 
reshaped its refonn agenda. It confronted the corporatist arrangement in those 
areas that were directly related to the economic refonn, but refrained from doing 
so in areas that were not, and that still played a significant role in maintaining 
political support. Such was the case of the unionised state bureaucracies in charge 
of providing social security services. 
5.3 The Actors 
5.3.1 Political Parties 
In spite of the PRI's seventy-year-old predominance as the official party, 
opposition parties from both sides of the ideological spectrum were part of the 
political context. However, with few exceptions, only since the late 1980's were 
elections fair enough to allow these parties to reach power at local and state level. 
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The slow process of political liberalisation led to the end of the PRI absolute 
majority in Congress in 1997, marking a turning point in the interaction between 
the Executive and Legislative branches. The Executive's lack of direct control 
over Congress through the official party, empowered legislators - from both 
opposition parties and the PRJ - to function as a check and balance, demanding a 
say in policy decision-making. In late 2000, for the first time in Mexico's modern 
history, an opposition party will reach the presidency. 
Of the more than eight officially registered opposition parties, two have coalesced 
in major political forces opposing the PRJ. To the left, the Partido de la 
Revoluci6n Democnirtica (PRD) was created in the late 1980's from the union of 
an internal division of the PRI - resulting from the technocracy's take-over of the 
party - and an array of left-wing political organisations. By the late 1990's, the 
PRD had carved a niche in the centre left that was abandoned by the PRJ due to 
the neo-liberal program it adopted from the 1980's onwards. After being close to 
winning the 1988 presidential elections, by the late 1990's it held Mexico City's 
mayoralty and some state governorships, as well as several municipalities. It has 
played a major role in pressing for the country's democratisation and in Congress 
has systematically voted against the Executive's pro-market liberalisation policy 
initiatives. Along those lines, it has openly joined forces with the groups resisting 
IMSS reform. 
To the right, the Partido Acci6n Nacional (PAN) was created in the late 1930's by 
bringing together a myriad liberal civic associations which resented the rapidly 
expanding state interventionism. During the following decades, with few 
exceptions, it had no clear chances of winning electoral posts given the state's 
control over elections, but maintained its role as minority opposition in Congress. 
It nonetheless continued to press for political liberalisation until, from the mid-
1980's onwards, it was able to govern three states, the two most important cities 
after Mexico City, and several others, along with local governments across the 
country. With few exceptions - related to political bargaining - the PAN has 
steadily sided by the Executive's neo-liberal agenda from the 1980's onwards. In 
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July 2000, it won the presidential elections, ending the PRI's seventy-one-year 
hold on power. 
5.3.2 Business 
Although not fonnally part of the PRI's corporatist arrangement, business 
represented a base of tacit political support for the state from the 1950's until the 
1980'sI4. In exchange for this support, and as part of its economic policy, the state 
granted businesses protected markets, subsidies and other benefits. Due to its key 
role in productive processes and its control over financial resources, the business 
elite had personal access to high-level public officials through infonnal channels, 
without the need for institutional forums (Luna et aI., 1987). However, the fonnal 
intennediaries between the government and business were the chambers of 
commercel5 • 
The arrival of technocracy to power and its market liberalisation agenda in the 
1980's changed the composition of the business-state network. While a part the 
business sector that was negatively affected by the market liberalisation policies 
and voiced its opposition to these measures, business groups that benefited from 
it, established more visible alliances with the technocratic group in power. This 
resulted in a well established state-society network in which big business gave its 
open political backing to state policies and shared information and knowledge 
with policy-makers who showed interest in pursuing refonns. 
For the first time, the business community had public-policy proposals prepared in 
private think tanks and presented them to the Executive. In most cases, these 
policy proposals were directed at the economic sphere. However, in the early 
1990's, a group of businessmen financed the Health and Economy project 
undertaken at the Mexican Health Foundation (Funsalud), a private-sector-funded 
think tank. Their idea was to have a serious technical argument that could justify 
an in-depth refonn - or dismantling - of the Mexican Institute of Social Security 
(lMSS), which, in their view, was an inefficient state agency. Although the 
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resulting document fell short of proposing the dismantling of IMSS, it presented a 
comprehensive long-term proposal for the transformation of the entire sector, 
including the in-depth reform of IMSS. The proposal was lobbied by important 
members of the business community with the economic team in power, and 
succeeded in influencing the Zedillo administration's health sector reform 
program. 
5.3.3 Labour 
Since their incorporation into the PRI in the late 1930's as a central element of 
state-society relations, official unions have successfully maintained their role as 
exclusive intermediaries between the state and labour and between policy-makers 
and state employees. They have obtained exclusive benefits for its membership 
and monopolised control of key state industries as well as state agencies in charge 
of the provision of social services - such as IMSS. Although unionised labour 
represented less than 25% of the economically active population, its political and 
economic influence was considerable. The oil workers' union, the state electricity 
enterprises unions, the teachers' union and social security unions were among the 
largest and strongest in the country. 
The structure of representation and participation of these official UnIons was 
vertical and authoritarian along the lines of the corporatist arrangement. During 
the structural adjustment process in the 1980's and 1990's, the state resorted to the 
leadership of these official unions to ensure its implementation, while at the same 
time preserving political and economic stability (Cavarozzi, 1994). However, 
these structural adjustment measures made them lose ground in the political arena, 
since they were unable to protect the interests of their membership. Furthermore, 
societal groups with informal employment and independent unions became more 
vocal and challenged the official unions' monopoly of interest representation and 
interaction with the state. 
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This rivalry between official and independent labour movements, and each 
union's calculations about their political allegiance, was a major factor in the 
politics of the IMSS' health refonn. On the one hand, the political strength of the 
IMSS' union, coupled with its veiled threat to change sides and join the 
independent movement, was a matter of concern for the government, which could 
not afford to be at odds with more corporatist organisations than those related to 
the economic sphere. This helped the union to make an effective resistance to 
change. On the other, the union's half-hearted willingness to abide by the old 
corporatist rules put it at odds with the rest of the still powerful official unions, 
and thus impeded it from finding allies and fonning a large labour coalition to 
resist the change16• 
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5.3.4 Bureaucracy 
The state bureaucracy in Mexico was divided into three levels: high, middle and 
low level. High-level bureaucrats or policy-makers did not promote their interests 
through unions or any other type of formal organisation, but instead pursued their 
careers and protected their interests through informal links with other policy-
makers, by means of vertical and horizontal support networks. As high-level 
bureaucrats did, mid-level officials sought to promote their interests through 
bureaucratic factions or camarillas. Only low-level public employees joined state 
workers' unions in order to pursue and protect their interests by means of 
collective action (Cornelius and Craig, 1988). 
The Mexican Social Security Institute (lMSS) was an exception among 
government agencies in that most of its employees, including high and mid-level 
officials, were members of the Institute's workers' union. Practically all of the 
Institute's employees, including doctors17, were members of the SNTSS, which 
represents all IMSS employees. The union's control over most positions, 
including high-level posts, increased its pressure and collective action resources 
and reduced the margin of manoeuvre of the IMSS' Director and his close team. 
Given the lack of an institutionalised civil servIce In Mexico, the change of 
administrations brought with it a massive renovation of personnel within the 
public sector - and, in fewer cases, between the public and the private sector. The 
higher the rank of the bureaucratic level, the higher the degree of circulation. Due 
to the lack of institutional mechanisms for a meritocratic career, policy-makers 
were dependent on closely tied groups, or camarillas. and the networks they built 
up while in a government position to ensure the continuity of their careers (Camp. 
1990). The president appointed all cabinet ministers and vice-ministers, but 
ministers had a say in the nomination of some of their close collaborators. Each of 
these, would in tum name his/her work team, and loyalty and trust were prioritised 
over expertise and performance (Grindle, 1977). 
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The various camarillas constantly competed to increase their influence on the 
decision-making process, as well as on the formulation and implementation of 
public policy. This bureaucratic competition determined, more than anything else, 
who held the high-level positions in government (Camp, 1990), and therefore 
which policy project was implemented. Bureaucratic faction competition also 
reflected competing ideologies and visions, and has resulted in significant changes 
in the direction of policy-making. The power to influence policy decision-making 
depended on the group's characteristics and its networks with other policy-
makers. Given that, until the late 1990's, the president had the power to designate 
his successor, the number and importance of the policy projects each camarilla 
was in control of, often signalled its closeness to the top of the bureaucratic 
pyramid - and thus its positioning in preparation for the following administration. 
This explained in part why, as the change of administrations approached, 
competition peaked and cohesion around the government's policy agenda faltered. 
The arrival of the technocracy to power in the early 1980's was the result of one 
of these power struggles. As had been the case in the past, due to the lack of 
democratic party competition, this bureaucratic rivalry reflected the state's change 
in ideological stand in response to society's perception of its performance, and 
national and international pressures to alter its policy agenda. The technocratic 
group that reached power saw itself as the purveyor of an "apolitical" approach to 
policy-making, exclusively based on technical expertise and professional track 
record. However, the group resorted to similar bureaucratic strategies as other 
camarillas to pursue power and maintain it. 
S.3.S Civil Society 
Since the mid 1960's social movements started to organise themselves in demand 
of political liberal is at ion and participation in policy decision-makingI8 • Since then, 
civil society has followed a long process to regain spaces outside the corporatist 
state-society relations. During the 1960' sand 1970' s, those groups that contested 
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the state's authority - particularly left-wing movements - were repressed and/or 
co-opted by it. Self-help groups and peasant organisations that were not controlled 
by local PRI politicians (caciques), were repressed or denied public services and 
resources in a "carrot-and-stick" strategy. However, as a result of the continuous 
economic crisis and the state's exhausted capacity to absorb new groups, the latter 
started to press the state on several fronts in search for more access to policy 
decision-making and public goods and services. 
The emblematic birth of the civil society movement was the 1985 earthquake in 
Mexico City. Faced with the state's slow reaction in helping earthquake victims, 
societal groups and citizens organised themselves in self-help groups. Since then, 
civil society has played a visible role demanding free elections, a stop to mass-
media control, and respect for human rights, among other issues. The Zapatista 
guerrilla movement that emerged in the state of Chiapas in 1994, also brought the 
state's and society's attention - in Mexico and abroad - to the problems of 
poverty and income concentration that the state had been unable to solve. 
A handful of grass-roots non-governmental organisations, social assistance 
associations, and private-sector-funded think tanks of different ideological 
affiliations, started to playa more visible, if still marginal role. Among the think 
tanks sponsored by the private sector, two stood out for their capacity to influence 
policy-making through direct contacts with government decision-makers in the 
1980's and 1990's. The Centro de Investigacion para el Desarrollo, A.C. 
(CIDAC), and the Fundacion Mexicana para la Salud (Funsalud). 
Figure (5.2) shows the political map of key actors with capacity to influence 
policy decision-making during the 1980's and 1990's. Policy decision making is 
presented in the middle of the concentric circles. The closer the actors are to this 
inner circle, the higher their power to influence policy decision-making. 
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5.4 Technocracy in Power 
Two phenomena single out the early 1980's in Mexico. The debt crisis, followed 
by the arrival of technocracy to power with a neo-liberal policy agenda. These 
events were detenninant in the redefinition of state-society relations and the re-
composition of the coalitions that supported the state and benefited from its 
economic and social policies. The magnitude of the economic crisis undermined 
the legitimacy of the economic model in force until the early 1980's, and severely 
damaged the credibility of the politicians and policy-makers in power who 
promoted it. Thus, the crisis opened a window of opportunity for a technocratic 
group of policy-makers to seize power, promote structural adjustment, and 
redefine the role of the state, the market, and state-society relations l9 • 
5.4.1 Origins 
From the late 1950's, technical officials in charge of the Finance Ministry (SHCP) 
concentrated decision-making power over the public agenda through control over 
the budget and supervision of policy implementation in the other government 
agencies (Bailey, 1980). Finance's legal and institutional attributes were 
reinforced by infonnal and political factors that facilitated its leading role in 
policy-making and gave it leverage in the bureaucratic political competition 
among government factions. Among these, the capacity of its officials to deal with 
complex policy-making and the direct support of the president in each of the 
administrations in that period. Together with the Bank of Mexico (central bank), 
the Finance Ministry recruited the best prepared engineers and economists in the 
country and enjoyed the lowest personnel rotation rate among government 
agencies (Sirvient, 1975). These two agencies shared a liberal ideology and 
worked around a conservative policy agenda that focused on economic growth 
over income redistribution, low inflation rates, and keeping government 
expenditure low (Benett and Sharoe, 1984). 
190 
Following the political crisis of the late 1960's20, and the change in ideology 
brought about by the arrival of the Echeverria administration (1970 -1976), this 
group was challenged by equally trained officials who favoured a state-led 
economic model and income redistribution via high levels of public expenditure. 
The latter predominated and, with the support of the president in that, and the 
following administration, remained in control of the Finance Ministry throughout 
the 1970's. But the competition to influence policy-making did not subside. 
Instead, it was institutionalised by the creation of the Ministry of Planning (SPP), 
in 1976, which housed the liberal faction opposing the state-centred economic 
model pursued by Finance21 • 
It was also during this period that the divide between politicians and technical 
officials became less clear, and technical officials saw the opportunity to take on 
political positions. Becoming aware of this, young professionals interested in 
pursuing a career in the public sector stopped following the traditional training in 
law, and instead concentrated on economics. A generation of policy-makers thus 
chose to study economics and public administration in private universities with 
close links to American universities, where they followed on to pursue graduate 
studies. The professionals that followed this trend in the 1970's returned to junior 
positions in the Finance and Planning ministries and the Central Bank. They 
formed a cohesive group of technical officials who were willing to pursue their 
careers in positions that had previously only been held by non-technical 
politicians (Grindle, 1996). 
The perceived need to renew top-level decision-makers in order to face the new 
challenges of the 1980's opened a window of opportunity for their arrival to 
power. They became a new breed of politicians, whose careers had been made in 
the technical ranks of the financial sectors of government, and not within the 
party, and who came to be referred to as technocrats. President De la Madrid 
empowered this group of policy-makers to lead the economic adjustment program. 
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5.4.2 The Arrival of Technocracy to Power: 
The De la Madrid Administration (1982 - 1988) 
In 1982, when president De la Madrid took office, the country was immersed in a 
profound economic crisis. While the origins of the crisis were domestic, the 
world-wide economic recession significantly increased its magnitude. The 
pressure of its external debt on Mexico's economy grew to unprecedented levels. 
In response to this situation, the De la Madrid administration implemented what 
was called the Immediate Program for Economic Reorganisation (PIRE) and 
formulated a new long- term development strategy. 
The general perception in the country - and abroad - was that the world economy, 
and the challenges of the Mexican economy had grown too complex and required 
specialised expertise to solve them. Furthennore, the immediate need to 
reschedule debt payments with international creditors enhanced the role of the 
technical policy- makers. While until the crisis they had played an advisory role, 
and politicians were in charge of direct negotiations, this situation required them 
to play both roles, and the liberal economists were the only ones that shared the 
ideology of the creditors, and therefore enjoyed certain credibility. 
Thus the crisis marked the end of the pro-state faction's dominance, and the 
technocratic group arrived in power. They formed a cohesive group with very 
similar education and social background, and shared a common policy agenda and 
ideology. None had strong links to the PRJ, nor had experience in elected 
positions. But many had previously worked in the public sector as junior officials, 
and were the sons, nephews and students of the technical officials that had served 
in previous administrations. Thus, aside from their technical training and 
qualifications, they were skilful in bureaucratic politics (Grindle, 1996) and 
counted on the network of the generation of technical officials that preceded them 
(Centeno, 1994). 
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They saw themselves and were perceived by other policy-makers as the junior 
members of the liberal group who had been relegated to the SPP. From there, they 
had witnessed the internal political battles to control public policy, the pre-
eminence of the pro-state position and the resulting policy choices that had 
brought about the most serious economic crisis the country had seen until then. 
Their arrival in power was perceived - and resented - by PRI politicians as a take-
over, and they were soon referred to as the technocrats from the SPP (Waterbury, 
1992). 
However, the perceived urgency to confront the economic crisis meant that the 
technocratic group found very little organised resistance. Soon traditional PRI 
politicians and union leaders were displaced from key decision-making positions. 
With the backing of the president, the new economic team pursued aggressive 
political manoeuvring to expand its scope of influence beyond the financial 
government sectors, and into areas of political control. However, they were 
careful to only replace senior-level officials in areas they considered strategic for 
the economy, in a power-sharing strategy with traditional politicians with whom 
they struck an alliance. 
The impact of this power rearrangement within the state was clearly reflected in 
public policy, which from then until the late 1990's has concentrated on 
conservative macroeconomic management as its main priority. The further 
deterioration of economic conditions in 1985 - due to a new drop in oil prices -
led the De la Madrid administration to deepen its structural adjustment program, 
accelerating the process of market liberalisation and the privatisation of public 
enterprises. The radicalisation of the structural adjustment policy agenda also 
facilitated the consolidation in power of the most orthodox faction of the 
technocratic group, which was led by then Planning Minister Carlos Salinas de 
Gortari. 
In 1987, in a new global economic crisis, the world's financial markets had their 
price indexes drop abruptly, pulling the Mexican market with them. The value of 
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the peso dropped more than 40% in one day; and as a consequence, inflation 
increased considerably. In response to the new crisis the government put together 
an economic pact - called the Economic Solidarity Pact (PSE) - and resorted to 
the old corporatist structure to ensure the joint compliance of the state 
bureaucracy, labour and business with its tough measures. The plan was 
formulated by the team in the Planning Ministry, which was gradually assuming 
control of economic policy. 
By sIgnmg the PSE, labour leaders agreed to restrain their wage increase 
demands, and the leaders of the business organisations pledged to support 
economIC liberalisation and to reduce profit margins. In return, the state 
committed itself to restrain public expenditures by freezing state service wage 
increases and undertake layoffs. All these measures had the short-term purpose of 
curtailing inflation, but it implied a long-term structural adjustment agenda and 
the radical transformation of the state and the economy. The underlying 
assumption is that the technocratic group that had been empowered would remain 
in key senior positions in the long term - i.e. through more than one six-year term 
in office - in order to bring it to fulfilment. 
By the end of 1987, President De la Madrid designated Carlos Salinas de Gortari 
as the PRI's presidential candidate, and therefore, as his successor. In order to 
ensure policy continuity during the change of administrations, he appointed 
several members of the latter's team in key positions in government, where, with 
few exceptions, they remained after the transition22 • These included positions in 
the Finance, Commerce, Interior, and Development ministries, as well as the 
Central Bank (Centeno, 1994). 
5.4.3 The Consolidation of Technocracy in Power: 
The Salinas Administration (1988 -1994) 
After very contested elections, the 1988 - 1994 Salinas administration marked the 
consolidation in power of the technocracy. President Salinas' cabinet was even 
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more homogeneous than President De la Madrid's, and represented a closed and 
cohesive elite, with roots in the Ministries of Finance and Planning. This 
economic team had some of its members migrate to other government agencies, in 
order to control the key sectors it wanted to reform. Also, in a key political 
manoeuvre, while President Salinas appointed this compact group of technocrats 
to key posts in the economic agencies, he designated traditional politicians to 
political control agencies, such as the Ministry of the Interior. As heads of the 
peripheral agencies - which were not key to his government's agenda - Salinas 
appointed members of societal groups considered relevant to preserve his coalition 
of political support. That was the case of Jesus Kumate, a military doctor, who 
enjoyed the support of right-wing conservative groups, and was appointed Health 
Secretary. 
The key members of Carlos Salinas' cabinet were: Finance Minister Pedro Aspe 
ArmelIa (Doctor in Economics from MIT, 1978); Commerce Minister Jaime Serra 
Puche (Doctor in Economics from Yale University, 1979); Planning Minister 
Emesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon23 (Doctor in Economics from Yale University, 
1978); NAFT A negotiator Herminio Blanco Mendoza (Doctor in Economics from 
the University of Chicago, 1978); and the president's chief of staff, Jose Cordoba 
(post-graduate studies at the Sorbonne and Stanford University). A third of the 
cabinet members had worked at the Finance Ministry, and half of the cabinet had 
worked at the Planning Ministry before reaching cabinet positions. 
This technocratic team shared a common neo-liberal ideology and a project to 
rebuild Mexico's economy. They supported the integration of the country into 
world markets resorting to low wages and the proximity to the United States as 
comparative advantages to boost economic growth. The economic team's program 
centred on controlling inflation as a means to stop its regressive effect on income 
distribution. It also set out to deepen market liberalisation and the downsizing of 
the state through a massive privatisation program and to seek fiscal balance at the 
expense of maintaining the base salary's purchasing power (Centeno, 1994). 
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The ideological and programmatic cohesion within the group of decision-makers 
was determinant for the successful implementation of this policy agenda, which 
reshaped the Mexican state and its relation with the economy and society. The 
dismantling of the Planning Ministry in 1992 returned the planning functions to 
the Finance Ministry reflecting at the institutional level the concentration of 
decision-making in this groUp24. 
During the Salinas administration almost the entirety of public firms which were 
not defined as strategic in the Mexican Constitution were privati sed. Such was the 
case of airlines, steel mills, mines, a part of the petrochemical industry and the 
telephone company. The banks, which had been put under state control in 1982, 
were put back in private hands25 • Some of the peripheral activities that were 
carried out within state agencies that were to remain public were also contracted 
out to the private sector. In spite of this trend, in the case of the IMSS, only 
cleaning and garbage collection was contracted out to private services, in an effort 
not to affect the IMSS' union interests (Interview, 10/18/99). 
Opposition to privatisation was headed by the unions of the enterprises that were 
being put on sale. The left-wing opposition parties that endorsed a nationalist, 
state-oriented agenda, also opposed the privatisation programs. The bureaucracy 
in the Ministry of Energy (SEMIP), which had been in charge of controlling the 
majority of the public enterprises put on sale, also actively opposed privatisation. 
But in spite of this resistance to change, the economic team was able to pursue its 
agenda with the political backing of the major labour unions and business 
organisations streamlined through the old corporatist arrangement. 
In spite of the economic team's need of this political support, it sought to 
selectively challenge important segments of this corporatist structure. The reforms 
it was implementing hampered the corporatist exchange between PRI-affiliated 
groups and the state; but also the technocratic team made a serious attempt to 
redefine state-society relations by substituting these alienated groups - such as 
workers' unions and the bureaucracy affected by the reforms - with new groups 
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that had formerly been excluded from the corporatist pact. These new societal 
groups were organised under the auspices of the government's new poverty 
alleviation and development programs in an effort to by-pass the corporatist 
mediation in state-society relations. 
However, the economic reform's failure to produce tangible benefits for the 
majority of the population, and the newly formed coalition's slowness to 
consolidate, resulted in a political vacuum unable to counter the resistance of 
politically mobilised groups, such as the unions of the public enterprises being 
dismantled or privati sed, and the owners of private enterprises who were facing 
bankruptcy due to the market liberalisation. In view of this scenario, and still 
needing to consolidate the structural adjustment plan via economic pacts with 
labour and business organisations, the technocrats gave up on their attempt to 
redefine state-society relations and instead resorted to the old corporatist apparatus 
and its leaders to ensure the reform's continuity and to hold on to power. 
5.4.4 Technocracy Delimited: The 1994 Crisis and 
The Zedillo Administration (1994 - 2000) 
By the mid-nineties, the negative impact of the economic crises and the structural 
adjustment measures on the majority of the popUlation had exerted great pressure 
on the political system and its stability. With very few exceptions, the majority of 
the population, regardless of income level, had borne the costs - albeit unevenly -
without any visible positive results after years of severe economic measures. This 
was particularly the case with the corporatist groups at the core of state-society 
relations until the 1980's, which were suffering a dramatic erosion of their 
purchasing power and of the exclusive social benefits the state had entitled them 
to for decades. 
The need to reconstruct state-society relations and to reconcile these groups 
became evident. The consolidation of the economic reforms remained the priority, 
but this now depended on the skills and political manoeuvring of the PRI's 
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politicians. President Salinas designated Development Minister Luis Donaldo 
Colosio as his successor, in an attempt to ensure the continuity of the economic 
plan, while at the same time rebuilding ties with PRI politicians. But the 1994 
political crisis resulting from the assassinations of the PRI's presidential candidate 
Colosio and its secretary general Ruiz Massieu, thwarted President Salinas' 
strategy. In the aftermath, to prevent the accession to power of a PRI faction that 
would revert the reform, President Salinas designated as his new successor, 
Education Minister Emesto Zedillo, a technical official with no political skills26 • 
The economic crisis that started soon after President Zedillo took office in 
December 1994, showed the vulnerability of the economy in spite of the structural 
adjustment efforts. To restore the equilibrium of public finances, the Zedillo 
administration was forced to increase taxes. During the first semester of 1995, 
after a politically wearying process, a 50 per cent increase in the Value-Added Tax 
(IV A) rate was approved in Congress. This initiative, along with the IMSS reform 
approved in December of the same year, were the only two major reforms - with 
an immediate impact on several societal groups - that were going to be approved 
during the Zedillo administration27 • Legislators from opposition parties and from 
the PRI were concerned about having to share the responsibility - and to pay the 
political price - of approving unpopular measures in view of growing social 
discontent. Faced with very little political capital to introduce major reforms and 
with the need to tighten the budget once again in order to limit the damage of the 
economic crisis, the Zedillo administration chose to minimise its reform agenda 
and to concentrate on stabilising the economy. Figure (5.3) shows the location of 
the economic team in charge ofre-defining the government's policy priorities. 
Figure 5.3 : Zedillo Administration (1994- 2000): 
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As a result of the new economic crisis and the discredit of the technocratic group 
in power, opposition parties grew stronger. In the 1997 mid-term elections, the 
ruling party lost, for the first time in Mexico ' s modem hjstory, its majority in the 
Lower House, thus initiating a process towards the balance of power between the 
Executive and the Legislature. As a result of the new political context, the speed 
and scope of the government's reform agenda was reduced even further. During 
the remaining three years of government, the Zedillo administration was reactive, 
rather than proactive, regarding the implementation of policy initiatives, and had 
no political power to impose policy change on those sectors pending reform. This 
was the case of the petrochemical and electricity sectors, as well as of the social 
security reform. 
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While the economy recovered and major progress was made in political 
liberalisation, the technocratic group in power failed to convert these results into 
political support in the wake of the presidential elections. The PRI had modified 
the party's rules to avoid the fourth consecutive succession in power of a member 
of the technocratic group. At President Zedillo's initiative, it also moved to have 
more control over the designation of its presidential candidate, and former 
Agriculture Minister Francisco Labastida, an economist with a state service career 
with little ties to the technocracy, was chosen. But he lost the elections to the 
PAN's candidate Vicente Fox. 
5.5 Summary and Main Points 
A distinctive characteristic of the political system in Mexico was the 
concentration and centralisation of power in the Executive branch of government, 
specifically in the president. The Executive's power is not only based on the 
formal attributes that the Constitution grants it. A series of informal faculties have 
allowed the Presidency to become the single most important source of legislation. 
This practice, in place for more than half a century, has transferred policy 
decision-making and negotiation to arenas outside the public scrutiny, such as the 
ruling party or the Executive itself. 
However, the Presidency's informal powers have weakened as a consequence of 
the democratic opening. Since 1997, when the PRI lost its majority in the Lower 
House, for the first time, the government has had to negotiate with opposition 
parties the approval of its bills. Also, given the more competitive political 
environment, the Executive has had to step up its negotiations with its own party, 
since the legislators' incentives to back unpopular policy initiatives have greatly 
diminished. 
A second relevant characteristic of the Mexican political system is the rather 
weakened, but still present corporatist arrangement that rules the relations between 
the state and different social sectors through the official political party: the 
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Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). The corporatist arrangement between the 
state and society rests on a set of implicit agreements that govern access to policy-
making and the distribution of public goods and services. This arrangement 
between the state and society has rested on the exclusive inclusion of organised 
societal groups mostly working in the fonnal economy. In exchange for organised 
political support, the incorporated sectors receive privileged access to public 
goods and services from the state. 
The health system in Mexico reflects, until now, the corporatist arrangement 
between the state and those actors it considered politically or economically 
relevant, to whom access to social security services were granted. It excluded 
those groups with little capacity for political mobilisation and whose economic 
activities were centred in the infonnal sector, notably the poor. To the latter group, 
the state provides underfunded and insufficient health care through the Ministry of 
Health facilities. 
The 1980's marked the exhaustion of the political elite who had been ruling over a 
closed statist economy for decades, and the arrival in power of a different breed of 
policy makers: the neo-liberal technocrats. Their seizure of power was possible 
due to the legitimacy crisis that the PRI's traditional politicians were facing. 
Furthennore, the economic crises and the change in ideology of the group in 
power, seriously undennined the corporatist arrangement. The lack of financial 
resources limited the state's capacity to maintain the exchange of public goods 
and services for the organised political support of the corporatist sectors. It also 
prevented the state from incorporating the newly mobilised societal groups - most 
of whom worked in the informal economy - into the old corporatist pact. 
The group of technocrats that gained strength within government in the early 
1980's, under the De la Madrid's administration, was a cohesive team made up of 
technically skilled individuals whose political careers had developed almost 
entirely in the financial and economic agencies of government. Most of them 
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lacked electoral or party experience. The increase in the technocratic group's 
influence corresponded to a decrease in power of traditional PRI politicians and 
union leaders. 
The technocratic group profited from this window of opportunity to consolidate 
itself in power and to pursue policy refonns that were to redefine the economic 
model, the role and size of the state, as well as state-market and state-society 
relations. However, this radical transfonnation in state-society relations did not 
happen simultaneously in all policy areas. Most significant changes occurred in 
the economic sphere, where market liberalisation was completed. Public 
enterprises were put up for sale and, in some instances, the state bureaucracy was 
trimmed down. Instead, the social sector's refonn - which was also part of the 
technocracy's agenda - had a very slow start and left the old corporatist 
arrangements and actors almost untouched. Social sector unions, and notably the 
IMSS union, not only survived state refonn, but were actually useful in securing 
the political support needed to pursue refonns in other sectors. 
However, macroeconomic changes failed to translate into tangible benefits for the 
majority of the population, but the economic refonn negatively affected interest 
groups that had played an important role in state-society relations for decades. The 
enonnous pressure on the political system that resulted from these factors, 
undennined its modus operandi of the last 60 years, notwithstanding its 
corporatist arrangement. 
Paradoxically, the technocrats who sought to limit the scope of action and even 
dismantle the corporatist machinery, had to tum to it in order to promote and 
consolidate their structural adjustment agenda. Thus, the technocracy in power 
was careful not to tamper with the corporatist interests in those areas that were not 
a priority in their policy agenda, but that played an important role in securing 
political support for the government and maintaining the overall political system's 
stability. 
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The liquidity crisis that occurred at the end of 1994 further complicated the 
prospects of the technocratic group in power. Ernesto Zedillo's government had to 
increase taxes to balance public finances. The political cost of promoting these 
reforms was so high that the government's margin of manoeuvre was considerably 
reduced. Nonetheless, he promoted the reform of the pensions system as a 
preventive measure against its imminent bankruptcy, and as a way to raise internal 
savings. But President Zedillo opted to reduce his reform agenda and focus on 
stabilising the country politically and economically. The priority given to pensions 
reform as part of the economic policy package, and the need to reduce potential 
political confrontation with organised groups such as the IMSS' union, severely 
limited the political feasibility of an in-depth health reform that would necessarily 
affect entrenched interests. 
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Chapter 6. The Policy Process 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes Mexico's process of health reform spanning from 1992 to 
1999. The background offers a brief profile of Mexico's heath care system from 
the view of the political context described in the previous chapter. And refers to a 
reform attempt made at the initiative of the technocratic government in the mid 
1980's. The rest of the chapter is organised in the sequential order of a policy 
process: problem definition and reform formulation, reform legislation and reform 
implementation. The final remarks present the key policy nodes and the 
interaction of the actors involved in the process. 
6.2 Background 1 
It has been argued that, in Mexico's public provision of social services, politics 
determine who obtains what, when and how (Ward, 1994). Health and social 
security services focused primarily on the urban formal workers that were 
members of the official labour unions, and other strategic groups such as oil 
workers, the army, the navy and the state bureaucracy. Non-mobilised groups 
working in the informal economy, particularly those in the rural sector, had access 
to second-rate public health services and in remote areas, to no services at all 
(Frenk et aI., 1994). 
Mexico's health system was organised as such in the early 1940's, with the 
founding of the Ministry of Health (SSA) and the Mexican Social Security 
Institute (IMSS). These agencies were established as part of the state's institution-
building process around its political and economic priorities. It was during that 
decade that the Mexican political system was consolidated around a corporatist 
arrangement. The public health-care services provided by the MOH were aimed at 
the general population. The IMSS offered a parallel system with exclusive social-
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security services for fonnal workers financed by a tripartite contribution from the 
government, the employers and the employees. 
Using the occupation criteria to detennine a citizen's access to health services has 
produced the division of the system in three clearly differentiated and vertically 
organised sectors: The IMSS; the Health Ministry and the private sector, each 
catering to a distinctive group of the population and each pursuing independent 
regulation, financial and health services provision activities. 
Figure (6.1) borrows a diagram from the MOH refonn program (1995) that 
presented the different providers of Mexico's health care system and their target 
popUlation. The popUlation has been divided between those covered by a health 
insurance plan - private or public - and those who do not have a health insurance 
plan and are entitled to public health facilities. A line depicting level of income 
has been added to highlight how income is a detenninant of the type of service a 
user can access2• 
Figure 6.1: Insured and Uninsured Population by Income Level 
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The relevance of the IMSS as a centrepiece of the corporatist arrangement with 
politically organised societal groups was clear from the start. Per capita public 
resource allocations favoured IMSS affiliates disproportionately until the mid-
1990's. Governments turned to the IMSS to maintain and expand health-care 
coverage, and also protected its financial equilibrium in times of economic crisis. 
On the other hand, the Ministry of Health suffered a series of important budget 
cuts and remained under- funded until the 1990's. With its funds, and the use of 
pensions funds, the IMSS built an important health infrastructure in urban and 
industrial areas3. This infrastructure, plus its financial autonomy vis-a-vis the 
government - due to employer-employee mandatory contributions - helped it 
maintain its predominant role in Mexico's health sector. Throughout the years, the 
IMSS' bureaucracy - through the IMSS' union (SNTSS) - became a powerful 
group due to its role as mediator between formal workers and PRI politicians. Its 
network included officials within the Executive, the Legislature, and state and 
local governments. 
6.2.1 A First Attempt at Health Reform in The 1980's 
As part of the state reform effort that accompanied structural adjustment in the 
1980's, a health system reform was started during the De la Madrid administration 
(1982 - 1988) to raise the efficiency and quality of services, and to improve 
equity in access to them. It included the decentralisation of the Ministry of 
Health's facilities and the formation - via the merging of rural IMSS services and 
MOH facilities and the creation of autonomous state-level health systems. These 
health systems were going to be created with the decentralised MOH facilities and 
those of the IMSS it used to serve the uninsured popUlation - thus it would imply 
passing over IMSS facilities into the control of local decentralised HMO facilities. 
It also sought to strengthen and increase the decision-making and leadership 
capacity of the Health Ministry as head of the health sector. These two 
components of the refonn would have implied a change in the balance of power 
between the MOH and the IMSS, since while formally the Ministry of Health was 
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the head of the health sector, the IMSS outweighed it m the financial, 
organisational and political fields. 
However, as the economIC cnSIS worsened, the government was forced to 
reconsider its refonn priorities in the public agenda. The president and his 
economic team focused their attention and political capital on limiting the 
economic crisis and accelerating structural adjustment in key areas such as the 
privatisation of state enterprises and the trade liberalisation. As a result of the 
IMSS' stark opposition to the health refonn agenda and the economic crisis 
reaching a peak in 1985, the De la Madrid government took the decision to bring 
the decentralisation process to a halt with only 17 out of the 31 states having 
completed the process. 
6.2.2 The Health Sector Reform Program (PRSS) 1995 - 2000 
Although initiatives to refonn the health sector began to be discussed from the 
early 1990's, it was only in 1995 that the Health Sector Refonn Program (PRSS) 
was presented as part of the National Development Plan. It was a very ambitious 
program that considered a long-term horizon spanning across more than the 
administration's six years. Regarding health services provision, both the National 
Development Plan and the health reform initiative identified the segmentation of 
the health system and the division of the target popUlation according to occupation 
as an issue to be addressed, and both stated that, in the long run, a health care 
system divided according to functions was desirable4• 
The Reform Program of the Health Sector stated the following fundamental 
goals5: 
• To establish instruments that promote quality and efficiency in the public 
provision of health services. 
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• To expand social-security coverage through mechanisms that make 
affiliation easier for the uninsured population and for those belonging to the 
informal economy. 
• To decentralise MOH health-care provision to those states where it was still 
centralised. 
• To expand health-care coverage to the very poor in rural and urban areas. 
Regarding the decentralisation process, the Program stated that the 
decentralisation of federal resources allocated to MOH services - which had been 
stopped in the mid- 1980's - should be reactivated, along with the creation of 
state-level health systems. While the decentralisation of MOH facilities did take 
place, the merging of IMSS facilities into the new state-level health systems did 
not occur. Instead, the IMSS pursued its own internal deconcentration process 
through the creation of seven regions with autonomous responsibilities and 
functions. 
Finally, in order to reach the close to 10 million people with limited or no access 
to health care, the Reform Program proposed the implementation of a "basic 
health- care service package" composed of essential cost-effective health 
interventions with high impact6, under the responsibility of the MOH. 
6.2.3 The Social Security Reform 
The reform of the health component of social security was formally considered as 
part of the sector-wide Health Reform Program (PRSS) under the leadership of the 
MOH. However, the IMSS' autonomous status and its political and organisational 
strength relative to the reset of the sector gave it enough leeway to define and 
implement its own reform agenda away from the MOH's influence. Thus, while 
formally the IMSS was required to discuss policy guidelines with the Minister of 
Health, in reality it negotiated its policy agenda directly with the core ministries -
notably with the economic team at the Finance Ministry and the Office the 
Presidency - as well as with state and local governments. It also managed its own 
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direct contacts with other actors in society, particularly with organised business 
and labour which, being affiliated to social security, were part of the Institute's 
board. The IMSS also conducted its own public opinion strategy around its 
refonn, in which it presented itself as an actor independent of the rest of the health 
sector. 
Another phenomenon that moved the locus of decision-making related to the 
IMSS' refonn further away from the MOH and closer to the Finance Ministry, 
was the fact that the economic team considered the IMSS' pensions refonn a part 
of the economic refonn. The economic team felt that the economic refonn had 
been mostly completed, and was turning its attention to the refonn of public 
social-service provision as part of an effort to preserve the equilibrium of public 
finances. The IMSS' refonn bridged the government's refonn agenda from the 
economic sphere to the social sphere, in that it had a key element related to 
economic policy - pensions - and presented - in the view of the economic team -
the challenges the state faced in relation to social policy: the IMSS' financial 
viability was at risk as a result of inefficient resource management and the 
demographic and epidemiological transition of its target population?, it presented 
inefficiencies in health service provision, and had an oversized bureaucracy that 
centralised the Institute's administration. Its personnel management - which 
included doctors - was hampered by inadequate perfonnance incentives, a rigid 
collective labour contract, and complex labour relations with the IMSS' union. 
The IMSS' policy problems subject to reform were articulated along the lines of 
the economic team's financial perspective, with the problems related to service 
provision proper playing a secondary role. In regard to pensions, the economic 
team's perception was that employer quotas were high - by world standards - and 
that this was putting local producers' competitiveness in the world market in 
jeopardy. According to this view, high quotas were also leading to under-
declaration, lack of incentives to create formal employment and fraud. By the mid 
1990's, the pensions fund showed severe financial imbalances. Its reserves had 
been depleted as they had been used to cost IMSS infrastructure and to meet the 
210 
runnmg costs of defaulting health services provision. As a result, retirement 
pensions were being met with active workers' quotas. However, this solution was 
untenable in the long run due to the changing age structure of formal workers -
due to increasing life expectancl. 
The IMSS' health service provision also presented serious financial challenges. 
The original quota had been calculated on the basis of costs of service provision 
for workers alone, and not for their families. But health service provision had been 
extended to cover worker's relatives without a matching modification of this 
original amount. Over time, benefits in health care were also increased without 
adjusting the quotas, furthering the financial imbalance. This was further 
aggravated by the fact that quotas were indexed to wages, and not to costs9 • The 
financial gap had been met with cross-subsidies from the pensions fund. 
The economic team's neo-liberal ideology also permeated the solutions set forth 
for the restructuring of the pensions system and the IMSS as a state agency, 
focusing on the privatisation of the former and the financial re-engineering of the 
latter. The resulting pensions reform proposal consisted of replacing the 
government's pay-as-you-go pensions system with a private scheme of fully 
funded individual retirement accounts. Policy to improve the IMSS' health service 
provision was formulated with the premise that efficiency and quality could be 
triggered by market (or quasi-market) mechanisms and competition. As a result, 
the reform proposal was based on changing the Institute's rules and incentives in 
health service delivery, and on contracting out with private providers in specific 
areas. 
Lastly, the fact that only a part of the population had access to the IMSS' health 
services - limited to formal workers and their families - was also addressed, 
although without the same urgency. It had become clear that the inertial expansion 
of the IMSS' coverage through the obligatory incorporation of new families into 
the formal work force would be very slow, since the creation of fonnal 
employment was very slow due to the economic crisis. Therefore, for the first 
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time, the possibility of incorporating non-formal workers on a systematic basis 
through a voluntary insurance scheme was considered lO • To that end, the Program 
considered the need to reform the Social Security Law in order to create a Family 
Health Insurance (SSP). Through this new health insurance scheme, the state 
would allocate a per capita subsidy financed with public funds directly to informal 
workers willing to affiliate by paying an annual fee. In this way, the population 
groups that had purchasing power, but that did not belong to the formal economy, 
could be incorporated into social security. 
The stated goals of the IMSS reform were: 
• To privatise the totality of the pensions system to ensure its financial viability 
and promote the country's internal savingsll . 
• To reorganise the financial structure of the IMSS to guarantee the agency's 
financial equilibrium with the elimination of cross-subsidies and adequate 
quota levels 12. 
• To improve the quality of health care provision through the introduction of 
measures such as doctor eligibility at the first level, permanence and 
productivity incentives, and the application of the opt-out option for those 
business willing to contract private health care services for their employees. 
6.3 Problem Definition and Reform Formulation (1992 -1994) 
From the early 1990's, a variety of groups in society and within the state started to 
consider different policy options for reforming the health sector in its totality, or 
in one of its central components: the health services provided by the IMSS to little 
less than one-half of Mexico's total population. These groups' initiatives, and 
indeed their own nature, changed over time as the process of health reform 
unfolded; but based on the basic characteristics of their proposals, and the position 
in the political context where they operated, they can be divided into three. 
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First, the technocratic group which from the government's economic team, which 
was assigned to the IMSS' Financial Division, and whose proposal was to prevail, 
influenced from the other two groups. Second, CEDESS, IMSS' think tank 
created to support the IMSS' Directive's decision-making, which lost the battle to 
define the content of the reform, but was indispensable to making the first group's 
technocratic proposal politically feasible. Third, a heterogeneous group formed by 
a private think tank representing the interests of the business community 
(Funsalud) and another made up of members of the Ministry of Health13 • 
6.3.1 The Economic Team and the IMSS Reform 
The IMSS was regarded by the economic team as a large government agency in 
financial difficulties that needed to be reformed as part of the efforts to bring the 
state's finances back to equilibrium. Responding to what was seen as an imminent 
crisis, members of the economic team in the Finance and Commerce ministries 
started studying the case and formulating policy proposals from the early 1990's. 
Pedro Aspe, the Finance Minister, assigned a group of young officials the task of 
exploring different policy options to solve the IMSS' imminent financial crisis 
and to design a new pensions scheme. Although some IMSS officials participated, 
most of the research and the reSUlting reform proposals stemmed from the Finance 
Ministry and the Central Bank (Bank of Mexico). Emilio Gamboa Patron, the 
IMSS' Director at the time, was kept informed of the project's development, but 
neither he nor his collaborators were directly involved. 
The Finance Ministry's proposal was not the only one that was formulated within 
the Executive. The IMSS issue was relevant enough to become an element of 
competition among the economic team's factions, which were positioning 
themselves to compete for the presidential successionl4 , Thus, in a parallel way, 
the Chief of Staff of the Presidency entrusted public officials from the Commerce 
Ministry with working on an alternative proposal (Interview, 04/08/99), The 
Finance Minister's team finally lost control of the project, which was assumed by 
the Finance Vice Minister, Guillermo Ortiz - who belonged to the president's 
213 
chief of staffs camarilla - and his team with the close collaboration of the 
officials at the Commerce Ministry. 
As the reform proposal took shape, some of the members of the technocratic 
group that had gained control over the project were assigned to positions within 
the IMSS to work on its technical details and prepare for its implementation -
which was planned to take place during the following administration. Among 
them, Gabriel Martinez, an economist who, as a junior member of the economic 
team working in the Commerce Ministry, had participated in important 
deregulation projectsls, and was aware of the discussions around the IMSS reform. 
At Commerce Minister Serra Puche's recommendation, he was assigned to the 
IMSS' Financial Department, to a position whose appointment was in control of 
the Ministry of Financel6 (Interview, 02/24/99). When President Zedillo was 
elected, it became clear that Minister Serra Puche would become the future 
Finance Minister - as indeed happened - and thus Gabriel Martinez and his team 
counted on direct political support from the Finance Ministry - a key vertical 
network. However, this change team was soon to lose its single most important 
vertical network with the resignation of Finance Minister Serra Puche within 
weeks of President Zedillo' taking office. 
6.3.2 The IMSS Attempt to Retake Control 
The take-over of the project by this new faction of the economic team coincided 
with a change in the IMSS leadership. Emilio Gamboa Patron was replaced by 
Genaro Borrego Estrada as the Institute's Director. Borrego's arrival at the IMSS 
represented a breaking point in the reform process. Although not a technocrat, and 
with a long political career in the PRI, he presented himself as a policy-maker 
with a combination of political and technical skills, capable of bringing about the 
social security reform. Contrary to his predecessors, he decided to participate 
directly and actively in the restructuring of the social security system. In order to 
do this, he sought to generate a technocratic reform proposal of his own that 
would differentiate itself from the economic team's proposal by looking beyond 
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the IMSS' financial aspect and present a comprehensive reform of the IMSS 
(Interview, 03/22/99). 
For this purpose, and before the economic team assigned Gabriel Martinez to the 
IMSS' financial division, he created a think tank in mid-1993, called Centro de 
Desarrollo Estrategico para la Seguridad Social (CEDESS) with a group of 
economists and actuarial experts with similar technical training and ideology as 
the technocrats in the Ministry of Finance. CEDESS was assigned the 
responsibility of studying policy options and to formulate an integral reform 
proposal which included an in-depth change in health service delivery. It was 
formally separated from the IMSS, and in practice operated as a think tank for the 
Institute's management. The CEDESS team was in charge not only of presenting a 
technocratic proposal in similar terms as that being prepared by the economic 
team in the core ministries - thus facilitating closer links with this group - but 
also of creating the means to have the IMSS reform process gravitate back to the 
IMSS' control. 
For many months, there was extensive exchange of information and analysis '7 
between the members of the economic team and CEDESS. But this did not 
develop into a co-operative relationship on an equal basis and only the few 
members of CEDESS who were also close collaborators of the economic team 
circulated freely from one team to the other. In the end, while most of the actuarial 
work and part of the economic analysis was carried out at CEDESS, the economic 
team and later on, the IMSS change team, were in control of policy decision-
making. 
Between 1993 and 1994, the CEDESS team worked on a senes of projects 
regarding the IMSS reform agenda with a wide range of policy options - from the 
most radical which relied on the market to the most moderate which preserved a 
central role for the state. Among the studies prepared by this group, the most 
important were the Proyecto de Gran Vision and the Proyecto Aguila stemming 
from it'8. In them, the CEDESS team compiled its assessment of social security in 
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Mexico and its refonn proposals. For the IMSS' health component, the Proyecto 
Aguila had, among its objectives, the need to achieve the financial self-sufficiency 
of the IMSS' health service provision, to increase quality and efficiency in service 
delivery, and to expand coverage to all the employed popUlation regardless of 
their status of occupation - both fonnal and infonnal 19• 
To attain these objectives, the document proposed the reorganisation of the IMSS' 
health care financing and service provision and the creation of a health insurance 
scheme for families not affiliated to social security. To achieve the IMSS' health 
services' long tenn financial equilibrium - and boost producer competitiveness -
Proyecto Aguila suggested an increase in the state's share of the tripartite social 
security quota equivalent to a decrease in the employer-employee share. This 
decrease was also expected to make the implementation of the opt-out option 
feasible, without putting IMSS finances at risk. The project also sought to 
eliminate cross-subsidies from the pensions fund into the IMSS' health care 
services - which had been used as a strategy to maintain their finances afloat - in 
preparation for the privatisation of the pensions scheme. 
With regard to measures to improve quality and efficiency in health care 
provision, Proyecto Aguila proposed doctor eligibility at primary level, and 
recommended both expanding doctor choice to private providers that complied 
with the Institute's requirements, and changing IMSS doctors' remuneration from 
salary-based to capitation, thus in practice opening IMSS services to public-
private health service provision and introducing competition. Along these same 
lines, the document suggested that support services such as phannacies, 
laboratories and radio diagnosis be contracted out - to providers operating 
independently or in IMSS facilities. 
In spite of CEDESS' collaboration with the economic team and the change team 
at the IMSS' Finance Division, the IMSS Director's attempt to take control of the 
refonn's fonnulation failed. The IMSS Directorate was only given a major role 
when the economic team had finished its own refonn initiative, and needed to 
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broker it with key interest groups - notably business and labour, and the IMSS 
union - and in Congress, when the bill was submitted for legislation. Some 
significant changes were made to the economic team's reform proposal based on 
the IMSS Directorate's arguments on political feasibility during negotiations with 
different actors throughout the reform process, but the project remained firmly in 
the hands of the economic team, who saw in Martinez' change team an extension 
of its own. 
Thus, under the control of the economic team, the reform of the IMSS' health 
services had two characteristics that relate them to the economic team's social-
sector reform agenda. First, it could be considered as an extension of the financial 
restructuring of IMSS insurance funds into the daily operative process of IMSS 
health services; and second, it followed the principles used by the economic team 
in social sector reform - rationalisation of expenditures, targetting, and 
performance incentives among others. Also, in contrast to the pensions reform, 
most of the policy changes related to the health component could be pursued 
through internal administrative acts and decrees within the IMSS, and without the 
need to amend the Social Security Law. This meant that there were few 
institutional requirements for consultation and policy dialogue with the health 
sector's interest groups, and that its timing did not have to abide by the legislative 
calendar. 
6.3.3 Other Groups Influencing Reform Formulation 
In preparation for the change of administration, other groups in society and within 
the state started studying and preparing policy proposals for health reform. Among 
these, two groups competed to influence policy decision-making and position 
themselves to head the MOH. One stemmed from the Planning Division of the 
MOH, and the other from the private think tank Funsalud. 
In the quest for the position of Minister of Health, the Ministry's Planning Vice 
Minister led his team into conducting a series of polls to build a database for a 
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health refonn plan. His group also published, as part of MOH publications, a 
series of small booklets addressing some of the issues relevant to the health sector. 
However, these publications did not fonn a single body fonning a health refonn 
proposaI20• As part of its political agenda, this team participated in a group 
organised by the PRI - called Grupo Coordinador en Salud - with the task of 
putting together a white paper on health as part of the PRI's electoral platfonn for 
the presidential race. However, when the team's leader was not assigned to the 
MOH, it was dismantled and its members resumed research activities at the 
National Institute of Public Health. 
Funsalud conducted a two-year project funded by the business community called 
Health and Economy. This group produced a comprehensive health sector 
proposal that envisioned major changes in both the Ministry of Health and the 
IMSS, aimed at establishing a single system with a plurality of public and private 
health service providers, where the Ministry of Health would be responsible for 
policy guidelines and regulation, while the IMSS would be in charge of health 
service financing. Health service provision was to be left to a plurality of 
public/private actors. 
Funsalud's project was the first case in which a very visible and comprehensive 
policy proposal was presented to the public arena by the private sector through a 
group of businessmen who aspired to influence the public-policy agenda in the 
area of health. This group was dissatisfied with the financial burden that the social 
security obligatory contributions put on the private sector, and by the poor quality 
of the services received by their labour force. Thus, they funded Funsalud's 
Economia y Sa/ud project with the aim of presenting, in an articulate manner, 
elements regarding the why and how of the need for IMSS refonn - particularly 
its downsizing and the possibility of replacing its services with public/private 
health care via the opt-out policy. 
The project's leader, Julio Frenk conceived the idea of the Economia y Salud 
project when he collaborated in the preparation of the World Bank's World 
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Development Report 1993, which had health as its main topic. Thus the Economia 
y Salud proposal went beyond an assessment of IMSS performance, and addressed 
issues central to the entire health care system, such as equity, efficiency and 
quality; and presented policy solutions along the lines that were being discussed in 
the international arena, such as the health care system's reorganisation by 
functions, quasi-market and competition elements to induce efficiency and better 
quality of care. 
As the proposal was being prepared, the businessmen supporting Funsalud lobbied 
in favour of their health reform agenda, resorting to direct contacts with members 
of the government's economic team, who shared the same ideology and were 
studying policy options in the same field. Funsalud's draft proposal was presented 
to the faction led by the Finance Minister, then in control of the government's 
social security reform project. The minister responded making information 
available to Funsalud, and a discrete policy dialogue was initiated. The Finance 
Ministry team found in Funsalud a space outside government and insulated from 
interest groups, in which different reform proposals could be studied and debated 
with no constraints or political considerations. 
By these means, Funsalud was successful in permeating the state's decision-
making on the health reform agenda. Also, through an accompanying strategy of 
policy dissemination - including seminars and publications - the Economia y 
Salud project managed to put the health issue on the public agenda and to 
articulate the policy debate around the reform - with positions against and in 
favour of ie l • But when the Ministry of Finance faction lost the project's control 
to its rival faction within the economic team, Funsalud lost its close contact with 
government decision-makers and with it, the possibility of influencing the 
reform's implementation plans. 
In 1994, as the presidential elections came closer, the PRJ invited Jaime 
Sepulveda's team, the Economia y Salud team, CEDESS, and Juan Ramon de la 
Fuente, Director of the National University'S Medicine Faculty, along with other 
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public officials, to organise a group called Grupo Asesor en Salud and prepare a 
health white paper to be incorporated into the PRI's political platfonn for the 
presidential campaign. This group worked for many months on a policy proposal22 
and competed to have control over its end result. It also strove to establish closer 
links with the technocratic faction of the economic team which was now in charge 
of the refonn proposal, and was working on presidential candidate Zedillo's 
government plan in a parallel arena to that ofPRI politics. 
In spite of these efforts, the refonn' s content remained firmly in the control of the 
economic team. This group took Funsalud's input, as well as the white paper's, 
but did not establish a policy dialogue with any of the teams that had prepared 
them. Instead, it continued to conduct its own analysis of other countries' 
experiences in the field of health care reform and decided on the reform's content, 
scope and timing in an isolated manner away from the public policy debate arena 
in which the other groups were operating. 
In retrospect, two different arenas where policy debate around the reform was 
taking place can be singled out. Figure (6.2) shows, in the top track, the insulated 
policy arena where the different technocratic factions discussed and competed to 
control the health reform project away from the debate and competition that was 
taking place simultaneously in the somewhat more open - if still very exclusive -
arena, with the participation of social and other state groups - represented in the 
bottom track. While the overall aim was social security reform, the content of the 
proposal varied according to the arena in which it was discussed and negotiated. 
The grey areas show the moments at which the health aspect of social security was 
discussed in both arenas. Given the political power of the economic team, the 
content of the resulting reform gravitated mostly around economic and financial 
issues, whereas the reform of the health component was only central to the more 
open arena involving state and societal actors related to the social sector. 
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6.4 The Reform Agenda in the Light of the Change of 
Administration and the 1994 Economic Crisis 
At the end of the Salinas administration, the economic cabinet studied the reform 
proposal prepared by CEDESS. Given the proximity of the change of 
administration, it was decided that further formulation and eventual 
implementation should take place during the incoming Zedillo administration. 
President-elect Zedillo asked Borrego to remain as IMSS Director and to develop 
a political strategy to implement the reform (Interview, 05/05/99). Gabriel 
Martinez and his team had already been appointed to the IMSS' Finance Division 
with the political backing of the newly appointed Finance Minister. 
At this moment of government transition, a certain balance persisted between the 
reform objectives related to pensions and those related to health services. These 
were: the increase in internal savings through the privatisation of the pensions 
system; stabilising of the IMSS' finances through the fmancial re-engineering of 
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the Institute's core insurance funds - pensions and the health component - and the 
expansion of and improvement in quality of the IMSS' health care services. It was 
clear that the aim was to carry out an integral reform. One that would imply the 
transformation of the IMSS (the old actor in the health care system) and the 
creation of new societal, such as HMOs that would cater for IMSS affiliates who 
decided to take the opt-out and quota reimbursement option described above. 
The incorporation of Gabriel Martinez into the IMSS was seen as a signal of the 
Zedillo administration's resolution to implement the social security reform. 
However, in spite of these preparations and the existence of a virtually complete 
reform proposal, the economic crisis in which the country was engulfed within 
weeks of the new government's taking office, and the legitimacy crisis that it thus 
endured, forced it to revise its reform agenda, including that of the social 
security's integral reform. 
The Finance Minister, Jaime Serra Puche, was made to resign less than a month 
after he had been appointed. However, he managed to negotiate for his 
collaborators to remain in their posts in different ministries (Interview, 02124/99), 
thus Gabriel Martinez and his change team, though deprived of their most 
important vertical network of support, remained in the IMSS and continued to 
pursue their reform agenda, if under much more constrained circumstances. 
The urgency to bring public finances back to equilibrium reinforced the new 
economic team's perception of the need to restructure the pensions system. The 
re-engineering of the IMSS' finances was also perceived as indispensable, since 
the decrease in employer-employee quotas - due to the drop in formal 
employment - were putting them under severe strain (Interview, 04/13/99). But 
the reform of the IMSS' health services did not represent an equally urgent 
challenge and resources to cover its transition were not at hand (Interview, 
04/22/99). 
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Thus, as an outcome of the December 1994 economic crisis, the reform of the 
social security's pension scheme gained priority status on the public agenda, but 
simultaneously, the impetus for an integral reform that would pursue the IMSS' 
pensions and health provision reform simultaneously, was lost. By early 1995, the 
Zedillo government had decided to concentrate its political and economic capital 
on the pensions reform and the re-engineering of the Institute's finances, and left 
the health component for a second stage. However, there were several attempts at 
reincorporating the health reform in part or in its totality, and a few elements -
notably those that did not require an open confrontation with the IMSS' 
bureaucracy and its union, did reach implementation stage. 
6.4.1 Negotiations within the Executive (1995) 
In spite of the reform definition that took place since the early 1990's, the formal 
process of amendment of the Social Security Law began with President Zedillo's 
speech at the LXXVI IMSS General Assembly, on the 25th of January, 1995. In 
his message, he summoned the Institute's community to carry out an assessment 
of the IMSS, and invited different societal groups, particularly workers and 
employers, to participate in the debate. Given that at the time of this invitation the 
government already had a social security reform proposal, this exercise aimed 
more at complying with a formal exercise of policy dialogue, than with promoting 
these groups' real participation in policy decision-making. 
In March 1995, less than two months after the president had formally convened all 
groups to participate in the IMSS' assessment, the IMSS Directorate presented a 
document called Diagn6stico. IMSS officials describe it as the "public relations" 
version of the the IMSS reform contained in the Proyecto Aguila prepared by 
CEDESS in 1994 (Interview, 10/06/99). Divested of all the technicalities, it stated 
in simple direct terms, the problems faced by social security and the Institute's 
administrative difficulties. The document defined the IMSS' policy problems in a 
way conducive to having the Proyecto Aguila reform proposal as their plausible 
solution. Under these circumstances, when the Diagnostico document was made 
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public, the IMSS union immediately rejected it on the grounds that it had been 
formulated without its participation (Interview, 05/05/99). 
As soon as the IMSS' Diagnostico became public, the Institute's Directorate 
began to implement a series of political strategies aimed at overcoming possible 
resistance and trying to avoid the formation of a coalition of resistance led by the 
IMSS union as had been the case a decade earlier. A media campaign was 
launched to inform public opinion about the IMSS situation and the need to carry 
out the reform. Information was oriented towards presenting the government's 
reform project as the best possible option, seeking the support of public opinion 
(Interview, 05/05/99). Simultaneously, negotiations were started with the business 
and labour organisations - notably the CCE and the CTM. 
The publication of the Diagnostico document was soon followed by another 
IMSS document, called Hacia el Fortalecimiento y Modenizacion de la Seguridad 
Social 23 in mid-1995, which presented the reform's policy proposals in detail. 
The comparison between this document, and the 1994 Proyecto Aguila, clearly 
shows how the government's intent to reform the IMSS' health component along 
with pensions had dwindled, reducing health reform to little more than the re-
formulation of the tripartite quotas for this insurance fund and the expansion of 
coverage through the creation of a Family Health Insurance (SSF) by which 
informal workers and their families could have access to health care through a 
voluntary and partly subsidised health insurance scheme. The controversial opt-
out and quota reimbursement policy - which if applied systematically would bring 
about the IMSS' most significant transformation - remained as part of the 
proposal - albeit without acknowledging the need to establish clear and non-
discretionary regulations for that purpose. 
At around the same time as the Diagn6stico document was made public, the 
Proyecto Aguila was presented to the new economic cabinet. The cabinet 
appointed pensions and health committees - composed of representatives from 
various ministries, such as Finance, labour, and the IMSS - to refine the reform 
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proposals (Interview, 05/11/99). The points of dissension were negotiated in the 
following months within these cabinet technical committees away from public 
scrutinY4. It was during this period of reform formulation and negotiation within 
the closed arena of the Executive power that a deliberate decision was taken to 
exclude any element concerning the restructuring of the health component of 
Social Security from the bill, and to include only the changes to the pensions 
system and the financing regime of the funds. It was at this moment that the 
CEDESS' more integral proposal lost to the more narrowly defined economic 
team's. The health care reform was abandoned at that moment because it was 
thought that including an additional element in the bill would burden the policy 
agenda, and the political feasibility of the priority reforms would be put in 
jeopardy (Interview, 04/13/99). Thus, without direct pressure from groups against 
the IMSS' health reform, the economic change team chose to discard it in order 
not to saturate the policy agenda and avoid a political confrontation that could 
jeopardise the pensions reform. 
However, for the economic team - and CEDESS - the discarding of the reform's 
service provision components from the bill to be submitted to Congress did not 
mean an immediate stop to their actual implementation. Rather, as a second 
option, the economic team decided to let these policy changes be pursued through 
administrative acts and by putting into practice the old IMSS Law's articles25 
(Interview, 04/16/99). In other words, the economic team resorted to 
implementing the health care reform through modifications to internal rules and 
regulations, without changing the Law, and in doing so, limiting the further 
politicisation of the entire reform. With this strategy, negotiations around this part 
of the reform were transferred away from the legislative arena where it would be 
open to the influence of many actors, to the IMSS' internal arena, where the 
process was exposed to the influence of fewer actors, albeit among them, the 
powerful SNTSS. 
The final reform package of IMSS' health component included a series of 
elements, six of which were related to the rationalisation of resource management 
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for the sake of a more efficient use of resources. At the same time, many of these 
policy proposals were linked to the Zedillo administration's health reform 
program (PRSS). Notably, the creation of the Family Health Insurance, aimed at 
expanding the social security's health component's coverage through a health 
insurance scheme for workers in the informal economy. The reform initiative 
related to the systematic application of the opt-out option that would have 
triggered the transformation of IMSS and given the incentives for the creation of 
the new providers in the sector - the HMOs - was not included in the reform 
package, but remained present as part of the Social Security bill that was 
submitted to Congress. 
6.4.2 Opening the Process? A Forum for Consultation (Late 1995). 
Once the content of the reform was agreed upon in the cabinet technical 
commissions within the Executive, labour and business leaders, together with 
public officials, were invited to participate in a forum to discuss the reform as part 
of the formal reform process called Comision Tripartita para el Fortalecimiento 
del Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social. 
Although the formal objectives of this forum's seven technical commissions were 
to analyse the IMSS' policy problems, and to study different policy options to 
solve them, the exercise was directed towards what had already been decided 
within the Executive (Interview, 04/15/99). On November 1995, the Comision 
Tripartita presented to President Zedillo its final document called the Propuesta 
Obero-EmpresariaL de Alianza para eL FortaLecimiento de La Seguridad Sociaf6. 
Although it was a joint labour-business-government document, the proposal 
clearly reflected the government's policy priorities. Thus, as a result of its 
deliberations on the IMSS' health component, the tripartite technical commission 
stated the following fundamental goals: to reach universal coverage, attain 
financial self-sufficiency, and improve the quality, efficiency and satisfaction of 
service provision. The concrete measures to improve the quality of the service 
were: doctor eligibility, capitation, and permanence and productivity incentives27 • 
226 
It also recommended an increase in the government's quota share and the 
systematic implementation ofthe opt-out and quota reimbursement mechanism. 
The formulation of the reform proposal was formally attributed to the Comision 
Tripartita28 , but its capacity to influence the reform agenda was limited. More 
than a real negotiation and consensus-building, it was an exercise with which the 
government fulfilled the requirements of the sectors' participation in the process. 
The intention was to present the document as a labour-employers' proposal to 
weaken possible SNTSS arguments against the reform, when in reality it had been 
previously negotiated with the CTM and the CCE (Interview, 05/05/99). Once the 
president gave his approval to the reform proposal, the process was opened to 
participation by a wider group of actors. Negotiations within the Executive halted 
and lobbying started in preparation for submitting the bill to Congress (Interview, 
05/05/99). 
6.4.3 Legislation (November - December 1995) 
The IMSS director, Genaro Borrego who had been given the task of negotiating 
the Executive's reform initiative with labour, business, and the IMSS' union, was 
again commissioned to lobby it in Congress. It was his political brokerage 
experience - as former PRI president, former governor, and former PRI Senator-
that gave political feasibility to the technocratic reform proposal prepared within 
the Executive. In the Legislative arena, the SNTSS, the main actor lobbying 
against the reform proposal, was able to exert a significant degree of veto power 
through its influence on legislators unwilling to come to odds with organised 
labour. But this proved to be insufficient to veto the pensions reform, which was a 
priority for the Executive. 
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On November 9, 1995, President Zedillo submitted the initiative for the New 
Social Security Law to Congress. The pensions component of the reform proposal 
in the initiative was very similar to the one formulated in 1994 in Proyecto 
Aguila; but the health services component had been significantly reduced. The 
items that required the modification of the IMSS' collective labour contract, or 
that could have an impact on IMSS personnel's labour conditions, were removed 
from the initiative. Such was the case of the doctor eligibility initiative and the 
modification of doctors' pay to introduce incentives for permanence and 
productivity and eventually for a capitation system. At this stage, the bill still 
contained, along with the modifications to the tripartite quota that would bring 
fresh public resources to the Institute and the creation of the Family Health 
Insurance, the amendment for the more systematic implementation of the opt-out 
policy, leaving open the possibility of the introduction of public/private provision 
of services. 
The limited nature - in number and scope - of these proposals geared to reforming 
the IMSS' health services, suggested that the idea of an integral IMSS reform was 
abandoned before it was formally submitted for legislation. Following its lobbying 
and negotiations in Congress prior to the reform initiative's formal presentation, 
the IMSS Directorate concluded - and warned the economic team - that if the 
health component was included in the bill, the IMSS reform would not be 
approved in the Legislature (Interview, 04/l3/99). So given that the economic 
team's - including the president's - central objective was to ensure approval of 
the modifications to the pensions system and the Institute's financial regime, the 
initiative was almost divested of its health component. 
The importance of each of the reform's components - and thus their probability of 
being included in the bill - could be traced back to which actors supported it, and 
to what extent. In the case of the pensions reform, it was clear to all actors that the 
president was committed to it, and that to confront this initiative would have been 
politically very costly (Interview, 04/16/99). In the case of the reorganisation of 
the IMSS' financing scheme, the thrust of the support came from the Finance 
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Minister and one of his vice ministers (Interview, 04/16/99). This was decisive for 
its inclusion in the new Law. Concerning the health component, no one clearly 
supported its inclusion in the bill. On one hand, neither the Office of the President, 
nor the Finance Ministry were committed to it. On the other, the IMSS Directorate 
perceived that it did not have sufficient political capital and enough economic 
resources to promote it on its own. As one official pointed out, " ... to push the 
health reform forward, it would have been necessary for the president or a 
minister to support it, and no one did." (Interview, 04/16/99). Likewise, the IMSS 
Directorate considered that the restructuring of health service provision could be 
implemented at the administrative level, through the modification of regulations, 
and without the need for Law amendments (Interview, 05/11 /99). 
Figure (6.3) shows the sources of support for the different elements of the social 
security reform initiative. The parts of government that were directly involved are 
shaded in grey. Note that the pensions reform was supported by all the agencies 
involved (black arrows). Particularly, it counted on the direct support of the 
president. The Finance Ministry backed the financial reengineering of IMSS, since 
it was concerned with the impact of IMSS' financial imbalance could have on the 
government's deficit. In contrast, the health refonn failed to convey the support of 
the president and the Finance Ministry, and instead, was only supported by the 
IMSS Directive within IMSS (white arrow). 
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6.4.4 Approval in Congress 
Before the reform bill had been sent to the Lower House, IMSS Director Borrego, 
in charge of brokering the refonn, perceived resistance from various opposition 
legislators, and even from PRI legislators, who still resented having been forced to 
vote in favour of the Executive's highly unpopular proposal to increase Value-
Added Tax by 50%, and were thus reluctant to vote in favour of it (Interview, 
OS/OS/99b). In response, the IMSS Directorate mounted a political strategy on 
different fronts to obtain the bill's approval in Congress,. It continued its media 
campaign to inform public opinion about the reform and generate social support 
around it. It lobbied in favour ofthe bill among the corporatist groups representing 
labour unions, pensioners' organisations and the business community. It also 
prepared a negotiation strategy around the reform's content that included defining 
those of its elements that could be left out as a concession to legislators resisting 
its approval. Along those lines, some government officials suggested that the 
IMSS Directorate might have recommended the inclusion of the controversial 
opt-out option in the reform simply as a bargaining chip to be removed as a 
concession, since it was certain to be a point of dissent (Interview, OS/OS/99b). 
It sought to establish personal contact with PRI representatives to explain the 
content of the reform and try to win over undecided members. A number of 
political operators were co-ordinated by the IMSS' Directorate to lobby in favour 
of the project within the PRI's legislative fraction. Among them, leaders of each 
of PRI's corporatist sector. Internal party alliances and political bargaining 
calculations played an important role at this time. The National Peasant 
Confederation did not present major resistance to the IMSS reform; however, 
CNOP members, and specially CTM members, presented a major challenge. 
Legislators who belonged to the PRJ's labour sector manifested strong resistance 
to the reform project, especially representatives with links to labour unions. As 
one PRI legislator put it "PRJ representatives do not like to vote against labour 
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unions" (Interview, 05/05/99). Alejandro Audry, a PRI congressman and Political 
Action Secretary of the IMSS union, was one of the most fierce and vocal 
opponents to the reform29 • The lobbing among congressmen included perks and 
benefits to individual congressmen (Interview, 05/05/99b). President Zedillo was 
personally involved in lobbing the National Action Party by holding conversations 
with the PAN's president. The PRD manifested its unconditional intention to vote 
against the project from the moment it was made pUblic. 
In spite of this intensive lobbing activity, the Executive's bill for social security 
reform faced such opposition in Congress30, that only the PRI's legislative 
majority - whose members abided by party discipline - granted the fast approval 
of the New Social Security bill with no substantial modifications. Two of the left-
wing opposition parties - the PRD and the PT - opposed the reform on 
ideological grounds. The PAN's position was more ambivalent. On the one hand, 
the privatisation of the pensions system was in accordance with the party's 
principles; on the other, PAN legislators were concerned with the political costs 
their support of the Law's approval would bring (Madrid, 1998). PAN 
representatives voted within the party to define the party's position regarding the 
reform proposal. In spite of the national party leader's lobbing effort, only 18 
congressmen voted in favour of the reform, 54 voted against it and 19 abstained. 
Some political observers think that PAN representatives received instructions to 
vote against the initiative to undermine political support around the PRI 
(Interview, 04/08/99). 
The bill's final version contained more than 60 modifications, but maintained its 
original orientation. The most significant modification was the retrieval of the 
Law amendment referring to the opt-out policy. Seeing that its lobbying strategy 
to stop the introduction of this component had been successful, the IMSS union 
pushed negotiations further in order to eliminate the article contained in the old 
IMSS Law that allowed for its implementation at the discretion of the IMSS' 
Technical Committee. But it did not succeed and the new IMSS Law maintained 
it. 
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The bill for the New Social Security Law was approved in the Lower House on 
December 7, 1995 with 289 PRJ votes in favour and 160 votes against it. A few 
days later, it was sanctioned in the Senate, with no modifications, on December 
12, 1995. Figure (6.4) diagram shows the position of the different groups that 
were involved in the approval of the Social Security Law, as well as their level of 
influence. Each actor's relative distance from the centre represents their relative 
power to influence the reform's policy content. 
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After the new Social Security Law was approved in Congress in 1995, the 
pensions reform implementation was started right away, whereas a transitory 
article mandated the rest of the reform - related to IMSS' finances and health 
services - to start implementation in 1997, to allow the Institute to prepare for 
policy change. Thus the health reform process gravitated back to the IMSS arena 
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where financial resource reallocation, and the new rules and incentives by which 
policy change was to be pursued were to be defined. These responsibilities were 
assigned to the change team working at the IMSS' Finance Division, which 
continued to work closely with its counterparts in the Finance Ministry. The 
change team secured an important loan from the World Bank to cover the IMSS' 
investment needs in infrastructure and to fund the design and pilot implementation 
of the components of the refonn related to health service provision - most of 
which did not stem from changes in the IMSS law, but could be carried out via 
administrative acts and changes in the IMSS' labour contract. 
But given that IMSS change team had lost its vertical network - which was not 
replaced by the new Finance Minister - it lacked the political support to insulate 
itself and the refonn from the pressure of the key interest group resisting change: 
the IMSS union. While it had some control over the financial re-engineering since 
the complexity of resource reallocation made resistance to it difficult, the change 
team was forced to negotiate and look for consensus within the IMSS in all 
aspects related to the implementation of changes to the health services. The fact 
that IMSS senior level officials were affiliated to the union31 helped it have access 
to infonnation and control over decision-making related to policy change -
including the co-ordination of the World Bank-sponsored pilot projects and their 
implementation. 
In this competition for control over the reform's implementation within the IMSS, 
the change team at the Financial Division did not count on the support of the 
IMSS'Directorate either. Not only had both groups been rivals from the refonn's 
early fonnulation stages, but the latter continued to see the fonner as an extension 
of the economic team, and thus foreign to the IMSS. The change team's 
orthodoxy in exclusively using technical criteria in policy decision-making, 
without considering the political dimension of policy change was seen as a 
potential political problem, since it risked putting the Institute's relations with 
business, labour, and particularly the IMSS' union - still strained by the recent 
approval of the refonn - in jeopardy (Interview 06/09/99). Moreover, because the 
233 
health refonn was not a priority in the national refonn agenda, and a potential 
labour conflict within the Institute was always a serious matter for concern - due 
to its immediate visibility - the Executive's support for this component of the 
IMSS refonn was also minimal. 
Also, in the eyes of the Institute's directorate, the urgency to refonn the IMSS' 
health services had ceased, not only because it had lost its political returns - since 
the quest to take control of the refonn by adding this element to it had been lose2 
- but also because the allocation of fresh public resources - due to the 
implementation of the new quota with a larger government share - had taken the 
strain off the IMSS' finances in the short tenn (Interview, 05/11/99). The 
following diagram shows how the IMSS health service provision solved its deficit 
as of 1997, when fresh funds were introduced; however, expenditure continued the 
same trend, reflecting no effective implementation of policy change leading to 
cost containment in the short run. 
But above all, the principal obstacle to policy change once the refonn had 
gravitated back to the IMSS was the IMSS' union (Interview, 05/05/99). The 
union had regained its position of power since change depended on its 
membership. The union's political strength was based on a series of factors, 
including the size and presence of its membership and its average education level 
- since it incorporated doctors - which allowed it to influence IMSS activities at 
every level, and to develop a sophisticated alternative policy agenda. Furthennore, 
the union's political base had expanded and diversified. Its leadership maintained 
a close interaction with the PRJ's leadership, who still perceived it as a key 
intennediary in state-society relations, and thus an important political player to 
accommodate to. At the same time, its heterogeneous membership had expanded 
contacts with other groups with high political mobilisation capacity, such as left-
wing parties and guerrilla movements33 • The expansion of the IMSS as the single 
most important state provider of health services - catering in many instances to 
the uninsured popUlation as well - had consolidated the union's presence at the 
national, state and local levels, where it had daily contact with the popUlation, and 
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thus the opportunity to generate a base of support of its own. While the union did 
not make any open threat to mobilise its membership or this base of support 
against the implementation of the reform, the fact that it had done so in the past -
notably during the first attempt at reform in the 1980's - worked as an important 
precedent. 
The union was originally set to protect the IMSS pensions system and maintain its 
control, but its political strength was not sufficient to confront the economic 
team's agenda in this area, since the latter counted on the direct support of the 
president. Thus, it focused on health and other services provided by the IMSS, and 
saw any attempt at contracting out private providers, or the implementation of the 
opt-out option and the introduction of the public/private mix in health service 
provision, as an unequivocal antecedent to the Institute's dismantling or its 
privatisation. It thus opted for a strategy of no concessions. The union effectively 
stopped the undertaking of any additional contracts to private providers in non-
essential areas, as well as the publication and sanctioning of the regulation 
package needed to implement the opt-out option. It was also successful III 
protecting its collective labour contract from any modifications needed to 
implement some of the elements of the health reform - notably those related to 
wage incentives towards quality and efficiency and doctors' eligibility. 
While the economIC team, the IMSS change team and CEDESS effectively 
isolated the union from reform formulation, and it had partial influence over the 
reform's legislation, it regained control over the reform once it entered its 
implementation stage. It is not clear whether the union made any serious attempts 
at letting itself into the decision-making room during the reform's formulation. Its 
attempts at influencing the process during legislation were also half-hearted, 
where it concentrated more on limiting the scope and depth of the reform, than on 
derailing it all together. It made timid attempts at organising a labour coalition in 
defence of the status quo - to no avail - and did lobby sympathetic legislators of 
different parties. However, it stopped short of mobilising its membership or 
organising a media campaign - with exception of some editorials and articles 
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accusing the government of attempting to privatise the IMSS. It can therefore be 
argued that the union chose to wait for the reform to gravitate back to the IMSS 
during its implementation stage, where it had enough power to preclude policy 
change from happening. 
6.6 Another Attempt at Health Reform 
A few months after approval of the new IMSS Law, the Executive put together an 
ad hoc inter-agency group - with a similar profile to that of the cabinet's technical 
commissions - in 1996, to study the need to regulate the private health sector and 
the emerging Health Management Organisations (HMO) market called 
Instituciones de Seguros en Salud (ISES). Because this initiative was intrinsically 
related to the opt-out issue34 , the long-standing discussion about the possibility of 
establishing a more systematic opt-out option mechanism for IMSS affiliates was 
put back on the decision-making table by the economic team in the Executive. 
This inter-agency group made up of officials from the Office of the Presidency, 
the Finance Ministry, the Health Ministry and the IMSS started to work on a 
policy proposal that considered the possibility of regUlating simultaneously the 
Health Management Organisations (HMO's) emerging market and the IMSS' opt-
out policy. But once more, the possibility of a confrontation with the IMSS' 
union, and its political consequences, led the group to postpone the latter and to 
carry on exclusively with the former. Yet again, political considerations were not 
the only concern this group had when it decided to postpone the issue once more. 
The other reason behind not pursuing this line of policy change was the 
technocrats' perception that there was no objective information about the opt-out 
option and public/private service provisions having a positive impact on the health 
system as a whole - or that ofIMSS affiliates (Interview, 05111/99). 
The economic team was aware that the private health sector was not prepared to 
absorb a sudden increase in health services demand, since with few exceptions 
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concentrated in the major urban centres, it continues to be a very desegregated 
market with very small unregulated providers scattered unevenly throughout the 
country (Interview, 05/11/99). Furthermore, given that the new Social Security 
Law had augmented the government's participation in the IMSS' funding, the 
group of businessmen who had been lobbying to have the opt-out policy 
implemented failed to present convincing evidence on the financial soundness of 
quota reimbursement - for both parties, the IMSS and employers35. 
As a result, when the reform initiative to create and regulate the new HMOs was 
ready, the inter-agency group decided not to introduce it as a new law amendment 
to the Social Security Law, and instead sought to modify the General Law of 
Mutualist Insurance Companies and Institutions. The decree to amend the Law 
was presented to the Lower House on April 1999 and approved within a few 
days36. However, the initiative lay idle at the Senate, which did not put it up for 
debate for many months. Finally, with the political brokerage of the newly 
appointed Health Minister, it was approved in December 1999. 
Policy makers involved in the reform initiative expected that with the regulation 
of the health business market, investors would be given certainty, and thus there 
would be a significant increase in private health infrastructure. This development 
would then contribute to solving what had been a de facto obstacle for the 
implementation of the IMSS' opt-out option. Also, a better developed and more 
regulated private health provision market would create incentives for current 
IMSS affiliates with purchasing capacity - and particularly their employers - to 
press for the implementation of the opt-out policy (Interview, 10/10/99). 
This long-term scenario would be conducive to the IMSS' downsizing and its 
effective reform37; and thus the health system would be significantly transformed 
in the direction envisioned by the economic team in the official health reform 
proposals - both sector-wide, and for the IMSS - without the need for direct 
political confrontation with the IMSS union. In other words, the economic team 
traded short-term comprehensive and state-directed change, for gradual and long-
237 
run change brought about by market incentives. At the close of the present study's 
field work in December 1999, the creation of the new providers in the sector, the 
HMO's, and the IMSS integral reform were only in the making. 
Figure (6.5) shows a simulation of tendencies of old providers (IMSS) and new 
providers (HMO's) in the health sector following the series of assumptions and 
decisions made by the economic team and its inter-agency group. The graph 
shows in solid lines the growth tendency of the IMSS - which increases with the 
expansion of formal employment - and the increase in number of HMO's and 
private providers (societal actors) as a result of a more predictable market due to 
the new regulation package. The dotted lines show the economic team's 
assumption that, with the IMSS' opt-out policy regulation sanctioned, a 
substitution effect would take place triggering the downsizing of IMSS and an 
increase of the HMO's share of the health sector. 
In this scenano, a substantial reform of the sector would be obtained via an 
incremental and indirect strategy, based more on market tendencies and regulation 
than on direct short-term institutional change - and political confrontation with 
entrenched interest groups. With the postponement of the IMSS' opt-out policy, 
instead of this substitution effect what can be appreciated is the simultaneous 
presence of both old and new providers, increasing the total number of providers 
in the health sector. In this scenario, no substantive change is obtained beyond the 
emergence of the new providers, while social security health service provision 
remains firmly in the hands of the IMSS. 
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As the Zedillo administration was coming to an end, the IMSS financial 
restructuring was well on its way. The significant increase in the government's 
quota participation - a result of the new 1995 Social Security Law - restored the 
IMSS' financial equilibrium. The IMSS change team - whose leader had become 
the Financial Division's Director - managed to complete the IMSS' financial re-
engineering. The Family Health Insurance scheme has been operating since 1997 
and has affiliated 300,000 families, but it still needed to expand more aggressively 
if it was to meet the government's stated goal of increasing access to the IMSS 
health services for all families with purchasing power who work in the informal 
economy. All the other policy changes in the IMSS' health reform - such as the 
integral model of health services delivery, AMDGs, family doctor eligibility, the 
use of performance incentives, and contracting out of services - were still in the 
pilot phase under the close scrutiny of the IMSS' union leaders. The opt-out and 
quota reimbursement policy has largely been left untouched. 
6.7 Summary and Main Points 
During the Zedillo administration (1994 - 2000), an ambitious health reform 
envisioning long-term policy change in the entire health sector was presented in 
the Health Reform Program. This reform included the transformation of the social 
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security health care servIces provided by the IMSS. However, due to the 
Institute's autonomous status, and the government's approach to social security 
reform as part of it economic policy - notably with the privatisation of the 
pensions fund in mind - the reform of the latter followed a policy process 
independent from that of the rest of the health sector. 
The economic crisis and political de-Iegitimisation that took place at the outset of 
the Zedillo administration severely limited the possibilities of pursuing its reform 
agenda. The government concentrated on limiting and redressing the economic 
crisis damage, and revised all other reform initiatives. As a result, the pensions 
reform was given priority, but not so the health reform. This did not stop 
interagency competition - between the economic ministries and the IMSS - for 
the control of the health refonn's formulation. This rivalry persisted during the 
entire reform process with each agency having a different team of policy-makers 
working on rival proposals within IMSS - CEDESS and the change team at the 
Financial Division. 
The change team at the Financial Division was an extension of the government's 
economic team, and originally counted on the direct support of the Finance 
Minister. It was expected that this vertical network would empower the change 
team to isolate itself and its reform initiative from political pressures and from 
interest groups resisting policy change - notably the IMSS' union. However, with 
the resignation of the Finance Minister, the change team lost its vertical network 
and was thus forced to negotiate all elements of the reform initiative related to 
changes to the health services. 
The IMSS union, the reform's most formidable veto group, was isolated from 
reform formulation, and had partial success in limiting the depth and scope of the 
refonn initiative during legislation. But once the refonn gravitated back to the 
IMSS for implementation, it resorted to its regained position of power to take 
control of the reform and stop policy changes that ran counter to its membership's 
interests - notably job profiles, wages and job security. Most importantly, it 
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presented effective opposition to the introduction of the opt-out option, which 
would have allowed for a public/private mix in health service provision for IMSS 
affiliates, a measure that would have brought about a significant transformation of 
the sector. 
The reform's policy process took place in three major policy nodes. The main 
policy node was located within the Executive, during the period of policy 
formulation. All external actors, including the IMSS union, and to a great extent, 
the IMSS directorate, were excluded from this arena and precluded from 
participating in the decision-making process. The policy node located in the 
Executive - where factions from the economic team competed to influence it -
was crucial to the reform of the IMSS' health component, since it was there that it 
was decided to approach it through regulation and administrative actions, rather 
than resorting to amendment of the Social Security Law. 
The second policy node was located in Congress - specifically in the Lower 
House - during the process of approval of the new Law. In this case, PRI 
legislators vetoed the law amendment that sought to make a more systematic use 
of the opt-out option as a condition to vote in favour of the pensions system 
refonn. Also, the IMSS union lobbied members of other political parties to vote 
against the social security law initiative, successfully reducing the number of 
votes in favour, but failing to derail it. 
The third policy node was located within the IMSS during the implementation 
period. In this arena, the IMSS union constituted the principal veto group. The 
strength of the union was enough to control and in some cases block the change 
team's refonn proposals, which, with no firm support or vertical networks - like 
the president or the economic team - needed to negotiate all its undertaking 
regarding policy change implementation. This affected the speed and scope of the 
reform that had been approved in the Legislature. 
The government considered a last attempt at reforming the health sector using an 
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indirect strategy that would bring about change through new regulation and 
market incentives. It regulated the emerging HMO market and considered 
presenting this bill in Congress in tandem with the pending regulation package for 
the opt-out option. But once more, the latter was avoided and only the HMO 
regulation package was approved. 
Footnotes for Chapter 6 
I For details on the health care system and its relation to the political context, see Gonzalez -Rossetti, 1994. 
2 The chart shows 10 million persons without access to health care. This population group is 
formed by the poor who are dispersed in the rural areas. Giving access to a basic health care 
package to this group was a central part of the government's health reform agenda. The analysis of 
this policy initiative goes beyond the scope of this thesis. 
3 The sole exception being the northern industrial states, where instead of building infrastructure, the IMSS 
allowed most companies in the region to procure health services for their work force in the private sector and 
reimbursed their quotas in what is called the opt-out option. 
4 Poder Ejecutivo Federal, Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 1995-2000, and Programa de Refonna del Sector 
Salud 1995-2000. 
S Programa de Refonna del Sector Salud 1995-2000. 
6 Programa de Refonna al Sector Salud 1995-2000. 
7 Among the most relevant demographic changes are: rise of life expectancy, decrease in the birth rate, and 
increase in the population's average age. The epidemiological transition consists in: decrease in infectious 
illness and increase in chronic-degenerative sicknesses. 
8 IMSS, Diagnostico, March, 1995. 
9 Diagnostico. 
10 CEDESS, Proyecto Aguila, December, 1994. 
II Refonners also thought that the privatisation of the pensions system would help limit the political handling of 
the Institute's resources, since resources would cease to be deposited in a general fimd, and instead would go to 
individual accounts. 
12 The contracting out of services was also considered a means to lower service provision costs. Administrative 
decentralisation and low and mid-level personnel layoffs were on the agenda as well. 
\3 Other groups in society, particularly an academic group from the Xochirnilco Autonomous University, have 
been studying the health care system for years, and publishing policy recommendations. However, these groups 
did not present fonnal policy docwnents with reform proposals as the other did; and did not have an important 
presence in the policy debate and the political struggle that evolved around the health reform process. For 
details on their policy positions, see Lauren, 1994. 
14 Also, the Presidency promoted competition between factions as a means to drive forward more "efficienf' 
proposals, to limit the power of the different groups within the government and to consolidate its own power. 
IS Notably teleconummications. 
16 Following an unwritten agreement between both agencies, the assignment of this position had been in control 
of the Finance Ministry for many years. 
17 Gabriel Martinez, head of the Economic Deregulation Unit of SECOFI at the time, had contact with the work 
being carried out at CEDESS regarding the reform (Interview, 03/11199). 
18 Proyecto de Gran VisiOn and Proyecto Aguila were documents of restricted circulation. 
19 Proyecto Aguila. 
2°Secretaria de Salud, Cuademos de Trabajo, 1994. 
21 For instance, Funsalud's proposal was heavily criticised in an academic forum by the left-wing Xochirnilco 
University group as a neo-hberal project that took away from the state its responsibility to guarantee free and 
universal access to health care for the entire population. 
22 See Salud Para Todos los Mexicanos. Lineas Estrategu:as para un Programa de Sa/ud 1994-200, Grupo 
Asesor en Salud (SSA-SHCP-CEDESS-Funsalud-Grupo de Prospectiva), noviembre 23 de 1994. 
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23 IMSS, Hacia el Fortalecimiento y Modemizacwn de la Seguridad Social, mid-1995. 
24 For instance, in relation to the pensions scheme, while the Finance Ministry economists were in favour of 
letting each worlcer choose hislher own pension fund, the Institute's representatives favoured the option of 
having either the union or the employer choose it for them (Madrid, 1998). Also, there were lengthy 
dehberations about the optimal share of employer and employee social security contnbutions and that of the 
government 
25 1bis was particularly the case of the controversial opt-out option. 
26 Presentaci6n al C. Presidente de la Republica, Emesto Zedillo Ponce de LeOn, de la propuesta Obrero-
empresarial de Alianza para el Fortalecimiento y Modemizaci6n de la Seguridad Social, November 1995. 
27These measures were intended to generate quasi-market mechanisms and competition as incentives for 
medical personnel to improve quality of services. 
28In the speech following the presentations of business and labour representatives, President Zedillo committed 
his government to "respond" to their proposals. 
29 Audry voted against the first version of the refonn proposal, but yielded in the end, changing his vote. 
30Resistance to the refonn was so strong, that even dropping the IMSS financial restructuring from the refonn 
initiative was considered a measure to ensure approval of the pensions refonn (Interview, 04/19/99). 
31 When a member of the union is assigned to a senior level position, he/she asks for a temporary leave of 
absence for the duration of this assignment 1bis means that formally, senior level positions are not unionised, 
but informally, the union retains control over them. 
32CEDESS, which had been created to support the IMSS Directorate in this endeavour, had been marginalized 
and nearly dismantled, with its activities reduced to the undertaking of some policy studies. 
33 Since it joined the independent labour movement, the IMSS' union has made a veiled threat to juggle 
alliances between the PRI and the PRO, a matter of concern for the former - and of interest for the latter - given 
the size and level of organisation of its membership. The union's leaders in the past have had close relatives join 
key positions in guerrilla movements such as the National Liberation Front and the EZLN in Chiapas. 
34Since investors in the HMO market are interested in catering to IMSS affiliates who would look for services 
in the private sector if the opt-out option is applied. 
35Contradictory explanations in interviews with both state and society actors as to why the implementation of 
the opt-out option did not go ahead, showed how contentious the issue remained. While some contended that 
the regulatory body needed to implement this policy was ready, but there was no political will to put it into 
practice (Interview, 05/05/99), others contended that the technical complexity behind it was such that the 
regulatory body was yet to be made operational (Interview 05/05/99b). Also, since the new Social Security Law 
significantly diminished the employer-employee quota share by augmenting that of the government, business' 
urgency to press for the implementation of the opt-out options dwindled. The reimbursement of the lower quota 
share to business in the case that the opt-out option were applied, made paying for an equivalent package of 
health services for employees in the private sector financially unfeasible. 
36The goals of the regulation package for the emerging HMO market were: to promote market development, 
give certainty for investment and guide and protect the conswner. "Exposici6n de motivos a la "lniciativa de 
Reformas a La Ley General de Instituciones y Sociedades Mutualistas de Seguros". 
37The outcome of the implementation of the opt-out option remains unclear, since the complex factors around 
employers' and employees' choice between staying in the IMSS or choosing an HMO service makes it 
unpredictable. 
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Chapter 7. Change Teams and Their Strategy Choice 
7.1 Introduction 
In the competition for the control of the social security reform project between the 
economic team and the IMSS Directorate, both tried to form a change team and 
empower it as a strategy to gain leverage over the definition of the reform. 
Reflecting the institutional rivalry between the economic team and the IMSS, 
these two groups did not have incentives to join efforts, and instead competed for 
influence over the reform process, even though both were located within the 
IMSS. From the outset, both teams had different policy agendas and these were 
reflected in their differing reform proposals. 
This chapter analyses the characteristics of the two groups of reformers within the 
IMSS that were intended to lead the reform, their political manoeuvring and their 
choice of strategies as they prepared alternative reform projects. It also examines 
the Executive's interagency groups and their decision-making process on the 
reform's content and choice of strategies. Particular emphasis is put on explaining 
why all these groups of reformers - both within the IMSS and within the 
Executive - opted for eschewing short-term in-depth change - requiring direct 
confrontation with entrenched interests - and favoured long-term incremental 
policy change brought about by market forces and competition assumed to be 
triggered by the creation of societal actors in the health sector (the HMO's). 
7.2 Two Attempts at Forming a Change Team 
7.2.1 The IMSS Cbange Team 
Economic reform in Mexico was promoted during the eighties and nineties by a 
small group of technocrats whose Careers were based at the financial and 
economic government agencies - defined here as core ministries. This economic 
team I had ideological and programmatic cohesiveness, and its members shared a 
high level of technical training and a commitment to economic liberalism. 
However, given that Mexico's informal rules for designating the presidential 
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candidate (Centeno: 1994) for the incoming administration made many of the team 
members potential candidates2, their cohesiveness in ideology and policy content 
was hampered by their political manoeuvring seeking to better position 
themselves. 
Thus, at least two factions - or camarillas - could be distinguished within the 
economic team, which competed for political power and the control of strategic 
projects that were part of the president's policy agenda, and by the number and 
nature of the government positions to which each faction could assign its members 
(Waterbury, 1992). These dynamics left their imprint on the social security reform 
process from its outset, since the economic team's factions competed for its 
control. 
The first change team that was assigned to work on the social security reform was 
formed under the auspices of the economic team's faction led by then Finance 
Minister Pedro Aspe during the early nineties. With the economic reforms - or 
first generation reforms - on their way towards consolidation, Minister Aspe had 
turned the agency's efforts towards studying options for the reform of the social 
sector - or second generation reforms. The rationale behind this agenda was to 
avoid the impending negative impact that the inefficient and financially 
unbalanced social sector could have on public finances. Thus, in order to promote 
the study of policy options and develop a project to privatise the retirement 
pensions system, Finance Minister Aspe formed a group of very young and highly 
trained economists, mathematicians, and actuaries, who shared a neo-liberal 
ideology and had as their main goal the reform of the state (Waterbury, 1992; 
Centeno, 1994; Dominguez, 1997). Team members were isolated from the rest of 
the state bureaucracy, and from other interest groups, so as to avoid external 
pressure on the project's formulation. 
Aspe and the social security change team had been involved in the economic 
reforms of the eighties and nineties, and continued to work under the assumption 
that all sectors - both in the economic sphere and in the social sphere - could be 
reformed by following a similar strategy: modifying rules and incentives to trigger 
245 
policy change by having actors in the sector being reformed respond to the new 
rules of the game. Thus, their reform proposal resorted to policy strategies such as 
privatisation, market competition, and eligibility of service provider. At this point, 
this team did not incorporate the reform of the IMSS' health care services as a 
component of their reform proposal, and focused exclusively on its pensions 
component, because it had a direct impact on the governments fiscal balance. 
A political struggle between the two rival factions within the economic team led to 
a take-over of the pensions project by the faction led by Jose M. Cordoba, the 
President's Chief of Staff. Thus the pensions team backed by Minister Aspe was 
forced to abandon the project in mid-1993, and Guillermo Ortiz, the Finance 
Deputy Minister - who belonged to Cordoba's faction - assumed control of the 
project, designating his chief of staff as project leader3• 
From mid-1993 through 1994, the new pensions group - still at the Finance 
Ministry, but with the backing of the Office of the Presidency - worked to develop 
a social security reform proposal in close co-operation with Jaime Serra Puche, the 
Commerce Minister - who belonged to the same faction - and his collaborators. 
The new pensions team followed the same assumptions and policy choices as the 
previous group. This team also failed to include the reform of the IMSS' health 
component, but did include the financial re-engineering of the Institute. 
As the change of administration approached and in preparation for implementing 
the pensions reform, Minister Serra Puche had Gabriel Martinez\ one of his 
economic advisors and then head of the deregulation unit, appointed to a position 
in the IMSS' Finance Division, where, working as an extension of the economic 
team, he was to form and lead a change team of very young professionals with 
training in economics and accounting and no previous experience in pensions or 
health, in charge of pursuing the IMSS' reform. 
The appointment of Martinez to head the IMSS reform within the IMSS points to 
the economic team's reliance on changes in regulation as a strategy choice. In his 
position as head of the Deregulation Unit in the Ministry of Commerce, he helped 
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develop the proposal to reform the structure of the pensions system and IMSS' 
finances, and had participated in all stages of the reform process - if tangentially at 
the beginning - ever since Cordoba's faction had taken control of the Social 
Security reform project within the economic team. 
Soon after taking office in late 1994, President Zedillo appointed Serra Puche as 
his Finance Minister. This endowed the new IMSS change team under Martinez' 
leadership with a crucial vertical network, empowering it to pursue its reform 
agenda. The change team faced resistance from the IMSS bureaucracy and from its 
Directorate, which perceived it as foreign to the Institute and an intrusion from the 
economic team in the Finance and Commerce Ministries (Interview, 04/04/97). 
And indeed, this change team made little effort to establish a network within the 
IMSSs. Instead, it concentrated on moving as swiftly as possible with the financial 
re-engineering of IMSS insurance funds and the other components of IMSS 
reform, and continued to work very closely with their peers in the Finance and 
Commerce Ministries - its horizontal network6 • 
The IMSS change team's reform agenda followed the same assumptions as those 
of the two pensions teams in the economic team: through financial adjustments, it 
intended to modify the rules and incentives that regulated the IMSS' internal 
proceedings in the administration of funds and the provision of services. These 
changes were expected to lead to more transparent, equitable and efficient 
processes without the need to impose changes on the IMSS bureaucracy - and thus 
avoiding directly confronting it. 
With the economic crisis of December 1994 and the resignation of Jaime Serra as 
Finance Minister, the IMSS change team lost its single most important vertical 
network of support. This forced the change team to slow down and reduce its 
reform agenda to remedial policies aimed at re-engineering the defaulting IMSS 
finances. With very few exceptions in which the change team was able to maintain 
its policy agenda isolated by its high degree of technicalities, the change team was 
forced to negotiate all items of policy change with the IMSS union, a formidable 
veto group. Simultaneously, and also as a result of the economic crisis, the 
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pensions reform became a priority on the government's agenda, and thus the 
economic change team kept the matter within its realm and away from the IMSS. 
However, within this narrow space for manoeuvre, it still managed to continue to 
operate with the support of the horizontal networks it counted on - notably with 
Finance Ministry officials who were Martinez' former peers and also members of 
the economic team. This allowed it to focus on the parts of its reform agenda 
requiring the cooperation of the Ministry of Finance, such as significant aspects of 
the IMSS financial reengineering program, and securing loans to ensure the 
availability of financial resources required to further policy change 7. 
7.2.2 The Centro de Desarrollo Estrategico para la Seguridad Social (CEDESS) 
Parallel to the economic team's initiative in social security reform within the 
Executive - and to the factional competition for the social security project - IMSS 
Director Genaro Borrego founded the Centro de Desarrollo Estrategico para la 
Seguridad Social (CEDESS), as part of its efforts to establish the conditions for 
the project to gravitate closer to the IMSS' area of influence. In creating CEDESS, 
Borrego attempted to create a technocratic change team similar in nature and 
modus operandi to those used by the economic team as a means not only to 
insulate policy decision- making from the IMSS bureaucracy (Interview, 
03/22/99)8, but also to reach out to the economic team and establish closer ties of 
co-operation. The CEDESS team was thus made up of apolitical technicians with 
as possibly similar backgrounds and policy experience as those of the technocrats 
in the Finance Ministry. Economists, mathematicians and actuaries were hired to 
develop a technically sophisticated reform proposal to which the technocrats of the 
economic and financial agencies of the government could relate9 • 
The task assigned to the CEDESS team was to develop an integral social security 
reform proposal along the lines of the economic team's discussions. But, as the 
imprint of the IMSS Directorate, it should go beyond the reform of the IMSS' 
pensions scheme, and include a plan to reorganise the provision of health services. 
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While CEDESS did resemble a change team since it operated separately from the 
IMSS bureaucracy, with policy-makers foreign to the Institute, and isolated from 
possible pressure from interest groups within and outside the agency, the IMSS 
Directorate was not successful in transforming it from a think tank into a change 
team. The political leverage of the IMSS as an agency - when compared to that of 
the economic team in the core ministries - was not sufficient to endow CEDESS 
with a vertical network of support and thus empower it to lead the reform. In other 
words, in spite of counting on Borrego's political backing, CEDESS was not able 
to compete on equal terms with the other teams working on alternative reform 
projects within the Executive and within the IMSS proper. 
This resulted in CEDESS playing a subsidiary role in support of the economic 
team's decision-making within the Executive. Thus, in what pertained to the 
pensions component of its reform proposal, CEDESS members - who were close 
to the economic team - developed policy initiatives along the lines of those 
developed within the Executive, ones that questioned the role of the state as the 
main provider of social services, and proposed market mechanisms and an 
enhanced role for the private sector to manage the pensions funds. In contrast with 
its pensions reform project, CEDESS' proposal for the health component did not 
question the central role of the state as the main provider of health services, but 
simply put forward a series of measures to increase the quality and efficiency of 
service provision through quasi- market mechanisms such as doctor eligibility, 
contracting-out and some competition generated by the introduction of a 
pUblic/private mix through the opt-out optioniO • 
7.3 Characteristics of the IMSS Change Team and CEDESS 
The IMSS change team was a cohesive group with similar training - mostly in 
economics - which shared a pro-market ideology, and had a single reform project: 
the transformation - and reduction - of the role of the state, in this case in social 
service delivery. In contrast, the CEDESS was not cohesive and its members, who 
had diverse training - including actuaries, economists and doctors - represented 
different ideological positions, which spanned from an enhanced role for the 
market to preserving the role of the state in social service delivery. As a result, 
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CEDESS' members did not share a single reform project, but instead brought 
policy proposals that reflected different visions of the role the IMSS should play. 
The IMSS change team members had made their careers through the bureaucratic 
ranks of government, based entirely on the support of peers within the state. Thus 
it had no experience of seeking consensus-building beyond internal bureaucratic 
manoeuvring. CEDESS shared this technocratic trait, in that its members had no 
political manoeuvring experience, either; but it did not attempt to lead policy 
change. Instead, it acted as a group of technical officials assigned to support the 
IMSS Directorate's decision-making and, tangentially, its political manoeuvring. 
7.4 Political Manoeuvring of the IMSS Change Team and CEDESS 
Team members of the IMSS and CEDESS did not have any personal political 
support or power base outside the Executive, therefore the political feasibility of 
their reform agenda and of their leading position in the reform process depended 
exclusively on the support of the president and the government's economic team 
(vertical networks). This fact shielded them from political pressure from outside 
the Executive, but not from other government factions involved in the process. 
Therefore, not having a social mandate or a particular coalition of support made 
them entirely dependent on changes in the economic team's - or the president's -
policy priorities. 
7.4.1 Vertical Networks 
When it was formed and first assigned the reform of the IMSS' health component, 
the IMSS change team counted on the direct support of the Finance Minister, who 
was thus its highest vertical network, capable of empowering the change team to 
lead the reform. However, with the resignation of the Finance Minister, it lost this 
political support - which was not replaced by a similar vertical network - and thus 
also its empowerment. The CEDESS' highest vertical network stemmed from the 
IMSS' Director, which proved insufficient to empower CEDESS to lead the 
reform, particularly in a context where the IMSS rivalled other more powerful 
agencies, such as the core economic ministries for control over the reform. 
250 
7.4.2 Horizontal Networks 
The IMSS change team had strong horizontal networks with former colleagues 
who had participated in the economic reforms during the Salinas administration at 
the core ministries - notably Finance and Commerce - as well as a few networks 
in the Presidency's Office and the Ministry of Health. Once the IMSS change team 
lost its vertical network, it was these horizontal networks which granted it a 
minimum space for manoeuvre to be able to continue with some elements of its 
reform agenda - particularly those related to the financial aspect of the reform, 
which had to be done in co-operation with the Ministry of Finance. 
While some CEDESS members also counted on horizontal networks with the 
Finance and Commerce ministries - notably those in charge of the pensions 
component of the reform - their support did not become extensive to all the team's 
members given their lack of cohesiveness and the fact that they did not operate as 
a single body. The economic team recognised but a few of CEDESS members as 
equal partners, and did not perceive it as a change team or as a change team 
capable of policy decision- making and of negotiating the reform. Instead, through 
the few horizontal networks, it reached some temporary level of co-operation by 
approaching it as a think tank and using its input to support decision-making. 
7.4.3 State-Society Networks 
Both teams developed very few state-society networks and instead resorted to 
sporadic contacts. Given the lack of leverage of both groups, they were 
subordinated to the IMSS Directorate's control of relations with societal actors. 
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7.5 Choice of Strategies of the IMSS Change Team and CEDESS 
Changes to the reform's content carried out as a strategy to enhance the reform's 
chances of being pursued, went beyond the decision-making power of both the 
IMSS change team and CEDESS, and remained firmly in the hands of the 
interagency groups within the Executive. Such was the case of the speed and 
scope of policy change the reform should entail, and the choice of legislation -
i.e. the final content of the reform initiative presented to Congress, which reflected 
decisions as to whether to induce change through legislation or regulation, for 
instance. 
The IMSS change team did not participate in brokerage in Congress. This was 
left in the hands of the IMSS Directorate, which relied on CEDESS for support -
such as the preparation of policy briefings and presentations in Congress - but not 
for decision-making around political strategy. The role of both groups in policy 
dialogue was also marginal, since neither was assigned the negotiation of the 
reform. In the case of the IMSS change team, it resorted to an insulation strategy at 
the outset, but when it lost its vertical network, it was forced to establish policy 
dialogue with interest groups opposing change - notably the IMSS bureaucracy 
through its union. CEDESS organised a series of forums on social security with 
the participation of foreign specialists, but this was part of the IMSS Directorate's 
overall strategy to win public opinion, and not an independent action from 
CEDESS proper. 
With regard to transition strategies, while CEDESS did not have any 
participation at all, it could be argued that the IMSS change team independently 
decided to move ahead quietly but swiftly with the IMSS' financial re-engineering 
with two goals in mind: First, to bring about as much change as possible to avoid 
having it reverted once it was substituted in the IMSS' Financial Division. Second, 
to put as many "locks" on the system to make it transparent and avoid political use 
of funds and corruption. The IMSS change team also secured multilateral loans to 
ensure funds to cover the reform's transitional costs and therefore raise the 
chances of its continuing in the medium to long run. 
• 
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The IMSS change team and CEDESS held different views on strategies to induce 
change, particularly as regards the reform's health component. The IMSS change 
team shared the economic team's view that changes in health service provision 
could be induced in the long run and indirectly through market forces, while 
CEDESS proposed the direct implementation of changes in the short term. 
However, none had the power to take the ultimate decision, which was yet again in 
the hands of the interagency groups. These favoured the pro-market/indirect 
option, but this coincidence with the IMSS change team stems from the fact that it 
shared a common view about the role of the state and the market with the 
economic team, rather than as a result of its negotiation. Once the IMSS 
Directorate lost the bid for control of the reform initiative - for which it had 
chosen the health reform as a trade mark - the direct implementation of policy 
change in the IMSS health services as suggested by CEDESS was reduced to a 
minimum, with only a few pilot projects taking place. 
7.6 The Executive's Interagency Groups 
The economic team within the Executive did not delegate final decisions on policy 
content either to the IMSS change team, or to CEDESS. Instead, it put together 
one interagency group in charge of looking into the social security reform - with 
particular emphasis on the pensions component - and later on, another interagency 
group in charge of looking into policy changes to the health sector - where the 
reform of the IMSS health services was considered once more. While these groups 
within the Executive resembled change teams to a large extent, they were not 
empowered to broker the reform initiatives, nor to implement them. Instead, in a 
sort of "division of labour", the IMSS' Directorate was put in charge of brokering 
the reform - with the support of CEDESS - and the IMSS change team of 
implementing it. 
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7.6.1 The Social Security Interagency Group 
In view of the 1994 economic crisis, President Zedillo and his economic team 
decided to push forward the pensions reform proposal that had been developed 
during the previous administration. An interagency group was designated by the 
economic cabinet to adjust this proposal within the Executive. The interagency 
group was made up of officials from the Finance Ministryll and the pensions 
regulation agency CONSARI2, as well as officials from the IMSS, including the 
IMSS change team's leader, Gabriel Martinez. There were also representatives of 
the Ministries of Labour and Health\3, and from the Office of the Presidency. The 
team was assigned the development of the final pensions reform proposal. This 
interagency group worked in isolation and did not open the discussions on the 
reform's content to other arenas outside the Executive. Although the interagency 
team took into consideration the proposals developed at CEDESS, they did not 
grant it access to the decision-making process. 
Formally, an interagency group's function is to represent the various government 
agencies relevant to a specific arena of policy-making and to create an arena for 
representation and negotiation. However, because the majority of this group's 
members had been part of the economic team leading reforms in the previous 
administration, they shared a common policy agenda that went beyond that of their 
respective agencies. Therefore, with the exception of the Labour Ministry 
representatives, they put aside their institutional position and worked as a task 
force. In that manner, this group operated in resemblance to a change team, since it 
worked as a cohesive group, with a common agenda based around unified 
ideological and programmatic principles. This was further reinforced by the 
Presidency's direct participation and arbitrage of policy discussions. 
In accordance with the president's priorities, the team decided to push forward the 
restructuring of the pensions system and the financial re-engineering of the IMSS, 
and postpone the health component reform. The interagency team briefly 
considered the restructuring of the IMSS health component as it was formulating 
the final proposal of the pensions reform. However, it was this team which decided 
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to postpone it in order to ensure the political feasibility of the new pensions 
scheme and its approval in Congress. 
7.6.2 The Health Interagency Group 
After the new Social Security Law was approved and the pensions interagency 
group had been dispersed, another interagency group was created within the 
Executive, now with the task of formulating the regulation of the emerging HMO 
market in the private health sector. Their initial objective was to simultaneously 
regulate the emerging HMO market along with the IMSS' opt-out policy, but 
while officials in the economic team considered it a priority to regulate the 
emerging HMO market - in order to give the new industry economic certainty and 
protect the users - the same was not the case for the regulation of the IMSS' opt-
out policy. 
The health interagency group presented most of the characteristics of the social 
security interagency group. It was made up of a reduced number of policy-makers 
with high technical training - most of them were economists and lawyers - who 
were assigned the formulation of a specific aspect of the health reform. It was also 
an ideologically and programmatically cohesive group isolated from external 
interest group pressure. Also it was not assigned the political manoeuvring to 
broker the bill 14 • 
Although this group had the formal purpose of representing the agencies involved 
in the reform process, most of its members subordinated this function to that of 
involving themselves as technical apolitical policy-makers in the formulation of 
the reform proposal. Among the team's members, only the IMSS officials used the 
interagency group as a forum of agency representation to try to influence the 
decision-making processl5 . However, the direct involvement of the president's 
staff maintained the group's cohesiveness around the predominant reform 
objective, and soon the IMSS officials were partially isolated. 
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Figure (7.1) presents a diagram showing the positions the members of the pensions 
and health interagency groups had during the Salinas and the Zedillo 
administrations. Note that the majority stems from the core economic agencies in 
both administrations. 
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The team approached the reform as a regulation problem. This meant setting up 
the rules to create and regulate societal actors in the health sector, such as Health 
Management Organisations (HMO's) to provide private services to middle 
income groups through individual health insurance plans. The regulation of the 
emerging HMO's market was also intended to boost private investment in health 
infrastructure in the short run. And in the long run, through the simultaneous 
regulation of the IMSS opt-out policy, to create the market forces to induce the 
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transfonnation of the health sector's old providers - such as the IMSS - through 
market competition. 
However, when the team was made aware of the IMSS' union's mounting political 
pressure against the implementation of the opt-out option16 it concluded that the 
intention to regulate both issues at the same time could affect the political 
feasibility of having the HMO market regulation approved in Congress. Thus, 
given that the opt-out policy was not part of the government's policy agenda, and 
its benefits remained unclear in the short run, it was postponed once again. 
After the initiative was presented by the Executive in Congress, the health care 
interagency group was dismantled and the initiative was "frozen" by Congress. 
Only a few mid-level officials from the Finance Ministry continued to broker the 
initiative within the Executive, in order to jump-start its efforts to obtain 
congressional approval. However, it was not until the new Health Minister, Jose 
Antonio Gonzalez Fernandez -whose profile was similar to that of JMSS Director 
Borrego, inasmuch as he had pursued a political career within the ranks of the PRJ, 
but interacted with the technocratic group in power-, took on the initiative as part 
of his policy agenda and personally lobbied it before Congress and the PRJ. He 
finally managed to have it approved towards the end of 1999. 
7.7 The Executive's Interagency Groups' Choice of Strategies 
Given that the Executive remained in control of the government's social security 
initiative instead of delegating it to either the IMSS change team or CEDESS, it 
was the interagency groups which made decisions on the reform's final policy 
content, and, along with it, the policy choices. In these circumstances, the 
interagency groups made a series of strategy choices aimed at enhancing the 
political feasibility ofthose policy issues that had priority on their reform agenda -
the pensions reform and the creation of new private health services providers, 
respectively. Their choice of strategies responded to the opportunities and 
limitations the institutional context and the nature of the reform posed to them. 
Some strategies entailed defining the degree of participation in policy decision-
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making, whereas others entailed modifications to the reform's policy content in 
order to ensure its political feasibility. 
In regard to the pensions reform, the social security pensions interagency group 
sought to trigger in-depth short-term comprehensive change through new 
legislation, along the lines of economic reform efforts pursued by the economic 
team in the past. In stark contrast to these groups' choice of policies to pursue 
policy change in the pensions scheme, this groups' choice of speed and scope of 
policy change for the health reform was to avoid in-depth short-term changes, and 
instead to rely on incremental changes in the short run. In a follow-up of the 
Executive's decision to prioritise pensions at the expense of health, the health 
interagency group also only attempted to trigger incremental change. 
Following this logic, the social security interagency group considered only briefly 
the possibility of including law amendments geared to reforming the IMSS' health 
services in the social security reform initiative to be presented in Congress - on 
the grounds that these services were an integral part of the IMSS. Instead its 
choice of legislation was to resort to internal administrative acts within the IMSS. 
It did so in order to avoid jeopardising the passing of the new law reforming the 
pensions scheme; but this decision was also based on the fact that the original 
social security law already endorsed the IMSS' opt-out policy, which could be 
systematically implemented by establishing its regulation through an 
administrative act. When the health interagency group considered the reform of 
the IMSS health services anew - this time on the grounds that the group was 
exploring policy changes in the health sector - this fact also influenced its choice 
of legislation. Again, changes in legislation to bring about policy change in IMSS 
services were discarded as politically contentious; and instead, the option of 
relying on the IMSS' internal administrative acts was endorsed. 
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7.7.1 Inducing Change 
This choice of strategies also ran in tandem with the interagency groups' choice of 
mechanisms to induce change, one that was based on the groups' assumptions -
which in tum were based on their experience with first generation refonns - and 
the ideological stand of their members. The mechanisms both groups chose were 
changes in rules and regulations as a means to bring about policy change, and a 
reliance on market forces. Thus, in the case of health reform, both groups chose to 
avoid imposing change, which would have required a direct confrontation with 
entrenched interests - thus putting in jeopardy both groups' reform priorities. 
Instead, both groups chose to induce change indirectly through the concurrence of 
two factors: First, the issuing of IMSS administrative decrees regulating the 
systematic implementation of the opt-out policy - thus allowing social security 
affiliates to chose their own health service plan. And second, generating market 
competition by putting in place the incentives for the creation of HMO's these 
affiliates could tum to as an alternative service. 
In other words, with the simultaneous regulation of the IMSS' opt-out policy, the 
team expected to promote a shift of IMSS affiliates to the new HMO's. The 
introduction of competition by creating new health service providers and allowing 
IMSS affiliates to switch to them, was expected to trigger improvements in health 
care quality. As they gained economic strength and political weight, HMO's 
would also represent a new base of support to confront the old agency's 
bureaucracy - and particularly its union. However, neither of these two factors 
were under the control of the interagency groups - the issuing of these 
administrative decrees was in the hands of IMSS authorities, and competition 
depended on market incentives and timing. 
7.7.2 Policy Dialogue 
The interagency groups worked in isolation to formulate the reform proposals. 
Their capacity to insulate policy formulation from other actors depended on two 
elements. First, the political backing of the president, and second the institutional 
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context in which they were immersed. In other words, the formal and informal 
rules of policy negotiation that empowered the President to conduct reform 
formulation within the Executive away from public scrutiny and from other arenas 
of interest representation - Congress notwithstanding. Only the requirements of 
this institutional context, or the need to rely on the IMSS' bureaucracy for the 
implementation of certain aspects of the reforms forced the interagency groups to 
"open up" and negotiate with groups outside the Executive. Such was the case of 
reform legislation, and thereafter, the implementation of some of its components in 
the IMSS - notably its financial re-engineering; and on these two occasions it did 
so indirectly, by relying first on the IMSS Directorate, and later on the IMSS 
change team. 
During the legislation stage the interagency groups chose to rely on the old PRI 
corporatist structure to secure support for the pensions reform, control resistance 
from powerful interest groups - particularly the IMSS union - and secure the 
PRI's vote in Congress. To that end, it assigned the brokerage to IMSS Director 
Genaro Borrego, who had a political profile - with a career based in the PRI ranks 
and elected positions - and therefore was able to establish policy dialogue with the 
party's corporate organisations - particularly labour - and peak associations. 
During the implementation stage, the interagency groups assigned the IMSS 
change team to bring about policy change from within the IMSS. Following the 
same strategy choice of the interagency groups - since it worked as an extension 
of the economic team - the IMSS change team also tried to insulate reform 
implementation from interest groups resisting change - particularly the IMSS 
union. But its lack of leverage within the IMSS bureaucracy greatly reduced its 
control over policy change, and forced it to negotiate and seek consensus with 
those groups resisting change. 
Figure (7.2) presents a diagram with the change team's choice of strategy over 
policy dialogue. The horizontal axis presents the different stages of the reform 
process. The vertical axis represent the choice of policy dialogue from closed or 
non existent (insulation), to open or inviting participation (consensus building). 
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The line presents the team's choice at each stage. The closer the line is to the 
horizontal axis, the less policy dialogue and thus the more insulated the change 
team. The diagram shows that the change team chose a strategy other than 
insulation only during reform legislation. That is, at the stage of the reform 
process in which the institutional context forced the team to abandon the 
insulation strategy and engage in policy dialogue to broker the reform. 
Figure 7.2: Change Team Strategy Choice on Policy Dialogue 
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Economic reform in Mexico was promoted during the eighties and nineties by a 
small group of technocrats whose careers were based in the financial and 
economjc agencies of government. This economic team had ideological and 
programmatic cohesiveness. Its members shared a high level of technical training 
and a commitment to the principles of economic liberalism, even though they 
competed for political positions. 
During the early nineties, a group of these technocrats from the Ministry of 
Finance and the Central Bank, led by Pedro Aspe, the Finance Minister, developed 
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a project to privatise the retirement pensions system, which directly involved the 
IMSS. This group was forced to abandon the project in mid-1993 following a take-
over by a rival camarilla led by the Presidency's Office along with the Commerce 
Ministry. From mid- 1993 through 1994, this technocratic faction worked to 
develop a proposal for the reform of the pensions system. 
The economic team's strategy to pursue the pensions reform followed the same 
pattern that had been used during the first generation reforms. A small change 
team of highly technical policy-makers, foreign in training and professional 
experience to the IMSS, was placed in formal positions within it, and its co-
ordination was assigned to Gabriel Martinez, a junior member of the Executive's 
economic team. In this way, the team in charge of implementing the IMSS' 
financial re-engineering was an extension of the economic team, linked by a 
vertical network that consisted of the direct support of Jaime Serra Puche, who 
was named Finance Minister at the outset of the Zedillo administration. However, 
with the resignation of Serra Puche, this vertical link was to be broken and the 
IMSS change team was left without the political support of the core ministries. 
This event considerably narrowed its scope of action, slowing the pace of the 
IMSS reform. This fact was further aggravated by President Zedillo's decision to 
halt his support for any policy reform that was not directly related to solving the 
economIc cnsls. 
The IMSS Directorate, for its part, also attempted to create a change team similar 
in nature and modus operandi to those used by the economic team in the core 
ministries, by fonning the Strategic Development Centre for Social Security 
(CEDESS) in mid-1993. The creation of CEDESS responded to Borrego's 
political strategy of establishing working links with the economic team, through a 
decision-making space outside the realm of the IMSS bureaucracy and its interest 
groups - notably the IMSS union. The IMSS Director shared the perception that 
the creation of a technocratic change team made up of non-IMSS policy-makers 
was an effective strategy to bring about policy change within a setting of 
resistance. 
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However, he was not successful in transforming CEDESS from a think-tank into a 
change team. The CEDESS group lacked a series of traits that are indispensable 
for the formation of a change team, such as ideological cohesiveness and a 
common reform agenda. But most significantly, it lacked vertical networks of 
support stemming from the core ministries. The economic team did not recognise 
the group in CEDESS as a technocratic group of policy-makers with the 
credentials to become a partner in the IMSS reform. Furthermore, the CEDESS 
group did not have the horizontal networks with other technocratic policy-makers 
in other ministries, as the IMSS change team did - notably, with the Finance 
Ministry. 
The Executive maintained control over the social security reform and put 
particular emphasis on its pensions component. Instead of delegating decision-
making to either the IMSS change team or CEDESS, it created ad hoc interagency 
groups within the Executive under the leadership of the economic team, to study 
the reform proposals presented by CEDESS and the IMSS change team, and 
decide on the reform's final policy content. These interagency groups formally 
served as an arena for the representation of the core ministries and other 
government agencies involved, but this was not their main role. The interagency 
groups' members were like-minded policy-makers who shared a common ideology 
and similar views on the reform agenda. Therefore, they worked more as a task 
force than a negotiation table, since there was little need to seek consensus, but 
instead members departed from a platform of consensus and concentrated on 
reform formulation. 
These groups prioritised the use of changes in rules and regulation as a means to 
bring about policy change. This was aimed at bringing immediate change to the 
pensions component, but in the case of the health component, it implied inducing 
change indirectly, through market forces that would only have an impact in the 
long run. 
The IMSS change team prioritised the elements of the reform that were related to 
the financial re-engineering of the Institute, While the CEDESS used as its 
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trademark a more integral approach to the IMSS' reform, which included the 
transformation of IMSS health service provision. However, in spite of CEDESS' 
efforts to introduce short-term direct changes to the IMSS' health services along 
the pensions reform, all items pointing in that direction were removed by the 
interagency groups before the Executive presented the reform initiative to 
Congress on the grounds that they faced serious resistance from politically 
powerful interest groups - such as the IMSS union - and could therefore 
jeopardise the pensions reform. 
The Executive's faltering support for the inclusion of the health component in the 
social security reform initiative and its willingness to maintain control over the 
social security reform process - through ad hoc interagency groups - hampered 
both teams' potential to secure powerful vertical networks to help them lead the 
reform. As a result, a sort of "division of labour" was established in which the 
Executive's interagency groups would have the last word on reform formulation, 
the IMSS change team was assigned the formulation of the policy's technical 
details and regulation, and CEDESS was relegated to backing the IMSS 
Directorate in the efforts to broker the reform with groups in Congress and in 
society. 
The analysis of the two groups within the IMSS which attempted to take control of 
the reform process - the IMSS change team and CEDESS - and the two 
interagency groups that were assigned the reform's formulation by the Executive-
the pensions interagency group and the health interagency group - shows that the 
technocratic characteristics of the last two administrations led the Executive to use 
the same strategy it used to pursue economic reforms - first generation reforms. It 
opted for a strategy of insulation whereby the participation of societal groups and 
governmental agencies was restricted and entirely controlled by the core 
ministries, which, regardless of the policy issue, determined both the degree of 
participation and the composition of the group that was assigned the different tasks 
related to the reform process. Also, due to the Executive's concentration of power, 
and the secondary role played by other arenas, Congress notwithstanding, these 
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four groups found an ample space for policy definition only limited by the 
economic team's support and interest in the issue. 
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Footnotes for Chapter 7 
1 For details on Mexico's technocracy, the economic team, and its relation to the political context, see Waterbury, 
1989 and 1992; Haggard and Kaufinan, 1992 and 1995); Kahler. 1992; Grindle 1994 andl996. 
2 By which for the last 70 years the president in office names his successor from a member of the Cabinet at his 
discretion. 
3 During inteIviews two alternative explanations for this take-over were put forth. One pointed to an effort to 
establish a closer link between the pensions reform project and the president, thus helping to insulate it from the 
internal political struggle surroWlding the presidential succession (InteIview, 08/04199). The other pointed to an 
effort to establish a clearer line of control between the president and the reform's content (Interview, 08/04199). 
Yet it could have been possible that the economic team's factional competition was the main cause behind it 
with the new faction taking advantage of a window of opportunity opened by pressure from government 
factions unsatisfied with the partial results the Finance Ministry had obtained during its first attempt at pensions 
reform (Interview, 04/16/99). 
4Gabriel Martinez had a PhD in economics from Chicago University. Since 1993, and still working at the 
Commerce Ministry, he was commissioned to interact and co-operate with the CEDESS group, a think-tank for 
the IMSS directorate. 
5The IMSS change team and Martinez wolked in isolation with the sole exception of Eduardo Gonzalez Pier, a 
economist with a PhD in economics who was Martinez' second on board and was in charge ofbrokering the 
reform with other groups within the IMSS and societal actorsinterested in the reform. 
~otably with Santiago Levy, the Finance Deputy Minister in charge of social sector budget allocations. 
7See Appendix 2. 
8The Centre was perceived by its members and by the IMSS Directorate as a space away from the pressures of 
bureaucracy where researchers 'dared to think' (Interview, 02125/99). 
9The pensions group was headed by Enrique Davila, an economics professor with a PhD in economic history 
from the University of Barcelona with a pro-market approach, who had been advisor to the now Finance Deputy 
Minister Santiago Levy, when he headed the Economic Deregulation Unit of the Commerce Ministry 
(SECOFl) in the previous administration. The health team was headed by Dr. Mario Villafana, a doctor who 
stemmed from the ranks of the IMSS, where he had spent all his career practising in the IMSS' health services. 
He did not question the state's role in service provision, and instead looked to ameliorate the quality and 
efficiency of IMSS health services through this reform initiative. The labour risks team was headed by Jorge 
RendOn, who had been Director of the Actuarial Course at IT AM. 
1DOnce the IMSS Directorate lost its bid to control the IMSS health reform, CEDESS was gradually 
marginalized from the reform process Wltil it was dismantled and handed over to the IMSS union, with the name 
of Instituto de Estudios Sindicales para la Seguridad Social (IESSS) in 1998. Key members like pensions leader 
Davila joined the Zedillo administration from its outset occupying formal positions within the government's 
economic team. This further hampered the CEDESS' horizontal netwooo, reducing its interaction - and that of 
the IMSS Directorate - with the economic team. 
IIEnrique Davila, former member of CEDESS in charge of pensions during the previous administration, was 
one of the members to join on behalf of the Ministry of Finance, where he now held a formal JXlsition. 
12The National Committee for the Retirement Savings System. 
13 A change team had also been formed and positioned within the MOH to lead its reform, so the MOH officials 
who participated in this interagency group were not doctors, but economists who were former junior members of 
the economic team. 
14This task was in fact not assigned for a long time - and the initiative languished in Congress - Wltil taken up by 
Jose Antonio Gonzalez Fernandez, when he was appointed Health Minister in late 1999. 
15Given the political costs of confronting the IMSS union without the full backing of the president, the IMSS 
Directorate did not have the incentives to see the opt-out policy regulation take shape, as it would be its 
responsibility to implement it With the sole exception of Gabriel Martinez, IMSS officials invited to the 
interagency group used it as a forum to make their case that implementing the opt-out option was politically 
unfeasible. 
16This included union leaders' declarations in the press that the government was secretly planning to "privatise" 
the IMSS, which was echoed by option party members. 
PART IV 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
267 
Chapter 8. Comparative Analysis 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the comparative analysis of the political dimension of health reform in 
Mexico and Colombia, based on the findings described in the preceding chapters. The 
analysis is supported in a series of propositions about the elements that contribute to the 
state's capacity to promote policy reform, and therefore, enhance the political feasibility of 
health reforms. The discussion links the findings in the two case studies to the literature 
review presented in chapter 1, as well as emerging themes and theoretical debates on the 
political economy of policy reforms and public management. 
First, a reflection based on the case study findings on the political economy schools presented 
in chapter 1 - pluralism and new institutionalism - is presented. Then, the emerging themes 
related to New Public Management (NPM), organisational change, and strategic-choice 
model are introduced. Further on, the series of new propositions stemming from the literature 
and from the case study findings are discussed in comparative analysis. Following the 
analytical framework of this thesis, these are grouped in three clusters. Those related to the 
political context of reforms, those related to the reforms' policy process, and lastly, those 
related to the change teams that are put in charge of leading such reforms. The chapter ends 
with a brief recapitulation on the political feasibility of health reform in the light of the 
propositions explored. 
In chapter 1 it was noted that there is no consensus about what a health reform entails. In fact, 
health sector reform points at the "current wave of interest in changing the policies, practices 
and management systems within the health sector" (Mills, 2001). Many of the health reform 
agendas that are currently underway have a common element in that they seek, in part or in 
whole, market solutions to problems such as limited resources, inefficiency and lack of 
quality in health care. These market solutions have been referred to in the health policy 
literature as mixed market, internal market, quasi market mechanisms, regulated market, 
managed competition and public competition, among others (Robinson and Le Grand, 1994; 
Basset, 1993; Culyer, 1990; Saltman and Van Otter, 1989). 
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In the UK, Australia and New Zealand, this underlying element in health refonns seeking to 
redefine the responsibilities of the government and the market in health service delivery, as 
well as to apply managerial tools from the private sector, has been named New Public 
Management (NPM) (Barzelay, 2001; Mills, 2001; Paton, 1997; Hunter and Stockford, 1997; 
Hood 1990 in Parsons, 1995). NPM marks a turning point from administering or running a 
health system, to managing it, reflecting the need to rely on leadership to seek quality and to 
make choices within a situation of limited resources (Paton, 1997). It concentrates on how 
policy makers should guide, manage and oversee public bureaucracies (Barzelay, 2001). 
NPM draws from public management and a vast array of disciplines, such as scientific 
management, economics, social and occupational psychology, and management accounting, 
among others (Parsons, 1995). It offers a series of tools geared at improving the 
responsibility, accountability and perfonnance of the public sector like separating policy 
making and service delivery functions, using contracts to define goals and responsibilities, 
enabling consumer choice, and using perfonnance incentives and competition (Mills, 2001; 
Barzelay, 2001; Kaul 1997 and Haque, 1998 in Mills, 2001; Hood, 1991 in Hunter and 
Stockford, 1997). 
The influence of management in public policy, as articulated in NPM, is not new (Mills, 
2001). It stems from the introduction of management ideas in policy making and analysis in 
the US in the 1960's, which coalesced in what came to be known as public management in 
the 1970's, presenting a coherent critique - and alternative - to traditional public 
administration in the 1980's and 1990's (Hughes, 1994). This influence of private sector 
management innovation over public sector refonn triggered organisational change in state 
institutions and the adoption of NPM. As private enterprises reconsidered mass production 
and centralised organisations, the public sector started to follow the trend - if at a much 
slower pace - towards more decentralised policy implementation and a higher degree of 
responsiveness towards service users (Hoggett, 1987 in Parsons, 1995). 
As has been shown in the case studies, the health refonn agendas of Mexico and Colombia in 
the 1990's, held many components that can be identified with what has been described as 
NPM. Both countries sought to improve the efficiency, the effectiveness and the quality of 
health care service delivery by reassigning the responsibility previously solely in the hands of 
the state, to the market, and by introducing market-like mechanisms in the old provider 
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institutions. To do so, they focused on two aspects. One was the creation of new private 
health delivery institutions that were to compete among each other. The other was the 
transformation of the old public provider institutions through the reallocation of resources 
and redefinition of the rules and incentives of their public health sectors. 
Further research is needed to understand how these currently dominant ideas in the 
international health policy community! impact policy agendas at the local level. However, the 
case studies explored in this thesis have demonstrated that once this reform agenda has been 
adopted by policy makers, its feasibility, as well as its final policy content is greatly 
determined by the political context within which it is embedded, as well as the politics around 
the process it follows from problem formulation to consolidating the envisioned policy 
change. Thus, the case studies show that while the issues contained in NPM informed the 
health reform agenda in Mexico and Colombia, the analysis of its political feasibility 
remained in the political economy domain: in the factors that mediate the adoption of private 
sector management tools by the state. 
It has been stressed throughout the thesis that what makes health reform a political process is 
the fact that its policy affects the interests of different groups in society and within the state 
(see also Fierlbeck, 1997). And that therefore, during a health reform process, these groups 
compete to influence policy definition, legislation and implementation in order to protect and 
pursue their interests. In Evans' words ..... people - not just individuals, but rather well-
defined and more or less self-aware sub-groups within the population - are pursuing very 
different objectives in any reform process" (Evans, 1998). 
In chapter 1, two competing approaches to the political economy of policy change relevant to 
the analysis of health reforms were presented and critiqued. These were the interest group 
approach or pluralist school and the new institutionalism approach. As a result, a third 
alternative for analysing the political dimension of health reforms was suggested. One in 
which the focus of analysis is placed on the decision-makers in charge of pursuing health 
reform: the health change teams. The following sections present further elements for the 
critical comparison of these analytical approaches based on the findings of the two case 
studies. 
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Interest Group Approach 
The interest group approach or the pluralist school sees both reform definition and its policy 
outcome as the result of the struggle amongst social groups, also called stake-holders. 
According to this view, the political feasibility of a policy reform agenda depends on the 
difference between the power and number of the group of actors who favour the reform, and 
that of those who oppose it. Most importantly, this perspective assumes that the state is a 
neutral actor without an independent policy agenda. Therefore, the public agenda is defined 
and adjusted in reaction to the result of the competition among social actors striving to 
influence policy making (Schamis, 1999; Roderick, 1994; Dunleavy, 1991). 
Evidence in both case studies presented in this thesis showed a political scenario in which 
those who stood to benefit from the reform - consumers - were weak and politically 
disorganised, and those who stood to lose - bureaucrats, providers - were powerful, 
organised groups; thus making the probability of health reform occurrence very low 
according to the interest group perspective. However, health reforms were launched and 
produced varying degrees of policy change in both countries. Further, in neither of these 
countries did the health reform agenda stem from the mobilisation of social groups in society, 
but instead, from policy makers within the state. Also, in neither case did the health reforms 
translate into - nor did they seek - a large increase in political support2• Instead, the 
experiences analysed in this thesis show that policy makers pursued a policy agenda that was 
crafted according to their values and ideology even when this was at the expense of public 
health providers, who were powerful interest groups. 
An aspect in which Colombia and Mexico showed contrasting characteristics casts further 
doubts on the analytical strength of the interest group approach. This was the level of 
organisation and power of those interest groups that opposed the reform in each country and 
their impact in the reform process. In Mexico, the state bureaucracy and the public provider 
groups have historically played a key role as intermediaries between the state and society 
through service delivery (Gonzalez-Rossetti et aI., 1994), and were organised in powerful 
unions with strong links to the party then in power. On the other hand, Colombia's public 
provider unions were but a small fraction of the labour force and were quite fragmented, and 
as a consequence, their political leverage was quite limited in comparison to the Mexican 
case. 
271 
In light of these contrasting scenarios, the interest group approach would lead to expect less 
organised resistance in Colombia and therefore, better chances for its health reform's 
consolidation. However, the empirical evidence of the case studies showed that while in 
Colombia reformers were able to make significant progress in the creation of new private 
health providers, they were equally unable to implement the transformation of the old 
provider institutions where these interest groups had their stakes. These findings suggest that 
there are other factors mediating the power relations between the policy makers pursuing 
reform and the interest groups affected by it. By the same token, it can be argued that the 
pluralist approach lacks the tools needed to fine-tune the analysis and understand policy 
outcomes such as these. 
New Institutionalism 
In chapter 1 it was argued that the elements that could strengthen the political analysis of 
health reforms were the factors mediating state-society relations and the power struggle 
among interest groups. A country's political institutions that define the rules of the game by 
which such competition takes place (Immergut, 1990; Steinmo et al. 1992; Linz and 
Valenzuela, 1994; Liphart and Waisman, 1996; Bates and Krueger, 1993). Institutions offer 
access to decision making to some groups, while blocking the participation of others; give 
opportunities for action to some actors - regardless of their intrinsic power as defined by the 
pluralist school -, while limiting the political action of others. In doing so, the institutional 
setting has a determinant role in the political feasibility of a reform initiative and its outcome. 
Most importantly, it has been stressed that this approach throws light on the processes within 
the state. Instead of considering the state as a monolithic actor, it "opens the black box" and 
enquires about the competition to influence policy making that takes place among those 
groups that are within the state or form part of it. This added dimension to the mere 
competition among interest groups in society reflects the more complex political dynamics 
that take place during a reform process. One in which policy makers pursue their policy 
agendas with some degree of independence from interest group pressure, within the 
opportunities and limitations that the institutional setting offers both to them and to all actors 
involved. 
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Evidence in both the Colombian and the Mexican case studies pointed to the importance of 
institutions in determining the political dynamics around health reforms and their feasibility. 
In both countries the Executive was more powerful than Congress. As a result, it was found 
that competition to influence the health reform formulation occurred mostly within the 
Executive, and not in Congress. While this did not eliminate interest group participation in 
policy decision making totally, it reduced it to the very few groups that were able to access 
decision-makers within the Executive. The comparative analysis of the interactions of these 
factors affecting health reform will be discussed below. 
Another element of new institutionalism reviewed in chapter 1 is the policy node. Policy 
nodes are the instances in which the health reform initiative can be altered, promoted or 
brought to a halt. These policy nodes are located in different points of the institutional setting 
of each country, such as the Executive, Congress, and public sector agencies. Immergut refers 
to them as veto points or "veto opportunities arising from the design of political 
institutions ... (which) ... explain both interest group influence and the effects of political 
institutions on policy results." (lmmergut, 1990:398). As a result of this somehow narrower 
definition of the times and places in which policy decision making affecting the reform is 
taking place, much of the scholarly debate has focused on the number of veto points to assess 
the political feasibility of reforms, instead of analysing the nature of these policy nodes and 
the profile of the actors within them. For instance, the cases in this thesis have shown that the 
actors in policy nodes located within the health service provider organisations - such as the 
social security institutes - were ideologically opposed to the market mechanisms; which was 
not the case in policy nodes within the finance and planning ministries. 
An analytical tool is needed to reflect upon and delve into the interactions among decision-
makers and other actors that take place within the institutional context that has been referred 
to. Further, what is needed is to trace in an orderly manner the process in which a health 
reform evolves in its context and the interactions among actors during the process. Grindle 
(2001) has pointed to the limitations of the new institutionalist approach in analysing the 
interactions between actors and has thus endorsed the use of a process approach to overcome 
them. Nelson (1999) has also studied in detail the varying political dynamics at each stage of 
the reform process. In the study of health politics Walt and Gilson (1994) and Altenstetter 
(1997) have proposed the use of policy process as a tool for analysis to be examined in 
tandem with a reform's policy content and the actors involved in both. 
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Given that in the two case studies health reform initiatives have been promoted by 
government, it is of particular importance to analyse the groups of policy makers that were in 
charge of promoting the state's reform agenda at important parts of the policy process- that is, 
the change teams. Thus, taking into account the analysis of the political context and the 
policy process of health reforms, this thesis has focused its analysis on these groups of 
decision-makers in charge of the reform and how they operated within their particular 
political context throughout the policy process. 
Change teams 
The Mexican and Colombian case studies showed that while some interest groups outside 
government discussed and sometimes pressed for health policy change, the issue did not 
reach the government's agenda in full until these small groups of senior policy makers took it 
on board. Colombia presented what seemed to be a counter example, since it was the interest 
groups represented in the temporarily empowered Congress, who first pressed for a thorough 
health sector reform. However, as it is presented in the case study, this first impulse dwindled 
and would have resulted in a series of marginal changes, had it not been championed by a 
heath change team within the Executive with the backing of the president. 
Once these groups of decision-makers incorporate the issue onto their policy agenda, they 
considered a series of factors and design strategies to promote it. Public management points 
to the importance of this aspect of policy reform through the strategic-choice model or 
strategic change (Morgan, 1986 in Parsons, 1995). Strategic change evokes the need of public 
sector reformers to take into consideration the political environment in which their 
organisations function in order to make the choices that will best serve their reform agenda 
(strategic choicesi. The strategic choice approach focuses on change teams (which it calls 
the dominant coalition): The group of decision-makers with a reform agenda in charge of 
making such strategic choices, are also referred to in the literature as reform enterpreneurs. or 
champions (Grindle, 2001; Srinivasan, 1985). 
As discussed further on, it is the institutional context that determines the potential for these 
groups of reformers to be convened and empowered by senior policy makers, as well as the 
margin of manoeuvre with which they are able to pursue their policy agenda. In the case of 
Colombia and Mexico, the existence of strong Executives and weak legislatures enabled the 
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use of change teams in policy formulation, and in brokering the reforms. As described in 
earlier chapters, this was also due to the fact that the Executive in both countries concentrated 
the policy tools, the infonnation and the human capital to do so. Further, in both countries, 
the absence of a professional civil service made the Executive rely on what has been 
described as "pockets of efficiency" (Geddes, 1994) - concentrated in the finance and 
planning ministries and on the president's staff - to develop and follow up its policy agenda. 
The technocratic groups in these positions played technical but also political roles in 
promoting the reform agenda - along the lines of the Grand Corps in France, which also has a 
strong presidentialist tradition (Suleiman, 1974). 
The formation and use of change teams has been presented as the logical extension of this 
arrangement (Geddes, 1994; Schneider, 1991; Centeno, 1994). It has further been noted that 
they operate in contexts where political power is concentrated in the Executive and the 
participation of social actors in policy decision making is limited (Williamson and Haggard, 
1994). And this brings us back to the analysis of the political context in which the reform 
process takes place. Following the analytical framework that this thesis has presented, the 
following sections will review some of the relevant propositions in the political economy 
debate pertaining to the context, the process and the change teams involved in policy reform 
in the light of the Colombian and Mexican experiences with health refonn in the 1990's. 
8.2 Political Context 
The findings in the case studies point to the importance of the role played by the institutional 
context in structuring state-society relations and their influence on the health refonn process. 
In this section 2 propositions are discussed in light of the evidence gathered in the case 
studies regarding the political context in which the health reforms evolved. They stem from 
the issues that are most salient in the political economy of policy reform in what pertains to 
the political context, and are the influence of regime type on the political feasibility of policy 
reforms, and the opportunities and limitations embedded in the political system of each 
country for the pursuance of a refonn initiative. 
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Influence of regime type 
Chapter 1 pointed out a dominant trend in the political economy literature that relates a 
country's political regime to the chances of successfully realising a reform agenda. In 
general, it is argued, launching reforms in democracies is a longer and more complex process 
than in dictatorships4. In other words, even though an authoritarian regime may have to 
"educate public opinion and negotiate with divergent pressure groups, it may be able to act 
more quickly because it can negotiate from a position of power"(Ardito-Barletta, 1994:463). 
However, this view has been countered by comparative studies that have shown no relevant 
correlation between the chances of promoting policy change and regime type (Remmer, 
1990; Nelson; 1990, Bates and Krueger, 1993). 
One of the problematic factors of this academic debate is that classifying countries along the 
democratic-authoritarian axis forces an oversimplified divide (Remmer, 1990) that fails to 
specify the analytical tools to compare differences in state-society relations during policy 
reform. Using this criterion Mexico is classified as authoritarian, and Colombia as 
"unambiguously democratic"(Williamson and Haggard, 1994). However, evidence from the 
two case studies suggested that both countries shared political characteristics that would 
classify them on the same side of the spectrum. If elections are taken as a measure of regime 
type, the cases showed that both Mexico and Colombia have held regular elections in the last 
8 decades with the exception of a short lived military government in Colombia. Haggard and 
Kaufman state that "elections in authoritarian regimes are, by definition, not wholly 
competitive" (Haggard, and Kaufman, 1992: 31). The case studies of both Mexico and 
Colombia have stressed that this has been the case in both countries. So it could be argued 
that classifying Mexico as an authoritarian regime and Colombia as a democratic one, has 
been largely based on political party rotation, since the former had a single party system in 
power for seventy years and the latter has rotated power between the two traditional parties 
sin the late 1950's. 
Established democracies like the US and the UK have had a similar pattern of party rotation, 
which, however, has been the outcome of free elections. In the case of Colombia until 1986, 
this was the result of a formal elite mechanism to share power (see chapter 5). Proposing the 
use of inclusiveness as one of the variables to refine the classification of regime type, 
Remmer (1990) classifies Colombia as "exclusionary democracy" and Mexico as 
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"inclusionary authoritarian". However, this classification still does not account for the 
evidence presented in this thesis, which shows that both countries a hybrid between 
democratic and authoritarian regime5: one in which through formal political institutions - the 
single party corporatist arrangement in Mexico and the National Front in Colombia -, the 
ruling elites secured their hold on power eliminating effective electoral competition, 
establishing an informal institutional mechanism to rotate the presidency and government 
positions, and limiting the political participation of social groups - and parties - in policy 
decision making. 
While these informal institutional arrangements would predict very little variation in the 
ideology of the different governments - along the lines of authoritarian regimes _6, Ward 
(1994) has shown that Mexico has moved along the ideological axis in what he calls the 
pendulum theory. In chapter 5 it is suggested that Colombia has undergone similar 
ideological shifts, in spite of the fact that there too, as a result of the political pact eliminating 
party competition, parties lost all incentives to present clearly distinct ideological positions. 
The fact that, as shown in the case studies, both countries presented a very similar pattern of 
ideological shifts and these did not result from free and competitive elections, suggests that 
the relevant question for the comparative analysis of Mexico and Colombia is not regime 
type, but instead the "degree of pluralism permitted" (Williamson and Haggard, 1994). That 
is, the formal and informal institutional attributions of each country's political system that 
determine where and how interest group competition takes place during the policy process, so 
as to have an impact in the ideology permeating the state's policy agenda. Among these are 
the characteristics of the political system, and the formal and informal rules of the game 
determining the balance of powers, which will be discussed in the following section. 
Political System 
In contrast to the pluralist perspective discussed earlier, recent scholarly work on the political 
economy of reforms has suggested that political and policy outcomes cannot be understood 
solely as a result of the sum of societal interests; be it in the economic sector, or in the social 
sphere; but in combination with the political context in which they interact. More 
specifically, the characteristics of the party system and the Executive-Legislative balance of 
power (Haggard, 1994; Immergut, 1990). 
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Both Mexico and Colombia have strong presidential systems (Kaufman, 1999) and therefore 
weak legislatures. This has led to two significant results. Firstly, in both countries, the single 
most important source of legislative proposals is the Executive; and secondly, that it enjoys a 
high degree of independence from Congress in promoting its reform agenda. In the case of 
the health reform agenda, examined at length in the preceding chapters, f~rmal institutional 
rules required that health reform initiatives be legislated and approved in Congress in both 
Colombia and Mexico. But in both cases the strong presidential power established in their 
Constitutions - as well as the informal or unwritten institutional features - gave pre-eminence 
to the Executives in defining the reform's policy content. 
In Colombia's case, Congress enjoyed a period of temporary leverage vis-a.-vis the Executive 
as a result of the new Constitution and the political reform that was taking place. This 
enabled legislators to condition the pensions reform to include health reform on the same bill. 
Yet once the Executive assumed the health reform agenda as its own, the Congress lost 
control over it, and was reduced to a reactive role. In the case of Mexico, when the inclusion 
of the health reform on the new Social Security Law was considered, the party in power still 
enjoyed an absolute majority in Congress. Under these circumstances, the decision to reduce 
the reform's scope was not a result of negotiations in Congress, but rather of political 
calculations within the Executive made prior to the presentation of the reform initiative to the 
Legislature. 
In both countries, the informal institutional features that concentrated power in the presidents 
as individuals, played a key role in determining the Executive's degree of leverage vis a vis 
Congress. The Colombia case study showed how, when negotiations in Congress had reached 
a stalemate in spite of the brokerage of the economic and health change teams, the president 
was able to supersede political competition and bargaining in Congress, and secure a cupular 
arrangement between the two traditional parties that guaranteed enough votes to legislate the 
reform. 
Also, the informal institutional features of the Mexican political system enabled the president 
to establish a clear cut division of labour between the technocratic groups within the 
Executive - entrusting them with policy formulation -, and the members of his party, who, 
while not allowed into the decision-making room - and therefore having no ownership over 
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the refonn agenda -, were put in charge of broke ring it within the party itself at first, and then 
in Congress. 
As a result of the strength of the Executive vis-a-vis Congress in both countries, political 
competition and policy debate was transferred from the wider social arena to a narrower one 
within the state, where most of the refonn's policy process took place away from public 
scrutiny. This converted the government - more precisely, the senior level bureaucracy - into 
the single most important veto point in the political system. One where the prospects of the 
refonn and its final content were defined by limiting and selecting the access of societal 
actors interested in influencing it. In studying the French health refonn Immergut (1990) had 
found a similar situation: one in which "because Executive decisions could not be vetoed 
elsewhere, political negotiation tended to be contained within the Executive arena" 
(Immergut, 1990:396). The study of bureaucratic politics and competition within the 
Executive becomes then central to explain how different factions of policy-makers with 
different ideologies confront one another. 
One of the aspects that come to the fore is the fact that if political competition to influence 
policy definition is transferred within the Executive, then far from being a monolithic block, 
the Executive sends "contradictory signals from different policy centres" (Williamson and 
Haggard, 1994:594). The case studies showed that regardless of the party in power, the full 
ideological spectre from pro-market to pro-State positions was represented among the 
different government factions. The 'control' ministries and the 'spending' or 'constituent' 
ministries (Haggard, 1994) ran along ideological lines where the former saw a diminished 
role for the state, whereas the latter defended state intervention. In studying the politics of 
social security and health refonn in Poland, Hausner (1998) and Duffy (1997) found similar 
inter-ministerial competition within the Executive also stemming from differences in 
ideological stand. 
However, in spite of the institutional fragmentation due to competition to influence policy 
within the state, governments in Mexico and Colombia did have policy agendas with a 
coherent ideological profile and a single direction. This means that other factors were at play 
within the state that resolved this conflict and ensured a coherent plan of action. In the case of 
Colombia, the fierce competition around social security and health refonns between the pro-
market and pro-state factions was brought to a halt by the president, who dismissed those 
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opposing the change team's reform agenda; and ensured that policy makers sympathetic to 
the reform were put in key positions. In Mexico, the power concentrated in the 'control' 
ministries and the presidency was such that there was no need to ensure the homogeneity of 
senior officers in the ministries to be reformed. 
The other factor that served as a counterbalance to this internal fragmentation enabling 
governments to pursue a single policy agenda were the change teams and interagency groups. 
The presence of change teams - with different labels - as mechanisms to counter institutional 
fragmentation is noted by Suleiman (1974) in France and by Schneider (1991), Evans (1985) 
and Geddes (1994) in Brazil. Their characteristics and role in the reform process will be 
discussed further on in this chapter. 
8.3 Policy Process 
This thesis has stressed the relevance of the policy process variable as a key element in the 
analysis of the political dimension of health reforms. The dynamic characteristic of this 
variable helps explain the different political conditions around a health reform initiative as it 
evolves in time and space through its different stages7. This section will address 2 
propositions to underline the importance of considering these two dimensions - time and 
space - when assessing the political feasibility of health reform. The first proposition (space) 
stems from the comparative analysis of the two case studies presented in this thesis and it 
relates to the existence of parallel arenas in the political context in which, in a simultaneous 
manner, health reforms are discussed and negotiated. The second proposition (time) stems 
from recent political economy literature on policy reform, and it relates to the different nature 
- and political consequences - of the two "moments" of a health reform process. 
Parallel arenas 
Based on the comparative analysis of the findings described in the case studies, this section 
seeks to sustain the proposition that parallel arenas exist during the health reform process, 
that they have different political dynamics and as a result, they generate dissimilar policy 
proposals. 
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The findings in both Mexico and Colombia case studies, point to the large public debates in 
diverse fora hosted or promoted by civil society, but also by the governments pursuing health 
reform. As it has been shown in chapters 3, in Colombia social groups participation was 
ample even before the health reform was incorporated into the public agenda by the state. 
Groups with different ideological stands proposed and critiqued competing proposals on the 
features the new health system should have. The particular political circumstance that 
Colombia was undergoing with the writing of a new Constitution and political reform, also 
encouraged unusual levels of political participation and public debate. Colombia's Congress 
and its National Constituent Assembly were centre stage to these debates. Later on, when the 
Executive took the health reform banner as its own, it constantly promoted instances for 
public debate and dialogue both among social actors themselves, and between these and 
government officials. 
In a much smaller scale, the debate about health reform also reached public opinion in 
Mexico through social actors before the State made it part of its policy agenda (see chapter 
6). Several groups in society debated different health reform options and competed among 
each other to gain influence over policy decision making. Most importantly, once the 
Executive had the social security reform in its agenda, it convened the key actors in the 
sector, sponsored its thorough assessment, and encouraged the preparation of policy solutions 
for the problems that were identified. These were formally presented to the President. 
The number of these public fora - and in the case of Colombia - the high levels of 
participation in them, would give the misleading perception that the health reform process in 
these two countries was based on an inclusive and participatory public policy debate. 
The careful observation of the policy nodes where the reform process took place in these 
countries, this is, the time and the place of the different stages of the reform process, reveal a 
different picture. One in which, in both countries, problem definition and reform formulation 
was taking place simultaneously but independently of these public fora. 
The political dynamics in these parallel arenas showed marked differences: the public fora 
gave priority to participation as a source of legitimacy at the expense of swift decision 
making. Participants sought to build political support for their proposals as a means to 
incorporate them into the public agenda. Instead, policy decision-makers formulating policy 
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insulated from the public debate, prioritised efficient decision making over participation. The 
different factions within the Executive strove to make their proposals prevail on the public 
agenda through technical debate and bureaucratic politics. As a result, the reform proposals 
stemming from these parallel arenas bore very little resemblance with the exception of those 
cases in which the state had manipulated the debate. 
In both case studies, the outcome of the internal competition to influence policy definition 
within the state, prevailed over the results of the several public fora - a factor that explains in 
great part the prevalence of NPM solutions and pro-market mechanisms in both country's 
health reforms, even though when they were largely criticised in these more open arenas. 
Further research is needed on how interest groups whose stakes are at risk - such as unions -
make use of these fora. 
The two "moments" of the health reform process 
The analytical framework of this thesis a standard form to divide the reform process into 
anchor stages is used (see chapter 1): problem definition, policy formulation, legislation, 
regulation, implementation and consolidation. It has been stressed that in each of these stages, 
the policy reform passes through different policy nodes whose political dynamics affect the 
reform's content and the feasibility of its being pursued into the following stages of the 
policy process. An emerging theme in the literature is pointing at a possible relevant 
approach that classifies these stages in the policy process into two overarching "moments"s: 
one that comprises problem definition, policy formulation, legislation and regulation (which 
will be called initiation); and another comprising policy implementation and consolidation 
(which will be called consolidation). 
There is an underlying element of the interest group approach in this proposition to divide the 
reform process in two moments. The emphasis on the fact that the reforms may affect 
entrenched interests at their outset, but will only produce tangible benefits in the long run - as 
well as the characteristics of the losers and winners of this sequence -, lies at the heart of the 
pluralist explanation about the unlikeness of reform. This "short-term losses and long term 
gains" factor informs the scholarly debate that is being framed in this "two moment" 
proposition. The challenge, it has been stressed, is to ensure that the reform initiative 
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"survives" long enough for it to accrue tangible benefits and thus acquire political support in 
its own right (Williamson and Haggard, 1994; Nelson, 1998). 
Scholarly debate has concentrated on the strategy options reformers have to ponder to this 
end. And here is where the "initiation moment" and the "consolidation moment" seem to 
require opposite approaches to solving this challenge. Haggard (1994) has argued that during 
the reforms "initiation stage", reformers face the resistance of the interest groups who benefit 
from the status-quo. Reform initiation, he claims "is thus more likely when Executives and 
their teams enjoy a degree of independence or autonomy" (Haggard, 1994: 468). 
On the other hand, because second generation reforms like health not only require "price" 
changes, but profound changes in the incentives, benefits and costs of those groups in charge 
of producing change, their consolidation moment requires their consent or compliance. In a 
comparative study of health reform in Germany and the Netherlands, Lieverdink and Van der 
Made (1997) note that reform proposals may enjoy support at first, when they present 
abstract policy problems and solutions that cannot be related to particularist interests. 
However, resistance emerges when these solutions are translated into plans with tangible 
consequences for provider groups. 
Thus, while the initiation moment may call for insulation to make health reform feasible, the 
consolidation moment may require the active nurturing of political support. While some 
authors claim that generating tangible benefits is a sufficient condition to generate support 
(Sachs 1994, also see Williamson 1994), others see the need to seek consensus and endow the 
reform with a certain degree of legitimacy if it is going to stand a chance of bringing about 
policy change. In other words procedural legitimacy defined as "the widespread perception 
that not only the formal rules but also the spirit of open and fair debate were observed and 
that all major interested groups had an opportunity to state their case (Nelson, 1998: 41). 
Interestingly, procedural legitimacy needs to be obtained during the initiation moment. 
Haggard acknowledges that the "consolidation of reform demands the building of legislative 
and interest-group bases of support" (Haggard, 1994: 468). 
The observation span of the Colombia case study does not allow for conclusive remarks in 
this aspect, since the health reform there is currently on its consolidation moment. However, 
tentatively, it could be argued that the lack of consistency between what was legislated and 
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what has been implemented so far - particularly the failure to transform the ISS -, could be 
attributed in part to this lack of procedural legitimacy. Studying health reform in Poland and 
Hungary, Nelson (1998) also found that the reforms did not have procedural legitimacy since 
the governments "side-stepped public debate and legislative approval" (Nelson, 1998:39); 
and therefore had very little chances of reaching consolidation. 
And this brings us back to the existence of parallel arenas discussed in the previous section. It 
could be argued that by firmly insulating their change teams within the Executive, while at 
the same time complying pro forma with the requirement for social participation and policy 
debate in public fora, governments in Mexico and Colombia were seeking to respond to the 
contradictory requirements of the reform process: insulation in the initiation moment, 
followed by the demand for social participation and procedural legitimacy that needed to be 
met prior to starting the consolidation moment9• 
The evidence gathered in the two case studies is not sufficient to advance a firm conclusion 
on this issue, since at the moment field work was terminated, Colombia had only recently 
entered its consolidation moment, and Mexico was yet to start. Therefore the thrust of the 
thesis' analysis focuses on the initiation moment of health reforms, which bare the 
characteristics of second generation reforms. The issue about the contradictory demands of 
the two reform moments described in this section, and how reformers respond to them - and 
with what level of success -remains an open question for further research. 
8.4 Change Teams and Health Sector Reform 
In the thesis it has been argued that the use of change teams in health sector reforms was a 
distinctive political strategy aimed at increasing the state's capacity to promote health policy 
change, and that these groups of policy- makers could be distinguished as such by team 
members themselves and by other actors involved in the reform process. This section will 
analyse a series of propositions related to the use of change teams as a political strategy to 
promote health reform - an their characteristics -, their political manoeuvring, and their 
choice of strategies in pursuing health policy change. 
As stated in chapters 1,4 and 7, the precedents for the creation and use of change teams of a 
similar nature in Colombia and Mexico could be traced back to the processes of selective 
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state modernisation centred around the core economic ministries in both countries where 
"pockets of efficiency" (Geddes, 1994) were created from the 1960's and remained firmly in 
place thereafter. The use of change teams as a strategy was first used to bring about economic 
reform. Once these were under way, the technocratic governments in power at the time in 
both countries, turned to the same strategy to bring about policy change in the social sphere. 
Following a comparative study of 15 countries which attempted economIC reform, 
Williamson and Haggard (1994) concluded that "a good and united team is a precondition for 
reform to have a chance" (Williamson and Haggard, 1994: 579). In the case of health 
reforms, change teams - although not always labelled as such - have been used in Poland 
(Hauser, 1998), United Kingdom (Hunter and Stockford, 1997), Mali (Fatourmata, El Abassi 
et aI., 1997), and Chile (Borzutzky, 1998), among others. 
In Colombia and Mexico policy-makers in the core economic ministries resorted to the 
formation and empowerment of change teams as a strategy to spearhead health reforms. They 
did so by assigning junior members of their own economic team to key positions needed to 
promote change within the health sector agencies and thus secured a direct line of influence. 
The health change teams were assigned the leadership of the reform. This entailed not only 
the reform's policy, but decision- making on the political strategies to secure support around 
it. Thus they were expected to go beyond the purely technical field and into the political 
aspect of the health reform process. 
They did so through a choice of political strategies aimed at gaining leverage as a team and 
protecting their reform project from bureaucratic factional competition at first. These were 
followed by other strategies geared to ensuring its legislation, and then to putting in place the 
policy mechanisms expected to bring about change - such as resource reallocation and new 
regulation. One of the main findings presented in this thesis are the marked similarities 
between these political strategies and those applied by similar technocratic teams in charge of 
economic reforms in these countries. Owing to the fact that in both cases the pro-market 
stance supported by the economic teams prevailed, emphasis was placed on putting public 
finances on a sound footing and the search for a more efficient provision of health services. 
By the same token, the choice of strategies to bring about health reforms in both countries -
including the creation and empowerment of health change teams - was informed by the 
285 
economic teams' reform experience and their assumption that a similar approach - both in 
policy content and strategy choice - could be embraced in second generation reforms as well. 
In this section it will be argued that although these strategies were effective in the creation of 
new providers and the introduction of market incentives in the health sector, they did not 
have the same impact on the transformation of the old provider institutions - such as the 
health ministries and social security institutes - and that this has considerably limited the 
progress and consolidation of the reforms. 
Change team members in both case studies presented themselves as apolitical and saw 
political manoeuvring as a lesser task. However, if the difference between a change team and 
a group of technical experts is the fact that the former is assigned the power and the 
responsibility to make the reform politically feasible - as explained in chapter 1 -, then it 
follows that the change team members did need to "exercise the skills validated by traditional 
political practice ... (relegating) ... the agenda of normative economics ... to a second place 
( ... )" (Toye, 1994: 38). 
Health change teams were able to engage in political manoeuvring, to gain leverage, and 
pursue their reform agendas due to the characteristics of the political contexts of Mexico and 
Colombia. The relevant enabling factors for their empowerment and use were the Executive's 
formal and informal institutional prerogatives to present policy initiatives and govern by 
decree; weak Legislatures and strong Executives; and the presence of a powerful technocracy 
in core ministries with a common ideology and vision of state reform. These elements in the 
political context of the two case studies were also found to be relevant in the political 
mediation around health policy in France (Wilsford, 1991). 
However, these contextual "enabling factors" do not automatically endow the change teams 
with the capacity to use effective political manoeuvring, and therefore, a more careful 
analysis of their characteristics and choice of strategies is required in the light of the 
challenges presented by the health reform process. Toye (1994) contends that just as 
politicians do not have the training and the skills of technocrats, the technocrats do not have 
the skills of politicians. Bates (1994) goes even further by arguing the technocrats are 
generally of an academic background and therefore they lack the normal prerequisites of 
political influence: wealth and power. This leads them to suggest that there should be a 
division of labour among the two groups if policy reform is to be successful. In studying the 
286 
politics of health reform in Brazil, Ribeiro (1996) points to the contrary: a case in which the 
technocrats in power manage to substitute traditional politics for their technical discourse. 
In the case of Mexico, as has been described in chapter 7, this is clearly the standing that was 
followed: change teams concentrated on the technical aspects of the reform and assigned the 
responsibility of brokering the reform - both in Congress and in society - to a politician. A 
similar case was pointed by Conaghan and Malloy (1990) in the economic reforms in Peru. 
The case of Colombia is less clear (chapter 4). On the one hand the change team, and 
particularly its leader, got directly involved in political manoeuvring to ensure the political 
feasibility of the health reform. However, despite its visible presence in Congress, the change 
team relied on the advice and intervention of senior politicians who were veterans in 
manoeuvring in Congress to get the consent of reluctant legislators. 
Thus, while agreeing with Williamson and Haggard's (1994) counter argument to Toye 
(1994) that political skills are not acquired through professional training and that therefore 
change team members are potentially able to learn the political skills they need through 
experience, the case studies in the thesis showed that there was a division of labour and 
therefore that politicians played a significant role in securing the support for the health 
reforms. This supports Bate's view that" in successful cases, the politicians took care of the 
politics, creating a political space for policy innovation by the technocrats ( ... )"(Bates, 1994: 
33). On the same line, Ardito-Barletta (1994) sees as a positive scenario to have technocrats 
work alongside politicians to "establish a sustainable program of policy actions (a reform 
program)" (Ardito-Barletta, 1994:462). 
8.4.1 Change Team Characteristics 
The use of change teams as a strategy was followed under the assumption that it could bring 
about policy change in any sector - regardless of the match between the sector's specificity 
and the training of change team members - by applying universal liberal economic principles 
such as freedom of choice, market competition, and an emphasis on a subsidiary state - thus 
prioritising privatisation and targeted subsidies for the poorlO. This assumption was further 
reinforced by the technocrats' view of state-society relations: one in which an oversized state 
did not serve the common good, but the interests of a few entrenched groups. This led change 
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teams to hear arguments pointing at a sector's particularities with suspicion, as these were 
perceived by them as efforts to protect vested interests against policy change. 
In the case of the health refonns in Colombia and Mexico, with the exception of the very few, 
none of the change teams' members had extensive experience or knowledge of health 
economics or health policy prior to their arrival at the MOH and IMSS, respectively. In a 
very critical statement, Robert Evans points to this increasingly frequent phenomenon saying 
that" refonn proposals find their way onto the agenda ( ... ) in complete disregard not only of 
the evolving evidence on the detenninants of health, but of that on the implications and 
consequences of different ways of organising and funding health care systems themselves" 
(Evans, 1998: 2). 
The background, knowledge and previous policy experience of change team members were 
an important factor detennining the content of their health refonn proposals, the political 
strategies they chose in order to pursue them, and ultimately, their ability for political 
manoeuvring. For instance, in both cases, some of the health change team members had had 
previous experience in first generation refonns. Notably, change team leaders had 
participated in economic refonn as junior members of the core ministries in each country. 
Thus they tended to fonnulate the policy content of their health refonn proposals and to 
choose their political strategies to pursue them, along the lines and assumptions they had 
successfully used then. This explains the emphasis, in both refonn initiatives, on triggering 
policy change through changes in rules and regulations and resource reallocation. It also 
explains in part these change teams' inability - or unWillingness - to press for refonn in those 
areas needing the co-operation of health service provider groups - such as the unionised 
health manpower - and their preference, instead, to induce them to change through new 
regulation and market incentives generating competition. 
8.4.2 Change Team Political Manoeuvring 
The majority of the members of the change teams in Colombia and Mexico were "outsiders" 
in the health service agencies where they were located, and very few were doctors. The teams 
were thus perceived as an intrusion from another ministry and could not count on a base of 
support within their health sector. Instead, their political backing stemmed from senior 
policy-makers outside the sector, particularly from the government's economic team _ 
288 
vertical networks. The political economy literature is assigning growing importance to the 
political support change teams need in order to be effective. For instance, case studies on 
Peru (Webb, 1994) and Brazil (Bresser Pereira, 1994) showed the presence of change teams 
at the helm of these countries' economic reform initiatives which failed to consolidate. In 
both instances, these change teams failed to obtain the political backing of senior politicians 
that would have endowed them with the leverage to broker their reform initiatives. 
In both Colombia and Mexico, the support of the economic team and/or that of the president 
- vertical networks - was the sine qua non for the feasibility of health reform. In other words, 
while the provision of health services is bounded within the health sector, the political and 
economic consequences of a health reform are of such magnitude that the determining factors 
- and determinant actors - go beyond the MOH, and include the core ministries in control of 
the economy. In Colombia, the health reform suffered a serious threat when it lost the support 
of the economic team, a situation that was only resolved through the direct intervention of the 
president. 
Mexico presented the most dramatic examples of the importance of the vertical network for 
the empowerment of health change teams and the political feasibility of their reform agendas. 
In one of the cases, the IMSS Director formed a group of highly qualified technical officers 
(the CEDESS) and mandated the preparation of a comprehensive reform proposal for the 
IMSS, which included the thorough reform of its health service provision. However, neither 
this team, nor its reform proposal obtained the backing of the government's economic team. 
As a result, in spite of the IMSS Director's direct political backing of CEDESS, this was 
unable to promote its reform initiative and was eventually sidelined and dismantled. 
Secondly, a health change team was formed and assigned to a key location within the IMSS -
the Finance Division - by a faction of the government's economic team. This group of highly 
trained officials foreign to the IMSS (the IMSS change team) was empowered and assigned 
the reform of the IMSS - including its health services - with particular emphasis on its 
financial aspect. But the IMSS change team's leverage was short-lived when the Finance 
Minister, its direct vertical network resigned. The IMSS team was not dismantled and 
continued to operate at the Financial Division, managing to make progress in the financial re-
engineering of the IMSS. However, left with no support, it had to slow down its policy 
agenda and, above all, negotiate policy change with the vested interests within the IMSS, 
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notably the IMSS union. It is thus important to note that the economic team's endorsement is 
of such importance, that it does not need to make its resistance explicit, since its lack of 
support is enough to derail a health reform initiative. 
Vertical networks are a sine qua non, but not sufficient to enable the change team to operate. 
Change teams need to build networks across sectors and policy nodes to facilitate the 
reform's process without the constant need for the backing of the top leadership who 
empowered them. Also, if the change teams are unable to build horizontal networks within 
the public health provider institutions, they may find their reform efforts halted or reversed 
once they leave office in spite of having enjoyed top level political backing while there. Thus, 
as part of its efforts to embed itself within the state, the change teams resort to horizontal 
networks with like-minded same-level peers in other agencies, particularly those of 
relevance to their reform agenda. These horizontal networks allow the change team to interact 
with other agencies independently - and many times in spite of - the head of the agency 
where they are located; obtaining vital information, but, above all, being able to make the 
case for its reform agenda with their peers without the need to constantly rely on cabinet 
members - to whom it may not have constant access. In the case of Colombia, team members 
profited from their networks at the DNP to obtain information and policy analysis support 
and to make their case about the health reform. They also joined efforts with a more powerful 
team, that of the pensions reform, which was brokering the reform from the Labour Ministry. 
This greatly strengthened the brokerage capacity of the health team in Congress. 
In the case of Mexico, it could be argued that the IMSS change team remained in place and 
managed to continue pursuing its reform agenda - if at a much slower pace - thanks to its 
horizontal networks with former colleagues at the core ministries, who supported it and 
continued to work closely with it in spite of the loss of its vertical network. However, 
horizontal networks do not replace vertical networks in their capacity to empower a change 
team, so the scope and depth of policy change led by the IMSS change team was minimal. 
Finally, in the case of Colombia, the health change team made a visible effort to establish 
horizontal networks within the MOH - in some cases by establishing lines of co-operation 
with MOH officials, and in others substituting them - as a means to buttress the chances of 
the health reform continuing once the team had left office. However, with few exceptions, 
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this strategy failed to become a network, and to offer a significant counterbalance to the 
MOH apparatus which did not pursue the reform agenda once the team was out of office. 
Thus it could be argued that if the change team is unable to build horizontal networks within 
the ministry itself - via consensus-building and/or substituting personnel deep enough in the 
bureaucracy - it may find its reform efforts halted or reversed as soon as it leaves office, in 
spite of having enjoyed top-level political backing while working at the MOH. 
State-society networks were sought half-heartedly by change teams in both Mexico and 
Colombia. Societal actors did not playa visible role in the competition between change teams 
and other government factions for control over the health reform, but nonetheless there were 
attempts by both the pro-state and the pro-market factions to court societal actors that could 
prove an element of political backing. These state-society networks were made up not only of 
unions and provider groups, but also of business groups, insurance companies and 
international actors, among others. They were then used as leverage in the political struggle 
and the policy debate within government. 
The case studies in this thesis show, however, that the change teams did seek selective 
contacts with think tanks and other institutions outside the state in order to access information 
and knowledge on the health sector. A similar phenomenon occurred during the UK health 
reform (Hunter and Stockford, 1997). However, these contacts were unidirectional, in that 
they did not secure access to these groups to policy decision-makers. In both countries 
change teams sought and respected the advice of policy analysts who had the same academic 
background and technical command - particularly in economics; but in spite of this 
communications, for these organisations the State and policy decision making within it 
remained very much a "black box" see chapters 4 and 7). 
8.4.3 Change Team Choice of Strategies 
Given that health reforms count on a tepid endorsement from public OpInIOn, and are 
vigorously opposed by the entrenched interests who stand to lose, change teams are swiftly 
made aware of the need to develop and pursue political strategies in order to ensure the 
feasibility of their reform project. Strategies that had been used during first generation 
reforms and that health change teams turned to as well included the use of highly technical 
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policy content to limit the participation of other interested actors; the element of surprise; and 
the drafting oflaw and regulation away from public scrutiny. 
The fact that the social sector presented a different challenge - in that the state needed to 
convince its provider groups to change their modus operandi in order to bring about policy 
change - did not seem to have an impact on the change teams' choice of strategy in both 
Colombia and Mexico. This underlines the ideological stand of reformers in both countries, 
which led them to assume that whatever changes did not occur in the short run, would happen 
in the mid to long term as a result of the market incentives and the NPM mechanisms put in 
motion by their reforms in the health sector. 
Another plausible explanation is the fact that change teams were aware of the stark resistance 
their reform agenda would face during its implementation stage, and also of the power of 
those interest groups who stood to lose with it - notably the provider unions and the health 
sector bureaucracy. Further, they were aware that their leverage - and their permanence in the 
health provider institutions - was temporary and that it would not last as long as the reform 
process would require to consolidate. Faced with this scenario, they resorted to the tools they 
had at hand - market mechanisms and NPM strategies - as a means to strengthen their reform 
agenda as much as possible before it faced the veto power of provider groups during its 
implementation stage. In other words, change teams sought to maximise their control over the 
reform and to introduce as many mechanisms to "lock-in" policy change before it was 
captured by the entrenched interest groups. The following strategy choices deserve particular 
emphasis. 
Speed and Scope 
The political economy on policy reform has two contending propositions as to the best 
strategy to ensure the political feasibility of policy change. One stresses a comprehensive, 
one-time approach, and the other an incremental-phased approach. The supporters of the "big 
bang approach" (Przeworski, 1999) purport that it makes reversion to the status quo ante 
more difficult, and therefore opens an opportunity for reform to consolidate (Sachs, 1994; 
Piiiera, 1994). Also, a one-time comprehensive approach would leave very little space for 
those groups opposing change to organise effective resistance. As a result of the analysis of 
health reform experience in the Netherlands, Schut (1995) and Baakman, Vander Made and 
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Mur-Veeman (1989) coincide in the need to use the "surprise" effect of comprehensive one-
time reform as the only means to break the resistance of the powerful corporatist groups in 
that country. A comparative study on the politics of health reform in the UK and Germany 
arrived at a similar conclusion (Giaimo and Manow, 1997). 
As it has been shown in chapters 4 and 7, the change teams in Colombia and Mexico shared 
this sense of "urgency" about implementing their reform agenda. They acted by surprise and 
with very little experimentation, moving swiftly to change regulation and resource allocation 
as a "lock in" strategy that would deter policy reversal in the future. In studying health reform 
in the United Kingdom, Hunter and Stockford (1997) pointed to the same phenomenon: 
"Ministers ruled out the possibility of any pilots or any independent evaluation of the 
reforms, insisting instead that the radical changes they wished to introduce should commence 
throughout the NHS within two years of the reform document ( ... ) being introduced" (Hunter 
and Stockford, 1997:78). As discussed in previous sections, while this strategy did prove to 
be effective in breaking initial resistance, there is serious debate as to whether the chances of 
reform consolidation have also been undermined by the same means. 
Supporters of the incremental approach present different arguments. One is the need to create 
consensus and ensure that the actors that will be in charge of implementing policy change 
have a sense of "ownership" over the reform agenda (Nelson,1999, Grindle and Thomas, 
1991). The other points to the need to phase the reform in order to avoid jeopardising all 
affected actors at once and thus debilitating the reform (Nelson, 1994, 1989; Waterbury, 
1989). In Ardito-Barletta's words "the government constantly needs to re-evaluate how its 
policies and actions affect the stock of political capital which it needs to govern effectively 
(Ardito-Barletta, 1994:469)11. Further, Nelson (1998) points to the political advantages of 
producing at least some visible benefits at first to gamer political support for the overall 
reform. In studying the politics of health reform in Mali, Fatoumata, EI Abassi and Maiga 
(1997) point to the demonstration effect of introducing new centres delivering basic services 
as one of the key conditions for success. 
This note withstanding, the findings of the two case studies in this thesis call for further 
research on this issue. In Colombia, social security enrolment went from 20.6% to 53% of the 
population, ensuring constant access to health care for the first time to social groups who had 
previously only had it sporadically (see appendix I). In the case of Mexico, 300,000 mostly 
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urban low income families were emolled under a new social security mechanism, and thus 
granted constant access to health care for the first time as well (see appendix II). However, it 
is not clear that this large increase in beneficiaries translated into political support giving 
leverage to reformers confronting entrenched interests in the sector 12 . Further analysis has to 
be made, however, on the political role of the emerging intermediaries between the state and 
these new beneficiaries: the new provider institutions who have an economic stake in policy 
change and its consolidation, and who have been politically active to that end. 
What remains a central argument in this thesis is that change teams in Colombia and Mexico 
had to make decisions on which aspect of their reform's policy agenda to develop first, at 
what speed, and the degree of "dependency" among the various elements included in the 
reform on the basis of political calculation. To simplify the argument, this thesis has reported 
that the technocratic groups in both Mexico and Colombia took into consideration the 
political dimension of health reform when deciding what to do first and how. In both cases, 
priority was given to the creation of new providers - who would not oppose the measure -
and to postpone the transformation of the old provider institutions, which would have 
generated much resistance. Thus, while new actors were created and the conditions put in 
place for their operation, old providers failed to be transformed, at a great loss for the health 
system and its potential to consolidate policy change. 
In the case of Colombia, where the health reform did reach its implementation stage, the 
transformation of old actors was left for a later stage or halted by status quo interests. It could 
be argued that the change teams postponed the transformation of the old actors as a strategy 
to ensure the political feasibility of a major part of their reforms: the creation of new actors 
and the introduction of market forces into the system. As has been stated, one of the 
assumptions behind this strategy was that market forces would induce the change that was 
being avoided by the state. In other words, in both Mexico and Colombia, reformers took this 
decision on the assumption that the new actors and the new rules of the game for the sector 
were eventually going to force old actors to change. 
Yet another element that might have inclined change teams to this strategy is that contrary to 
the factors that triggered most economic reforms (see Williamson, 1994), the crisis or 
"collapse" of the health system does not happen at once and simultaneously. Instead, the 
sense of crisis is perceived in a protracted and dispersed manner! 3 . As a result, instead of 
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being forced to a one-time reaction to crisis, change teams considered a more incremental 
approach in which the health system does not follow an overhaul overnight, but instead 
follows a series of policy changes each affecting the system on the margin until the sum of 
such interventions bring about the new system. 
Brokerage in Congress 
Change teams adapted their brokerage strategy in Congress according to the particular 
characteristics of the political context in which they were operating. In the case of Colombia, 
where interest representation was dispersed and political parties failed to work as institutional 
channels to structure it, the change team approached Congress as if it were a group of 
individual voters and focused on those legislators who had an interest in the health issue and 
who could thus veto the reform initiative or significantly alter its policy content. These 
legislators were perceived by the change team as informal leaders who could sway the vote of 
the rest of the congressmen. In the case of Mexico, interest representation within the party 
that held the majority in Congress (the PRI) was structured along the lines of a corporatist 
arrangement, where leaders of each corporatist group (labour, peasants, the "popular" group) 
would secure the votes of their bloc. Thus the technocratic groups assigned the brokerage of 
the reform to a former president of the PRI who "knew the ropes" (the IMSS Director) and 
who held one-to-one negotiations with the leaders of each of these corporatist groups in order 
to secure the totality of the PRJ's votes. 
Choice of Legislation 
In both case studies, the change teams - and in Mexico the inter-agency groups - carefully 
considered the content of the reform initiatives they presented to Congress from a political 
perspective. It was in fact, the only stage in the reform processes where in the two cases 
political considerations were given priority over technical orthodoxy. In the case of Mexico, 
the health reform was virtually brought to a halt by excluding it from the social security bill 
presented to Congress. This can be explained in two ways: the first is that the health reform 
component was perceived as a liability jeopardising the political feasibility of the pensions 
reform and was thus simply derailed. The second was that reformers believed that policy 
change in IMSS health services could be brought about with internal administrative acts 
without the need for a law amendment. This second account is coherent with the technocratic 
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groups' ideological stand and policy choices. It also suggests a strategy to circumvent 
Congress. 
In the case of Colombia, the change team formulated its reform proposal in isolation until it 
"opened up" to lobby its approval in Congress. The bill that was eventually approved after 
arduous negotiations, lacked precision on most of the issues. This was supported by the team 
in part to accommodate the competing positions of the different actors involved in Congress 
and thus to ensure its approval. Ardito-Barletta (1994) considers this a strategy by which 
policy reform may be strengthened "by maintaining the broad guidelines of policy while 
retaining some flexibility and allowing many representative groups to participate in the policy 
negotiations" (Ardito-Barletta, 1994:463). 
But also, Colombia's health change team supported a lax legislation because it ensured room 
for manoeuvre for the team which was to recuperate control over the reform during the 
preparation of its body of regulations - which could be developed in isolation and thus 
without interest group pressure l4• In doing so, the team gave itself the opportunity to "bring 
back" the reform closer to its original project during the drafting of the regulations. But by 
the same token, it hampered the potential to consolidate the reform through legislation, since 
the new Law's general wording was also used by groups resisting change once the change 
team was no longer in office. 
Policy Dialogue 
In both case studies, the change teams - or technocratic groups in the case of Mexico -
explicitly isolated themselves and the reform process from the influence of other actors, and 
did so until the institutional rules of the game forced them to "open" the process. They made 
intermittent contacts with groups within the state and in society that were relevant to them 
due to their knowledge and information, but did not establish a systematic policy dialogue on 
equal terms giving these groups access to policy decision-making. In both countries 
reformers argued that reform formulation should be kept from being captured by organised 
vested interests trying to influence the reform's policy content in their favour. 
This strategy choice can also be traced back to the economic teams which during first 
generation reforms had been successful in consolidating policy change by insulating the 
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reform process and circumventing interest representation mechanisms on the grounds that 
these were captured by powerful vested interests 1 5. At that time, the systematic use of 
Executive and administrative decrees was also given priority over legislation. Yet the choice 
of this strategy in health reforms yielded mixed results. While it has proven successful in 
bringing about change in areas susceptible to changes in rules and regulations, it has not 
triggered the transformation of the old provider organisations, whose employees were 
effectively excluded from policy formulation. 
However, concluding that this outcome can be attributed to the change teams' choice to 
insulate themselves and the reform processes may be an oversimplification. This brings back 
the argument to the interaction between reformers and interest groups analysed from the 
perspective of the institutional context in a previous section. While in both the political 
economy literature on reforms and the literature on the politics of health reforms it has been 
argued that insulating reform formulation from interest groups only makes politics "re-
emerge through the fog of market and technocratic rhetoric" (Chinitz, 1997:253) during 
implementation, and that it might even exacerbate it (Grindle, 1994), these cases suggest the 
need for a complementary explanation. One in which actors opposing the reform may not 
"resurface" during implementation because they were denied access in previous stages of the 
reform process, but instead, perhaps preferred to act during implementation as a more 
effective strategy. 
Such may be the case of unions and other provider groups within the state. While they may 
effectively be kept from participating in reform formulation, they might also not seek to force 
themselves into the decision-making room at that stage. Instead, they may focus more active 
strategies during reform legislation, where reformers are forced by the institutional rules to 
"open" the process. But unions and provider groups' leverage will become strongest during 
reform implementation, when policy change will depend on them. Thus, these interest groups 
against change would act then in order to press their demands and halt the reform process, 
independently from the strategy used by reformers in the prior stages of the reform process. 
The issue calls for further research - which will acquire importance as health reforms 
approach their consolidation moment - on the workings of provider group reactions to policy 
change initiatives which they feel as foreign to them. Yet an alternative interpretation to the 
one suggested here that provider groups resisting change are not necessarily acting as a 
• 
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reaction to the change teams' insulation strategy, but instead proactively choosing the 
strategic moment to exert resistance to policy change, points to the slow reaction these groups 
have shown in face of imminent policy change in cases such as the health reform in 
Colombia. According to this view, provider groups would only have "regrouped" to resist 
change during the reform's implementation stage because they took a long time to become 
aware or understand what was at stake in the reform agendal6• 
Inducing Change 
Is the formation and use of change teams then an effective strategy to enhance the state's 
capacity to pursue health reform? The case studies in this thesis show that health reforms 
entail two critical changes: one that is related to changing the rules of the game (NPM) and 
creating new actors, by passing new laws and regulations and changing resource allocation; 
and another, that requires the transformation of the old actors - that is, the government 
agencies in charge of providing health services for the majority of the population. Thus, a 
reform would only be complete when it manages to create the new actors and to transform the 
old ones. Further, the Colombian case study has shown that as the health reform entered its 
consolidation phase, it became evident that when old actors fail to be transformed, they 
become serious obstacles for the consolidation of the new actors and for the overall 
advancement of the reform of the system as a whole (See appendix I). 
Mexico recently legislated the creation of new provider actors, and thus it is too early to 
assess the end result of these measures. But in Colombia, the change team was successful in 
formulating reform, passing it through legislation and preparing it for implementation 
through regulation and resource reallocation. It created new actors and new rules of the game, 
generating market mechanisms within the health sector. But, be it for lack of time or for lack 
of political leverage to confront actors resisting change, the team was not successful m 
implementing the direct change of the old provider institutions. 
Failing the direct short-term transformation of these old providers, the Colombian change 
team expected these to occur in the long-run and indirectly through market competition. In 
other words, it expected that by creating new - and in principle better - health care providers, 
it would give beneficiaries an alternative by which to move away from the old provider 
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institutions, thus forcing them to diminish in size and importance in the sector until they 
offered better quality care in a more efficient manner. 
Thus it may be concluded that while the use of change teams has proven its effectiveness in 
inducing policy change through regulation and resource reallocation, it has failed to bring 
about the restructuring of the old public provider institutions, thus greatly limiting the scope 
of health sector reforms. In order to achieve the transformation of the old actors, interest 
groups that are normally excluded from the reform process - notably provider groups - need 
to be taken into consideration, either via consensus-building or confrontation. So far, given 
their nature and position, change teams seem to have a serious limitation in this respect, in 
that they have been unable or unwilling to do either. 
8.5 The Political Feasibility of Health Reforms 
This brings us back to the economic teams which, from the core ministries in government, 
formed and empowered the health change teams as a strategy to reform the health sector. 
Since they were the health change teams' principal source of power, the economic teams 
delimited the former's margin for manoeuvre by revising how much political backing to give 
them at each stage of the health reform process. This had a direct effect on the political 
feasibility of the health reforms overall, and on the possibilities of pursuing its different 
components in particular, since health change teams were dependent on the leverage they 
were endowed with to pursue their health reform agenda. 
This means that the dilemma to undertake a comprehensive health reform or not, was not in 
the realm of decision-making of the health change teams, but rather in that of senior members 
of the economic teams - and, ultimately, in the Presidents. As it has been stressed in both 
cases, these officials were concerned with preserving the minimum level of political capital 
that would allow them to pursue as many as possible of the components of their policy 
agenda. This was particularly evident in the relation between the health reform and the 
pensions reform, which were either competing items in the government's policy agenda 
(Mexico), or fed into each other (Colombia). 
The health reform formulated by the health change teams in both countries presented the 
economic change team with two policy options. One was pursuing a comprehensive health 
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reform in the short run by creating new providers and directly transforming the old ones. The 
other was to phase the reform by creating the new providers in the short term, and indirectly 
triggering the transformation of the old ones through market competition - enabled by the 
creation of these new actors - in the long run. As has been evidenced in the case studies, the 
actors involved in the political dynamics around these two options were different, and so 
were the political costs and benefits of pursuing either or the two. 
Particularly, the direct transformation of the old provider institutions in the short run entailed 
affecting the interests of large organised provider groups employed in the public health 
service agencies. As part of the state bureaucracy, these provider unions had a significant 
political role as intermediaries in state-society relations, since they interacted with society 
constantly at national level through their activities in health service delivery. They had 
historically exchanged their compliance and political backing to governments in office, in 
return for job security and employment and salary benefits. These groups resisted the reform 
and, more importantly, were not prepared to implement the transformation of the old provider 
agencies, since it put their interests at risk. Thus, the economic teams which were pondering 
their backing to the health change teams and their reform agenda, were back to facing what 
was described in chapter 1 as the "orthodox paradox". That is, the need to lay the 
implementation of policy change in the hands of the actors resisting it. 
Recently Hausener (1998) has suggested a possible solution to this dilemma. He purports that 
change teams should seek more policy dialogue while at the same time sustaining firm policy 
guidelines. Along the lines of NPM discussed earlier in this chapter, he calls it strategic 
leadership and social partnership and claims that "this juxtaposition involves no 
contradiction, as long as strategic leadership is understood as the capacity to form a strategic 
vision of the development of the system and to win democratic legitimisation for measures 
adopted for implementation ( ... )" (Hausner, 1998:36). Further research is needed to explore 
the potential of this proposition. 
The findings in this thesis bring to the fore the centrality of the political dimension in health 
reform efforts on two related levels. Firstly, they lead to conclude that economic teams failed 
to give their political backing to the consolidation of the health reform initiatives, since the 
direct transformation of old provider agencies ran against organised state health manpower. 
And secondly, it underlines the fact that it was this lack of political backing that led health 
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change teams to an apparently contradictory strategy choice: one that relied on market 
competition to modify the incentives of these old provider groups, when their incentives were 
not dependent on market forces, but rather - and solely - on their collective labour contracts 
with the state. 
With the creation of new providers on its way in both Mexico and Colombia, the 
transformation of these old providers will remain the critical pending issue for the 
consolidation of health reforms in both countries. And their transformation will remain 
political, as governments confront the need to sit at the negotiation table with state health 
manpower and workout what needs to change if policy reform is to be implemented. It is this 
political choice in which lies the key to consolidating new, more efficient and quality 
oriented health care systems in Colombia and Mexico. 
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Footnotes for Chapter 8 
I See chapter 1. 
2 This note withstanding, President Gaviria's personal political backing of the reform once it was on the policy 
agenda requires further analysis. It could be argued that it was the reform's visibility and therefore its potential 
political returns what prompted his support. 
On how these strategic choices are made, see Alvarez and Gonzalez-Rossetti (1990). 
4 For a review of the academic debate about the role of political regimes in policy reforms see Haggard and 
Kaufman, 1992; Malloy, 1977; Remmer, 1990, among others. 
5 A point made by Centeno in analysing Mexico (Centeno, 1994). 
6 See chapters 2 and 5 for further discussion. 
7 Also for this reason, most of the issues relating to policy process are covered in the political context and 
change team sections in this chapter. 
S They will be called moments as a means to distinguish them from the process stages they engulf. 
9 The argument is that beyond the different political dynamics at the micro level of the different policy nodes, 
these two moments present stark contrasts in the political interaction among key actors, as well as tangibly 
different challenges to reformers. In analysing first generation reforms, Haggard and Kaufman (1992) suggested 
that "(i)t is useful to draw a distinction between the initiation and the consolidation of reform efforts, because 
the political logic of the two phases is somewhat different" (Haggard and Kaufman, 1992). Also Nelson (1994) 
suggests looking at the reform process as two separate stages, each with particular political challenges, and thus 
demanding particular strategies. 
10 This phenomenon has been also observed in health reforms in the United Kingdom and the United States 
during the Thatcher and Reagan administrations. See Hunter and Stockform (1997) and Pierson (1994). 
II Arditto-Barletta (1994) defines political capital as "the aggregation of support and credibility that a 
government may have at a given moment" (Arditto-Bartletta, 1994:460). See also Fragile Coalitions (Nelson 
and Waterbury (eds.), 1989) for a thorough analysis on this matter. 
12 A possible explanation is that the new beneficiaries do not perceive their new entitlements as the result of a 
cero-sum game in a situation of scarce resources; but instead, as a result of the expansion of a welfare policy. If 
this is the case, the new beneficiaries would only have incentives to get mobilise politically to ensure the 
permanence of their new entitlements by pressing the governments to secure enough resources for that purpose, 
but not necessarily demanding the transformation or dismantling of the old provider institutions. 
13 In his study of health reform in Peru, Arroyo (2000) makes a strong argument about how "crisis" in the health 
reform is not a one-time event, but a long process of de-structurisation. 
14 This strategy shares the same rationale of the strategies used by the Colombian economic change team who 
preceded and supported the health change team. One that sought to accelerate economic liberalisation through 
administrative acts while the Legislature was not in session in order to side-step opposition (Urrutia, 1994). 
IS In studying health politics in France, and the elite bureaucracy in that country - which guards a high 
resemblance with the technocratic groups in presidentialist systems such as Mexico and Colombia, Freddi 
(1989) underscores these group's perceptions of themselves as guarding the national interest and therefore being 
"ill-disposed toward negotiation with interest groups" (Freddi, 1989: 16). Bjorkman (1998) endorsed this view in 
studying the politics of health in the United States. 
16 I thank Joan Nelson for suggesting this idea while reviewing this chapter. 
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Chapter 9. Conclusions 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter starts with a brief recapitulation of the rationale for the thesis, the analytical 
framework it proposed, and the case studies it used. Then, the main argument is presented, 
followed by a profile of change teams and the factors enhancing their performance based on 
the cases presented in the thesis. The chapter ends with an agenda for further research and a 
synthesis of the thesis' contributions to knowledge and policy making. 
9.2 Background 
This thesis started with the premise that while the complexities of the technical aspect of 
health reform are not to be underestimated, the main factor determining the depth and scope 
of policy change is political in nature, and thus has to do with the interaction of the actors 
involved, their political strategies and their potential to influence the reform process. As a 
result, the political dimension of health reform formulation, legislation, implementation and 
consolidation needs to be brought to the foreground since it is a key factor in determining the 
feasibility of health policy change as well as its final outcome. 
The comparative analysis undertaken in this thesis has shown that the study of the politics of 
health reform has an intrinsic value in advancing knowledge about the political dynamics 
involved in second generation refonns. Added value should result from testing an analytical 
framework that can be used as a tool for the rapid assessment of the political dimension of 
health refonn initiatives elsewhere and thus help in the planning and the design of political 
strategies to strengthen the state's capacity to pursue its health reform agenda. 
The analytical framework used for this thesis looked at the political context, the policy 
process, and change teams as three variables affecting the state's capacity to bring about 
health policy refonn. This framework allowed for a systematic observation of the contextual 
factors detennining the political feasibility of health policy change. It then looked into the use 
of change teams as a singular recognisable political strategy aimed at buttressing the state's 
capacity to pursue health sector refonn. It explored the characteristics, political manoeuvring 
and choice of strategies of these groups of policy-makers to gain an understanding of how 
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they reacted to the political opportunities and limitations they confronted. In doing so, it has 
facilitated comparative analysis and has allowed for elements common to both case studies to 
surface as factors relevant to other health reform experiences. 
Colombia and Mexico were selected as case studies. During the early 1990's, these two 
countries incorporated into their policy agendas health reform initiatives directed mainly at 
making health service provision more efficient. Both reform proposals were similar in the 
roles they assigned to the market and to the state in the articulation, financing and provision 
of health care. Their model or vision of how the new sector should operate was 
comprehensive on paper, with the introduction of new providers operating under new rules of 
market competition, and the transformation of the existing public institutions, or old 
providers into more efficient and user-responsive organisations also operating under the new 
rules. However, the political dynamics of both reform processes have thus far precluded them 
from developing in full. New providers were created and new rules introduced, but old actors 
remained the same, operating along the lines of the old system. This has put a question mark 
over the change teams' capacity to ensure reform consolidation in light of the political 
context within which they operate, as well as their characteristics and strategy choices. 
However, change teams were effective in initiating the reform process by ensuring the 
coherent formulation of a health reform agenda, ensuring its legislation, and preparing it for 
implementation. 
9.3 The Argument: Context, Process and Change Teams in Health Sector Reform 
This thesis has argued that the political feasibility of health reforms was determined by the 
political context in which they evolved, the political dynamics of and around the policy 
process, and the characteristics and strategies of the change teams in charge of leading policy 
change. One of the clear findings suggests the importance of the role played by the 
institutional context in structuring state-society relations and their influence on the health 
reform process. This confirms recent scholarly work on the political economy of reforms, 
which state that political and policy outcomes cannot be understood solely as a result of 
societal interests (Haggard and Kaufman, 1995). In both Mexico and Colombia, it was the 
institutional context that determined the potential for the state, on the one hand, and societal 
actors, on the other, to influence the health reform's policy content. Therefore, the state's 
304 
capacity to pursue its reform agenda depended more on the country's institutional context 
than on the societal actors interested in influencing its content. 
The formal institutional rules of governance were matched in relevance by the informal rules 
of the game that structured the interaction between societal groups and the policy-makers 
within the state. Beyond the formal relationship between the Executive and Congress, and the 
characteristics of the political party system, the informal mechanisms by which each country 
structured its politics - such as corporatist arrangements (Mexico) and inter-party governance 
agreements (Colombia) - also played an important role in determining which interests could 
influence the policy agenda and through which channels. As a result, informal arrangements 
were also an important element determining the Executive's leverage and control over policy 
formulation. 
In reform legislation, in both Colombia and Mexico, formal institutional rules required that 
health reform initiatives be legislated and approved in Congress; but in both countries 
informal or unwritten institutional features - as well as the strong presidential power 
established in their Constitutions - turned the Executives into the principal legislative 
authority. Thus, most of the reform's policy process took place away from public scrutiny -
with the exception of the legislation stage - and limited the use of institutional channels of 
interest representation - such as Congress - by societal actors interested in influencing the 
health reform. 
The strength of the Executive vis-it-vis Congress and the reSUlting weakening of formal 
interest representation in reform formulation transferred political competition and policy 
debate from the wider social arena to a narrower one within the state. Bureaucratic politics 
and competition within the Executive were therefore central, and different factions of policy-
makers reflecting a wide array of views and ideologies confronted each other. 
Although interest representation was limited, and the centre of debate happened within the 
Executive, policy reform still required intense political manoeuvring, as different state 
factions struggled to have their policy projects prevail during reform formulation. The fact 
that the locus for political debate around the health reform projects was forced away from the 
formal channels of interest representation and into the Executive arena did not completely 
protract interest group participation, but instead limited it. Interest groups in society having 
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become aware that the key policy node in a reform process was the Executive, and not 
Congress, focused their political strategies towards gaining influence over the former. They 
did so by resorting to informal channels and elite contacts in an effort to gain access to key 
decision-makers. It was only when this approach failed, that these groups considered other 
means to press for access to decision-making, such as approaching representatives in 
Congress. 
Inside the state, decision-makers who were competing to have their reform project prevail 
tried to avoid those interest groups that opposed it, while welcoming and nurturing links with 
those interest groups that favoured their proposal. Thus, coalitions in favour of and against 
health reform played their determinant battles within the Executive by resorting to support 
both within and outside the state. 
In the two cases under study, the reform took place in the midst of a struggle between two 
major coalitions that supported different models of what the health sector should be and how 
it should function. These coalitions were made up of actors within and outside the state 
whose positions were based not only on issues of particular interest, but also on clear 
ideological premises as to the roles of the state and the market in the performance of the 
economy and the provision of services, the former, pro-market, and the latter, state-run. What 
determined the breadth and scope of the health reforms in the two countries has been the 
result of this political struggle. 
The visible heads of both coalitions in Mexico and Colombia were within the state arena, 
occupying positions in different state agencies. The pro-market group had its support base in 
the economic and financial agencies, while the pro-state group had its support base in the 
agencies in charge of the provision of social services, such as health and social security. Thus 
while the main source of power of the first group stemmed from policy-makers at the highest 
level of the government hierarchy, the power of the latter stemmed from the capacity of its 
actors - the health manpower unions, the bureaucracy, and their links with traditional parties 
- for collective action and its control over the actual provision of the services - and thus over 
the reform's implementation. 
While the institutional context gave the Executive enough leverage to secure a high degree of 
control over reform formulation and reform legislation, in neither of the cases studied did that 
306 
give it the means to also control reform implementation. In this stage of the refonn process, 
those aspects of the refonns that required the transfonnation of public health services faced 
the effective resistance of public employees working in the old provider institutions - MOH 
and social security institutes - on whom the implementation depended. This was the case of 
bureaucracies and unionised health manpower in the social security institutes in both Mexico 
and Colombia. 
This reveals the critical role of the political institutions over the state's capacity to bring 
about health refonn from a different perspective: that of organised provider groups resisting 
policy change. It has been stated so far that the state was able to limit these entrenched 
interests' influence over refonn fonnulation and legislation by maintaining the fonner within 
the Executive, and imposing the latter on Congress; and that it had failed to retain control 
over refonn implementation. This explanation portrays provider groups resisting change as 
passive actors, and points to the need to explore alternative hypotheses, such as the possibility 
that provider groups are taking a more active stand and choosing their strategies based on the 
opportunities and limitations presented to them by the institutional context. 
In this scenario, provider groups would have waited for the refonn process to reach its 
implementation stage at the policy node in which they had the greatest leverage to influence 
the refonn process. This second perspective would lead to a more balanced conclusion in 
which the state retained control over health refonn fonnulation and legislation because it 
found the institutional means to do so, but also because provider groups resisting change only 
acted with full force during the refonn implementation stage, where they could be most 
effective - or where they became aware of the refonn's impact on their interests. 
In either case, the more authoritarian the regime, the less access these groups will have to 
refonn fonnulation and legislation, but in these two cases, the implementation of policy 
change will depend on them, and this gives them the opportunity to flex their muscles once 
the refonn process reaches their realm. These provider groups' reaction to policy change 
presents a serious challenge for reform consolidation. 
The case studies showed that the use of change teams in health sector reforms was a 
distinctive political strategy aimed at increasing the state's capacity to promote health policy 
change, and that these groups of policy-makers were distinguishable as such by the team 
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members themselves and by other actors involved in the reform process. Placing the focus of 
analysis on them proved key in explaining the politics of health reform, since they were a 
converging point reflecting the state's and society's strategies to influence the reform 
process. 
Change teams were formed and empowered by governments with a health reform agenda as a 
political strategy to acquire a degree of autonomy vis a vis entrenched interests opposing 
change, and secure more control over reform formulation and legislation. This note 
withstanding, change teams were able to trigger reform implementation, but not to ensure 
reform consolidation. The following section presents these change teams' profile and the 
factors enabling their performance that surfaced from the comparative analysis of the case 
studies. 
9.4 Change Team Profile 
The experiences analysed in this thesis show that the conformation and use of a change team 
has been a useful strategy to buttress the state's efforts to pursue health reform, particularly 
during its initiation stage. This section draws on the comparative analysis of the 
characteristics of these change teams to suggest a profile of their members, as well as factors 
that may help these groups promote health policy change. 
The policy-makers and technical professionals of the change team must endow it with an 
array of policy and political skills that go beyond technical expertise. Aside from being 
capable to define the policy problems, and formulate and present policy solutions for them, 
they need to be knowledgeable on the specific features of the health sector they intend to 
transform, its key actors, and the context in which the reform process is to evolve. In a few 
words, the sum of each member's particular skills and professional experience most endow 
the team with the technical and political tools to formulate the health reform, secure its 
legislation, prepare it for implementation. 
Change Team Skill Mix 
The mix of technical training and policy experience of the health change team should yield, 
as a minimum, knowledge on health policy and economics, and health care systems; the 
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institutional memory of the policy processes that the system has undergone in the past, as 
well as the actors involved in them; brokerage capacity in the reform's key policy nodes; 
knowledge and command of law-making and public administration; capacity to articulate the 
reform's policy content in a simple message; and finally, media management skills. 
Rather than concentrating on ideal professional profiles to compose the change team, policy 
makers interested in its use as a strategy should focus on ensuring the combination of these 
skills, which ought to be put to work once the group is assigned the responsibility of 
promoting health reform. In some cases, part of this expertise can be hired out, but this 
requires careful management in order to ensure its usefulness in the process. The case studies 
also pointed to the possibility of establishing a division of labour between the change team 
and senior politicians capable of brokering the reform. However, there was no conclusive 
evidence about the comparative advantage of either option - putting change team members in 
charge of brokering the reform, or leaving this in the hands of politicians. Based on the 
analysis of the case studies, the following table presents the list of skills that should ideally be 
present in a change team, and which will be briefly described next. 
Figure 9.1: Change Team's Mix of Skills 
Brokerage 
Institutional memory 
Health policy and economics 
Law making & public administration 
Articulation of reform message 
Communication management 
Brokerage: The ability to communicate on one-to-one basis with actors involved in both 
high and low-level positions within the state bureaucracy; as well as to win the trust and 
negotiate with senior officials in the Executive, legislators in Congress and leaders of societal 
groups involved in the reform process. The brokers within the change team - be it a change 
team member or its leader - are the ground breakers for the change team and for the reform 
agenda in the different policy nodes through which it needs to pass. 
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Institutional memory: The knowledge of the health sector - and its key actors -, as well as 
health policy-related infonnation stemming from holding previous positions in the sector - or 
related ministries. An added advantage should stem from having policy makers with previous 
positions in the core ministries such as finance and planning as change team members, since 
this endows the team with an entry point in these ministries - a crucial factor when brokering 
the refonn within the Executive. Change team members who have participated in state reform 
while in previous public sector positions also endow the team with important experience and 
know-how on managing the refonn process. 
Health policy and economics: The technical expertise in the field and the ability to conduct 
highly specialised studies to tackle the refonn's most complex issues is a key factor. Change 
team members with these skills should start activities as soon as the team is fonned, 
anticipating the requirements of the refonn process in the future, such as the fonnulation of 
the regulation package once the refonn is legislated, or the operational plans once the reform 
is to be implemented. Given the division of labour among team members, those in charge of 
these activities normally work in isolation and are not exposed to political bargaining within 
the state bureaucracy or with interest groups in society. 
Law making and public administration: The ability to convert the reform's policy content 
into law and make it applicable to the country's public administration. An expertise in 
regulation and knowledge of public law is crucial when the reform agenda entails to bring 
about policy change through modifications in rules and regulation. Team members with this 
expertise ensure the legal base of the team's policy proposals, and help to strengthen the 
team's position in the negotiations within the Executive and in Congress. 
Articulation of the reform message: The ability to articulate the reform agenda to different 
publics - including public opinion in general. It requires translating the reform's some times 
highly technical and complex content into simple messages that can be understood and 
discussed in the policy nodes of the reform process. Also, this activity will form the basis for 
the communication strategy. The change team member responsible for articulating the reform 
mayor may not become its visible head as well. When this last role is assumed by a doctor 
with "hands on" experience, there seems to be more potential for establishing channels of 
communication and cooperation with provider groups, who will not regard him as an outsider 
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- a situation that will necessarily surface given the training of change team members in 
disciplines other than medicine. 
Communication management: The capacity to develop a media strategy to buttress public 
opinion support for the reform - and, by the same token, for the change team. The change 
team will require to design and conduct a media strategy in T.V., radio and the press around 
public health issues in order to introduce the reform to public opinion and gamer its support. 
In spite the fact that this activity may be hired out, a change team member will need to have-
or develop - the skills to relate to opinion leaders and the press, and thus ensure spaces for 
the team to explain an promote its reform agenda to public opinion. 
The composition of the change team should change as little as possible in spite of the 
different demands each stage of the reform process will present. However, the organisation of 
the team should be such that the level of influence of its members should vary in order to 
ensure the flexibility needed to adapt the reform to these changing demands. Notably, 
depending on the stage of the reform process, the change team will have to confront the 
constant tension between the need for highly technical detail in the reform's policy content, 
and the need to apply political criteria - which may sometimes run counter to technical 
orthodoxy. If correctly managed, this tension between technical orthodoxy and political logic 
- and thus between change team members with profiles running along those lines -, should 
result in policy decision making that incorporates elements from both criteria, augmenting the 
feasibility of pursuing the reform agenda in a coherent direction. 
On the other hand, it is of outmost importance that change team members have a minimum 
level of common ground both ideologically and in the vision of where the health system 
should head to. In other words, a change team can only operate if it acquires working 
capacity as a cohesive group. Having said that, it is also as important to count on divergent 
views - bounded by this common ground - to ensure the team's capacity to adjust its reform 
agenda through critical debate among its members - particularly if the change team is to 
remain insulated from more open policy debate. 
For these dynamic processes within the change team to work in a constructive manner, the 
team should count on a clear leader. One capable of breaking the stalemate - if this is reached 
- and thus avoid paralysis. On the same line, the change team leader will have to respond to 
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the different challenges presented by the reform's political context and its policy process, by 
giving pre-eminence to the technical voices over the political ones or vice versa within the 
team, according to the circumstances. Beyond his role as tide breaker, the team leader will 
also probably be its principal broker within the Executive. Other members of the change team 
may take preponderant roles in relating the team to Congress and to public opinion, since 
these require different skills and networks. However, the change team leader will remain the 
most visible head of the reform. Both roles - tide breaker and visible head of the reform -
make his ability to know when and how much of the policy content to compromise to secure 
political support a key factor in ensuring the overall survival of the reform. 
Other critical factors in the performance of health change teams: 
In order to avoid competing demands on their time - and possible commitments with other 
groups -, change team members should be assigned full time positions as members of this 
group. For this purpose, it is more likely that they be hired as a task force or group of 
advisors, instead of simultaneously holding formal positions within the Ministry of Health's 
structure. However, the characterisation of the change team as a task force does not mean it 
should have a short time span. On the contrary, the duration and permanence of the change 
team at the helm of the reform process is key to ensure its continuity and thus enhance its 
chances of consolidation. By the same token, although the change team may undergo several 
transformations throughout the reform process - through the inevitable replacement of some 
of its members -, all efforts should be made to preserve a core group or critical mass to 
preserve the mix of skills described above, as well as continuity both in policy content and 
the policy process. 
The change team's technical capacity as well as its knowledge of the country's health care 
system should make it capable of absorbing the international policy trends on health reform, 
and "tropicalising" them to the country's needs and institutional capacity. By the same token, 
change team members should be in a position to having fruitful interaction with national and 
international health policy experts in order to learn and discuss the health sector's policy 
issues and enrich the reform agenda. 
Although the change teams studied in this thesis favoured insulation over an open 
participatory process, they do not operate in a vacuum. Their mix of skills will not have any 
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impact on the refonn' s chances of success if they do not construct, protect and use a network 
of support around the refonn and themselves. This network should reach key members of 
Congress, the Executive and other groups in and outside the state. In this manner, change 
teams may have the political backing they need to have leverage vis a vis the groups resisting 
change (vertical networks), channels of communication and coordination with their peers in 
other ministries relevant to the refonn process (horizontal networks), and access to 
knowledge and information on health policy stemming from actors within and outside the 
state (state-society networks). These three types of networks should also enable change team 
members to make their case in favour of reform at the right time and place during the reform 
process. 
Finally, it should be noted that it is extremely difficult to create and empower a change team 
as part of an effort external to the government in power. This is due to the fact that creating 
and using a change team is a political decision in nature, and therefore needs the consent and 
political backing of senior level decision-makers if it is to become an effective strategy. This 
thesis has pointed to the unsuccessful bids for reform made by technocratic teams that did not 
count or lost political backing. Under these circumstances, regardless of their mix of skills, 
change teams would only be capable of contributing with knowledge and information to the 
reform process, but would rarely be able to define the refonn' s agenda. In view of this, 
efforts geared at supporting health reform should focus on locating already existing groups of 
policy makers within the state and supporting them with training and funding in order to 
prepare them to lead and promote the health reform. 
9.S Agenda for Further Research 
The conceptual framework used in this thesis was very helpful in identifying key aspects 
detennining governments' capacity to pursue health reforms and passing judgements on 
them. It also provided a prism through which to understand the complex political dynamics 
that take place at each stage of health reform processes. By the same token, the analysis in 
this thesis has shed light into further lines of research that would enrich the knowledge on the 
political economy of health sector reform. 
Owing to the thesis' interest in the state's capacity to pursue its reform initiative, the 
framework focused its analysis from the vantage point of reformers within it. As a result, it is 
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biased in favour of these reformers' policy preferences - for instance the reformers' 
perceived need to prioritise efficiency - which competed at times with the principles formally 
embraced in the reform proposals - such as equity and expanding access. It was also beyond 
the scope of this thesis to validate the reforms' policy content against their stated principles. 
Such a goal would have required a thorough policy evaluation of the reform and would thus 
have given the political dimension a secondary role. This calls for a complementary 
analytical effort that would focus on the reforms' policy content and its "fit" to the needs and 
capacities of the health systems attempting to be reformed. 
Placing the vantage point of the analysis on health change teams rendered other actors less 
visible. These other actors' own experience of the reform process, however central, was only 
present inasmuch as they made themselves visible to the change team. There are as many 
accounts of a social phenomenon as there are actors that witness and/or participate in it. The 
health reform processes analysed here would have been presented rather differently, had the 
focus of analysis been placed on provider groups facing the imminent implementation of a 
reform they opposed, for instance. Yet a third account would stem from average citizens, the 
intended beneficiaries of these reforms, whose awareness of the policy debate around the 
options to transform their health system is very fickle. However, the complexity of assigning 
equal relevance to these different experiences called for schematisation. Instead, this thesis' 
account of the politics of health reform calls for analytical comparison with other studies in 
the field that have focused on alternative perspectives of the same process, such as the issue 
of people's participation, or the perception of provider groups of health reforms, and their 
reaction to it. 
The analytical framework in this thesis aimed at furthering knowledge of the determinants of 
governments' capacity to pursue health reforms, and to do so it placed the emphasis on their 
management of politics as a central aspect. However, other elements are also important in 
determining the state's capacity to bring about policy change and therefore ought to be 
explored. Such is the case of a state's institutional capacity - both managerial and 
organisational - to both pursue and absorb change. Accompanying this thesis' results with 
other in-depth studies on these aspects would render a more holistic perspective of the 
challenges behind implementing health reforms. 
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Other lines of research should also take relevance in future scholarly work. Perhaps the 
central question that arises from this thesis is that related to the transformation of the old 
providers in the health sector, such as the institutes of social security and the ministries of 
health. It was argued that change teams were effective in breaking resistance to change from 
vested interests in areas susceptible to be transformed by changes in rules and regulations and 
resource re-allocation. However, these teams encountered insurmountable obstacles when 
attempting to trigger changes that touched the interests of state employees in whose hands 
rested their implementation. This does not detract from the value of the conceptual 
framework per se, but does call for further research. In particular, it suggests that the 
underlying issue of labour relations between the state and its employees - both its 
bureaucracy and the health care provider groups - deserves more exploration when 
addressing the prospects of consolidating health reforms in the future. 
9.6 Contribution to Knowledge and Policy Making 
This thesis had two objectives. First, to contribute to existing knowledge in the health policy 
field by furthering the analysis and explanation of the political dimension of health reforms; 
and second, to produce and test an analytical framework that could be used as a policy tool to 
support policy analysis and decision-making in health reforms. 
Recent comparative research on the experience of different countries in pursuing state reform 
demonstrates that political leadership alone was insufficient to obtain positive results. 
Instead, it points to the need for policy-makers with a reform agenda to act. In other words, to 
make strategic decisions related to managing opposition to change and building support 
around reforms (Graham and Grindle, 1999; Batley, 1999). 
This thesis endorses this stand by drawing attention to the political dimensions in policy 
decision-making around reforms, and applying this perspective to the field of health policy. It 
also shares the view of other studies, that the group of policy-makers in charge of the reform 
- the change team - can make these strategic decisions and pursue them (Graham and 
Grindle, 1999; Batley, 1999). This thesis thus provided an assessment of the use and 
prospects of change teams in health reforms by looking into their comparative advantages 
and disadvantages in bringing about health policy change. 
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Graham and Grindle (1999) also call for the need to have reformers develop the analytical 
skills enabling them to assess the opportunity of policy change, and the rules of the game of 
the political dynamics around it - among others. This thesis contributed to this effort by 
proposing and testing an analytical framework that may serve as a policy tool to support 
decision-makers in their quest to understand and better manage the political dimension of 
their health reform initiatives. In other words, it proposes this framework as a policy tool 
aimed at the rapid assessment of the determinants of the political feasibility of health reforms. 
In doing so, it hopes to help policy-makers interested in health reforms to understand how 
and why they are incorporated into the public policy agenda, and how their policy content is 
subject to changes during the interaction between reformers and interest groups acting within 
the boundaries of the political context. 
Finally, the thesis offered further empirical data on health reform experiences in middle-
income countries in the Latin American Region by looking at the cases of Mexico and 
Colombia. In so doing, the study lays the groundwork for further comparative analysis in 
other middle-income countries in Latin America and other regions - such as the Middle East, 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia - which are also facing the challenge of reforming their 
health care systems. 
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Appendix I - Relevant Aspects of the Colombia Health Reform 1 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis has purposely avoided the formal evaluation of the health reform 
initiatives in Colombia and Mexico. However, responding to the need to give the 
reader some reference points with respect to the issues in debate during the reform 
process, this appendix presents a brief description of those elements of Colombia's 
health reform that were referred to in the body of the text and their evolution. The 
appendix includes a description of the new provider groups created as a result of the 
reform and their role in the new health system. This is followed by the highlights of 
the very complex transformation of the ISS, which remains the principal old 
provider in the health system. Some of the policy mechanisms formulated by the 
health change team to promote more efficient and quality health care delivery in the 
system are then discussed. 
I. 2 The Creation of New Providers and their Impact on Coverage 
The health reform in Colombia was legislated in 1993, and its implementation stage 
started in 1995. The main objective of the reform was to attain universal access to 
equitable, efficient and quality care by the year 2001. The principal mechanism to 
achieve this goal was to legislate the compulsory affiliation to social security of all 
societal groups regardless of income or economic activity2. 
Two health insurance plans were formulated in order to affiliate the population. 
One, the contributory health plan - the health insurance scheme for salaried 
workers, the strategy was to expand coverage from salaried workers to their family 
members. This health plan was to be funded with contribution stemming from a 
pay-roll tax on families' added income. As a result of the reform, this contribution 
increased from 6% to 12% of the family income in order to generate the resources 
to affiliate all members of the family. The other, the subsidised health plan, targeted 
the low income groups who had no formal employment. In this case, the principal 
sources of funding were a fraction of the contributory health plan - the solidarity 
mechanism that took 1 point from the contributory health plan and allocated it to 
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the subsidised one - and an equal amount stemming from the national budget. Other 
resources of funding were earmarked taxes and a fraction of the value added tax -
called social VAT. 
The affiliation to the health component of the social security system increased 
dramatically in the following years after the reform. While in 1993 only 20.6% of 
the total population was affiliated to social security, in December 1997 53% of the 
population was enrolled. The equivalent of 22 million Colombians. From this total 
of affiliates, 68% were enrolled to the contributory health plan, and 32% to the 
subsidised health plan (32%). At least 47% of those affiliated to the subsidised 
health plan belonged to the low income groups~ and many were granted regular 
access to health services for the first time. 
In spite of this progress, universal affiliation for the year 2001 will not be met. 
Among the principal difficulties in expanding coverage further, have been the 
problems in incorporating groups of the popUlation who had no previous affiliation. 
In the case of the contributory health plan, the thrust of the expansion in coverage 
(53%) was achieved by enrolling the family members of affiliates. The reform has 
not had the same progress in affiliating the self-employed, in spite of having 
established compulsory affiliation by Law. A total of 87% of the affiliates to the 
contributory health plan, were employees, 8% pensioners, and only 5% were self-
employed (Ministerio de Salud, 1998)3. 
On the other hand, the reform has successfully expanded the regular provision of 
health services to areas that had been previously undeserved. This has been 
particularly the case of the subsidised health plan, who has brought access to the 
health component of social security for the first time to areas other than the main 
urban areas. As a result of the reform, coverage has increased in the majority of the 
territorial entities, where, since 1997, there has been investment in health 
infrastructure as a result of the new allocation of resources envisioned on the 
reform. 
In spite of this progress, there remains a very high concentration of social security 
health services in urban areas catering for middle income groups. A total of 62% of 
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the social security affiliates are in the more developed regIOns - Antioquia, 
Atlantico, Cundinamarca, Santander, Valle, Bogota region, which concentrate the 
tertiary care facilities, as well as the health service networks that are established 
around them. The problem of concentration is particularly acute in the contributory 
health plan, which has 74% of its affiliates in the more developed areas. 
As a result of the reform, new organisations were created to articulate the funding 
and provision of health services. The Entidades Promotoras de Salud (EPS) in the 
contributory health plan, and the Administradoras del Regimen Subsidiado (ARS) 
in the subsidised health plan. Also, the old organisations functioning within the 
sector before the enactment of Law 100, 1993 were mandated to transformed 
themselves in order to operate along the lines of the new health system envisioned 
in the reform. 
In 1998, there were 30 EPS in functioning within the contributory health plan: 10 
were public, 1 public/private, and 15 were private - a further 4 (called CCF) were 
previous public/private health insurance schemes operating as private organisations 
and the social security institutions for state employees. The ISS was mandated to 
convert into an EPS and start operating as such. Since it retained most of its 
affiliates, it concentrated 63% of the total affiliates of the contributory health plan, 
with the following EPS in size lagging behind with only 6% of the total enrolees. 
Therefore, in spite the growth in size and number of the private EPS - which now 
have a total of 4.5 million affiliates -, the contributory health plan remains largely 
under the state control. 
Within the subsidised health plan, at the end of 1997, 205 ARS had been created 
and were working in almost every municipality catering for 7 million affiliated 
poor. From the total of ARS, 19 are EPS, 27 CCF and 159 ESS. These institutions 
have faced the most serious challenges in consolidating the health reform, among 
which stand out the concentration of low income affiliates, the low levels of 
affiliation -with consequences for risk distribution. These elements, along with the 
problems in resource allocation have rendered their financial equilibrium fragile 
and their capacity to deliver the Basic Health Care Package weak. A case in point 
has been the evolution of the ESS. They have played an important role in affiliating 
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the very poor, particularly in remote regIons; but their small scale and the 
dispersion of their target population has precluded them from providing adequate 
health services to the population - particularly in cases requiring high cost 
treatment (DNP, 1999). 
Furthennore, there has been very uneven utilisation of health services. In 1997 
population groups covered by the subsidised health plan had lower usage rates than 
those in the contributory health plan, and only resorted to the facilities for 
emergency care. This situation has been attributed the lack of promotion of EPS and 
ARS health facilities. But factors such as long distances, lack of accurate 
infonnation on the target population - especially in rural areas - and the affiliates' 
low levels of education and lack of infonnation on their rights under the new health 
plans have also been major factors. 
Affiliation and access to health services in the contributory health plan has also 
been a challenge, if of a different nature. The self-employed and those working in 
the infonnal sector have been slow to join the new health plan. Again, this is partly 
attributed to insufficient promotion of the new health plan. However, the amount of 
the contribution to be made has deterred middle and low income groups who are in 
the infonnal sector fonn affiliating - this is particularly the case of those who are 
not entitled to receive a partial subsidy from the state. 
1.3 The Transformation of Old Providers: The Case of the ISS 
According to Gonzalez and Perez (1998), the health reform's transition period has 
faced its hardest challenges on the implementation of the subsidised health plan and 
the transformation of the ISS into an EPS within the contributory health plan. 
According to the health reform plan, the ISS was to undergo an in-depth 
transformation of its modus operandi in order to be able to operate by the rules of 
the new health care system and also to be able to compete with the new provider 
organisations in the contributory health plan (EPS). For this purpose, its status was 
fonnally changed to that of an industrial and commercial state enterprise, with 
autonomy and contracting rules equal to those of a private sector firms. It was 
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allowed to retain its national level coverage, but was expected to deconcentrate its 
activities and decentralise its functions into smaller administrative units. 
The number of affiliated to the ISS rose considerably and suddenly as a result of the 
reform, since by law, the family members of those previously enrolled became 
affiliates with granted access to health care. The number of its affiliates grew from 
7.3 million in 1995, to 9.3 million in 1997. However, these changes were not 
matched by the transformation of the ISS. The Institute resisted many aspects of the 
reform, and by 1998, it continued to delay the implementation of key aspects of the 
reform, such as the definition of the Benefits Package content, the co-payment 
measures, the compensation mechanisms, the separation of health service financing 
and provision activities, and the separation of the pensions and health service funds. 
This had a series of negative impacts on the transition of the health reform and its 
possibilities of consolidating policy change into a new health system. On the one 
hand, the lack of formal limits to the package of services offered by ISS became an 
unfair competition strategy with the rest of the EPS, who could not offer similar 
services. As a result, ISS affiliates were discouraged from leaving the ISS and 
joining the new EPS. The only exception were the higher income groups who 
"opted-out" and affiliated in private EPS. 
At the same time, the increase in affiliation without the accompanying limitation on 
the benefits package exacerbated the financial problems of the institution. This put 
in jeopardy the financial equilibrium of the entire contributory health plan, since it 
works on a common financial fund from which, in its new status as EPS, the ISS 
can siphon out resources to redress its financial imbalances. 
The probabilities of undermining the financial viability of the contributory health 
plan overall, have been increasing the equal proportion as the ISS' financial 
problems. In 1997, the average cost of care at the ISS' facilities remained 15% 
higher than what had been calculated for the EPS. This was largely due to its 
overhead costs, which were running two-thirds higher than what was defined for the 
EPS due to the pay-roll costs - which could be traced back to employment benefits 
of its health manpower. The ISS also refused to introduce the co-payment quotas 
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aimed at "moderating demand" established in the new Law, which had increased 
systematically as a result of the reform. 
1.4 Promoting Efficiency, Quality and Equity 
Efficiency, Quality and Equity were the key principles of the reform established in 
the new Law. The main strategy to attain them was to introduce managed 
competition in the affiliation of the population, and in the provision of health 
services. In the case of the quest for more efficient and quality care, one of the 
underlying mechanisms was the definition of a Basic Health Care Package (or 
Benefits Package). This instrument found difficulties first during legislation -
where the limited health care package formulated by the change team was not 
approved -, and later on during implementation, where it faced technical and 
institutional difficulties. 
The formulation of a Benefits Package was expected to work as criteria for 
transparent and efficient resource allocation. It could also help redress equity 
imbalances by establishing and objective criteria for resource allocation. Following 
World Bank methodological guidelines on calculating the burden of disease, 
resources were to be allocated according to this assessment and the cost-
effectiveness of interventions. However, the Benefits Package defined by the 
change team along these guidelines was rejected in Congress, and instead, an 
integral package was mandated, which included prevention, promotion, diagnosis, 
treatment and rehabilitation along the lines of that formally offered by the ISS 
(Decree 1650177). This package was to be made available to the affiliate and his/her 
family. 
The financial constraints of the health sector impeded it to make this package 
available to the entire population, and so initially different packages were mandated 
for the two health plans: a more limited one for the subsidised health plan, and a 
more integral for the contributory plan. However, responding to the need to abide 
by the equity principles established in the Constitution, the new Law mandated that 
by the year 2001, both health plans should offer a single integral health package. 
The health change team made a last attempt at defining a minimum health care 
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package during the formulation of the new Law's regulation package; but the lack 
of sufficient information, and the political negotiations around it, made this 
impossible, and the definition of the health package along the lines of the services 
offered by the ISS in Decree 1650/1977 prevailed. 
Another mechanism envisioned in the health reform to induce efficient and quality 
health care, was the use of market competition both in the affiliation of new 
enrolees, and in the provision of health services. However, the introduction of 
market competition has proven challenging, particularly in the subsidised health 
plan and in the provision of complex health care. At local level, the reduced number 
of health providers makes competition difficult. Furthermore, in order to ensure the 
financial survival of the new providers at the local level, local authorities were 
bound by the new Law to contract out at least 40% their services to these new 
enterprises, thus limiting further the potential for competition. Also, the investment 
and running costs required for complex health care services can only be met by 
public hospitals, that thus retain a monopoly in the provision of such services. 
The separation of the financing and provision of services functions has also lagged 
behind, further hampering the possibility to introduce market competition. The most 
salient case is that of the old provider organisations, particularly the ISS, who 
continue to operate along the lines they had been operating prior to the reform. But 
some new providers, particularly in the subsidised health plan in some regions, are 
also tending to maintain the financing and provision of services together. 
While unprecedented progress has been made in improving access for the poor to 
health services, the introduction of equity within the health care system remains the 
most serious challenge for the health reform. There remains a fragmented system 
with different providers offering different access to health care. Particularly, state 
employees who were affiliated prior to the reform, continue to have privileged 
access to public health care services. The institutions that cater for them were 
bounded by the new Law to adapt to the new system within a four year period 
(1994 -1998) by offering the same Basic Package and charging the same 
contributions to their affiliates, as the rest of the providers in the system. 
Furthermore, they were mandated to join the single fund and the compensation 
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process among providers that aimed to maintain a solidarity mechanism and to 
redress equity imbalances among social security affiliates. But these organisations 
have continued to offer the same comprehensive health care packages and have not 
joined the single fund. This has been particularly the case of the ISS, as it has been 
described above. 
I This section is based on Cuartas, 1998; Gonzalez and Perez, 1998; ASSALUD, 1997, Jaramillo, 
1997, MOH, 1998; DNP, 1997; and ISS, 1998. 
2 See Law 100, 1993. 
3 These numbers do not include ISS affiliates. 
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Appendix 11- Relevant Aspects of the Mexico Health Reform4 
II. 1 Introduction 
This thesis has purposely avoided the fonnal evaluation of the health refonn initiatives in 
Colombia and Mexico. However, responding to the need to give the reader some reference 
points with respect to the issues in debate during the refonn process, this appendix presents a 
brief description of those elements of Mexico's health refonn that were referred to in the 
body of the text. It first gives a brief overview of the financial reengineering implemented at 
IMSS. The decentralisation efforts and the implementation of the Model of Integrated Health 
Care Services (MIAIS) follow this. A brief discussion on the new health insurance scheme is 
presented next, followed by the central elements on the introduction of perfonnance 
incentives. Finally, a brief overview ofthe opt-out option policy is presented. 
II. 2 Financial Reengineering 
Before the privatisation ofIMSS' pensions fund, the Institute's long tenn reserves were being 
used to support the short-tenn cash needs of IMSS' health component via cross-subsidies5. 
Thus, with the refonn of the pensions scheme, there was an urgent need to create reserves for 
the IMSS health care services, as well as to put in place financial mechanisms to help IMSS 
maintain its financial equilibrium. The need to revise IMSS financial structure also opened 
the opportunity to redress imbalances in resource allocation and put a limit to its discretionary 
use. 
Among the measures that were part of the IMSS' financial reengineering were the 
introduction of modem actuarial systems to calculate and do follow-up activities of both 
investment and current expenditure, as well as the formulation of standard criteria - backed 
by a legal framework - for resource allocation. Simultaneously, the tripartite quota (the 
govemment-business-Iabour contributions to IMSS) was reconsidered in the new Social 
Security Law. In the new scheme put in practice in 1997, the business and labour quotas 
decreased, while that of government increased. This increase in government outlays redressed 
the negative trend in the finances of IMSS health component, and brought its internal account 
to positive numbers that same year, with the surplus reaching $1,761.4 million pesos - after a 
deficit equivalent to $1,146.5 million pesos in 1996. 
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In measure to expand its financial autonomy, in 1998, IMSS signed a management agreement 
(Convenio de Fortalecimiento Financiero or Financial Strengthening Agreement) with the 
Ministry of Finance. The agreement with the Finance Ministry was to substitute historical 
budget allocation, and was conditioned to IMSS on the basis of its finical performance. It 
established, on the one hand, IMSS' independence in financial decision related to its own 
budget. While in the past IMSS took autonomous decisions on its budgetary flows stemming 
from the employer-employee quotas, it was dependent on the government's decisions 
regarding its contribution to IMSS, which changed according to the country's economy's 
cycles and the fiscal policy adopted in response. 
The Convenio de Fortalecimiento Financiero also gave IMSS more leeway to sign, in its 
tum, similar contracts with its own administrative units throughout the country. These 
management agreements (Convenios de Gestion) among IMSS different levels of care and 
the central level were also aimed at substituting historical budget allocation. The criteria for 
the formulation of the new management contracts had an emphasis on equity in budget 
allocation, and incorporated epidemiological and demographic indicators. 
Aside from the fresh funds allocated to IMSS VIa the increase in the government's 
participation on the tripartite quota, IMSS secured a credit from the World Bank for $700 
million US dollars to solve the existing lag in health infrastructure and technology 
investment6 • A further credit for $25 million US dollars was directed at developing strategic 
projects of technical assistance to support the health reform's policy formulation and 
. 7 implementatIon . 
II. 3 Health Service Decentralisation 
In 1995 and 1996, IMSS established seven regions that were to function as administrative 
units throughout the country in order to streamline decision making among the 37 already 
existing delegations and the centre. In other words, an administrative figure was created to 
mediate between the centre and the local level. In 1998, these regions were assigned 
purchasing responsibilities for equipment and supply. 
In 1997, these regions were further subdivided in what eventually came to be called 
Decentralised Medical Areas (AMGD). These administrative units form the axis of IMSS' 
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decentralisation process, SInce they are to become responsible for the management 
agreements with the centre described in the previous section8• The AMGDs are defined 
according to the demographic and epidemiological characteristics of their target population, 
as well as IMSS' local capacity to respond to its needs. Each AMGD is formed by at least 
one Zone General Hospital or a Regional Hospital, Sub-Zone Hospitals, Family Medicine 
Units, and the Community Health activities servicing its area of influence. In 1998, the 
totality of the 139 AMGD's were officially formed and IMSS had commitment to signing 
Management Agreements with all of them by 2000. But progress has been slow. In two 
consecutive occasions IMSS union has objected to their implementation on the grounds that it 
was not consulted, and later on, that it needed to adjust its own organisational design before it 
could proceed to operate under this new scheme. By the end of 1999, less than 7 agreements 
had been signed. 
11.4 The New Family Medicine Model, Doctor Eligibility and 
other Performance Incentives 
According to the government's Health Sector Reform Program 1995- 2000, family doctor 
eligibility was to be allowed as a mechanism to promote quality care. To implement this 
measure, the IMSS formulated the New Family Medicine Model to strengthen health care 
services at primary level and introduce an integral approach to service delivery. It also aimed 
at putting incentives in place to motivate health manpower teamwork and increase the health 
personnel's commitment to their work. 
The new health service delivery model was also aimed at increasing the resolution capacity of 
first-entry and primary level health units, and to strengthen referral and counter referral with 
the other levels. Most importantly, it envisioned establishing the ground work for the 
introduction of doctors' capitation payments - in the form of extra payments to their base 
salaries - as an incentive to better quality care. While this integrated model has been 
formulated in full, and 37 pilot projects were programmed to be implemented in 1999, it has 
faced significant delay in its implementation. The IMSS union conditioned its 
implementation to having all health manpower in the selected health units be eligible to the 
incentives program. This has put a strain on its financial viability. The project was 
renegotiated with the union who approved it in 1998 on the condition that the IESSS - the 
union's think-tank - be given the responsibility to evaluate the results of the pilot projects. 
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Aside from the capitation payments to be established in the long run, the new model of 
family medicine also envisioned a scheme of performance incentives geared at promoting 
efficient and quality care both at the primary level and at the hospitals. However, the 
operational details of this scheme at hospital level was still pending. The areas to be covered 
by the incentives scheme are ample and include IMSS' non-medical areas as well. Among 
these stand out IMSS' hospitals, research and development centres, occupational health, 
medical support areas and administrative areas. IMSS union has stated that it will comply 
with this scheme as long as it does not imply any modifications to its Collective Labour 
Contract. Currently, the IESSS - the union's think-tank - is in charge of studying options to 
develop this scheme. 
II. 5 The Family Health Insurance 
Responding to the government's objective to expand access to health care stated in its Health 
Reform Plan 1995 - 2000, IMSS Law created a pre-paid health insurance plan (called the 
Family Health Insurance) for population groups who worked in the informal economy - and 
therefore were not entitled to social security -, but who had purchasing power to cover a 
yearly contribution to have access to IMSS health services. As opposed to the case in 
Colombia, this health insurance scheme was made voluntary. The regulation package 
specifying the target groups and their entitlements was prepared in 1996. Annual 
contributions per affiliate covering himlher and 4 immediate relatives - were to be equivalent 
to 22.4% of the annual minimum wage (approximately $260.00 USD1998 per family). This 
amount was to be matched by a target subsidy equivalent to 13.9% of the official minimum 
wage paid from public funds. 
The Family Health Insurance has been criticised on the grounds that it still presents economic 
barriers to access to its target population both by its total cost, and by the fact that families 
find the one-time annual down payment difficult to meet. Furthermore a weak information 
and dissemination campaign and complex procedures to sign up, have not promoted its 
expansion, and questions remain about IMSS' capacity to absorb the potential new demand at 
its already saturated entry level. 
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II. 6 The Opt-out Option POlicy9 
The opt-out option in health services is the mechanism by which the employer is made 
responsible for the provision of health services for his/her employees and their families. The 
opt-out option established in Art. 86 in IMSS Law states that employers and employees may 
jointly apply for the partial reimbursement of their mandatory contribution to IMSS and 
procure health services other than those of IMSS, as long as these offer the same 
interventions at similar quality standards. 
Until 1999, only 2.5% of the total IMSS affiliates (approximately 200,000 employees) used 
alternative health service facilities in the private sector under this scheme. A total of 95% of 
this group work in the banking sector. Almost all the remaining ones are opt-out agreements 
given to companies in the northern states of Mexico, where IMSS lacked the infrastructure to 
meet the demands of its affiliates. 
In spite of this provision in IMSS Law, the assignment of opt-out agreements remains rare, 
unpredictable and at the discretion of the Institute's Technical Committee. The last request 
for the opt-out option was granted more than a decade ago. As a result, some private 
companies who are unsatisfied with the quality and efficiency of IMSS' health facilities have 
enrolled their employees on private health insurance schemes - while at the same time 
continuing to pay IMSS quotas. The private sector has also proven slow in offering options 
for the potential demand that would consolidate if IMSS grated opt-out requests in a more 
systematic manner. 
However, a more predictable and systematic use of the opt-out option could facilitate a 
public/private mix in health service delivery and could potentially help to introduce 
competition and market incentives to the health sector. With these ends In mind, an 
amendment to IMSS Law was introduced along with the pensions reform in order to change 
Art. 89 and make facilitate the affiliates' choice of provider. It was envisioned that the new 
insurance schemes could cater to risk pools of at least 100,000 to be able to operate offering 
comprehensive care. 
However, this policy initiative proved to be politically contentious. IMSS union saw it as a 
precedent for the potential privatisation of IMSS it so vehemently opposes. Furthermore, the 
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capacity of the private sector to respond to this potential new demand remains limited with 
85% of the private hospitals in Mexico being micro firms with less than 15 beds and lack of 
capacity to respond to complex demands. AS a result, with significant pressure form IMSS 
union, legislators bargained out this part of the bill on the grounds that it established the 
precedents to the privatisation of IMSS. Note-with-standing, given that Art. 89 was no 
modified, reformers were aware that there remained potential to apply the opt-out option 
more systematically through the formulation of its accompanying regulatory package. 
In light of this stalemate, a new proposal of opt-out option policy (now called integral and 
comprehensive contracting out of clinical services) is currently being analysed within IMSS -
and the regulation package to operationalise the opt-out option was not completed or 
presented to the public. Under this new agreement, the financing from service provision 
could be done in such a way that the employer would still pay the totality of his/her quotas to 
the However, IMSS would then establish agreements for the provision of comprehensive and 
integral health services with the newly created Health Management Organisations (HMO's) 
called Health Insurance Institutions (ISES). Second, a "risk pool" or a "risk fund" had to be 
generated, where a certain value should be given to each insured person according to his/her 
sex, age, and average expenditure in the IMSS among other variables. Third, the firm should 
offer an integral package of health services that would be the same in nature, kind and 
quantity to the one given by the IMSS and in exchange he would receive a payment. Fourth, 
the ISES will establish agreements with service providers, if they have a certification of the 
National Insurance and Bail Bonds Commission (CNSF). 
In December 1999, a law amendment to modify the General Law of Mutualist Insurance 
Societies and Institutions, was ratified in the Senate - as it had been approved in the Lower 
House, to create the new ISES and a regulation package to structure its new markets. The 
ISES will thus be regulated as insurance companies to be supervised by the National Health 
Council. The new scheme has technical problems to be solved, the difficulties in meeting the 
financial reserves needed to operate in an unpredictable market such as health service 
delivery. The successful creation of an ISES market (referred to in the body of the text as new 
providers) along with the regulation of IMSS opt-out option would bring about a more 
systematic use of a public/private mix in health service delivery in Mexico. According to the 
reformers' assumptions, this would also generate the market competition and thus the 
incentives for more efficient and quality health care in Mexico. 
4 The primary sources supporting this section are: 
IMSS (1998) Programa y Convenio de Fortalecimiento Financiero 1998-2000. 
IMSS, (1998) Modelo de Medicina de Familia. Documento para prueba. 
IMSS, (1996) Lineamientos Estrategicos 1996-2000. Mexico: IMSS. 
IMSS, (1997) Reg1amento del Seguro de Salud para la Familia. 
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5 The health component of IMSS' social security services had been operating at a loss from the outset because 
contributions had been calculated to reflect the costs of catering for individual affiliates, but not for their 
families as well. Inefficient management accompanied by the impact of economic cycles, further exacerbated 
this situation. 
6 World Bank Loan # P07720, 06/30/1998 
7 World Bank Loan #P055061, 06/30/1998 
8 These units would form the basis for the separation of the financing and provision activities in the long run. 
9 The opt-out option has been re-Iabelled several times along with the details of its contents folowing the 
political dynamics around policy formulation. The initiative that is being negotiatied now is called "integreal 
contracting out of services". For clarity purposes, this thesis uses the "opt-out option name". 
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Appendix III: Colombia - List of contacted persons 
Position Institution NR* 
1. School of Public Health Harvard 
2. School of Public Health Harvard 
3. School of Public Health Harvard 
4. School of Public Health Harvard 
5. School of Public Health Harvard X 
6. School of Public Health Harvard 
7. School of Government Harvard 
8. School of Government Harvard X 
9. Independent Consultant 
(Former DNP officer) 
10. Former Minister of Health Health Ministry 
11. Former Senator Liberal Party 
12. Planning Minister DNP 
13. Former Vice Minister Health Ministry 
14. Former member of staff Health Ministry 
15. Former Minister of Health Health Ministry 
16. Former Chief of staff Health Ministry 
17. Former advisor to the Minister Health Ministry 
18. Former advisor to the Minister Health Ministry 
19. Director Health Intendencia 
20. Legislator Conservative Party 
21. Researcher FES 
22. Researcher ASSALUD 
23. Legislator Liberal Party X 
24. Director ISS 
25. Researcher FESCON 
26. Member Ombudsman Office 
27. Chief of Division DNP 
28. Officer of Health Division DNP 
29. Chief Social Policy Advisor President's Office 
30. Advisor President's Office X 
31. Secretary General Health Ministry X 
32. Member Health Reform Program X 
33. Member Health Reform Program 
34. Officer Legal Affairs Office Health Ministry X 
35. Superintendent Health Superintedency X 
36. Member National Social Security Council X 
37. Member National Social Security Council 
38. Member National Social Security Council X 
39. Member National Social Security Council 
40. Member National Social Security Council 
41. Member National Social Security Council X 
42. Member National Social Security Council X 
43. Member National Social Security Council X 
44. Member National Social Security Council X 
45. Member National Social Security Council X 
46. Officer Finance Ministry 
47. Former Director Social Unit (government) 
48. Former Vice Minister Health Ministry 
49. Former Secretary General Health Ministry 
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50. Head of the Research Unit Ministry of Health 
51. Chief Advisor in Social Policy Office of the President 
52. Representant PAHO X 
53. Representant USAID X 
54. Officer BID 
55. Representant World Bank X 
56. Representant UNDP X 
57. Professor Masters in Hospital Universidad laveriana X 
Administration 
58. Researcher Fedesarrollo 
59. Researcher Fundacion Corona 
60. Researcher Fundacion Corona X 
61. Researcher Fundacion Corona X 
62. Member Social Mision X 
63. Member Social Mision 
64. Member Social Mision X 
*NR - No response 
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Appendix IV: Mexico - List of contacted persons 
Position Institution NR* 
65. National Price in Public (consul tant) 
Administration 
66. Chief of staff Health Ministry 
67. Minister's staff member Finance Ministry 
68. Economics Professor ITAM 
69. Director of the Health Economy Unit National Institute of Public Health X 
70. Director IMSS 
71. Director of Administration Interior Ministry 
(fonner IMSS) 
72. Consultant PRODEISA 
73. Director of the Department of Political CIDE X 
Science 
74. Fonner Finance Ministry official 
75. Member of the Planning and IMSS 
Infrastructure Coordination X 
76. Chief of Staff Finance Under-secretary's Office 
77. Chief of Staff IMSS 
78. Researcher CIDAC 
79. President and General Director (Business Community) 
80. Director of the Social Science ITAM 
Department 
81. Director of Statistics and Computing Health Ministry X 
82. Member of the Finance Division IMSS 
83. Member of the Finance Division IMSS 
84. Member of the Finance Division IMSS X 
85. Member of the Finance Division IMSS 
86. Member of the Finance Division IMSS 
87. Member of the Finance Division IMSS X 
88. Member of the Finance Division IMSS X 
89. Researcher Funsalud X 
90. Professor of the Economics CIDE X 
Department 
91. Member of Planning and Infrastructure IMSS X 
Coordination 
92. Party member PAN 
93. Party member PRO 
94. Planning Coordinator IMSS X 
95. Researcher of the Economics Division CIDE 
96. Acting director of the Masters in CIDE 
Health Economics 
97. Advisor PAN 
98. Political Attache British Embassy 
99. Professor of the Political Science CIDE 
Division 
100 Chief of Staff in Economics Upper House - Congress 
10 1 Researcher Economics Department ITAM 
10 2 Member of the President's Staff President's Office 
10 3 Member of the President's Staff President's Office 
10 4 Fonner officer SEDESOL (Social Devlp. 
xx 
Ministry) 
105 Representant PAHOIWHO X 
106 Consultant PRODEISA 
107 Financer Abaco (Business Community) 
108 Social Sector Specialist World Bank X 
109 Professor Social Sc. Department ITAM 
110 Health Programs Director Funsalud 
III Member of Planning and Infrastructure IMSS 
Coordination (union) 
112 Consultant (health) PAHO/WHO X 
113 Director Masters in Public Affairs CIDE X 
114 Supporter PRI 
115 Legislator PRI 
116 General Director of Foreign Affairs Health Ministry 
117 Journalist Reforma news paper X 
118 Member of Staff Finance Ministry 
119 Researcher ITAM X 
120 Member of Staff (health) President's Office X 
121 Member of Staff (health) President's Office X 
122 Member of Staff (health) President's Office 
123 Member of Staff (health) President's Office 
124 Researcher National Institute of Public Heath 
125 Official of the Planning and IMSS 
Infrastructure Coordination (union) 
126 Researcher CIDAC 
127 President Funsalud 
(Business Community) 
128 Representant in Mexico BID X 
129 Member of Administrative Division IMSS X 
130 Member of Finance Division IMSS 
131 Member of Finance Division IMSS X 
132 Member of Finance Division IMSS 
133 Executive Director Funsalud 
134 President National Commission of Pension 
Funds (CONSAR) 
135 Researcher Colegio de Mexico X 
136 Director of the Masters in Public ITAM 
Affairs 
137 General Director of Social Sector World Bank X 
138 Director of Health Services IMSS X 
139 Adviser CONSAR 
140 Director USAID X 
141 Researcher CIDAC X 
14 2 General Director EDUCAL 
14 3 Coordinator of Health Policy Research Funsalud 
14 4 Officer Finance Ministry 
14 5 Officer Finance Ministry X 
14 6 Officer Finance Ministry 
14 7 Officer Finance Ministry X 
14 8 Officer Finance Ministry 
14 9 Officer Finance Ministry 
15 o Officer Finance Ministry 
15 1 Officer Finance Division IMSS X 
XXI 
152 Officer Finance Division IMSS 
153 Member Tripartite Commission IMSS 
(Business) 
154 Subdirectory World Bank Project IMSS 
(union) 
155 Journalist - Labour Supplement La Jornada news paper X 
* NR - No response 
Appendix V - Sample Interview Guide10 
The interview starts with a very brief and general presentation of my research and 
explanation that the objective of my interview is to identify the constraints and opportunities 
for health policy reform in the country. I then point out that it is an academic interview and 
that the sources remain anonymous. 
On the background of the reform initiative: 
Reasons and motivating factors for the reform. 
Persons and government agencies involved at its outset. 
Agencies involved. How decided? 
Persons involved. How decided? 
Expected products or outcomes. 
Authority to pursue the reform (where the group's decisions biding or voluntary?) 
Timing (what was the time horizon, why at that particular moment?). 
Cost and resources involved in the reform. 
Overall impressions of the most salient features and outcomes of the reform. 
Political strategy of policy makers in charge of the reform. 
Conformation of change team (Advisory committee, task force, informal group, formal part 
of governmental agency, etc.) 
Collaboration mechanisms among members. 
Frequency of meetings. Other forms of communications. 
Did the members know each other previously? 
Did the members have positive experiences in prior collaborations? 
What were the individual members' reputation for doing this kind of policy task? 
Where there other factors, such as common professional perspectives, similar 
educationfbackground, similar perspective about the role of the state and the role of 
reformers? 
Structure of collaboration: 
Who was in charge? 
How were decisions made? 
How formal and informal? 
Where there distinct strategies for different members (policy formulation, technical 
assessment, policy choice, political manoeuvring) 
Communication and support with other policy makers in: 
Higher levels of government 
Same-level counterparts in other sectors 
Bureaucracy 
Legislature and other institutions 
How did the reformers view participation of other groups in the policy process? 
An advantage (to whom, to what purpose?) 
XXIll 
A disadvantage (to whom, to what purpose?) 
Contacts and political manoeuvring with key interest groups in society. 
Other means and channels to pursue coalition building in favour of reform (media, opinion 
leaders, academia, international advisors and lobbying with key donor and multilateral 
agencies). 
The change team's benefits and costs: 
How important was this effort to those that initiated it? 
How do you know? And why do you say so? 
How did you view the potential benefits of this effort? 
What did you see in it for you and your peers, if anything? 
What potential costs, losses and pitfalls did you see? 
How do you think other policy makers and other agencies viewed the potential gains and 
costs of the reform initiative? 
About outcomes and towards consolidation: 
Did the reform obtain what it was supposed to obtain thus far? 
Where the goals and means to obtain them clearly stated and clearly understood by all the 
actors involved? 
Were they achieved? 
Were they taken seriously? 
Did the different agencies involved share a common view of what the problem was and what 
their collaboration was expected to achieve? 
How would you rate the reform's agenda thus far? Poor, passable, good or excellent? 
Why? 
What would have improved the reform initiative? 
Did the process occur as designed and at the envisioned time? 
Were the target problems and goals addressed? 
Why, why not? 
What do you know and what makes you say so? 
Were formulated policies implemented? 
If yes, what were the primary reasons for their acceptance? 
If not, why not? 
What influenced the decision not to proceed in the direction recommended? 
Overall assessment: Looking back at this effort: 
Did the reform efforts reach the target population it was aimed at? 
Was the reform even necessary? 
What could have been done differently to make it more effective? 
What would you in your role, have done differently? 
What were the biggest problems? 
What were the main limitations in the political system as it stands? 
What opportunities does the political system offer? 
What factors were most important to whatever success was achieved? 
About the change team: 
Is the change team's approach easier or harder to formulate policy change? 
Is the change team's approach easier or harder implement policy change? 
XXIV 
What are the characteristics of the change team that makes it ideal/not ideal to pursue health 
reform? 
What are the salient characteristics of the team's members that proved useful or a hindrance 
for the pursuance of the reform's agenda? 
Why? 
What is your assessment about the involvement of other groups and agencies in the reform 
process? 
Mapping the actors: 
How influential were X and Y in the process? 
What other actors played an important role in supporting the reform initiative? 
How powerful were they? 
What was the source of their power? 
What other actors played and important role in hampering the reform process? 
How powerful were they? 
What was the source of their power? 
How was their active resistance dealt with? 
Other sources 
Who else should I speak to about this case? About the reform in general? What documents 
should I review? 
Final comments: 
Any other comments or suggestions regarding health reform and ways to make it feasible? 
10 See Needleman et aI., 1984 and Suleiman 1974. 
